


Peace and Security in Northeast Asia:
Ways for Institutionalization



Jeju Peace Institute & Konrad Adenauer Foundation

Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: Ways for Institutionalization



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Ways for Institutionalization

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Preface

This volume is a collection of papers presented at the Jeju Peace Institute-Konrad Adenauer Foundation joint conference held on November 13, 2008, in Jeju. In an effort to ascertain the prospects for future cooperation and regional integration in Northeast Asia, the two organizations jointly convened the conference under the theme of “Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: Ways for Institutionalization.”

As a step toward carrying through the Jeju Process declared at the conclusion of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum in 2007, which emphasized the necessity of incremental progress that can institutionalize regional peace and common prosperity, this joint conference addressed ideas for institutionalizing regional peace and security.

During the conference, established experts from four countries – Austria, Germany, the Republic of Korea, and the United States – carefully discussed such a possibility that could promote cooperation and regional integration in Northeast Asia. Specifically, they covered topics including alliance dynamics, confidence building measures, political economy, the role of local government, cooperation and economic development, human security regimes, and environmental cooperation, based on the papers collected here. The two organizers of the conference would like to share their considerable wisdom and insights for these critical regional issues with the public and interested researchers. It is from this perspective we have prepared this publication.

In publishing this volume, I would like to extend my gratitude to all the participants on behalf of the Jeju Peace Institute. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to Mr. Marc ZIEMEK, the resident

representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Korea, who spared no energy in preparing for this joint conference as a co-organizer. I also am grateful to our Director Mr. KIM Jae-Hwan and Dr. KO Bong-Jun for their help in organizing this conference. My special thanks also go to two coordinators at the JPI and KAF, Ms. KIM Soon-Sun and Ms. LEE Ju-Hong, respectively.

I hope that this piece will contribute to a good beginning towards mutual benefits and common prosperity throughout the region and beyond.

HAN Tae-Kyu
President
Jeju Peace Institute

Welcoming Remarks

Dear Excellencies,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation I am honoured to welcome you to the JPI-KAF Joint Conference, titled “Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: Ways for Institutionalization.” Especially I would like to thank His Excellency Ambassador Kim Sook, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, for holding a keynote speech today. Also, I wish to express my warmest gratitude to His Excellency Ambassador Han Tae-kyu and the Jeju Peace Institute, who spared no efforts in co-organizing this event.

Today’s conference aims at finding ways to promote future cooperation and regional integration in Northeast Asia. In history, the example of the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Helsinki Process have shown, that such an integration and cooperation can lead to a stable peace, even in a region like Europe, which not long ago was the origin for two devastating world wars. Northeast Asia is still far behind Europe in terms of integration. However, recent developments like the Six-Party-Talks have shown that such a cooperation is possible and important. Nevertheless, territorial and historical disputes between Korea, Japan and China as well as the still unresolved nuclear issue with North Korea stand in the way of a peaceful integration. Peace on the Korean peninsula is essential for peace in the whole region.

I think, we all agree that our common goal of peace and security in Northeast Asia can only be achieved through multilateral cooperation. Therefore, I hope, that today’s international conference, which brings together various experts from all over the world, can help to institutionalize these goals in Northeast Asia.

This conference has a special meaning for the partnership between the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Jeju Peace Institute, since it’s our first jointly organized project. I hope, that our cooperation will continue in the future and that we can share our vision of a peaceful and secure Northeast Asia with the world. I am especially glad to hold this conference today on the beautiful island of Jeju, which has a rich historical background and serves as a symbol for peace.

On behalf of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, I would like to thank all of you for attending this conference and for sharing your valuable insight and knowledge with us.

Thank you very much.

Marc ZIEMEK
*Resident Representative Korea
Konrad Adenauer Foundation*

Keynote Speech

The Six-Party Talks and the Future Vision of Northeast Asia Peace and Security

Ambassador Han Tae-Kyu, President of Jeju Peace Institute, Mr. Marc ZIEMEKE, Resident Representative of Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

It is my honor to be here today and speak about the security issue before excellent scholars on the occasion of the Joint Conference hosted by Jeju Peace Institute and Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Thank you for your invitation, and for sharing insights and expertise on the topics of peace and security in Northeast Asia.

Introduction - Security Threats in Northeast Asia

With the advent of the 21st century, the international community has been aiming to establish a new paradigm of cooperation by promoting joint efforts for peace and prosperity.

The concept of security cooperation has now evolved to include topics like finance, terrorism, environment, energy, public health, disaster relief and even individual well-being. And in this age of globalization, the security of one region is easily affected by a disturbance originating from another region. For example, the financial crisis triggered by the subprime-mortgage problem in America has swept around the globe like an epidemic. The climate change and public health issue such as avian influenza are other examples.

Nevertheless, the importance of traditional security concerns has not diminished at all. As we noted throughout the U.S. presidential election,

traditional security concerns, such as the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the nuclear problem of North Korea and Iran, were all treated with serious attention, even under the shadow of a global-scale financial crisis.

The stability in Northeast Asia is an important pillar of peace and security of the world. Despite the increasing relevance of non-traditional security issues, the traditional security issues between states still constitute a major part of security concerns in Northeast Asia. At the core lies North Korea with its nuclear problem.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to share with you my views on peace and security in Northeast Asia, focusing on the North Korean nuclear problem and the inter-Korean relations.

North Korean Nuclear Issue

It has been almost twenty years since clandestine nuclear program of North Korea was first known to the world. It means, young Koreans in their twenties have lived with the issue most of their lifetime.

In this regard, some say that the North Korean nuclear problem has now become a part of our lives, or something that has to be endured like an incurable chronic disease. While the North Korean nuclear problem is a task that we have to manage patiently, we need to avoid the defeatist view which regards the problem as a Sisyphus' Rock, something we have to struggle with forever. Such pessimism can never be our position. Under any circumstances, a nuclear-armed North Korea cannot be tolerated. The complete abandonment of North Korean nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs is a goal which cannot be compromised.

Now, why is North Korea so persistent in pursuing the nuclear capability? Some argue that it is 'a tool with which to safeguard its regime' in reaction to the collapse of communism in the 1990's. Others say that it is 'a means to meet their economic difficulties.' Whatever the reason, developing nuclear capability cannot be a solution to any of North Korea's problems.

North Korea has chosen isolation and 'nuclear saber-rattling' as its

strategy. But we know that this strategy, which defies the stream of globalization, was an extremely bad move for North Korea.

North Korea may still believe its nuclear capability is an effective means to secure its regime while using it as a bargaining leverage.

Hence, the fundamental question of whether North Korea has genuine intention to abandon its nuclear weapons and programs. Anyway, it is obvious that there is no alternative to finding a solution through diplomatic means.

The Six-Party Talks is based on the common will to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem through peaceful means.

Once the third phase - the abandonment phase - begins, North Korea will finally have to face the moment of truth, which it has been trying to avoid all along. That will not be an easy time for us, but will be even more difficult for North Korea. Taking this into consideration, we need to come up with a diplomatic formula that can induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and programs.

On the other hand, the Six-Party Talks process has created an effective platform for resolving regional security concerns in a collective manner through dialogue. It also serves as an arena for confidence-building among the parties. In the past, it was inconceivable that Korea, the U.S. and Japan discuss a security matter, especially the nuclear issue, with China and Russia on the same table.

The Six-Party Talks has evolved into a consultative body that addresses a variety of related issues, including the normalization of U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations, as well as the creation of a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism(NEAPSM).

The Six-Party Talks has the merits to transform itself into a multilateral security consultative body of the region in the future. The six parties have already agreed to discuss the launch of NEAPSM in accordance with the September 19th Joint Statement and the February 13th Agreement. Once the North Korean nuclear problem is resolved, it is expected that the NEAPSM will serve as an institutionalized forum for discussing both traditional and non-traditional security issues in the region.

Currently, the Six-Party process is at the second phase of denuclearization. We are making our best efforts to bring together the wisdom of the parties in order to conclude the issues concerning the adoption of a verification protocol, disablement of the nuclear facilities, and economic and energy assistance.

North Korea submitted the declaration of its nuclear program in June, and the Six-Party Talks was resumed in July to explore ways to complete the second phase. Despite such progress, the process went astray when North Korea refused to cooperate in adopting a verification protocol.

North Korea suspended, and even reversed, the disablement process blaming the U.S. for delaying the removal of North Korea from the state-sponsors-of-terrorism list.

The momentum of the Talks was restored in October when the U.S. and North Korean negotiators agreed on a number of important verification measures which will serve as a baseline for the Six-Party verification protocol. As a result, the U.S. removed North Korea from its state-sponsors-of-terrorism list. In return, North Korea resumed the disablement measures for the Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

As the U.S. presidential election is over and the U.S.-North Korea contact in New York is concluded, I anticipate that the Six-Party Talks will resume sooner or later. With the inauguration of the new U.S. administration in 2009, the resumption of the Talks will provide a meaningful occasion to prepare for the third phase negotiation with the new agenda, that is, the nuclear abandonment.

The incoming U.S. administration will surely review existing foreign policies including the policy on the North Korean nuclear problem. Considering the position President-elect Obama expressed during the campaign, it seems that the new U.S. administration will take an aggressive and flexible position on the issue, while continuing to pursue the goal of verifiable disablement of North Korea's nuclear program. The policy of the new administration would probably reflect the lessons and some practical aspects of the two previous administrations' policies.

It is encouraging that President-elect Obama has categorically

emphasized the importance of policy coordination with its allies. We will strive to make progress in negotiations with North Korea based on the solid ROK-U.S. alliance.

Making North Korea give up its nuclear weapons is a tough task. Considering the rigid position of North Korea on the third phase of abandonment, the negotiation will certainly be tougher than in the previous phases of shut-down and disablement.

'Justice delayed is Justice denied.' Likewise, 'denuclearization delayed is denuclearization denied.' If the negotiation continues indefinitely, so does the period of North Korea's nuclear possession, which is not acceptable. We will endeavor to create a more favorable environment for North Korea to give up its nuclear programs. In order to do so, we will expedite the process of negotiations, closely consulting with the U.S. and the other parties.

Inter-Korean Relations

In addition to the North Korean nuclear issue, another critical task in our hand is to improve the inter-Korean relations.

The inter-Korean relations has been in a deadlock since the new government came into office in Seoul last February. From a longer-term perspective, this can be seen as a period of adjustment. The ROK government is striving to put the inter-Korean relations on the right track of normal dialogue and cooperation.

Making a mere breakthrough in the current inter-Korean relations is not the ultimate challenge for us. We must address more fundamental issues, such as the nuclear problem, chronic food shortages and other economic problems, the human rights situation, and North Korea's isolation from the international community.

Despite the quantitative expansion of exchanges between the two Koreas in the past decade, there has been no significant qualitative change in the nature of inter-Korean relations. Paradoxically, the large expansion in exchange and cooperation did not relieve North Korea from being one

of the poorest countries in the world. In 2007, the size of the South's economy was 36 times that of the North.

Efforts in the last decade have not only failed to yield a solid driving force for North Korea's economic development, but also failed to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula. In the meantime, North Korea has grown more stubborn in pursuing its nuclear capability in order to resolve their problems concerning the survival of its regime.

Due to such limitations and problems, a common understanding began to take shape in the Korean society on the need for a new approach in inter-Korean relations.

If North Korea were to overcome its economic difficulties and attain stability, it has no choice but to give up its nuclear weapons program, open its doors and move towards reform.

We are trying to persuade the North that, if it makes a strategic decision for a better future, we will be more than willing to help it achieve economic growth. We can share our experience of economic development with the North and forge an environment in which all Korean people can live in common prosperity.

This is the very purpose of our policy of 'mutual benefit and common prosperity.' For this, our government has continuously called for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.

However, North Korea slanders the Lee Myung-bak administration for attempting to completely disavow the policies of the previous administrations. But it is a misunderstanding caused by not fully comprehending the mixed nature of 'continuity' and 'change' in the new government's policy.

The most controversial issue at hand is the implementation of the October 4th declaration. The Lee Myung-Bak administration has repeatedly expressed its willingness to consult on the implementation of all important inter-Korean agreements, including the July 4th South-North Joint Communique, the Basic Agreement of 1992, the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and June 15th and October 4th Declarations. We just don't want North Korea to cherry-pick agendas of

their preference only.

The North Korean leadership may mistakenly believe that it is possible for them to circumvent or outmaneuver the South. This is a serious misjudgement. It is the South, whom the North will ultimately turn to in order to overcome its difficulties. The first step needed to be taken now is to start a sincere dialogue between the South and the North.

Concluding Remarks

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to touch upon the importance of bilateral relationship. The ROK-U.S. alliance plays an important role in dealing with security issues in Northeast Asia.

The ROK-U.S. alliance has been the cornerstone which has maintained stability on the Korean peninsula over the last half century. Thus, the ROK-U.S. alliance should be the most significant element considered in determining the direction of the ROK's future security policy.

With the launch of the Obama administration, fresh attention of Koreans is being paid to the new U.S. strategy towards the Korean peninsula. During the campaign, the President-elect emphasized the significance of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and expressed his commitment to promote the development of a solid relationship with one of its most important allies in Asia. I think the recent phone conversation between President Lee and President-elect Obama indicated the principal agendas for the future of the ROK-US alliance. They had a discussion on strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, and joint efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. I am certain that under the new U.S. administration, the future-oriented alliance will advance even further. The U.S. will never forsake the value of alliances or give up its efforts to pursue the common goals with its allies.

The ROK government will continue to promote friendly relations and expand security cooperation with other neighboring countries as well. At the recent summit meetings with China and Russia, President Lee elevated the respective bilateral relationships to the level of 'strategic cooperative

partnership.' This demonstrates our commitment to expand the range of security cooperation.

I believe such efforts to stabilize bilateral relationships will make a significant contribution to a stable management of the current security situation and to responding effectively to new security threats in Northeast Asia.

Thank you.

Kim Sook

*Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade*

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
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New Alliance Dynamics in Northeast Asia: Abandonment, Entrapment, Deterrence, and Autonomy

YOON Tae-Ryong
Jeju Peace Institute

Abstract

In international politics we have 'double' security dilemmas: inseparably intertwined adversary and alliance security dilemmas. In abandonment and entrapment fears, which constitute the alliance security dilemma, balancing logic and public goods (or free-riding) logic are embedded respectively. In this paper, I will first reconstruct Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory and Glenn Snyder's concept of the alliance security dilemma into a new single theory—Net Threat Theory—that provides a new balancing logic for overcoming the contradiction between the conventional balancing logic and public goods logic. Then, based on the logic of Net Threat Theory, I will outline the alliance dynamics in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era, addressing the issue of the Korea-Japan-U.S. alignment and the regional stability, and finally, deriving policy implications as well.

Introduction

When and why does a state sharing a common threat “ride free” on the aligned partner’s effort to pursue security when the state, according to Realist expectations, should “balance against” the common threat? This fundamental theoretical puzzle underlies many cases of seemingly anomalous state behaviors that constitute empirical puzzles. For a long time the contradiction of balancing/free-riding (or buck-passing) has been baffling to International Relations(IR) students and scholars engaged in theorizing state behaviors. This paper tries to provide a theoretical “solution” to this bewildering contradiction. If it

turns out to be truly a solution at all, it will be theoretically meaningful and will produce new research agendas.

The first section of this paper will point out ‘double’ security dilemmas—adversary security dilemma and alliance security dilemma—in international politics, and call for analysts’ attention to the needs for a single theory that can analyze state behaviors before and after an alliance formation at the same time. The second section introduces such a single theory (Net Threat Theory), which is based on the newly devised concept of net threat instead of common (or absolute) threat. The third section discusses the logic of Net Threat Theory in detail. The fourth section addresses the explanatory mechanisms for Net Threat Theory, such as, abandonment fears, entrapment fears, fears of deterrence failure, and fears of losing autonomy. The Fifth section, based on the logic of Net Threat Theory, will outline the alliance dynamics in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era. Then, I will address the issue of the Korea-Japan-U.S. alignment and the regional stability. In conclusion, I will derive implications for the U.S. policy goal towards East Asia from the analysis of this paper.

Double Security Dilemmas and Discrete Realisms

As we know, in international politics we have ‘double’ security dilemmas: “the vicious circle of insecurity and power accumulation”¹ in adversary games, and inversely related dilemma of abandonment/entrapment

(hereafter, ABT/ENT) fears in alliance games.² At first glance, the double security dilemmas seem to occur in the mutually exclusive arenas, one in enemy relationships and the other in alliance relationships. Thus for analytical purposes, scholars usually separate them even though they are in fact inseparably interconnected. The adversary security dilemma results in the alliance security dilemma for the latter, occurring because states in the form of alliance or alignment cooperate against some enemies (or external threats). Seen in this light, the direction of the solution for the alliance security dilemma is quite obvious: solving adversary security dilemmas first.

As it were, there is an “exit” at least theoretically. Most scholars will think it is a fine idea to solve alliance security dilemmas by solving adversary security dilemmas. However, eliminating adversary security dilemmas itself is quite a daunting project: how to engage enemies, how to promote cooperation in an adversary relationship, and how to change the nature of the games from adversary ones to friendly ones.³ Who doesn’t agree on this? However, in the way towards the exit there are many obstacles: uncertainty, mistrust, greed, “lack of love,” etc. in a structurally compelling “Third Image” situation.

Thus scholars usually go ahead as if the two security dilemmas were “discrete.” In a sense, many IR scholars, by starting with unrealistic assumptions in their theorizing efforts, might have been unwittingly

¹ This is Herz’s definition. John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Vol.2, No.2 (January 1950), p.157; Jervis gives a succinct definition of security dilemma as “the fact that most of the ways in which a country seeks to increase its security have the unintended effects of decreasing the security of others.” Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” *World Politics*, Vol.40 (April 1988), p.317. For a recent discussion of security dilemma in adversary relationships, see Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics*, Vol.50, No.1 (October 1997); For another security dilemma in alliance politics, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997); idem, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” *International Organization*, Vol.45, No.1 (Winter 1991); idem, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.44, No.1 (Spring 1990).

² I do not use the term ‘game’ like in ‘game theory.’ I use the term just in the sense that there are some ‘strategic interactions’ between two allies or between allies and adversaries.

³ For representative seminal works of two different strains of strategy for reconciling two distrusting states, see Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (University of Illinois Press, Urbana: 1962); Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1984). They employ different strategies: the former GRIT (Graduated Reciprocated in Tension-reduction), the latter Tit-for-Tat. For “hawk engagement,” see Victor D. Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” *International Security*, Vol.27, No.1 (Summer 2002); Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). For further discussions, Deborah Welch Larson, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty,” *International Organization*, Vol.41, No.1 (Winter 1987); Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Cooperation and Collaboration* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997).

engaged in a number of discrete (and not discreet) Realisms, which produce “flight from reality.”⁴ Even though we know all of this, for the theoretical purpose of simplification, we still tend to or intend to blind ourselves to the obvious fact.

Admittedly, this might be an inevitable process of theory-building and knowledge accumulation. However, separating the inseparable for analytical purpose has resulted in only partial (or discrete) understanding of state alliance behaviors by forcing us to forget the interconnected nature of the two arenas of adversary and alliance games. The existent alliance theories may be analytically correct in a specific arena, but they may be realistically incorrect in drawing a bigger picture.

For instance, despite their tremendous contribution to the understanding of world politics, Walt’s balance-of-threat theory⁵ cannot explain state behaviors after alliance formation as properly as it explains those in a pre-alliance period. In the meantime, Snyder’s theory of alliance politics (and alliance security dilemma)⁶ cannot explain state behaviors before alliance formation as neatly as it explains those in a post-alliance period. But why should it be like that? Is it impossible to have a single theory that explains state behaviors regardless of alliance formation? If we want to have such a single theory at all, I believe we should be reminded of the simple fact that double security dilemmas are inseparably interconnected, which is commonsense.

Throughout this paper, I want to proceed with this indiscrete reality in mind. Surprisingly, by accepting this commonsense, inseparable reality as it is, we might get the key to discovering the new single balancing logic

not only that explains state alliance/alignment behaviors in both adversary and alliance games, but also that solves the contradiction of conventional balancing logic and public goods logic (or free-riding logic). As I will demonstrate in the next sections, the contradiction can be easily solved if we employ the new concept of net threat instead of the concept of common threat in state balancing behaviors. Therefore, Net Threat Theory—balance-of-net threat theory—provides the theoretical framework by which we can probably conduct a refocused analysis of many cases of puzzling state behaviors neither Walt’s balance-of-threat theory nor Snyder’s theory of alliance politics can fully explain.

What Is Net Threat Theory?

I define net threat as “the balance between the common threat and the resources that are mustered against it,”⁷ arguing that by using this new concept, instead of common threat, we can better understand and explain state behaviors. As it were, Net Threat Theory is balance-of-net threat theory. It may sound esoteric at this point. However, it can be easily understood if we use our commonsense.

Let’s imagine two different scenarios. In the first situation, there is a little and weak boy. When he is facing a big bully, the boy will be very threatened. In the second situation, the boy is with his muscular big-brother, who is much stronger than the big bully. Or, the boy is with his well-trained and faithful dog. This time he will not be so threatened. Accordingly, the boy will behave differently depending on the situation. Similarly, a state will also behave very differently depending upon the availability and/or credibility of allies. It is because the state will consider not only the level of common threat but also the resources that can be mustered against the common threat. Of course, if the boy himself is not a little and weak boy but a big and strong one, he will also behave

⁴ For a discussion of problems in theorizing based on unrealistic assumptions, see Ian Shapiro, *The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005).

⁵ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987).

⁶ For an earlier introduction of the theory of alliance politics, see Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” *World Politics*, Vol.36, No.4 (July 1984). Originally, the concepts of abandonment and entrapment were introduced by Michael Mandelbaum, but elaborated by Snyder. See Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

⁷ I thank Robert Jervis for helping me to convey the idea of net threat into these succinct words. I myself figured out the concept of “net threat,” but Jervis suggested its definition in the present form.

differently.


As a general theory, the Net Threat Theory of alliance behaviors builds on Walt's balance⁸-of-threat theory and Glenn Snyder's concept of alliance security dilemma—theory of alliance politics. Therefore, I accept Walt's concept of threat: "The degree to which a state threatens others is the product of its aggregate power, its geographical proximity, its offensive capabilities, and the aggressiveness of its intentions."⁹

However, unlike balance-of-threat theory, Net Threat Theory does not solely focus on the level of the perceived common threat from the enemy state that compels the other states to balance against (or bandwagon with) it in one round of strategic interaction before alliance formation. Unlike the concept of alliance security dilemma of ABT/ENT fears, Net Threat Theory does not exclusively focus on the alliance politics or alliance management after alliance formation, either. I intend Net Threat Theory to be a useful analytical tool by which we can explain states' alliance or alignment¹⁰ behaviors regardless of alliance formation. This expansion of explanatory scope of Net Threat Theory is possible because, as I will articulate, the logics hidden (waiting to be "discovered") in the alliance security dilemma of ABT/ENT fears are exactly the same to balancing/public goods logics. The scopes each theory tries to explain can be summarized as in <Figure 1>.

⁸ Walt seems to use the word "balance" in the sense of "Universal Law of History." The point of departure of this usage is the assumed inevitable and natural struggle among states for preponderance, and the equally natural resistance to such attempts. See Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" *World Politics*, Vol.5 (July 1953), p.452.

⁹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp.22, 265.

¹⁰ I regard 'alignment' as the broader concept than 'alliance.' Alliance here is a specific, military, and the strongest type of alignment. Without a formal military pact, no matter how close a bilateral relationship may be, it is still an alignment, not an alliance. For instance, Japan and Korea have never been in a formal alliance relationship, but in an alignment relationship.



<Figure 1> Explanatory Scopes of Three Theories

Among others, one of the causal effects of the increased common threat on state behaviors is the formation of a military alliance between the two states as the strongest type of cooperation against the enemy states. In pre-alliance external balancing efforts of the states, common threat is theoretically the same to net threat, ceteris paribus. The net threat, which can be also expressed as the "balance¹¹ of threat/counter-threat," is smaller than or equal to the common threat, depending on availability of

¹¹ When I say 'balance of threat/counter-threat,' balance means distribution. See Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" pp.447-49.

alliance (or counter-threat). In absence of a formal alliance the net threat is tantamount to the common threat, other things being equal. Therefore, in Walt's balance-of-threat theory focusing on pre-alliance state behaviors, all the concepts of threat, common threat, and net threat are interchangeable.¹² However, once state A forms an alliance with B against threats, or once states A and B form alliances with state C respectively, the concept of common threat alone cannot explain the state alliance/alignment behaviors properly. For instance, once Japan and South Korea formed the military alliances with the United States respectively, the former two states' incentives to form a formal alliance with each other nearly disappeared. It is not because common threats decreased, but because net threats noticeably decreased due to the U.S. factor. The relationship of net threat, common threat, resources (that are mustered against common threat), counter-threat, and credibility of allies' commitment can be summarized as follows in <Figure 2>.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{NET THREAT} &\leq \text{COMMON THREAT} \\ \text{NET THREAT} &= \text{COMMON THREAT} - \text{RESOURCES} \\ &= \text{COMMON THREAT} - \text{COUNTER-THREAT} \\ &= \text{COMMON THREAT} - \text{CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT} \\ &\quad \text{(ASSUMPTION IN JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS)} \end{aligned}$$

<Figure 2> Relationship of Key Concepts of Net Threat Theory

Net Threat Theory purports to be also useful in the analysis of state behaviors in a stream of many rounds of strategic interactions after alliance formation. In other words, in adversary games between the two contending groups of states the formed alliances themselves indicate that, as a result of states' balancing behavior, a certain degree of the rough

threat equilibrium between adversaries (threats to "us") and allies (counter-threats, or threats to "them") has been already struck. After alliance formation the more appropriate concept to be employed to analyze alliance behaviors is not the level of perceived common threat alone, but the net threat—balance of threat/counter-threat. To put it differently, the net threat can be calculated by subtracting "our" fears relieved by the ally's credible commitment from fears stemming from "their" threatening capabilities and behaviors. Therefore, in analyzing alliance politics or alliance management what matters is not only "their" threats but also "our" capabilities to counter the threats. Hence the necessity of the concept of net threat—dependent variable—which can be roughly determined by four factors: (1) the level of perceived common external threat to a state, (2) the state's own military capabilities, (3) the level of allies' commitment to the defense of the state, and (4) the allies' military capabilities. Except for the common threat, the other factors are tantamount to the resources that can be mustered against the common threat. In that sense those three factors constitute 'counter-threat' against 'common threat.' However, (3) and (4) can be fused into the credibility of the allies' commitment to the defense of the state. It is because the higher the level of commitment and the stronger the allies' defense capabilities, the more the credibility of the allies' commitment.

In a nutshell, according to Net Threat Theory, state alliance behaviors are determined by the level of net threat: if the net threat increases, then the states' cooperative incentives [the states' balancing behaviors] increase accordingly. I want to emphasize, though, that what I am talking about is "cooperative incentives," and not necessarily the actual level of cooperation, which also varies with the degrees of "conflict of interests" as well as "common interests" of the concerned states.

At this juncture, it is necessary to elaborate as to how Net Threat Theory provides the more comprehensive logic that can solve the contradiction of balancing/free-riding logics.

¹² In reality "other things" will be widely different depending on the specific nature of relationship of the alignment partners. It is possible that a close alignment relationship is even better than a nominal alliance relationship.

Discovering the Logic of Net Threat Theory

Balance-of-Threat Theory, Contradiction of Balancing/Free-Riding, and a New Balancing Logic

Realist theory, including Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory,¹³ assumes that states with common threats have a tendency to cooperate by aligning or allying themselves to increase their relative 'aggregate power'¹⁴ and balance against external threats. Walt emphasizes and demonstrates the causal importance of perceived threats¹⁵ in alliance formation. According to Glenn Snyder, however, his study (*The Origins of Alliances*) is not only limited empirically to alliances in the Middle East¹⁶ but also principally about alliance formation rather than the politics of alliances after they form.¹⁷ Snyder bridges this theoretical gap with the theory of 'security dilemma in intra-alliance politics' after alliance formation, which provides a theory of alliance management or alliance

bargaining.¹⁸

Net Threat Theory builds on these two scholars' theoretical contributions to the study of alliance behaviors in the belief that their insights are not mutually exclusive but complementary. Both scholars are aware of the effect of threats—common threats, but not net threats—on alliance behaviors, but the one's focus is on before and the other's on after alliance formation. Despite Snyder's critique of Walt, however, Walt would willingly accept a Realist commonsense that "[t]he greater the threat posed by an adversary, the greater the cohesion of the alliance"¹⁹ because the formation of alliance itself indicates the greater cohesion within a group of states facing common threats. Although their focuses are different, seen from a broader perspective, both scholars similarly see the external threat as a positive force for uniting a contending group of states against another group of enemy states.²⁰ However, neither goes as far as to hammer out a hidden logic that coherently explains the state behaviors regardless of alliance formation.

IR scholars usually regard Mancur Olson's public goods logic²¹ of alliance behaviors and Kenneth Waltz's or Stephen Walt's balancing logic—articulated in balance-of-power theory (external balancing) and

¹³ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*; idem, "Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?" *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.43, No.1 (Summer-Fall 1989).

¹⁴ A state may ally with another not primarily to aggregate power capabilities against a common threat but to gain influence over the ally and perhaps restrain it from taking certain actions that might be contrary to the first state's interests. See Jack S. Levy and Michael Barnett, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignment: the Case of Egypt, 1962-73," *International Organization*, Vol.45, No.3 (Summer 1991), 371 (footnote 7); Also see Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: Published for the National Security Education Problem by the University Press of Kansas, 1976). However, motives of alliance formation seem to rest between two extremes: power aggregation on the one extreme and restraining allies on the other extreme. Restraining allies is a negative way of referring to a state's efforts to prevent those allies from being a part of the enemy's aggregate power. Then these two motives are not mutually exclusive, but complementary.

¹⁵ For a good discussion of threat perception, see Klaus Knorr, "Threat Perception," Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: Published for the National Security Education Problem by the University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp.79-119.

¹⁶ After this critique, Walt published an article on alliance formation in Asia. See Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War competition," Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, ed., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

¹⁷ Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," 103-4; idem, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," p.125.

¹⁸ Snyder, *Alliance Politics*; idem, "Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." Presumably, some of the dynamics of alliance formation reflect anticipations of what the relations will be after the alliance has been formed. Snyder shows both alliance formation and management involve bargaining process. Bargaining power is determined by the state's interest, dependence, and commitments. See idem, *Alliance Politics*, pp.75-78, 165-177.

¹⁹ Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," p.125.

²⁰ Groups seem to be inherently competitive, although the degree of competitiveness may be different depending on the nature of the groupings and the nature of the social relationship among those groups. See Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization*, Vol.49, No.2 (Spring 1995).

²¹ Mancur Olson, and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 48 (August 1966); John S. Duffield, "International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels," *International Organization*, Vol.46, No.4 (Autumn 1992); Avery Goldstein, "Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World," *International Organization*, Vol.49, No.1 (Winter 1995); For the seminal work on the logic, see Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1965 and 1971); For another application of the logic, see idem, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagnation, and Social Rigidities* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982).

states' incentives for "self-help" (internal balancing), and balance-of-threat theory—as mutually contradictory, but both are based on a rational choice paradigm. Although Waltz's argument for the desirability of a bipolar system is based on public goods logic²² and Walt's main target is not public goods theory but bandwagoning logic, both scholars see balancing logic behind states' countervailing efforts against a dominant power or dominant threat.²³ Unfortunately, most scholars choose one theory of the two and show a tendency to keep silent towards those who choose the other theory. Considering each theoretical framework seems perfectly logical, therefore, it is difficult to refute the opposing argument and such silence is understandable.

One way of resolving this contradictory tendency of state behaviors is to specify the condition under which the one logic prevails over the other. For instance, Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder explain a state's choice between buck-passing (free-riding) and chain-ganging (balancing) according to an offensive-defensive advantage. Perceived offensive advantage breeds unconditional alliances (chain-ganging), whereas perceived defensive advantage breeds free-riding (buck-passing) on the balancing efforts of others. However, their focus is on alliance patterns, not on intra-alliance politics.²⁴ This analysis is consistent with the logic of Net Threat Theory because offensive advantage means the heightened net

(or common) threat while defensive advantage means the lowered net (or common) threat since that offensive advantage heightens the probability of attack from the adversary.

In the meantime, Glenn Snyder tries to reconcile these contradictory theories by taking account of the potentially increasing costs of inaction over repeated challenges and assuming these costs increase faster than the costs of action. Although the public goods logic prevails early in an aggressor's career, the balance of power eventually triumphs. In this light, he also points out that balancing coalitions typically do not take shape until aggressors have made substantial conquests. However, his brief discussion lacks elaboration, and in this case his focus is on war, not on intra-alliance politics, which is the main subject (of the rest of his book).²⁵ Therefore, both explanations are limited to state balancing/free-riding behaviors in the pre-alliance period.

Another way is to deny "security" having the nature of public goods. James Morrow argues that the public goods analogy to alliances is inappropriate for the question of intervention in war. First, security is not a pure public good because the level of the good increases with the number of nations contributing. Second, winning a war provides selective benefits to the victors; they can alter the status quo as they wish.²⁶ However, his explanatory scope is very limited and he lacks elaboration too.

The other way is to employ the one logic in a case, and the other logic in another case. In the case of Waltz, it's confusing that he employs two contradictory logics at the same time (in the same book): balancing logic for balance-of-power, and public goods logic for the management of international affairs. And he is also silent as to why he is using different logics for different cases. At first glance, this seems to be contradictory.

However, using different logics to analyze the issue areas of different

²² Waltz argues, "The smaller the number of great powers, and the wider the disparities between the few most powerful states and the many others, the more likely the former are to act for the sake of the system and to participate in the management of, or interfere in the affairs of, lesser states. The likelihood that great powers will try to manage the system is greatest when their number reduces to two." See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p.198. However, this doesn't mean that he denies the balance-of-power theory, although he doesn't explain why he is using two contradictory logics in the same book. Actually, his two different logics are used for the analysis of two issue areas of different nature.

²³ Walt's balance-of-threat theory is an important modification of balance-of-power theory. According to Walt, balance-of-power theory focuses only on power capabilities and neglects other factors that statesmen will consider when making alliance choices. For example, states may choose to ally with the stronger of two powers, if the weaker side is more dangerous for other reasons. See Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?", p.4.

²⁴ Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Vol.44, No.2 (Spring 1990).

²⁵ Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, pp.50-52.

²⁶ James D. Morrow, "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics," David A. Lake and Robert Powell, ed., *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.104.

natures is not a contradiction at all. When we talk about contradiction between balancing logic and public goods logic, we are dealing with the issue area that involves us in adversary games and alliance games at the same time. As it were, this issue area belongs to “somebody’s business” against others. However, the management of international affairs belongs to an issue area of “everybody’s business” against nobody or for everybody, which is an issue area that belongs to international regimes,²⁷ where analyzing the involved problems by employing balancing logic—or deterrence theory—is inappropriate.

So far, the seemingly contradictory two logics have been literally puzzling because there is no elaborate theory that explains when and why the one logic is prevalent over the other. There are a number of case studies on “burden-sharing” that employ public goods theory. Some others have applied balancing logic in explaining alliance formation. Most scholars seem to be concerned about deciding the winner of the two rather than figuring out why the same assumption of rationality leads states to adopt different strategies of burden-sharing/buck-passing.

For instance, Avery Goldstein, through a case study on the development of nuclear weapons by Britain, China, and France, argues that the public goods theory of alliances and Neorealist theory yield conflicting expectations about the security policies of states. The former emphasizes the temptation to “ride free” on the efforts of others, while the latter emphasizes the incentives for “self-help.” He concludes Neorealism better explains the outcome of each state’s independent development of nuclear weapons than public goods theory.²⁸ However, posing this problem as a matter of choosing the winner of the two theories is misleading.

First of all, in the earlier days of the Cold War period and before the Nonproliferation regime was established, the states’ abandonment fears

regarding the nuclear deterrence were much greater than the fears regarding the conventional deterrence because the credibility of a nuclear umbrella was inherently weak. It was highly doubtful that the two nuclear superpowers would really provide their nuclear umbrellas for their allies at the risk of their own destruction. In the case of nuclear deterrence neither the U.S. commitment to the defense of France and Britain nor the Soviet commitment to the defense of China was credible due to the nature of the nuclear weapons. Compared with conventional weapons, the massively destructive power of nuclear weapons not only increased the level of absolute threats enormously, but also rendered the superpowers’ nuclear commitments barely credible, resulting in enormously increased net threats for the nuclear have-nots. Hence, it is natural for the have-nots to have great incentives for “self-help” and to decide to have nuclear weapons all by themselves.

However, this does not necessarily corroborate the inferiority of public goods theory to Neorealism. When the net threat a state perceives is low, the state may show a greater tendency to “pass bucks,” whether because a superpower’s commitment to the defense of the state is credible, or because the alignment partners have already taken various balancing measures, or because the common absolute threat is lowered. In case of nuclear wars, the credibility of the superpowers’ commitments was inherently low. Therefore, the other powers were keenly concerned about possessing their own capabilities to balance against the enemy.

In other words, public goods logic works exactly because of the considerably satisfied balancing desires of the states. The case of nuclear war is not simply a ‘crucial case’ for defeating the public goods logic because it is an ‘easy case’ for balancing logic. Moreover, “self-help”—internal balancing—is only a part of the state balancing behaviors. Considering that alliance making—external balancing—is also a part of balancing behaviors, it seems that Goldstein unwittingly overlooked the fact that Britain, China, and France decided to resort to internal balancing instead of forming external balancing coalition regarding the nuclear deterrence. What they did was not either giving up the benefit of free-

²⁷ Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983).

²⁸ Avery Goldstein, “Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World,” *International Organization*, Vol.49, No.1 (Winter 1995).

riding or avoiding the cost of burden-sharing. Actually, they did not see any benefits of free-riding. They just gave up one way of (external) balancing for another way of (internal) balancing. For them giving up nuclear weapons was not free-riding on the other's balancing efforts because the superpowers' nuclear balancing seemed to be just for the superpowers alone, neither for other powers nor for all. Simply, there was no public good of nuclear security to be provided for Britain, China, and France by their free-riding—not going nuclear. No public goods, no need for free-riding.

My discussion of the decision to go nuclear is not to demonstrate Goldstein's analysis is wrong, but to emphasize that we will lose sight of a bigger picture by narrowly focusing on a specific case alone. In a bigger picture balancing logic and public goods logic may not be contradictory at all. Moreover, we should be also reminded that a state does not just mechanically react to given net threat. The state may aggressively try to decrease net threat itself. Going nuclear was such a step for Britain, China, and France by way of internal balancing when external balancing was not credible in the arena of nuclear deterrence.

No scholar has addressed the possibility of synthesizing the two logics in a single framework yet. It is because each theory seems to be incompatible with each other. Net Threat Theory purports to provide insight that there is a way to reveal the real nature of the relationship—compatibility—of the two contradictory theories. Net Threat Theory suggests public goods logic and balancing logic are not actually contradictory but closely intertwined. Public goods logic works within the workings of balancing logic. States have a tendency to balance against the common threat. Formation of alliance or alignment relationship is a result of the state's balancing behaviors. Once an alliance is formed and especially when solidarity seems to be assured, the parties have a tendency to avoid paying for extra burdens as long as and as much as possible, that is, the tendency to “ride free.” This logic of public goods is working exactly because the parties are participating in balancing acts already. That is, for those who formed an alliance, so-called free-riding is

not actually “free” because alliance partners are already paying for various transaction costs to continue to enjoy the benefits of alliance.

In addition to the formation of an alliance, other various factors, such as the perceived common threat, power capabilities, credibility for the allies' commitment, could affect the level of net threats and determine the tension between balancing and free-riding. Depending on a specific relationship of the states, various factors could play a role in determining the tension. At this moment, I am raising the question of how the tension between balancing and free-riding changes over time. The general theoretical argument is that the higher (lower) the level of net threat, the less (more) the tensions between balancing and free-riding; the less (more) the tensions, the more (less) cooperation among the alliance/alignment partners. In other words, when net threat is high, the prevalent balancing logic dominates the state relationship and inducing cooperation; when net threat is low, the prevalent public goods logic dominates the state relationship and inducing frictions.

When we have in mind the effect of common threat alone, it seems to be contradictory that states in an alliance relationship fight for “buck-passing.” In light of a conventional understanding of Realism or balancing logic in its corollary, states should always cooperate against common threats but they do not. It is sort of esoteric. This is also related to the descriptive and prescriptive nature of Realist arguments Jervis mentions.²⁹ However, conventional balancing logic leads us to have a dichotomous view of balancing, which is concerned only about whether to balance or not, ignoring the degrees of balancing.

In the meantime, adopting the concept of net threat and a new fine-tuned logic of balancing allows us to look at public goods logic differently. According to the new balancing logic, how much to balance if a state balances at all is also important. If we broaden our perspective and see “the forest instead of individual trees,” public goods logic is actually about

²⁹ Robert Jervis, “The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?” *International Security*, Vol.16, No.3 (Winter 1991/92), 41 (footnote 5).

adjusting/determining the degrees of balancing (in the forest), not about whether to balance or not (in an individual tree).³⁰

As it were, state A can ride free if and only if state B balances, or only if state A itself already balances. In other words, public goods logic starts to operate exactly because of balancing logic, not despite of balancing logic; the pre-conditional workings of the balancing acts of the states (that want to cooperate in a big picture) make it possible for them to afford to fight for buck-passing (in a small picture). A formed alliance itself is an indication of the strong commitment of a party to the defense of the other party, which somewhat relieves their concerns for security.

In light of Net Threat Theory, the formation of an alliance means the decrease of net threats to the parties. Therefore, it is no wonder that cooperative incentives decrease as net threats decrease. If we utilize the concept of net threat, the reason for working of public goods logic in alliance politics—free-riding tendency—is understandable within the larger picture of balancing behaviors of the states. Seen in this way, public goods logic and balancing logic are perfectly compatible; public goods logic itself is a part of balancing logic. Buck-passing is, as it were, an anemic form of balancing, not an alternative to balancing.

When we use the concept of (common or absolute) threat in a conventional way that focuses on the source of threat alone without paying proper attention to the countervailing effect of available internal and external resources that can be utilized to counter the threat, public goods logic (free-riding, or buck-passing) and balancing logic (burden-sharing, or chain-ganging) seem to be contradictory to each other.

³⁰ This suggests the possibility that so-called ‘soft balancing’ and ‘underbalancing’ are the results of the level of net threat, which is not so severe. For discussions on soft balancing, see Stephen M. Walt, *Taming Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” *International Security*, Vol.30, No.1 (Summer 2005); Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” *International Security*, Vol.30, No.1 (Summer 2005); T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” *International Security*, Vol.30, No.1 (Summer 2005); Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” *International Security*, Vol.29, No.2 (Fall 2004).

However, if we use the concept of net threat, balancing logic works all (or most of) the time in an arena of “somebody’s business” against others where adversary games and alliance games overlap. The cases explainable in terms of public goods logic are deviant cases for Walt’s balance-of-threat theory or Waltz’s balance-of-power theory, but they are explainable in terms of balancing logic if we use the concept of ‘net threat’ instead of ‘common threat.’

Now it seems to be necessary to discuss in detail how exactly the contradiction of public goods logic and balancing logic is related to the dilemma of ABT/ENT fears in alliance politics.

Revealing Hidden Logics of the Alliance Security Dilemma

Snyder has focused on trade-offs in alliance politics for a long time: the dilemma of abandonment and entrapment fears. As he puts it,

Abandonment ... is “defection,” but it may take a variety of specific forms: the ally may realign[,] ... merely de-align, ... may fail to make good on his explicit commitments; or he may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected.³¹

Entrapment means being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only partially. The interests of allies are generally not identical; to the extent they are shared, they may be valued in different degree. Entrapment occurs when one values the preservation of the alliance more than the cost of fighting for the ally’s interests. It is more likely to occur if the ally becomes intransigent in disputes with opponents because of his confidence in one’s support. Thus, the greater one’s dependence on alliance and the stronger one’s commitment to the ally, the higher the risk of entrapment. [emphasis mine]³²

Snyder labels these twin ABT/ENT anxieties as an “alliance security dilemma” since they are inversely related: reducing one tends to increase the other. The risks of abandonment can be reduced by strengthening one’s commitment to the ally, but this increases the risks of entrapment for

³¹ Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” p.466.

³² *Ibid.*, p.467.

two reasons: (1) the ally is emboldened to stand firmer and take more risks vis-à-vis his opponent, and (2) one becomes more firmly committed to the ally.³³ (As I will discuss in detail later in <Figure 5>, ABT/ENT fears are not always inversely related. When common threat itself increases/decreases, ABT/ENT fears increases/decreases at the same time.)

Here it should be reiterated that a state's increasing support for/commitment to the allies means more balancing while decreasing support for/commitment to the allies means less balancing (= more free-riding). Therefore, balancing and free-riding are also inversely related as entrapment fears and abandonment fears are so. A state's increasing balancing acts will increase its entrapment fears regarding the ally while the state's increasing free-riding acts will increase its abandonment fears regarding the ally. Snyder does not seem to pay attention to this because he is focused on examining intra-alliance politics.

Actually, there are several theoretical puzzles that have been baffling IR scholars for a long time. They are fundamentally of the same nature. The core challenge for scholars is to figure out the solution for contradiction of balancing/public goods logics ultimately. The ABT/ENT fears (alliance security dilemma) Snyder focuses on is just one of the several different ways of indicating the same problem.

The puzzling dilemmas or contradictions of ABT/ENT fears and chain-ganging/buck-passing are related to contradiction of balancing/public goods logics in the final analysis. In all of these cases, states (and analysts) do not know whether to pursue the long-term & broader common interests or to pursue the short-term & narrower self-interests. A state does not always cooperate with other states for common interests even if cooperation is in the interest of all. Therefore, we would get the key to solving all of these problems if we had the theory for explaining or solving the contradiction of balancing/public goods logics.

Net Threat Theory is an attempt in such a direction. It can neither provide a solution for conflicts among states nor lead the states to settle their disputes and achieve peace, but it may provide a plausible explanation of cooperation/frictions among those states that are engaged in alliance games and adversary games at the same time—games of “cooperation among some against some others,” the realm of adversary security dilemma intertwined with alliance security dilemma, or the gray area of amity and enmity.

At first, it may be confusing or surprising to some analysts that I argue Snyder's concept of the dilemma of ABT/ENT anxieties, as it actually boils down to two seemingly contradictory logics: balancing logic and public goods logic. These two logics are surely contradictory seen from the conventional perspective. We know that the one logic—balancing logic—is behind the argument for cooperation with the alignment partner against common threats, while the other logic—public goods logic—is behind the argument for defection against the alignment partner despite common threats. I have just mentioned ‘two seemingly contradictory logics’ because I believe that the two logics are not contradictory at all actually. Our conventional understanding of the relationship between the two logics operating against or despite common threats inevitably leads us to believe the two logics are contradictory. Indeed, without introducing a new concept, net threat, the hidden logic cannot be easily disclosed and grasped.

Although I already explained briefly why conventional balancing logic and public good logic are not contradictory in light of Net Threat Theory, let me elaborate further why Snyder's concept of dilemma of ABT/ENT anxieties rests on the two logics, not just one. The closer examination of the concepts of ABT/ENT fears will lead us to see there are two logics involved in alliance security dilemma. As in <Figure 3>, Snyder himself in his recent book provides us with a useful figure that classifies interaction arenas among states.

³³ Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” p.113.

		Preparedness	Diplomacy	Action
Adversary Game	Conflict	arms race	threats of force	war
	Cooperation	arms control	concession	war limitation or termination
Alliance Game	Cooperation	burden-sharing/ joint planning	promises of support	chain-ganging
	Conflict	free-riding	threats of defection	buck-passing

<Figure 3> Interaction arenas³⁴

In an alliance game, abandonment fears regarding the partner arise when a state defects against the partner despite the common threats by free-riding, threats of defection, and buck-passing. In other words, a state defects to avoid burden-sharing/joint planning, promises of support, and chain-ganging. In this case the logic behind the state's behaviors is public goods logic. In the meantime, entrapment fears regarding the partner arise when a state cooperates with the partner against the common threats by burden-sharing/joint planning, promises of support, and chain-ganging. In other words, a state cooperates to avoid free-riding, threats of defection, and buck-passing. In this case the logic behind the state's behaviors is balancing logic.

The reason that Snyder argues the mixture of ABT/ENT anxieties is inverse and he calls it an alliance security dilemma, is quite understandable if we consider that abandonment fears and entrapment fears arise when a state follows the opposite or contradictory logic in each case in confrontation with the common threats. Abandonment fears arise when a state follows public goods logic, while entrapment fears arise when the state follows balancing logic. At the present time, we don't have any established general theory on when or under what conditions

balancing logic prevails over public goods logic and vice versa. Thus, it seems that without a theory on the relationship of balancing logic to public goods logic, we would not be able to determine or predict when states decide to avoid the actions that increase entrapment fears—decide to defect—and when they decide to avoid the actions that increase abandonment fears—decide to cooperate. In this corollary, without such a theory, we do not have a clue to explaining when a state is more cooperative or contentious towards the partner in an alliance or alignment relationship. To put it differently, this suggests that depending upon whether we successfully figure out how those two logics are related, we might be able to have some hypotheses on the variation of cooperation/friction in state relations in general, which can be tested against the actual diplomatic history of the concerned states. Net Threat Theory can be such a theory to facilitate this role.

Explanatory Mechanisms of Net Threat Theory: Beyond Abandonment/Entrapment Fears

Fears of Deterrence Failure—Functional Equivalent to ABT Fears

In an alliance relationship the weaker state, with limited resources and limited capability of making commitments, supports the ally primarily because of its bilateral abandonment fears. However, the stronger state does not support the weaker ally mainly due to “abandonment” fears. Rather, the stronger state supports the weaker ally principally because of its fears of adversary's “temptation” (or fears of deterrence failure). As Henry Kissinger once made this point succinctly,

The reason for our continued commitment is the same in both Europe and Korea: We doubt the ability of our allies to assume their own defense completely and we fear that the removal of our shield might tempt aggression.³⁵ [emphasis mine]

³⁴ Quoted from Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, p.34.

³⁵ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p.308.

Therefore, the weaker state's bilateral abandonment fears and the stronger state's fears of deterrence failure against the adversary are playing the same functional role in their positive effects on the two states' cooperative incentives.

In Snyder's discussion of severity of abandonment fears one important factor in calculating a state's abandonment fears is the degree of strategic interests that the parties have in defending each other. The strategic interest, which Snyder also terms as "indirect dependence," is the state's interest in keeping the ally's power resources out of the opponent's hands.³⁶ In other words, the stronger state can also have high "abandonment" fears regarding the weaker ally if the former has the strong strategic interest in the latter. Such "abandonment" fears the stronger partner has regarding the weaker partner are different from abandonment fears the weaker partner has regarding the stronger partner. In such a case the stronger state does not fear the reduction of aggregate power on the allies' sides due to voluntary abandonment by the weak ally, but it fears the increase of aggregate power on the enemies' side due to involuntary dismemberment of the weak ally by the adversary. Nevertheless, such fears are functionally the same to the stronger state's fears of deterrence failure. Or it might be called fear of instigating an adversary's "temptation" because the adversary is drawn into attacking if it believes that the stronger state will not protect the weaker ally. After all, this is a matter of failure of extended deterrence. Therefore, ABT/ENT fears are not the only explanatory mechanisms that should be considered.

In calculating ABT/ENT fears a state's cooperative incentives are not necessarily due to abandonment fears regarding the alignment partner. For instance, especially during the Cold War, it may be true that the ROK's abandonment fears regarding Japan is a bit higher than Japan's abandonment fears regarding the ROK because Japan is a relatively richer

or stronger state than South Korea. But this does not mean Japan has no cooperative incentive regarding the ROK. In fact Japan also has higher fears of deterrence failure (North Korea's attacking of South Korea) than fears of deterrence failure the ROK has regarding Japan (North Korea's or other communist states' attacking of Japan). Therefore, even though Japan's entrapment fears are higher than South Korea's and that South Korea's abandonment fears are higher than Japan's, those fears can be neutralized by Japan's higher fears of deterrence failure regarding North Korea (and by South Korea's higher fears of losing autonomy regarding Japan to be discussed in the next section).

Moreover, each state's ABT/ENT fears towards each other are insignificant compared with those fears in other bilateral relationships, such as the U.S.-ROK or U.S.-Japan relations. Despite the Japan-ROK alignment (and not alliance), both states have intentionally avoided concluding a military pact, and there has been no crucial mentionable military cooperation between them except at the symbolic level. This is not only because the strong third party ally was available for them, but also because the two states do not want to depend on each other militarily due to other fears—the ROK fears of losing autonomy regarding (and Japan's entrapment fears).

Fears of Losing Autonomy—Functional Equivalent to ENT Fears

In addition to the ROK's insignificant entrapment fears regarding Japan, it is also necessary to consider the ROK's fears of losing autonomy in case of the heightened security or military ties with Japan. Theoretically, the stronger (or the less dependent) alignment partner's entrapment fears are not necessarily more intense than its fears of deterrence failure that are a functional substitute for its bilateral abandonment fears regarding the weaker partner. Both fears (of deterrence failure and abandonment fears) increase when the common threat increases. Similarly, the weaker (or the more dependent) alignment partner's bilateral abandonment fears are not necessarily more intense than its fears of losing autonomy that are a

³⁶ Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," pp.472-73.

functional substitute for its entrapment fears because both fears (of losing autonomy and entrapment fears) increase when the stronger partner's level of commitment is heightened.

Regarding entrapment fears, we should refrain from making a generalization that any state with low entrapment fears regarding an alignment partner has inversely high abandonment fears, or that any state with high abandonment fears regarding an alignment partner has inversely low entrapment fears. Depending upon the specific nature of a bilateral strategic relationship, each state can fear military cooperation itself because the two states worry about the negative effect of bilateral military cooperation while they can meet security needs through an alliance with a powerful third party. As Arnold Wolfers points out,

Cooperation means sacrificing some degree of national independence with a view to coordinating, synchronizing, and rendering mutually profitable some of the political, military, or economic policies the cooperating nations intend to pursue.³⁷ [emphasis mine]

In this vein, a state can refrain from cooperating militarily with the alignment partner not because of bilateral entrapment fears but mainly because of 'fears of losing autonomy' especially when the state is compelled to cooperate with the former colonial ruler that the state does not trust. Bilateral entrapment fears are the fears of "being dragged into a war that a state does not want," but the concept can be broadened to include fears of "being dragged into a strategic/military situation where a state loses its autonomy." In case of formerly colonized weaker states, like Korea, sensitivity to the possibility of losing national independence again may be particularly greater in political or military arenas than in economic arenas. Even when the former colonial ruler or the defeated power in previous wars, like Japan or Germany, pursue a very low-profile foreign policy, and therefore there is virtually no entrapment fears on the part of their weaker ally or alignment partner at the present time, the weaker ally

³⁷ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p.27.

will be very reluctant to cooperate due to fears of losing independence. Therefore, our discussion of the structure of ABT/ENT fears needs to be fine-tuned to a particular nature of a certain bilateral relationship.

We can then expect Japan will have a converged mixture of fears of deterrence failure and bilateral entrapment fears and that the ROK will have a converged mixture of bilateral abandonment fears and fears of losing autonomy in the long run.

Alignment Dynamics in Northeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era

Previously, when we discuss alliance politics and alignment relationships among states, we usually consider the effect of common threats in the process of forming an alliance, and the effect of abandonment/entrapment fears in the bargaining process between the alliance partners regarding burden-sharing for maintaining the alliance. However, in explaining state alignment behaviors Net Threat Theory leads us to take into account the effect of common threats as well as that of elements which constitute counter-threats: (1) the level of a perceived common external threat to a state, (2) the state's own military capabilities (ultimately backed by its economic growth and political stability), (3) the credibility of the allies' commitment to the defense of the state.

I will examine the alliance dynamics in Northeast Asia in terms of each state's fear of abandonment, fear of entrapment, fear of deterrence failure, and fear of losing autonomy, each of which varies with the level of net threat.

Remaining Cold War Structure: Two Against Two

Since the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asia has emerged one of the most economically powerful regions in the world.³⁸ However, the sense of

³⁸ For details, see Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol.18, No.3 (Winter 1993/94).

regional consciousness is still weak and the institutional infrastructure tenuous. The security context is that of a classic balance-of-power, self-help system with reciprocally rising arms budgets and no confidence building measure or institutionalized multilateral forums for the resolution of volatile issues. In many respects, the relationships among the four great powers represent a continuation, in a less confrontational form, of the Cold War alignment: two against two.³⁹

One of the major causes for this, in my view, may be the events evolving at the flashpoint in Northeast Asia: the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean nuclear issue emerged right after the end of the Cold War and has since rendered all the four major powers and the two Koreas involved in mutual suspicion, fierce military competition, and divergence of grand strategies. Especially, the North Korean nuclear threat has made Japan and the United States much closer than before and ossified the anachronistic structure in the region.

On the one hand, China and Russia have defied all contrary expectations to forge a strategic partnership of considerable mutual utility and strength. The territorial dispute has been successfully resolved and, though the 2001 Friendship Treaty is a limited liability accord rather than an alliance, it does symbolize the strength of their well-maintained bilateral ties. On the other hand, Japan and the United States remain partners to the strongest bilateral alliance in the region, and both are capitalist democracies, and the alliance has grown stronger. In both ideological affiliation and security commitment, as well as the distribution of deeply rooted issue disputes (e.g., territorial differences between Japan and Russia, Sino-American friction over Taiwan, conceptually distinctive notions of human rights), the “two vs. two” momentum is quite well established.⁴⁰

Chinese diplomacy is more accepting of extant international

³⁹ Lowell Dittmer, “The Emerging Northeast Asian Regional Order,” Samuel S. Kim, ed., *The International Relations of Northeast Asia* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), p. 357.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

institutions, international norms, and U.S. dominance of the international and regional power structure than at any time since 1949. But the limited Sino-U.S. counter-terrorism cooperation after 9/11 has not changed the dynamics fundamentally due to the adversary security dilemma.⁴¹

Russia’s relations with its neighbors in Northeast Asia remain perched between balance-of-power politics and economic integration. For ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, old images of potential threats and national interests overshadowed new strategies of mutual benefit, but after 9/11 there were signs of significant change that persisted.⁴² The Bush administration’s decisions on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, NATO expansion, and launching of Missile Defense (MD) system have fed the suspicion of Chinese and Russian leaders, making the region keep the structure of “two against two.”

Rise of China

China’s grand strategy is designed to foster favorable conditions for continuing China’s modernization while also reducing the risk that others will decide a rising China is a threat that must be countered.⁴³ Thanks to this success of this strategy, once a sleeping giant, China today is the world’s fastest growing economy, which has alarmed many Westerners.

However, the real danger lies not in China’s astounding growth but in the deep insecurity of its leaders. Their anxious reactions to the violent protests in Tibet and the horrific Sichuan earthquake on the eve of the Olympics highlight the troubling paradox they face: the more developed and prosperous the country becomes, the more insecure and threatened they feel. The Chinese regime is desperate to survive in a society turned upside down by astonishing economic growth and a startling openness to

⁴¹ Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s International Relations: The Political and Security Dimensions,” Samuel S. Kim, ed., *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*, p. 90.

⁴² Gilbert Rozman, “Russian Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia,” Samuel S. Kim, ed., *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*, p. 201.

⁴³ Goldstein, Avery, *Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005).

the outside world. China's leaders closely track public opinion on the Internet and constantly worry that citizens could turn against them.⁴⁴

At the present time, the United States remains predominant, and the current order in the region will change in a fundamental way only when China and Japan find a way to reconcile their deep differences that have so far prevented them from even acknowledging the national security concerns of the other. As there are no signs of such a reconciliation occurring in the near future, it seems likely that the United States will continue to be the principal guarantor of order in East Asia for the foreseeable future.⁴⁵ In this context, recognizing China's weakness is America's danger, Shirk recommends not to flaunt U.S. military strength, not to build up Japan as a military power, not to overreact to China's economic rise, and urges to work the China-Taiwan problem and to provide respect.⁴⁶ According to Lampton, America and China have made a double game, bets that are prudent. Washington has bet that as China becomes more powerful it will be socialized into the norms of the international system and, because of interdependence, will become a responsible stakeholder. Beijing has bet that Washington will not seek to systematically frustrate the growth of China's power. Developments since 1978 have broadly affirmed the prudence, indeed wisdom of these bets.⁴⁷

Korea-Japan-U.S. Alignment and Regional Stability

Two Alternative Approaches to the Analysis of Korea-Japan Relations

Japan-Korea relations showed enigmatic fluctuations during the Cold War. The persistent historical animosity has influenced their relations even after their diplomatic normalization in 1965. Accordingly, many

analysts focus on the colonial legacies negatively affecting their relationship, stressing the abnormal, idiosyncratic, or non-Realist nature of the relationship, which without 'burden of history' would have been much more cooperative. Nevertheless, the strategic environment compelled Korea and Japan to cooperate against the communist threats. As Realists would expect, Korea and Japan also developed an alignment relationship in a bipolar world.⁴⁸

Many experts employ the historical animosity or 'psycho-historical' approach—which is engaged in dispositional explanation of state behaviors—focuses on the emotional or psychological conflicts that have developed throughout the long history of the two states' unfortunate encounters. Indeed, the 'history perception gaps' did and do exist as we have witnessed their effects in the bilateral relationship since 1945.

In the meantime, the strategic settings—situational (environmental or systemic) factors—led Korea and Japan to align against the threats from Soviet Union, China and North Korea during the Cold War. As Realists would expect, Korea and Japan also developed their cooperative relationship under the compelling situation in a bipolar international system. One recent version⁴⁹ of this Realist approach, Victor Cha's "quasi-alliance"⁵⁰ model, by employing Glenn H. Snyder's theory of alliance politics and the concept of "alliance security dilemma"⁵¹—that is, the inverse structure of abandonment/entrapment fears—explains Korea-Japan cooperation/frictions as a function of the U.S. engagement in or

⁴⁴ Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁴⁵ Michael Yahuda, "The Evolving Asian Order: The Accommodation of Rising Chinese Power," David Shambaugh, ed., *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics* (Berkeley: University of California, 2005), p. 359.

⁴⁶ Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower*, pp. 261-268.

⁴⁷ David M. Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2008), p. 274.

⁴⁸ For balance-of-threat theory, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987); idem, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security*, Vol.9, No.4 (Spring 1985).

⁴⁹ Victor Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999).

⁵⁰ Cha defines quasi-alliance as "the relationship between two states that remain unallied despite sharing a common ally." *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁵¹ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997); idem, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," *International Organization*, Vol.45, No.1 (Winter 1991); idem, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.44, No.1 (Spring 1990); and idem, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, Vol.36, No.4 (July 1984).

disengagement from the East Asian region: When the U.S. disengages from East Asia, there is Korea-Japan cooperation because of their multilateral symmetric abandonment fears regarding the U.S.; when the U.S. engages in the region, there is Korea-Japan friction because of their bilateral asymmetric abandonment/entrapment fears. The argument implies the final U.S. disengagement from the region will promote Korea-Japan cooperation (against China or North Korea threats). This version of the Realist approach pays exclusive attention to the indirect or unintended consequences of the U.S. engagement/disengagement policy on Korea-Japan relations, while ignoring other multiple or contradictory aspects of U.S. policy.

These two alternative approaches have different implications for the U.S. policies towards East Asia and opposite predictions for the prospect of the future Korea-Japan relations. The psycho-historical approach regards the reduction or elimination of perception gap between Korea and Japan as the most important factor in improving the bilateral relations. This approach is usually pessimistic about the prospect of the relationship as long as the perception gap between the two peoples remains unchanged, regardless of the U.S. engagement or disengagement. Thus, its main concern is to find out the ways to bridge the bilateral perception gap on history.

Meanwhile, Cha's quasi-alliance model regards the U.S. engagement as a negative force that decreases Korea-Japan cooperative incentives. This approach is optimistic about the prospect of the relationship even without the U.S. military presence in East Asia. In this corollary Cha succinctly argues for "gradual finality," saying, "Explicit but gradual disengagement fosters greater cooperation."⁵²

Each of the two alternative approaches calls our attention to only a partial aspect of Korea-Japan relations. While historical animosity approaches focus on conflict aspects alone with cooperative aspects

unexplained, Cha's quasi-alliance model focuses on the unintended consequences of the U.S. policies of engagement or disengagement with the intended consequences of the three states' willful policy coordination ignored. Cha criticizes that "scholars and practitioners have grown accustomed to throwing up their hands in frustration and blaming historical animosity," and he argues that "[t]his has become a stale and over-utilized argument."⁵³ However, in analyzing Korea-Japan relations Cha, not unlike those who employ historical animosity alone, makes the same mistake of running the risk of "putting all his eggs in one basket" in the sense that he is trying to explain too much with a single variable: the policies of the United States.

However, we need to recognize various aspects of the U.S. policies and their different or contradictory effects on Korea-Japan relations. Over-reliance on a simplistic analysis might lead the United States to employ a wrong and dangerous policy towards East Asia. Thus the sound analysis of Korea-Japan relationship is in order because it has both theoretical and practical implications significant for the attainment of stability in the East Asian region and for a desirable direction of the U.S. security policies towards this region.

The U.S. Role in the Process of the 1965 Korea-Japan Diplomatic Normalization⁵⁴

Why was the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization achieved at this particular juncture? No existing single factor, such as the U.S. pressure,⁵⁵ is sufficient for explaining the outcome. Rather, we need to refocus on what is hitherto ignored: (1) The existing literature focuses on favorable domestic/

⁵³ Ibid., p. 5.

⁵⁴ This section is a summary of the author's previous analysis. See Tae-Ryong Yoon, "Learning to Cooperate Not to Cooperate: Bargaining for the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization," *Asian Perspective*, Vol.32, No.2 (Summer 2008).

⁵⁵ For Cha's analysis that emphasize the decisive role of the U.S. pressure in the process of Korea-Japan Normalization, see Victor D. Cha, "Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty," *Korean Studies*, Vol.20 (University of Hawaii Press, 1996).

⁵² Victor Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, p. 213.

international conditions only after General Park's military coup in 1961. But this exclusive attention to the 1961-65 period of 'success' blinds us to the long-term learning process of the two states; (2) We need to ask a non-question: why was the Normalization so delayed even under favorable conditions at the time: U.S. pressure, economic needs and President Park's strong leadership? Based on counter-factual analysis, I argue that without the coup the Normalization would have been achieved much faster in a way more conducive for a genuine Korea-Japan reconciliation. The complicated political situation caused by Park's military coup delayed, rather than accelerated, the Normalization. The refocused analysis suggests that America-centered approach groundlessly relegates a non-great powers' Realism to irrational emotionalism, and that the U.S. role in Korea-Japan relations is significant but not determining.

The intensified U.S. pressure on Korea and Japan to accelerate the Normalization process, was one of the facilitating factors. However, the importance of U.S. pressure should not be exaggerated. It was basically a constant factor throughout the period of 1950-1965.⁵⁶

The main reason for Korea-Japan cooperation regarding Normalization is that the two states had strong cooperative incentives for their own interests: (1) Japan had fears of deterrence failure regarding North Korea because Korea was undergoing political instability and economic difficulties; (2) Korea had abandonment fears regarding the U.S. and Japan as well especially in economic sense.

We also need to refocus on the Normalization process in two different ways.

First, we need to refocus on the long-term process through which the two states learned by failures, of how to "cooperate not to cooperate" or how to "solve the unsolvable." The repeated failures in the previous period was not because there were no cooperative incentives between the two states, but because they had various conflicting interests, which kept the flame of historical animosity burning but which itself also amplified the disputes related to conflicting interests in turn. Especially, the territorial dispute of Dokdo, Japan's North Korea policy, and history perception gaps of the two states were the major sources of frictions. However, although they could not solve these issues, they learned that it is better to avoid solving the problems on their own terms so as to make progress in other arenas.

Second, we need to refocus on the meaning of anti-Normalization movements from a different perspective. Many experts attributed anti-Normalization movements to the deep-seated historical animosity between the two states. Although historical animosity is one aspect that intensified the anti-Normalization movements, the more fundamental cause of the movements are that political opponents in both Korea and Japan tried to seize the opportunity of advancing their political cause by using the anti-Normalization movements as a rallying point for mobilizing domestic dissident forces. Therefore, anti-Normalization movements were not just an eruption of anti-Japanese or anti-Korean emotionalism but a wherewithal by which the opponents, for their own political causes and interests, wielded against the incumbent governments.

One more interesting aspect of the anti-Normalization movements is that the Korean government tried to utilize them to put itself in a better bargaining position in tough negotiations with Japan. Although we cannot find such similar evidence in Japan's case, it is a possibility that it exists. However, Japan, knowing Korea's weak bargaining position, sometimes seems to have delayed the Normalization process purposely to strike a better deal. Once the new Korean government seemed to firmly grip power after Park was elected as civilian president, the Japanese government seemed to believe that time was on its side.

⁵⁶ This point is against conventional wisdom and can be controversial. However, I do not intend to imply the U.S. policy line was flatly constant over time. Rather, I argue, the U.S. efforts to pressure for Korea and Japan to strengthen the weakest leg of the triangular alignment had been constantly exerted. Even the U.S. disengagement from the region can be understood as a method of indirect U.S. pressure. For an analysis of disengagement hypothesis and the U.S. pressure hypothesis, see Seongji Woo (U Sŭngji), "Naengjŏn sigi han'guk-ilbon hyŏpnyŏk ūi pŏjŏl: pulgaeip gasŏl tae gaeip-yŏnhap chŏngch'i gasŏl (Explaining South Korea-Japanese Cooperation during the Cold War Era: Disengagement Hypothesis vs. Engagement-Coalition Politics Hypothesis)," *Han'guk chongch'i hakhoebŏ* (Korean Political Science Review), Vol.37, No.3 (September 2003).

In short, the final conclusion of the Normalization talks was delayed not because the two governments had no outward and inward cooperative incentives (or no recognition of the absolute gains to be gained by Normalization), but because they tried to increase their relative gains as much as possible. However, despite the delayed settlement, the very fact that the Normalization of Korea-Japan relations were finally accomplished at all, is a powerful indication of the big march towards cooperative bilateral relations. Through this accomplishment, the two states agreed to go beyond one important threshold in Korea-Japan relations.

This analysis reveals that the America-centered approach, which over-relies on the determining power of U.S. factors—whether it is U.S. pressure or U.S. (dis)engagement—in explaining Korea-Japan relations, groundlessly relegates a non-great powers’ Realism to irrational emotionalism. The U.S. role in Korea-Japan relations is significant but not determining.

Contradictory U.S. Roles in Facilitating Korea-Japan Cooperation

As shown in 1965 Korea-Japan normalization process, the intensifying U.S. pressure or urge for Korea and Japan to improve the bilateral relations, share burdens, and strengthen solidarity among the three against the communist threats was not necessarily accompanied by the weakening U.S. commitment. Rather, such pressure means that the United States was seeking willful (intended) policy coordination to strengthen the weakest leg of the triangular security tripod. In this case the concern for the United States is not whether to engage, but how to engage. This sort of U.S. pressure, which does not necessarily heighten Korea-Japan’s abandonment fears acutely, was a critical facilitator in achieving the most difficult task of opening the diplomatic door. Thus the normalization case suggests that the United States should engage wisely if it does engage at all, and not that it should disengage from East Asia.

However, the U.S. policies could have more complicated and contradictory effects on Korea-Japan relations than we might imagine.

Logically speaking, in the context of Korea-Japan relations, both the common threats and U.S. engagement could have contradictory effects.

First, the common threats may cause two contradictory outcomes. If external common threats increase, Korea-Japan’s cooperative incentives might increase (External common threat → Korea-Japan cooperation). This causal relationship is consistent with the Realist logic of balancing. However, although Japan had agreed to form a security pact with the United States, it tried to avoid being deeply involved in the Cold War politics as much as possible. Despite U.S. opposition, Japan maintained a certain level of economic or private contacts with all its communist neighbors—the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea—by adopting so-called the policy of *seikei bunri* (政經分離/“separation of politics and economics”). This policy led South Korea—which was engaged in fierce competition with North Korea—to see Japan as immorally opportunistic, which often resulted in diplomatic rows in Korea-Japan relations. This kind of Korea-Japan friction should not be attributed to historical animosity; rather, it is an outcome of ‘conflict of interests.’ Different grand strategies of the two states, accompanied by the usual gaps of threat perceptions, could not but create certain degrees of friction.

Second, while the increase of external threats has the effect of keeping or increasing the level of U.S. engagement, Korea-Japan cooperative incentives might decrease by increasing Korea-Japan’s free-riding tendency (External threat → U.S. engagement → Korea-Japan’s free-riding → Korea-Japan frictions). This causal relationship is not consistent with the conventional Realist logic of balancing. Here public goods logic works. Cha’s quasi-alliance model focuses on this causality of unintended consequences of U.S. policies. However, instead of utilizing the concept of “free-riding,” Cha uses the concept of asymmetric bilateral abandonment/entrapment structure. It is at least theoretically possible, though not so probable due to historical animosity, that Korea and Japan might have developed much stronger security ties if each had not concluded a security treaty with the United States. Korea and Japan could afford to “fight” because of the security guarantee from the United States.

Third, however, U.S. engagement could have a positive effect on Korea-Japan cooperation too. The increased U.S. engagement or higher level U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea might motivate the United States to play a more positive leadership role as a mediator pressuring Korea and Japan to cooperate (External threat U.S. engagement U.S. pressure Korea-Japan cooperation). This causal relationship is consistent with the conventional Realist logic of balancing. Here the focus is on the intended consequence of U.S. policies. Meanwhile, the collective-goods-theory version of Realist approach like Cha's quasi-alliance model regards the U.S. engagement as a negative force that decreases Korea-Japan cooperative incentives. Cha argues the quasi-alliance model specifies the conditions under which American overtures have been most effective, denying his model's evident implication for threat of disengagement being the only positive influence on Korea-Japan relations.⁵⁷ However, his model is based on public goods logic while the role of U.S. pressure, on balancing logic. Therefore, his statement that he specifies the conditions by the model is not accurate. Actually, he simply employs a different logic from balancing logic working behind the roles of U.S. pressure.

Fourth, as Cha points out, Korea and Japan have symmetric abandonment fears regarding U.S. disengagement from the East Asian region, which encourages Korea-Japan cooperation (U.S. disengagement Korea-Japan's symmetric abandonment fears regarding the United States

Korea-Japan cooperation). This causal relationship is consistent with public goods logic, which is adopted by Cha's quasi-alliance model. However, the causal mechanism of Korea-Japan's symmetric abandonment fears regarding the United States might be actually redundant in explaining Korea-Japan cooperation if we infer that Korea-Japan's free-riding tendency will go away when the United States disengages from the region. There seems to be scholarly confusion or ambiguity regarding the relationship of such concepts as abandonment

⁵⁷ Victor Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, p. 3.

fears, entrapment fears, balancing logic, public goods logic, etc. For instance, is abandonment fear consistent with public goods logic or balancing logic? If the U.S. disengagement causes Korea-Japan abandonment fears, then does the resultant increase of Korea-Japan cooperation demonstrate the two states' balancing behaviors? Then, is it the case that when the United States engages in the region, Korea-Japan relations are dominated by public goods logic; while the United States disengages from the region, balancing logic? We do not seem to have irrefutable answers to these questions at the present time.

Fifth, in the case of U.S. disengagement from the region, besides Korea-Japan symmetric abandonment fears regarding the United States, there could be another fear. The persistent historical animosity could lead Korea, facing U.S. disengagement, to have another kind of asymmetric fear of the resultant collapse of the "double containment"⁵⁸ mechanism not only against common external threats but also against Japan itself. This latter kind of Korean fear, by deepening Korea's "adversary security dilemma" (Herz⁵⁹ and Jervis's and not Glenn Snyder's) towards Japan,

⁵⁸ A state may ally with another not primarily to aggregate power capabilities against a common threat but to gain influence over the ally and perhaps restrain it from taking certain actions that might be contrary to the first state's interests. See Jack S. Levy and Michael Barnett, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignment: the Case of Egypt, 1962-73," *International Organization*, Vol.45, No.3 (Summer 1991), p. 371 (footnote 7). For the role of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty as a mechanism for "containing" Japan, see Mike M. Mochizuki, "To Change or to Contain: Dilemmas of American Policy Toward Japan," Oye, Lieber and Rothchild, ed., *Eagle in a New World* (HarperCollins Publisher, 1992); Hans Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1990/91), p.93: He sees that one of the purposes of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty was to "keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Japanese down." Betts also recognizes that "the security guarantee ... allowed Japan to remain militarily limited," arguing that "as long as possible" the U.S. should not demand genuine military reciprocity from Japan." Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol.18, No.3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 55-56.

⁵⁹ Herz describes the "security dilemma" as follows: "Whenever ... anarchic society has existed ..., there has arisen ... "security dilemma" of men, or groups, or their leaders. ... Striving to attain security from ... attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. ... Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world or competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on." See John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol.2, No.2 (January 1950), p. 157.

might increase Korea-Japan frictions. (U.S. disengagement Collapse of containment mechanism against Japan Korea's intensifying adversary "security dilemma" towards Japan Korea-Japan frictions).

Sixth, and finally, the causal roles of common threats and the U.S. engagement suggest that the Realist theory focusing on "materialistic" power can be useful. In the meantime, the causal roles of perceived common threats and historical animosity indicate that "intersubjective meanings" of the relationship, which influence the process of identity/interest formation, are also important.⁶⁰ In reality however, materialistic factors and intersubjective factors may not be inseparable.

Regarding Korea-Japan historical animosity, we can figure out a possible role the United States played right after the war. Some people might wonder why Japan, unlike Germany, has been so reluctant or slow to admit its war crimes in the past. Put more directly, it is the Japanese conservatives that have been reluctant to take responsibility for the wrongdoings afflicted on the neighboring states during World War II, which still makes it difficult for Japan to command respect from neighboring states due to the perception gap of history.

The persistent conservative rule in Japanese domestic politics was in turn helped by the U.S. occupation authority's "reversal" of the policy direction from demilitarization and democratization of Japan, towards strengthening Japan as a Cold War bulwark against the communist states. Accordingly, the United States helped the conservative political forces—Liberal Democratic Party—to rule Japan for an extended period. Shortly, the U.S. intervention in the East Asian regional politics, though originally intended to promote security cooperation among the anti-communist states, probably have had a long-term negative effect on the process of reconciliation between Japan and other states, including Korea. (External threat U.S. engagement U.S. intervention in Japanese politics Japan

under the rule of conservative political forces Perception gap on history + historical animosity No reconciliation between Japan and neighboring states Korea-Japan frictions).

As we examined, the U.S. roles in Korea-Japan relations are undeniably important but not determinant because the effects of U.S. engagement/disengagement on Korea-Japan relations are various and contradictory to each other. The U.S. roles seen from the trilateral alignment relationship is much more complex than a simple bilateral relationship.

Simply stated, without considering these multiple effects, the desirable direction of U.S. policies cannot be determined. Even the same policy line can be either stabilizing or destabilizing depending on concrete situations. In this context, whether or not trust prevails in East Asian states could determine the sort of effect of U.S. policies on Korea-Japan relations and other bilateral relations. However, how to build trust between and among states in the region is another big and serious topic that I cannot deal with in this paper.

Drawing a Bigger Picture Where Peace Breaks Out in East Asia

We should be cautiously reminded of the limitation of a threat-driven cooperation theory or a theory based on balancing logic, such as Waltz's balance-of-power theory and Walt's balance-of-threat theory. It leads the analysts to focus on explaining Korea-Japan cooperation as an effect or result of threat, which is ultimately caused by enemies. Such "exclusive" cooperation is undeniably an important part of the state relationship. However, we cannot deny that the existence of the more broadly based goodness-driven "inclusive" cooperation, which is more desirable than "exclusive" cooperation, however difficult it may be to achieve the inclusive one. When extracting policy implications from the above analysis we should be aware that our intention for peace might destroy peace unexpectedly. If we lose sight of the bigger picture, only a part of which a threat-driven cooperation theory explains, our policy

⁶⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review*, Vol.88, No.2 (June 1994); See also Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," *International Organization*, Vol.46, No.2 (Spring 1992).

recommendations might result in instability in the region contrary to our wishes. So I want to avoid deriving mechanical implications from a narrowly focused analysis, no matter how logical the analysis itself may be.

The most important two states to be taken into account first in the analysis of Korea-Japan relations are Korea and Japan themselves, not the United States. The key states that are most responsible for improving their relationship are Korea and Japan too, not the United States. This is not to deny that the United States has played “significant”—both positive and negative—roles in molding the strategic environment, by which the strategic choices Korea and Japan can make are significantly limited.

Nevertheless, the decisions related to the bilateral relations have been ultimately made by Korea and Japan themselves, and the direct U.S. influence in the process of the bilateral reconciliation was “marginal.”⁶¹ This phenomenon is not against our commonsense: we cannot force other people to love or reconcile with each other.

In the process of improving the bilateral relations and removing conflicting interests between the two states the key state is Japan, not Korea. I am saying this in the sense of a Korean/Chinese idiomatic expression, *kyōljahaeji* (結者解之), meaning, “He who entangled the problem should disentangle it.” Of course, this doesn’t indicate in any way that Japan alone is always responsible for a worsened relationship. Nor does it imply Korea and China have always lived up to the standard of “justice.”⁶² I do not deny that as a Korean I might have a bias. I do admit such a possibility although I conscientiously tried my best not to be prejudiced. Nevertheless, I believe, if Japan remains to be the same kind of

“reactive state”⁶³ that has been reluctantly and passively submitting to the demands of the victimized neighbors little by little, not so much change would be brought about in its relations with its neighbors. Japan, like Germany, should be a “proactive state” at least in disentangling the history-related issues or World War II-related issues. Only after that, the neighboring states would neither oppose Japan’s change into a “normal state” nor fear it.

As I examined, if we have in mind those contradictory effects of the U.S. policies with multiple aspects, we cannot but doubt the validity of any policy recommendations based on the analysis focusing on the one aspect of U.S. policies alone.

Victor Cha’s optimistic view on Korea-Japan relations in the post-Cold War era on the assumption of (and on the basis of the policy recommendation for) the “gradual finality”—phased U.S. disengagement from East Asian region—should be weighed against other possibilities.

First of all, Cha’s optimistic prediction is not well grounded on theoretical and empirical findings. His optimistic view is based on the analysis of Korea-Japan relations with the help of the quasi-alliance model. However, as I already discussed, the quasi-alliance model is so narrowly focused on the only one aspect of the U.S. policy that it cannot provide sound policy recommendations. He believes Korea-Japan relations are good at the time of U.S. disengagement from the region because the symmetric Korea-Japan abandonment fears regarding the United States will lead the two states to cooperate against the common threat—China or North Korea. However, the validity of his explanation itself is debatable.

Although whether U.S. commitment is credible or not partially determines the level of perceived threat, the U.S. factor alone is not sufficient, though necessary, for explaining the variations in Korea-Japan relations. My analysis suggests that what is important regarding the U.S. policies towards East Asia is not whether to engage or disengage, but

⁶¹ Similarly, the U.S. influence on the Korean domestic politics was marginal as a former Ambassador to Seoul describes. See William H. Gleysteen, Jr., *Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

⁶² For instance, personally I believe that the Chinese government’s brutal invasion of Tibet and the repression of Tibetan independence movements thereafter are wrong. I also believe that Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War was wrong. However, Japan’s wrongdoings done to China and Korea cannot be justified by the wrongdoings China and Korea committed towards other states.

⁶³ Kent E. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” *World Politics*, Vol.40, No.4 (July 1988).

either how to engage or how to disengage. I do not necessarily support either U.S. disengagement or U.S. engagement. Either policy can be stabilizing or destabilizing depending on how to conduct it, and in what situation. Therefore, I rather support either U.S. disengagement with some stabilizing measures or U.S. engagement with some measures promoting inclusive cooperation, not exclusive cooperation.

My analysis also leads me to conclude that we can neither be necessarily optimistic nor pessimistic about Korea-Japan relations in the post-Cold War era. Although we witnessed “progress” in the bilateral relations, there have been “ups-and-downs.” Until now, we have not seen extreme downs, such as severance of diplomatic relations or war. But we cannot guarantee such extreme outcomes will not be brought about if the territorial dispute of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets is boundlessly escalated to such an extreme extent that a war breaks out between the two states. Actually, there was a Korean novel based on such a scenario.⁶⁴ I am optimistic in the sense that I regard such a scenario is not probable, but I am pessimistic in the sense that I cannot rule out such a possibility: I believe Korea and Japan have not formed a “security community” yet.

All things considered, the debate on the U.S. policy towards East Asia should not be focused only on whether to engage or disengage from the region. But its focus should be redirected into consideration of how to stabilize, how to relieve security dilemmas among the regional states, and how to help the regional states—former enemies—to reconcile with each other, regardless of the U.S. decision to engage in or disengage from the region.

Second, Cha’s analysis and conclusion give me the impression that he seems to argue or assume that for Korea-Japan cooperation—exclusive cooperation—everything else should be geared up for it: there is/will be/should be a new threat, and the United States should disengage from

the region. However, promoting Korea-Japan cooperation itself should not be and is not the only concern for the United States. There is something else more important than Korea-Japan cooperation itself in East Asia.

The more stabilized cooperation in Korea-Japan relations founded not only upon truly mind-to-mind reconciliation but also upon materialistic mutual interests is one of the key factors in achieving stability in East Asian international politics. However, this cannot be achieved without appropriate understanding of the nature of the present antagonisms between Japan and its neighboring states, including South Korea.

In the postwar era the U.S. policy towards East Asia was focused on containing communism by establishing several pairs of bilateral security alliance networks. In this process of establishing a containment mechanism the U.S. government did not exert any serious effort to promote true reconciliation between Japan and other neighboring states because the it was compelled by the Cold War confrontation to put its priority of Asia policy on strengthening Japan as the bulwark against the communist threats. This not only helped the Japanese conservatives to rule Japan with the support of the United States since then, but also allowed the Japanese conservative politicians to afford to ignore the neighboring states’ resentments towards Japan’s unrepentant attitudes regarding the past wrongdoings. This “favorable” Cold War situation might have helped Japan to survive, accelerate its economic development, and attain a great power status.

However, the hitherto favorable situation seems to start backfiring and shackling the feet of Japan, which aspires to be a new permanent member of the UN Security Council. At the present time, China, South Korea and North Korea are officially opposing Japan’s bid to take the UN council seat because they think Japan is not qualified for such a status as its postures on several history-related issues shows. Most of the neighboring states and people believe that the Japanese government is not sincerely reflecting or repenting on the past atrocities, but is helping whitewash those wrongdoings by making right-wing textbooks justifying Japan’s invasion of the neighboring states available to be adopted by schools; they also

⁶⁴ Kim Chin-Myōng, *Mugunghwa Kk’och’i P’iōssūmnida* (The Rose of Sharon Has Blossomed) (Seoul, Haenaem Publishing Company, 1994). In this novel North and Korea cooperated to defeat Japan’s attack.

believe the Japanese prime ministers' repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine is more confirming evidence.

In the past the U.S. pressure on Korea and Japan for promoting Korea-Japan cooperation was mainly for enhancing the deterrent power against the communist states, not for reconciliation between the two states. What seems to be obvious is that the United States allowed "particular things" to happen in Japan while not allowing those particular things to happen in Germany whatever the reason. This is a topic worthy of another serious study. If the United States continued to allow those particular things to happen in Japan, the stability and peace in East Asia in the post-Cold War era would not be guaranteed because of the persistent antagonism between Japan and its neighbors. Figuring out "those particular things" and starting the process of correcting them would be more important than anything else if the United States were really concerned about promoting inclusive cooperation among all the states in the region and keeping the long-term stability there, even to the extent that the U.S. doesn't need to station American troops there.

During the Cold War the United States seemed to be obsessed with only one goal of containing the communist states, and since the end of the Cold War, especially after 9/11 Incident, it seems that the United States has acted as if to search for another threat or to make "devils" of some states against which the United States leads a coalition of exclusive cooperation, while neglecting to start a process of reconciliation among former enemies. Unfortunately, the tendency of U.S. policy in this direction seems to have destabilizing effects on East Asian politics as well as in world politics in general. This should be corrected.

"Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good." (Romans 12:21)⁶⁵ This might be a good direction or recommendation the U.S. policy makers should pursue.

⁶⁵ I quote a passage from the Bible because of the possibility that U.S. President Bush and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's views of the world (where "evil" forces and "good" forces are contesting) is related to their Christian faith.

Third, in solving the bilateral disputes between Japan and Korea common sense shouldn't be lost either. That all humans are rational, emotional, and spiritual beings at the same time should be taken into account to maintain a good relationship not only between individuals but also between states. Nevertheless, not a few Japanese and Westerners think the Koreans or Chinese have purposefully utilized anti-Japanese sentiments to boost their governments' legitimacy or to obtain some monetary compensation despite the repeated apologies about the past atrocities on the Japanese side. I do not mean to unconditionally rationalize some Chinese and Koreans' thoughtless and irrational resentments and violent actions towards the Japanese. I do not support any type of stereotyping of Japan's national character. However, unless the concerned states start the "healing" process based on commonsense in human relationships, the relations between Japan and its neighbors could worsen in the post-Cold War era. Japan's colonial rule over Korea or invasion of China proper left deep traumas to the victims at both the individual and government level as well. If we regard that Japan's past invasions of the neighboring states are similar to the case of raping or killing, the direction to the solution is in fact very simple: an honestly repentant attitude and sincere apologies on the Japanese side, and forgiveness on the Korean or Chinese side. An astronomical amount of money cannot result in true reconciliation. Such a healing process has not even started yet as the Japanese government's repeated apologies have not been perceived by the neighboring states to be sincere.

As long as powerful Japanese politicians' or cabinet members' provocative remarks continue to erupt, the Japanese government's repeated efforts at the official level will be nullified again and again. Some proud Japanese sincere and understandable motivations and efforts to raise Japan's national prestige by rationalizing or denying past atrocities usually end up with producing opposite outcomes. If their goal is to enhance Japan's prestige and international status as a respected great power, at least their strategy should be changed with the "paradoxical logic of strategy" in mind,⁶⁶ which is similar to the logic revealed in a

verse from the Bible: “For everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and he who humbles himself will be exalted.” (Luke 14:11)

We cannot even imagine that a German cabinet member’s rationalizing remark on the Hitler’s holocaust is tolerated by the German people and by other states. Unless Japan sincerely learns some lessons from German-French relations or German-other neighboring state relations, the security dilemma will continue to haunt East Asian states because of the prevalent mistrust among them.

In this context we need to assess what the United States has done to help the healing process get started. Nearly nothing strikes me (except for the passing of a resolution on September 13, 2006 by the House Committee on Foreign Relations, calling on the Japanese to acknowledge its history of wartime sex slavery and apologize for it).

In South Korea, at the early stage of the military occupation in 1945, the United States even tried to keep the Japanese colonial ruling apparatus intact to use it for governing the Koreans. This is never to argue that the United States itself was inherently an evil force, but that it was ill-prepared and ignorant about the local politics. The same mistakes should not be repeated. Even today, unless the U.S. policy makers seriously addressed this issue in the process of their decision-making on East Asia policy, anything else they do would essentially be like “building a house on sand” because “man or the state”⁶⁷ is not only a physical/rational being but also a spiritual/emotional being. In a sense, the Cold War exempted Japan from reasonable punishments for the time being not only because China or Korea couldn’t afford to pursue them at the expense of their physical survival in the Cold War confrontation, but also because the United States also unduly allowed the Japanese misbehaviors to go

unpunished. The following newspaper article epitomizes the nature of U.S.-Japan “cooperation” right after the war was achieved at the expense of “justice.” And it illustrates how the devastatingly distorting effects of the compelling Cold War situation impacted East Asian international politics.

The United States paid money and gave other benefits to former members of a Japanese germ warfare unit two years after the end of World War II to obtain data on human experiments conducted in China, according to two declassified U.S. government documents.

It has been known that the Allies offered to waive war crime charges at the tribunal for officers of the Imperial Japanese Army’s Unit 731 in exchange for experiment data.

But the latest findings reveal Washington’s eagerness to obtain such data even by providing monetary rewards, despite the horrific nature of the unit’s activities, in an attempt to beat the Soviet Union in the arms development race.

Historians believe that some 3,000 people died in the experiments conducted in China by the unit led by military doctor Shiro Ishii before and during the war.⁶⁸

I do not believe the Chinese and the Koreans are determined to impose punishments to Japan belatedly. Rather, I believe, if Japan “somehow” had been successful in assuaging the victimized neighbors’ sorrows and pains emotionally and spiritually first, Japan’s soured relationship with them would have significantly improved. The victims’ tears will dry only after they are mixed with the offender’ tears. The first responsibility for “healing” rests on Japan as the expression of *kyōljahaeji* indicates.

Here I made three points: The focus of the debates on U.S. East Asia policy should not be about whether to engage or disengage, but on how to engage or disengage so that the United States may help the process of reconciliation and “healing” among the regional states to get started; The United States should promote “inclusive” cooperation, and not “exclusive” cooperation; U.S. policy should be based on the commonsense

⁶⁶ Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987).

⁶⁷ I do recognize and admit the power of the international systemic effects Waltz addresses. However, that’s just a part of complicated reality. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); idem, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

⁶⁸ “U.S. paid Unit 731 members for data,” *The Japan Times*, August 15, 2005. (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20050815a1.htm>)

that humans/states are rational (or seeking self-interests), emotional, and spiritual beings at the same time. These three points are actually not separate but intricately related.

Conclusion: What should be the U.S. Policy Goal towards East Asia?

This paper started by raising a theoretical puzzle: when and why does a state sharing common threats “ride free” on the aligned partner’s effort to pursue security when the state should “balance against” the common threat? Given the above discussions, the answer would be: when net threat increases, a state increases its support/commitment (increases balancing behaviors) for the alignment partner; when net threat decreases, a state decreases its support/commitment (increases free-riding behaviors). This answer is grounded upon the recognition of both the needs for overcoming discrete Realisms prevalent in theorizing on state behaviors and the needs for moving towards discreet Realism, which allows us not to forget the obvious fact: that is, an adversary security dilemma is inseparably intertwined with an alliance security dilemma.

Thanks to, and built on both Walt’s balance-of-threat theory and Snyder’s theory of alliance politics, which are complementary to each other, I have come up with Net Threat Theory as a solution to the contradiction of balancing/free-riding logics. The conventional balancing logic (against common threat) and free-riding logic may seem to be contradictory. However, balancing and free-riding are not contradictory at all if the concept of balancing is seen from a new balancing logic (against net threat, which is defined as “the balance between the common threat and the resources that are mustered against it”). That is, free-riding logic operates within (and not outside) a new balancing logic. In light of Net Threat Theory, the formation of alliance decreases net threats to the parties. Thus, it is no wonder that as net threats decrease, a state’s cooperative incentives decrease while free-riding incentives increase.

The conventional balancing logic forces us to have a dichotomous view

of balancing, which is concerned about whether to balance or not, ignoring the degrees of balancing. However, a state’s balancing is not just a matter of whether to balance or ride free, but a matter of how much to balance, to which the recent discussion of “soft balancing” is related. In this light, free-riding should not be understood as the opposite to balancing.

As it were, free-riding is not actually free in alliance politics because state A can ride free only when state B balances, or only when state A itself is already engaged in balancing. In other words, public goods logic starts to operate exactly because of balancing logic, not despite of balancing logic; the pre-conditional workings of balancing acts of the states (that want to cooperate in a big picture) make it possible for them to afford to fight for buck-passing (in a small picture). The alliance formed is itself an indication of the strong commitment of a party to the defense of the other party, which somewhat relieves their concerns for security. Therefore, free-riding is an anemic form of balancing, not an alternative to balancing.

This unconventional understanding of the relationship between balancing logic and free-riding logic (or public goods logic) is possible with the help of Net Threat Theory. If this theory were truly a theoretical renovation in the Lakatosian sense,⁶⁹ it can be employed to conduct a refocused analysis of many puzzling empirical cases that are difficult to understand under the assumption of separation of adversary games and alliance games. As a result, it would expand the “excess empirical content.”

In addition to solving the contradiction of balancing/free-riding logics, Net Threat Theory has several implications for other puzzling dilemmas or contradictions. For instance, Christensen and Jack Snyder’s analysis of

⁶⁹ Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, ed., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). According to Lakatos, a scientific theory T is falsified only if another theory T’ has been proposed with the following characteristics: 1. T’ has “excess empirical content” over T, that is, it predicts “novel facts” (facts improbable in the light of T); 2. T’ explains the previous success of T (all the unrefuted content of T is included in the content of T’); Some of the excess content of T’ is corroborated.

the correlation between chain-ganging/buck-passing and offense/defense advantage is consistent with the logic of Net Threat Theory because offensive advantage means the heightened net (or common) threat while defensive advantage means the lowered net (or common) threat since that offensive advantage heightens the probability of attack from an adversary.

Another thing we should have in mind is that, when we talk about contradiction between balancing logic and public goods logic, we're dealing with the issue area that involves us in adversary games and alliance games at the same time. As it were, this issue area belongs to "somebody's business" against others. However, in an issue area of "everybody's business" against nobody or for everybody, analyzing the involved problems by employing balancing logic—or deterrence theory—is inappropriate. It is in such a limited issue area that public goods logic has explanatory power.

Turning from theoretical issues to practical ones, without considering the multiple effects of the U.S. policies towards East Asia, the desirable short-term or long-term direction cannot be determined. Even the same policy line can be either stabilizing or destabilizing depending on concrete situations. For instance, whether or not the mutual trust prevails among states in East Asian region will determine the sort of effect of the U.S. policies on Korea-Japan relations and on other bilateral relations. The U.S. policy should be geared to build trust among states in the region and to help the "healing" process between Japan and its neighbors to get started, which has been delayed by the devastatingly distorting and negative effects of the Cold War, for which America is also responsible.

Fears create fears. Hatred creates hatred; love creates love. They are all contagious. Considering this, the ultimate goal of the United States should be to change several pairs of networks of "exclusive" bilateral or trilateral cooperation "against" some enemy states—whether it is Russia, China, or North Korea—into the networks of "inclusive" multilateral cooperation "with" all other states. A group of states' exclusive cooperation against another group of states endlessly reproduces fears and insecurity, which promotes only a short-term narrow scope of cooperation seen by others as

hostile to them while undermining a long-term broad scope of cooperation seen by all as desirable, stabilizing, and friendly.

Confidence Building on the Korean Peninsula

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Introduction

The Korean Peninsula's record of confidence building and arms control between the early 1990s to the present is now far short of everyone's expectations. Though South Korea tried confidence building negotiations many times with North Korea, through various political and military modalities alike, North Korea responded to its South Korean counterpart without substance, and at Pyongyang's chosen time and initiative. Even during timing that seemed unusually favorable to the South to seek confidence building measures, the South Korean government was unsuccessful in addressing these issues to the North, either by not establishing linkages between military-related issues and economic issues, or by intentionally postponing them to raise such issues to the North. At other times, the South Korean government set up such a tight linkage between the North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations that there could be no progress in either account.

Despite North Korea's adamant adherence to its nuclear card and military first politics, there has been a non-negligible move in the military talks between the two Koreas toward confidence building during the past two decades. In the process of initiating economic and social exchange and cooperation by the South Korean government, North Korea opened the De-militarized Zone, though limited in range and scope, and agreed to hold military to military talks to support the economic cooperation to the North's advantage. During the two inter-Korean summit meetings,

security and military issues did not receive a proper spotlight either because the Kim Dae-jung government and Roh Moo-hyun government did not place the first priority on such issues, or because the South did not bring those security and military issues to the negotiating table as the South Korean government thought North Korea would never respond to those issues.

The United States also did not pay appropriate attention to the issue of tension reduction, specifically on the conventional military issue on the Korean Peninsula, because its administrations regarded the North Korean nuclear issue foremost. In the 1990s, and in the 21st Century, the United States placed top priority on the denuclearization of the North so that its conventional threat and resultant tension reduction on the Korean peninsula has become a secondary issue to the United States.

From a North Korean perspective, the nuclear issue and conventional military issues were so intermingled that Pyongyang integrated these two issues together under the banner of its military first politics. Pyongyang exploited the U.S. priority to advance the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As the six party talks unveiled, the North Korean nuclear issue had become more serious and its stakes began to increase ironically. Therefore, military confidence building and arms control did not receive proper attention from the leaders of the two Koreas and the United States.

Now, it is necessary for us to evaluate the past record of confidence building and arms control efforts as objectively as possible and to think about ways to resolve the nuclear issue and conventional military threat issue in a holistic and comprehensive way, because the North Korean nuclear issue has become part of the entire North Korean problem after the six party talks convened and its resolution becomes feasible only when we think about the North Korean nuclear issue in terms of resolving the entire North Korean question in which confidence building and arms control can be resolved in the sub-framework; that is, the four party talks under the six party talks framework.

Therefore, this paper will analyze past records and the current state of confidence building and arms control on the Korean Peninsula, and

endeavor to identify an integrative and comprehensive strategy to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue as well as confidence building issues on the Korean Peninsula toward a Korean peace regime in the long run.

A New Approach to Confidence Building Measures on the Korean Peninsula

Upon analyzing European confidence building from the Helsinki process, James Macintosh described "broad confidence building as political, economic, military, technological, and cultural measures taken to enhance mutual understanding and trust among nations." Later he succinctly pinpointed three factors of success in the European confidence building process: existence of epistemic arms control the community in Europe; institutionalizing the confidence building process to change security relationships among states, and; the existence of supporting conditions for the progress of confidence building measures in Europe.

J.J. Holst and K.A. Melander defined it in the sense that "confidence building in a narrow and military sense intends to reduce fears of a surprise attack or political intimidation through the threat to use military force by increasing transparency, openness, and predictability with regard to military affairs in international relations." As people witnessed in the Helsinki process in Europe during the 1970s and the 1980s, military confidence building measures that had been adopted and implemented, rendered a peaceful and successful end of the Cold War in Europe.

The genuine purpose of CBMs was to reduce military fear and tension by enhancing transparency, openness, and predictability in military affairs that had remained largely secret and uncertain under the iron curtain up until then in divided Europe. To the CBM architect, promoting transparency in military affairs will lessen the chances that war might come about as a result of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

In particular, military CBMs can be summarized into three categories. The first category of CBMs include information measures, communication measures, notification measures, and observation measures. The second

category of CBMs include constraint and surprise attack measures which are often called to be striking features of operational arms control measures. These measures include inspections measures, non-interference measures (provisions to facilitate verification), behavioral or tension reducing measures, and deployment constraint measures. The third category of CBMs include opening meetings among contending countries to discuss security issues of mutual concern on a regular basis. This last category is a distinctive feature of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which convened on a regular basis and encompassed all the countries in Europe, the East, the West, and the Neutral and Non-Aligned nations, the United States and Canada. This regular convening of meetings for CBMs led all European countries to create and develop the CBM process, that is, the Helsinki process. Throughout the Helsinki process, European countries could advance confidence building and arms control either nearly simultaneously or generate virtuous relationships between CBM and arms control, which resulted in dismantlement of the Cold War structure in Europe. As of today, Europe enjoys the Organization of Security and Cooperation to prevent crises and manage them when they occur. Their successful multilateral security cooperation is disseminated to other regions for their emulation.

Historical Record of Korean Efforts to Build Confidence

On the Korean Peninsula, however, it is questionable how a viable and acceptable concept of confidence to North Korea can be developed, though South Korea many times proposed to the North such similar European CBMs. North Korea defies the concept of confidence most, because the North Korean leader mistook the real intention of South Korea and other countries, which persuaded the North Korean counterpart to build confidence, for injecting a bad external influence into the North in order to expedite North Korea's collapse or to subvert its regime. Their mistrust of

confidence building originated from North Korea's incorrect perception that the Soviet Union's collapse resulted from its acceptance of transparency and openness; in other words, confidence building, as persuaded by the United States and Western European countries throughout the Helsinki process. North Korea disliked the concept of confidence for a long time and yet it prefers to use the concept of trust, instead, in that trust is an unconditional belief of what Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il promised verbally to the outside world. This is why the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute recently suggested the need for a supplemental or facilitatory concept of "confidence enhancing measures," which means to start non-military confidence enhancing measures to build a secure and peaceful Korean Peninsula by taking into account North Korea's refusal of the traditional CBM concept, while believing that there is no minimum trust to build greater confidence.

In contrast, South Korea welcomed military confidence building on the Korean Peninsula because enhanced confidence between the two Koreas will help accelerate inter-Korean rapprochement and economic and social exchange and cooperation in addition to tension reduction in the military area. On top of that, South Koreans expressed their intent to provide economic assistance to the North if North Korea agreed to confidence building in the military area. In 1992, compromise had been struck between the two Koreas in how the South traded exchange and cooperation in economic and socio-cultural areas and military confidence building for North Korea's accomplishment of securing its regime's security in a form of non-aggression treaty.

The 1992 Basic Agreement itself was a reflection of the Helsinki Final Document because the two Koreas agreed to improve their mutual relationship in three dimensions by promoting political reconciliation, military confidence building and economic and socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation. Implementation of the Basic Agreement was blocked by three major reasons. First, applying the European CBMs without discretion and proper attention to the region specific conditions turned out to be idealistic, resulting in any verbal agreement not being supported

by follow-up actions. Second, North Korea did not have any intention to implement military CBMs, disclosing that since the non-aggression pact between Seoul and Pyongyang had been reached, the only thing left for North Korea was the peace treaty between Pyongyang and Washington. Last but not least, the North Korean nuclear issue surfaced and the United States demanded a tight linkage between South Korea's attempt to improve overall relationships with the North, and resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue to the extent that no inter-Korean relationship would progress before solving the North Korean nuclear issue.

It was right after the historic first inter-Korean June 2000 summit meeting that there has been initial progress in the inter-Korean military confidence building talks, though its scope is limited. The embryonic start in inter-Korean CBMs stemmed from their mutual effort to expedite the delivery of South Korea's economic assistance to the North. Although the United States, China, Russia, and Japan have been lukewarm in facilitating confidence building on the Korean Peninsula unless North Korea accepts full-scope safeguards and verification of North Korean nuclear programs, the Kim Dae-jung administration launched the Sunshine Policy, and then the two leaders of both Koreas agreed to build the Gaesong Industrial Complex north of the DMZ and open North Korea's Kumgang Mountain for tourism. To realize the two projects, the two leaders wanted their military to cooperate in building railways and roads for which both militaries removed landmines planted in and around the DMZ area.

In a nutshell, there has been some progress toward building confidence between the two Koreas during the past decade, though its scale is small and embryonic. Conspicuous among them are the June 2004 agreements where negotiations in the generals' meeting between the South and the North stipulated that the two sides suspend propaganda activities against each other in areas surrounding the Demilitarized Zone and eliminate propaganda means that had been installed for the past five decades around the DMZ until August 2004. Owing to this agreement and implementation thereof, propaganda activities to disrupt each other in the DMZ area disappeared completely. Nevertheless, propaganda wars of

another type began to reappear in the Internet propaganda activities allegedly initiated by the North and pro-North Korean groups residing inside the South, while leaflet-sending activities resumed mainly by South Korean non-governmental organizations, including North Korean defectors living in the South.

However, there was little progress on the issue of the NLL (Northern Limit Line) in the Western Sea even after two major naval clashes that took place in 1999 and 2002. Though the June 2004 Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the Western Sea and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities in the Military Demarcation Line Areas prescribes that the two sides establish emergency liaison systems such as the use of the international common network for commercial vessels, the use of visual signal provisions and intelligence sharing was used, regarding illicit fishing boats of a third country and installation of a communication liaison office in the Western Sea. No sooner had they implemented this agreement for a while, when North Korea mysteriously suspended all relevant communications. The NLL issue surfaced again under former President Roh Moo-hyun when he ambitiously pursued the second summit talks with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il in October 2007. At this time, North Korea clearly showed its intention to nullify the NLL and exploit President Roh's ploy to turn the pending summit into a historic success, which, in turn, he thought would provide a great window of opportunity for him to create conditions favorable to transfer political power to the same ruling party presidential candidate. Hurriedly, President Roh claimed that the NLL was against the South Korean Constitution, thereby legitimizing his attempt to turn the conflict ridden NLL into a peace zone -- a west sea peace cooperation zone by combining all good proposals such as joint fishery zone, ocean park, admission of free sea passage for North Korean commercial vessels sailing from a North Korean seaport, Haeju, etc. Such an attempt was initialed in the October 4th Joint Statement and following supplemental agreements between prime ministers of the two Koreas in November 2007. However, there were devils in the details and the two Koreas never succeeded in closing

those discrepancies in their positions. In retrospect, the two sides ought to have admitted the current border lines including DML and NLL given that the Helsinki process admitted national borders as existed as of 1975 as *fait accompli* when they started to talk about CBMs and peace in Europe. If one party claimed to nullify then-existing borders, they could never move an inch toward the Helsinki Final Act.

Although relocating military forces deployed forward around the Gaesong Industrial Complex Zone and Mount Kumgang area to the vicinity area is not an orthodox CBM, it is indeed equivalent to military constraint measures that will constrain the deployment and exercise of military forces by relocating forward based military bases and forces to other areas, including removal of landmines planted under the DMZ, thereby contributing to the tension reduction. However small and narrow, relative to the entire DMZ, the Kyungeui railway and road is, they are considered initial steps to build confidence between the two Koreas.

In the second Defense Ministerial talks on November 27-29, 2007, the two sides also agreed to hold meetings at the military leader level of the two Koreas to build confidence between them and resolve the NLL issue. However, the following talks have never been convened up until the present time. The problem here is not the number of agreements but the implementation thereof. And there has never been any verification agreements to obligate each other to visit and investigate their compliance with the agreed upon measures to enhance confidence between the two sides.

North Korea misused the South Korea's intention for political reconciliation through the Summit Talks to extract more economic gains from South Korea while leaving its military first politics unchanged. The political *détente* has been used by the North to heighten anti-American elements within South Korea, exacerbating the ROK-US relationship during the past five years.

In fact, the Sunshine policy resulted in giving away to the North, South Korea's inducements that otherwise could have been used wisely to set up linkages between economic benefits and North Korea's concession to

reducing military threats. The peak of giving away valuable economic benefits ensued when Kim Dae-jung's administration provided four hundred thousand tons of rice and fertilizer to the North right after the naval clash in the Western Sea of June 29th, 2002 only after receiving a mild apology made by the North. This kind of attitude culminated in Roh Moo-hyun's statement about the Northern Limit Line as a violation of the South Korean Constitution, which was shown to the North as windfalls from the inter-Korean summit. This kind of South Korean attitude could have been mistaken by the North that Pyongyang can extract economic benefits continuously without being worried about the suspension of economic aid from the South, and that the North can continue to develop nuclear weapons.

North Korea continued to develop nuclear weapons and exercise the nuclear card in order to extract benefits from the United States, and maintained the military first policy without considering South Korea's strategic calculations, because South Korea had often behaved in a way to understand North Korea from North Korean shoes.

At this moment, it is impossible as yet to judge Kim Jong-il's long-term intentions or abilities, much less those of lesser officials and military figures in the D.P.R.K. given Kim Jong-il's sickness. South Korea would be well advised to pursue an ambitious, probing, and adaptive strategy that clarifies intentions and reduces the risks of war while preserving the ability to back away, toughen up, and prepare for difficulties if developments sour. By reducing the North Korean threat, conventional arms control could prove extremely useful, and even if political developments subsequently worsened, its accomplishments might nevertheless endure and reduce the risks of war.

The U.S. and South Korean approaches up to now to negotiating with North Korea on the conventional military issues have been too timid and therefore too risky. Seoul's engagement policy thus far has been a step-by-step approach that starts with political and economic issues, and eventually proceeds to security issues. For its part, Washington will not pay attention to conventional security issues until the nuclear and missile

questions are resolved.

Dealing with the security threat on the Korean Peninsula requires a more ambitious, comprehensive, and adaptive approach that proceeds from the belief that a sustainable and productive engagement policy should include concrete steps to reduce conventional military threats on the peninsula. Simultaneous political, economic, and security negotiations have the best chance of inducing the desired behavioral changes in the North and reducing the threat of war.

When it comes to the information measures of CBMs, North Korea never publishes military information and data publicly, as South Korea does for Defense White Papers, policy announcements, and other related publications. North Korea never accepted South Korea's proposal for notification and observation of military exercises and maneuvers, not to speak of any verification of CBMs. Supposing that verification of any type could enhance trust and confidence between the contending parties militarily, it is regrettable that the fact that South Korea did not urge North Korea to accept any kind of verification from the very beginning of the inter-Korean negotiations.

In-advance notifications of military exercises and maneuvers above a certain level, invitation of observers from foreign countries to the notified military maneuvers and exercises, constraint on the size and frequency of military exercises and military deployments, verification, publication and exchanges of defense white papers and military information are included in CBMs. These measures are often borrowed from Europe and applied to other regions. In the earlier years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), there had been military confidence measures established and implemented among five SCO member countries to build and enhance confidence each in their national border areas by limiting the scale and frequency of military maneuvers and exercises. All of these measures can be reservoirs for the two Koreas to take for Korean Peninsula CBMs.

However, there have never been any military CBMs established and implemented on the Korean Peninsula except for Korean Peninsula

specific types of CBMs as described above, and as was agreed in the process for implementing the construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and in supporting people to people exchanges and cooperation through military means. In recent years, there were agreements between China and Japan, and between South Korea and Japan, to conduct joint exercises for search and rescue missions at sea, and hot-line links between China and South Korea, and the United States and China. Such hot-line links could help North Korea see positive elements in activating the inter-Korean hot-line that the two Koreas agreed on in the 1992 Basic Agreements.

Nevertheless, North Korea's military first politics and CBMs last policy hinders any meaningful progress in the area of CBMs between the two Koreas. As long as North Korea continues its military first policy, South Korea's economy first policy could be exploited to the North Koreans' advantage. This is why the Sunshine policy and policy of peace and prosperity turned out to be ineffective in changing North Korean behavior. The military first politics not only hampers inter-Korean military talks but also obstructs any attempt to enhance transparency and openness in the military area between the two Koreas. The military first politics by the North also limits the scope of any conceivable CBMs to the supplemental policy actions contributing to the activation of inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation. The primacy of the North Korean nuclear issue also hinders substantive talk and resultant implementation of CBMs on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, it is useful for us to think about CBMs in light of a comprehensive package deal in which five other countries such as the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia trade their economic and security incentives for North Korea's concession on the nuclear issue and conventional military issue. Such a comprehensive scheme will turn out to be a success only if North Korea agrees to cede their military advantages, conventional and nuclear alike for security and economic benefits.

An Integrative Strategy to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Pursue Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula

President Lee Myung-bak stated in his inauguration address as follows: "As already stipulated in my initiative for denuclearization and opening up North Korea to achieve \$3,000 per capita income, once Pyongyang abandons its nuclear program and chooses the path to openness, we can expect to see a new horizon in inter-Korean cooperation." The gist of the Lee Administration's North Korea policy is to provide economic assistance to North Korea over the next ten years in cooperation with the international community, to make North Korean per capita income reach \$3,000, after North Korea abandons its entire nuclear program and capabilities verifiably, and decides to open up its system. The Vision 3000 initiative includes five areas of cooperation toward North Korea: to raise 100 export-oriented enterprises that will be able to export more than three million dollars worth of products annually; to train industrial experts through various education programs, to raise an international cooperation fund of 50 billion dollars, to construct a new Seoul-Sinuiju highway, and to support North Korean wellbeing.

The 3000 initiative is a vision that the Lee Myung-bak administration intends to promote vis-a-vis North Korea on the proposition that North Korea fully implements its denuclearization policy by actions, not by words alone. The opening-up of the North Korean society is also what North Korea should adopt soon after, or in tandem with its denuclearization decision. South Korea's new North Korea policy assumes that North Korea's denuclearization will be done through the six party talks led by the United States in negotiation with North Korea. However, it is questionable whether North Korea will adopt to open its society like China did under the Deng Xiaoping's leadership even after its denuclearization, because North Korea disliked and avoided opening up its system to prevent its unexpected consequences.

The Lee Myung-bak administration's new North Korea policy came

out of the serious critique of the ten years under the so called “Sunshine Policy” that had been pursued by the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. The Sunshine Policy has not achieved anything tangible on the issue of resolving North Korea’s nuclear weapon issue. Instead, the Sunshine Policy resulted in North Korea’s nuclear device test because the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, never took seriously into account South Koreans’ reaction when it comes to the nuclear issue.

As a matter of fact, the Sunshine Policy during the past decade caused serious internal debate as to what it has achieved or not actually achieved. The conservative camp including Lee Myungbak's political camp contended that the Sunshine Policy has neither induced change within North Korea so as to cause the North Korea system to be in favor of openness and reform, nor did it change North Korea’s nuclear behavior. Underlying assumptions of the Sunshine Policy turned out to be wrong with the passage of time.

The very assumption of the Sunshine Policy that predicated North Korean behavioral change on the amount and will of South Korea’s one-sided provision of economic assistance and cooperation has not come true. A policy based solely on carrots and no sticks weakened public support in the South for continued engagement with the North, while it caused North Korea to misuse South Korea’s good-will, resulting in North Korea’s nuclear device test.

After North Korea’s nuclear device test, general support for the Sunshine Policy quickly evaporated within South Korea as well as outside of the Korean Peninsula. Since the rule of reciprocity has been neglected for a decade in applying the policy, reciprocity was reemphasized by the conservative camp to be introduced to South Korea’s new North Korea policy. It is natural that newly elected President Lee emphasized that ideological elements in the North Korea policy be removed for a North Korea policy to be practical and fruitful.

With regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, the Sunshine Policy actually prolonged the problem to the extent that North Korea exploited South Korea’s economic assistance, while North Korea exerted saber-

rattling tactics vis-a-vis the United States and South Korea. As the Bush administration changed its own saber-rattling tactics after the Republican Party’s defeat in the November 2006 congressional mid-election, North Korea could exploit the Bush Administration’s intention to achieve a diplomatic success on the North Korea nuclear issue. In reality, North Korea is to blame for violating the international nuclear nonproliferation regime; not South Korea nor the United States.

The February 13th, 2007 agreement resulted in resuming the six party talks, followed by the October 3rd nuclear accords in the Six Party Talks. Now is the time for the United States and the four other participating nations in the six party talks to wait for North Korea’s acceptance of nuclear verification on their declaration of its nuclear fissile materials and programs, not to speak of dismantlement of its nuclear weapons. However, the progress of North Korea's nuclear issue seems to be stalling at the second stage of disabling its already declared nuclear facilities until the new U.S. administration comes in to take up the existing stage of the North Korean nuclear issue.

It remains uncertain how concerned parties in the Six Party Talks will proceed to further denuclearize North Korea from the second stage of denuclearization until they reach agreement on how to eliminate North Korea's entire nuclear program and capabilities. Also lacking in the Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea policy is how South Korea will induce North Korea to arrive at the stage of denuclearizing North Korea before talking about applying the 3000 Initiative. Meanwhile, North Korea strongly denounced Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea policy for three reasons: it is a policy of confronting North Korea, as matter of fact, a policy to declare war and block inter-Korean relations rather than resolving the nuclear issue; that an opening policy is a provocation policy to disregard North Korea’s dignity and regime; and, that the 3000 policy is an insult to the North Korean regime.

Therefore, the feasibility of denuclearization and opening the 3000 initiative hinges on whether North Korea will meet with South Korea’s expectation that North Korea will become denuclearized in a complete

and verifiable manner. Before the North's denuclearization, it will be unlikely that South Korea will launch the opening of the 3000 Initiative. It is also critical to what extent South Korea defines the state of North Korea's denuclearization and whether North Korea will take actions toward denuclearization.

In inducing North Korea to denuclearize and dismantle all its nuclear programs, facilities, and weapons, the six party talks are better than two- or three- or four- party talks. Since it is lacking in South Korea's new North Korea policy how South Korea will lead North Korea to denuclearize, South Korea has no other option but to rely on the six party talks to achieve North Korea's complete and verifiable denuclearization. Therefore, some political and security policy instruments should be brought in to fill the gap existing in Lee administration's new North Korea policy of mutual benefits and co-prosperity, between denuclearization and the opening of the 3000 initiative.

In this context, a recent report published by RAND Corporation is perfectly germane to achieve North Korea's denuclearization. The political and security policy instruments suggested by the RAND report are the following. In the political approach, there are policy instruments to be proposed to North Korea to induce North Korea to denuclearize. For example, there will be six nation declarations of non-aggression and peaceful coexistence, direct multilateral and bilateral (US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK) talks leading to normalization of relations (as part of this process, the United States removed North Korea from its list of state sponsored terrorism recently and North Korea remained faithful to the second stage of denuclearization, that is, the disabling stage), and DPRK participation in international conferences and institutions. Chinese and Russian research institutes and scholars who participated in the above mentioned RAND study held the view that North Korea's prime concerns are not economic or social, but security concerns. American and South Korean scholars came to incorporate Chinese and Russian concerns in the final report by integrating confidence building and arms control tools in the comprehensive package of political, economic, security, and social and

cultural aspects. In the security package, the United States and other countries will provide security guarantees to North Korea; five countries will encourage and host bilateral and multilateral military to military security seminars and exercises; four countries (South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China) who will host peace forums will establish mechanisms for ending the Korean War and negotiating a peace regime; three countries including the United States, South Korea and North Korea will make reciprocal adjustments in the size and deployment of military forces and adopt other Cooperative Threat Reduction initiatives, and North Korea will agree to the prohibition of NBC weapons and technology sales and transfers.

As a result of the six party talks, all the participating countries discovered the fact that the North Korean nuclear issue can not be resolved only by focusing on the nuclear issue, but can be resolved only if the North Korean nuclear issue is seen in a broader framework and context to resolve the North Korean problem. The September 19th, 2005 Joint Statement itself vindicates the validity of a comprehensive approach to North Korea's political, economic (energy), security, and social problems.

For a denuclearization success with North Korea once and for all, there ought to be an intensive and comprehensive inspection regime with clearly defined details of the inspection regimes. There need to be various inspections: baseline inspections that will make a complete list of undeclared and declared nuclear sites and programs by matching U.S. intelligence with North Korea's declared information, elimination inspections that will supervise and monitor North Korea's real dismantlement of nuclear sites and weapons, on-site and portal inspections allowing inspectors visit to North Korean sites on short notice and staying there long-term to monitor any resumption of nuclear activities. Unless complete and comprehensive verification agreements are agreed in tandem with political and security deals with North Korea, verification will neither be feasible nor materialize, not to speak of leaving high explosives latent during the long-term negotiation process and on the

road to denuclearizing North Korea. Therefore, the new North Korea policy needs to identify problems lying on the road to the successful denuclearization of North Korean nuclear programs, materials and facilities, and weapons, and to solve those issues requires an effective strategy to deal with these anticipated problems.

The History of “Classical” CBMs and Why They Can’t be Applied to the Two Koreas

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Introduction

This paper raises three points. Firstly, how CBMs came about in Europe in the late 60’s and how they worked. Secondly, why the time in North East Asia is not ripe for CBMs and thirdly, why the two Koreas nevertheless should continue in their efforts to establish CBMs between them.

The main argument is that CBMs in Europe were the result and not the precondition of a stable balance of power between the two superpowers (USA and USSR). Thus the analogy to North East Asia suggests that as long as there is no stable balance of power in which all sides do feel secure (in military terms) it appears to be quite unlikely that CBMs can ease tensions between the two Koreas. But nevertheless, and this will be my last point, the fact times are not ripe in North East Asia for CBMs doesn’t relieve politicians from not pursuing CBMs, so that once the structure of the relations between North and South Korea permits it, CBMs can fulfill their role as facilitators of military cooperation.

Theoretical Starting Point

In order to understand my reasoning it is of importance that I lay out briefly my own theoretical starting point. The following arguments are

influenced by the neorealist school of thought, according to which states act and interact in an anarchical system under the conditions of a power and security dilemma.¹ In absence of a higher authority which protects states from being victims of other, more powerful states, maximizing security becomes the primary goal of state politics.²

In a world of security seekers balance of power occurs as a, quasi automatically generated pattern of state-to-state relations only interrupted by revisionist states who try to achieve hegemony.³

Due to the fact that states can't trust each other cooperation, although not impossible, becomes difficult since states are interested and concerned by relative gains.⁴

In return cooperation is possible if states do face a common threat⁵ and if there is a stable balance of power between the partners in cooperation.

How CBMs came about in Europe⁶

Already in 1972, during the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, an informal group of smaller Neutral and Non Aligned (NNA) countries, among them Sweden, proposed to discuss the military aspects of Détente, especially "So called CBMs". The larger European states, for instance France, opposed the idea, but it was finally accepted.

That was actually part of a larger deal. The members of the East Bloc were all concerned about their military secrets and unwilling to accept any measures that would give the West any information – but they were eager to have mutually accepted and acknowledged borders. The Western states were not very interested in the border issues, but eager to get an insight into military matters on the other side. The West was also interested in

Human Rights in Eastern Europe and the final deal became a barter deal between acknowledging the borders and Human Rights measures and military CBMs. The Final Act of the Helsinki CSCE Conference contained provisions about negotiating further CBMs during follow up conferences. The CBMs were not at all popular in the Soviet Army. All CBMs of the Helsinki Act as well as in the Stockholm Document and the Vienna Document were explicitly politically binding only, not legally binding by treaty

The Process

The initiative to the European Security process lay with "the Nine", (that is the nine European nations who were then members of the originally purely economic organization of the European Economic Community). They were preparing what would eventually evolve into the European Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation that we see today a one important element of the European Union. The aim was to present a more distinct European identity in international politics. USA was initially not enthusiastic, but the Soviet Union was.

After Helsinki, there was a long period of mutual distrust between the West and the Soviet Block. These were the years of President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative. It was only after a worsening of the relations because of a (temporary) resumption of the arms race that both camps realized the need for resumed negotiations.

That common understanding and a stable military balance of power was an important precondition for the success of the CSCE process – and for the CBMs to become accepted as important steps. Without reaching that understanding after years of fruitless efforts influenced by the doctrines of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and efforts to plan for winning a nuclear war as well as a slowly emerging awareness of the fact that such efforts would for ever be in vain there could not have been such a thing as a process of Confidence Building in Europe.

Both sides needed and wished to have some concrete evidence of a

¹ See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass. 1979.

² See Carlo Masala, Kenneth Waltz. Eine Einführung, Baden-Baden 2005.

³ See John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of great Power Politics*, New York 2001.

⁴ See David Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoinstitutionalism. A Debate*, Princeton 1993.

⁵ See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca 1984.

⁶ The following is taken from Ingolf Kiesow, *Confidence Building Measures in Europe during the Cold War*, Beijing 2005.

lessening of tensions. CBMs were perhaps not terribly important per se, but they acquired a significant symbolic importance and did a great deal to accelerate an improvement of relations between East and West at the time.

It is today possible to say with some accuracy that Confidence Building was the most important result of the CSCE process. The process took 20 years and led to the confidence that was a most important contributing factor to the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc and the Soviet Union and an end to that division of the world into two competing power blocs that constituted the Cold War.

To avoid any misunderstanding it should be stressed in this context that it was not the new confidence per se that ended the Cold War. What really made it happen was the U.S. policy during presidents Reagan and Bush and the response by the Soviet side to that policy. The confidence was a prerequisite, not an initiator, but as a prerequisite it was a necessary one.

Conclusions about Preconditions for CBMs

We have seen that CBMs in the classical (European American) sense were basically military in nature and multilateral in implementation. We have also seen that preventive responses tend to shift from ad hoc measures to full range programmes that are also (and seen from a “classical” CBM point of view wrongly so) called CBMs.

All CBMs in Europe have been made in declarations, not in binding treaties. They are only politically binding, but that has appeared to function. It also functioned during the process leading to this mutual trust, but only because the parties wanted it to happen. It was in their interest to make it happen.

There has also been some discussion about which was the hen and which was the egg, the mutual confidence or the CBMs? That is not very relevant. There was a political will to make it happen. That political will was codified by both sides at the same time. There has also been a

discussion about whether the process itself might have been more important than the CBMs. Confidence was maybe created by the negotiations about CBMs and not by CBMs themselves. That is also not so relevant. There was definitely an interaction between the will to create confidence and CBMs during the 20 years between the initiation of the Helsinki process in 1972 and the acceptance of the final Vienna Document in 1992. The CBMs and the process supported each other and were mutual preconditions for each others’ existence, not mutually exclusive.

This is probably also the case in bilateral negotiating processes about CBMs. To a certain extent they can be modeled upon experiences gained in Europe during the Cold War, but they must of course also begin with the painful process of sounding out the other party, establishing the common ground and will to eliminate the condition of conflict potential and to establish a proper forum for the negotiations.

A Comparison Between Preconditions in Asia and Europe

Coming back to the fact that CBMs do not always affect states in the same manner, I wish to repeat the conclusion that disparity in size, resources, population or military capacity can create insecurity and become an obstacle for developing CBMs.

Using CBMs to promote co operation or dialogue does not necessarily by itself improve security. Successful CBMs require implementation to be straightforward and reassuring for all parties. Only the most cooperative behavior can achieve such results.

Nowadays the chances for successfully implementing CBMs in North East Asia are quite limited for two reasons. Firstly, because there is no stable balance of power in the broader region. Quite to the contrary North East Asia is in flux and for the time being it’s too difficult to forecast how a future power structure in North East Asia might look like. Secondly there is no stable balance between the two Koreas. The recent closing of the border between North and South reveals clearly that the North still feels

threatened by the South and its US ally.

Given the absence of these two preconditions for CBMs to work it seems to be quite unlikely at this moment in time that CBMs could contribute to what they did between East and West Europe, support the cooperation in the military realm.

Conclusion

The paper tried to make the point that CBMs in Europe have been the outcome of a concrete constellation which doesn't exist in North East Asia today. Nevertheless it is recommended that the two Koreas continue in their efforts to work on CBMs in order to create a situation in which, once the time has come, CBMs can help to facilitate cooperation and create a situation in which the risk of misperception, which can trigger major escalations, might be reduced.

Political Economy of the Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula

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Northeast Asia with Korea at the Center

We may define Northeast Asia as a region consisting of the Korean peninsula, China, Japan, Mongolia and the Russian Far East. The United States, although strictly speaking not a part of the region geographically, is deeply involved in the region economically, politically and militarily, and may be considered a de facto Northeast Asian country. In recent decades Northeast Asia has been one of the most economically dynamic regions of the world, and growing ties of economic, cultural, political, and even military cooperation have increased dramatically over the past several years. But at the heart of this growing process of regional interconnection is an anomaly: the divided Korean peninsula, with two states still existing in a technical state of war. Tensions on the peninsula have waxed and waned over the past sixty years, but a Korea divided into two mutually hostile regimes is the most important obstacle toward creating a lasting and stable peace regime in the region. Any discussion of peace-building in Northeast Asia necessarily places Korea at its center. So far, economic regionalization has not done much to overcome inter-Korean antagonism, and inter-Korean relations have taken somewhat a turn for the worse during the present South Korean administration.

A key aspect and outcome of this anomalous situation of peninsular

division is North Korea's alienation from this growing integrative process. To be sure, North Korea has developed considerable trade ties to China, hosts substantial South Korean investment at Kaesong, has improved its relations with Russia in recent years, and has long-standing trade ties (legal and illegal) to Japan in the East.¹ But North Korea remains largely isolated from the dynamic of regional integration. In terms of broader regional ties among South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, North Korea's place in Northeast Asian regionalism may not make much difference for now. Over the long run, however, North Korea will have to be integrated into a regional system in order for the region to maintain stability and increase cooperation. The Six-Party Process begun in April 2003 may, as I will discuss later, serve as an institutional mechanism for bringing the region together beyond simply addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. This paper argues that peace-building in Northeast Asia cannot be expected to grow naturally from economic integration; rather, it is critical to address the central problem of Korean division, and establish a more stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula itself, before a broader regional peace regime can be built.

Closely connected to the inter-Korean antagonism is of course the conflict between North Korea and the United States, focused for much of the last fifteen years on the issue of North Korea's nuclear program. The most recent round of this crisis, which peaked with the October 2006 North Korean nuclear test and seems to be now moving toward resolution (although a final resolution may be many years away) was only the latest round in the long confrontation between the United States and North Korea, ongoing since the Korean War broke out in June 1950. This crisis is best seen as a symptom of the more fundamental problem of division and confrontation in and around the Korean peninsula. However difficult and problematic it may be, the best means for resolving the current crisis is for both the United States and DPRK to move from confrontation to

¹ See Samuel S. Kim and Tahwan Lee, eds. *North Korea and Northeast Asia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).

engagement to an active process of reconciliation. U.S.-DPRK reconciliation within a broader multilateral framework would lay the basis for a Northeast Asian security regime that could substantially reduce the potential for conflict. The Six-Party Talks that began in 2003 -- involving North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States -- could serve as the framework for such a security regime. It is certainly better than the alternatives: military conflict over Korea or a nuclear arms race in East Asia.

At the heart of any progress toward peace in the region must be an end to the state of war on the Korean peninsula and a resolution to the U.S.-DPRK conflict that addresses the legitimate security concerns of both parties. We now seem closer to resolving the US-North Korean conflict over the DPRK nuclear program, at the same time that the North-South relationship has deteriorated. Coordinating these relationships is among the most politically and logistically difficult challenges for building a broader peace regime in Northeast Asia.

Overcoming the Cold War Divide

Northeast Asian regionalism has a long and fraught history going back to the nineteenth century.² In the 1930s and early 1940s the Northeast Asia region was first bound together as an economic unit by the Japanese empire. Though hardly based on voluntary cooperation, nevertheless Japanese colonialism laid the infrastructural basis for an integrated regional economy, which Japan exploited to fight the Second World War.³ In other words, the Northeast Asian "war regime" preceded any "peace regime." After the end of World War II, regional cooperation was long hindered by the divisions of the Cold War. The Cold War boundary began

² Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim and Stephen Kotkin, eds. *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006).

³ Daqing Yang, "Japanese Colonial Infrastructure in Northeast Asia: Realities, Fantasies, Legacies," in Armstrong et al, *Korea at the Center*, pp. 92 – 109. See also Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences," *International Organization* (winter 1984), pp. 1-40.

to be penetrated in the early 1970s, as rapprochement between the US and China, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, led to new and extensive contacts across the Cold War ideological divide.

In the midst of this eroding Cold War order, North and South Korea took their first tentative steps toward peaceful co-existence, articulated in the Seoul-Pyongyang joint communiqué of July 1972. The July communiqué did not lead to much expanded North-South contact nor did it spill over into Northeast Asia regional integration in the near term. In the late 1980s, however, South Korea took advantage of its expanding economic power to create new connections to North Korea's Cold War allies, in the so-called Northern Policy, or Nordpolitik, of President Roh Tae Woo. Roh sought to use his country's economic leverage to break out of the Cold War impasse and establish political relations with communist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia, and ultimately to engage with North Korea. The strategy worked: beginning with Hungary in 1986, one East European country after another recognized the Republic of Korea.⁴

The Soviet Union itself established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1990, and China, North Korea's closest ally, followed suit in 1992. As for North Korea, Pyongyang and Seoul signed an agreement on exchange and reconciliation in 1990 and a declaration for a nuclear-free peninsula in 1991; the two Koreas were on the verge of summit meeting when the nuclear crisis and the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994 halted progress in North-South relations for the next several years.

From "Sunshine Policy" to "Peace and Prosperity"

North-South Korean rapprochement in the context of growing Northeast Asian regional inter-connection moved forward again under Kim Dae Jung, elected in December 1997. Kim worked to cultivate good relations with all three of its major Northeast Asian neighbors, the United States,

the European Union, and North Korea. With Japan, issues over Japan's militaristic past notwithstanding, South Korea engaged in active cultural exchange, trade and tourism at levels unprecedented in the two countries' sometimes fraught relationship. Entering the new millennium, Japan and South Korea began discussions on a Free Trade Agreement. The "China boom" that South Korea had experienced since the early 1990s continued and deepened, and South Koreans put the largest share of their investment, literally and figuratively, into a rising China. But the centerpiece of Kim's inter-Korean policy was his "Sunshine Policy" of engagement with the North, which culminated with the Pyongyang summit of June 2000.

The Roh administration basically continued Kim's Sunshine Policy but placed it in a broader regional context. Whereas Kim Dae Jung focused on inter-Korean peace as an end in itself, Roh Moo-hyun tended to portray inter-Korean rapprochement as part of a general goal of "Peace and Prosperity" in the Northeast Asian region. Roh sought to focus on South Korea's role as a key force in regional economic integration, what it called Korea as the "hub economy" for Northeast Asia. In his inaugural address in February 2003, Roh said, "In this new age, our future can no longer be confined to the Korean peninsula. The Age of Northeast Asia is fast approaching. Northeast Asia, which used to be on the periphery of the modern world, is now emerging as a new source of energy in the global economy." Korea's position at the center for Northeast Asia had long been bemoaned as the reason for Korea's weakness and victimization by stronger powers. Now, Roh declared, this very position would be Korea's advantage.

The Korean Peninsula is located at the heart of the region. It is a big bridge linking China and Japan, the continent and the ocean. Such a geopolitical characteristic often caused pain for us in the past. Today, however, this same feature is offering us an opportunity. Indeed, it demands that we play a pivotal role in the Age of Northeast Asia in the twenty-first century.

First and foremost, Korea and the Northeast Asian region as whole would be propelled by economic growth.

⁴ "South Korea's 'Northern Policy'," *Pacific Review*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1990)

Initially, the dawn of the Age of Northeast Asia will come from the economic field. Nations of the region will first form a “community of prosperity,” and through it, contribute to the prosperity of all humanity and, in time, should evolve into a “community of peace.” For a long time, I had a dream of seeing a regional community of peace and co-prosperity in Northeast Asia like the European Union. The Age of Northeast Asia will then finally come to full fruition. I pledge to devote my whole heart and efforts to bringing about that day at the earliest possible time.⁵

Much more explicitly than its predecessors, the Roh administration sought to capitalize on its location at the center of one of the most dynamic regions in the global economy. With Japan as the world’s second largest economy, fitfully emerging from a “lost decade” of stagnation in the 1990s and in discussion for a free trade agreement with South Korea; and China, the world’s fastest-growing economy and both Korea and Japan’s top investment market, the three countries comprised an increasingly integrated regional economy. In the area of security, a region divided for decades by Cold War confrontation was coming together, paradoxically perhaps, over the North Korean nuclear issue, which created the opportunity for six-way security discussions involving South and North Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. For over a century, Korea had been a bystander as more powerful countries decided on the peninsula’s fate. Now, with the Six-Party Talks begun in 2003 over the North Korean nuclear crisis, the two Koreas were active participants, alongside their regional neighbors and the Americans, in negotiating a peaceful outcome to the confrontation on the peninsula. The Roh government went so far as to suggest that South Korea could play the role of a mediator in disputes between Japan and China, and between North Korea and the United States.

This ambition to play the role of “balancer” in Northeast Asia did not go over well in Washington. The administration of George W. Bush had been cool to Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” and had taken a harder

⁵ <http://www.icasinc.org/2003/20031/2003lrnh.html>.

line toward North Korea than either Kim or Roh. The Roh administration’s stated position on Northeast Asia seemed to downplay the US-ROK alliance, and was both of symptom of and a factor in the tension in US-South Korean relation during the first Bush administration. The US-ROK relationship reached its post-Korean War nadir in the winter of 2002-3, after the second North Korean nuclear crisis broke out and the gap widened between Seoul’s policy of engagement and Washington’s more hawkish stance.⁶ But the US position began to turn back toward engagement through the vehicle of the Six-Party Talks in the spring of 2003, although the talks proceeded by fits and starts and the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear crisis reached another peak with Pyongyang’s launching of ballistic missiles in the July 2006 and its nuclear test in October.

Less than a month after the North Korean nuclear test, which seemed at first like a grim repeat of the June 1994 crisis that brought the US and the DPRK to the brink of war, the US mid-term elections brought a democratic majority to power in Washington. Thereafter US foreign policy in general, and toward North Korea in particular, became less hawkish. The formerly unilateralist Bush administration turned more actively to multilateralism in a number of regional disputes (Iran, Palestine, North Korea) and for the next year or so US and ROK policies toward North Korea were largely in sync.

Changes in Seoul and Washington

An irony of the recent leadership changes in Seoul and Washington is that they seem to be pushing the US and ROK into opposite directions on North Korea policy once again – except now South Korea is taking a hard-line position, while the incoming Obama administration may be more pro-

⁶ There were other contributing factors that contributed to the downturn in the US-ROK relationship, including the US run-up to the invasion of Iraq and the accidental killing of two South Korean schoolgirls by a US military vehicle. But their different approaches to North Korea marked the main policy disagreement between Seoul and Washington.

engagement. Much like George W. Bush when he replaced Bill Clinton as US President in 2000, Lee Myung-bak has promised a new approach to North Korea that sharply differs from that of his predecessors. The Lee administration has rejected the previous two administrations' engagement policy as a failure, little more than unilateral appeasement that had left South Korea more vulnerable than before.⁷ This repudiation reflected widespread dissatisfaction with existing North Korea policy among the South Korean electorate as a whole. Much of the South Korean public felt that engagement under Kim and Roh had been a one-way street, with the South giving away the store and getting nothing in return. This may not entirely be supported by the facts, but such was the perception. Lee capitalized on this mood by taking a much more conditional approach to engagement.

While running for office, Lee Myung-bak advocated what he called a "pragmatic" policy toward the North. Subsequently detailed in his inauguration speech and other statements by the President, the Foreign Minister and other key officials, Lee's policy consisted of the following key points: improved of inter-Korean relations progress in North Korea's denuclearization, for which North Korea would be rewarded with economic aid to raise its per capita annual income to \$3,000 (the so-called "Vision 3000"); strengthening US-ROK cooperation in North Korea policy; more reciprocity in inter-Korean relations; conditional economic aid, except for emergency humanitarian assistance, and stricter monitoring of the latter; and greater attention to human rights problems in the DPRK.⁸

Pyongyang's reaction to the Lee administration has been quite negative, to say the least. North Korea accused the South of a "hostile policy" toward the DPRK and has threatened to cut off all ties to South Korea. Confrontation over a variety of issues, from South Korean balloons dropping anti-regime propaganda leaflets on the North to Seoul's

reported interest in joining the Proliferation Security Initiative, have brought North-South tensions to their highest level in years.⁹ At the same time, US President-elect Barack Obama has said repeatedly that he would be willing to meet directly with Kim Jong Il, and all signs are that his administration would push for greater engagement with the DPRK.¹⁰ The possible rift between Seoul and Washington over policy toward the North reflects the potential contradiction in Lee's North Korea policy: a staunchly pro-US posture and a hard line against Pyongyang are problematic when the US itself takes a more conciliatory approach. It remains to be seen whether this contradiction develops into a new rift between Seoul and Washington over dealing with North Korea. No doubt Pyongyang would prefer to deal directly with the US and sideline Seoul while US-DPRK relations improve. But without careful coordination and agreement among all three parties, the inter-Korean conflict at the heart of the Northeast Asia cannot be resolved. No amount of regional integration by itself can overcome the political problem of divided Korea, and improved inter-Korean ties are central to a lasting peace regime in the region.

The Future of Northeast Asian Regionalism

At the moment there is no overarching institution for Northeast Asian economic cooperation. In that sense the European Union comparisons are rather farfetched. In the security area several forums for regional cooperation exist, including the ASEAN + 3 meetings, the East Asian Summit, and above all the Six-Party Talks, which are directed specifically at cooperation of the Northeast Asian countries (including the United States) over the North Korean nuclear issue.

One idea that has attracted a lot of attention and excitement is the

⁷ Yong Sueng Dong, "The North Korea Policy of the Lee Administration and a Prognosis of Likely Developments," *Korea and World Affairs*, vol. 32, no.2 (summer 2008), p. 162.

⁸ Hyeong Jung Park, "Lee Administration North Korea Policy in the Context of Northeast Asian International Relations," *Korea and World Affairs*, vol. 32, no. 1 (spring 2008), p. 16.

⁹ Tong Kim, "Deterioration of Inter-Korean Relationship," Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online, November 4th, 2008. <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08084Kim.html>.

¹⁰ See the Council on Foreign Relations publication, "The Candidates on North Korea Policy," October 23, 2008. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/14757>.

creation of a Northeast Asian Peace and Security Forum, which would build on the Six-Party Process after the immediate issue of North Korea's nuclear program is resolved. This, it is argued, would encourage multilateral security cooperation and lay the basis for a "security architecture" that would address security concerns of the regional nations in both traditional terms and in terms of "non-traditional" or transnational security threats.¹¹ Such a Northeast Asian Peace and Security Forum would presumably take as its proximate model the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), based on the Helsinki Accord of 1972. A Helsinki-like forum would reflect the fact that strong differences between political systems remain in Northeast Asia, and would overlap with but be distinct from the architecture of regional economic cooperation.¹² Be that as it may, it remains to be seen whether the Six-Party talks can resolve the current North Korean nuclear issue, much less lay the foundation of regional security "architecture."

For all the recent talk of regional integration, in some ways Northeast Asia looks back to an earlier period of international relations. National sovereignty is jealously guarded, and nationalism is stronger here than in many other parts of the world. Geopolitics—in the old-fashioned, nineteenth-century sense of conflict over territory demarcated by clear boundaries—lives on in Northeast Asia, despite the era of globalization and its diminishing of territoriality. The main point of geopolitical contention is North Korea, but there are territorial disputes among all the other countries as well – between Korea and Japan, Korea and China, China and Japan, and Japan and Russia. And yet, some of the region's constituent parts are at the leading edge of global trends. China has become one the most important global centers of manufacturing and has

sustained the highest consistent levels of economic growth in the world. Japan rebounded from more than a decade of economic stagnation in the early 2000s, and it is still the world's second largest economy. South Korea, now a manufacturing and high-tech powerhouse in its own right, has the world's highest per capita rates of broadband Internet usage.

As the American influence in Northeast Asia ineluctably declines relative to China, a recovering Japan, a reemerging Russia, and a more independent South Korea, a strictly "realist" or power-political view of Northeast Asia might suggest that the region will once again become an arena of great power rivalry; that local conflicts are likely to increase; and that Korea will again be caught in the middle. In other words, the twenty-first century might begin to look much like the nineteenth. But the dynamics of the region and the world have changed considerably since Korea first became the object of geopolitical rivalries in the late nineteenth century. Although historical animosities and distrust among China, South Korea, and Japan, not to mention Russia, persist, in recent years, the conversations among the respective governments have tended to focus more on free trade areas and increasing cooperation at all levels. At the same time, transnational flows of goods, capital, culture, and people in the region flourish. Having wallowed in Yellow Peril, the depressed Russian Far East may finally be busier with learning how to overcome its disadvantages by taking advantage of nearby Chinese labor and markets. Even North Korea, despite its longstanding isolationism, appears to be fitfully emerging from its shell. Obviously, Northeast Asia lacks the institutionally based open regionalism we see in Europe or Southeast Asia.

Predictions about the future of this dangerous region are themselves dangerous, but a few trends seem to stand out. First, barring a devastating event on the peninsula such as war (a grim prospect, but not outside the realm of possibility), Korea—whether the South alone or a unified peninsula—will continue to be an important and increasingly independent actor in the region and will not lapse into its old role of "a shrimp crushed between whales," as the Korean proverb puts it. Second, the relative balance of power in the region appears likely to shift away from the

¹¹ See among others Shin-wha Lee and Hyun Myoung Jun, "Building a Northeast Asian Community: A Multilateral Security Approach," in Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas, eds. *Advancing East Asian Regionalism* (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 74 – 95.

¹² James Goodby and Markku Heiskanen, "Emerging Regional Security Architecture in Northeast Asia," Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online, January 3rd, 2008. <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08001GoodbyHeiskanen.html>.

United States and toward China. Nowhere is this trend more evident than on the Korean peninsula itself, where China has replaced the United States as South Korea's largest trading partner, and where U.S. plans to reduce and redeploy its military forces, perhaps ultimately to remove them from the peninsula altogether, are rapidly moving forward. Japan, too, imports more from China than from the United States, and even if China surpasses Japan as the world's second largest economy (as some predict), Sino-Japanese economic cooperation will remain a critical engine for regional prosperity.

Nor is Russia's presence to be discounted. After a decade of paying little attention to the region following the Soviet collapse, Russia started to reestablish its presence in Northeast Asia, first by establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea, and subsequently in forums such as the Six-Party Talks. In any event, Russia will play a critical role locally as a source of energy, including oil and natural gas, especially for Korea and Japan, which lack such resources domestically, but above all for a resource-devouring China. Overall, then, the countries and areas within Northeast Asia may well draw closer together, while the U.S. presence could decline to a position more indicative of its geographical distance. Finally, the flow of goods, information, cultural products, and people in all directions appears unstoppable, and likely to increase. Again, Korea offers a telling example: by 2003, more South Korean students were studying in China than in the United States, and this trend shows little sign of abating.

Amid this broadening regionalism, Korea has been and will remain at the center. But unlike in the past, Korea now has the opportunity to function as a facilitator of regional cooperation. The previous administration of Roh Moo Hyun dreamed of Korea becoming the "hub" of a dynamic regional economy. The current administration by contrast emphasizes the centrality of its alliance with the US over being a "balancer" between competing interests in the region. Nevertheless, the Lee Myung-bak government has recently discussed a "strategic partnership" with China and has sought closer ties with Japan despite the ongoing dispute over Dokdo. Korea continues to play an active role at the

center of Northeast Asia.

Many uncertainties remain. Historical animosities and rivalries among China and Japan, Korea and Japan, China and Russia have hardly disappeared. No effective institutional mechanism for resolving critical security issues yet exists. China's economic power creates competition as well as opportunities for Korea and Japan, as well as tremendous ecological pressures. Korea's political and economic presence in the region is unlikely to rival or surpass that of China or Japan in the foreseeable future; its most important role would be that of facilitator or catalyst (a promoter of free trade areas an organizer of security dialogue) rather than of regional leader.

The biggest question of all is the future of Korean division, which is to say, the future of North Korea. To paraphrase Mark Twain, rumors of the DPRK's imminent demise have so far been exaggerated. Notwithstanding "collapsist" scenarios favored by many Western scholars and experts, twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall North Korea was still with us. Futurology on North Korea has become a cottage industry, but basically forecasts come down to three possibilities: sudden implosion, gradual reform, or war. The latter scenario would mean devastation for the peninsula and much of the surrounding region, and none of the governments in the region, including the United States, favors a military solution to the Korean problem. "Regime change" triggered by popular protests and removal of the current government by internal political forces, akin to those that swept communist Eurasia from Berlin to Ulan Bator between 1989 and 1991, could still sweep North Korea. So far North Korea has avoided this scenario, but the future of North Korea without Kim Jong Il as leader now appears much closer than we had previously sought. It is not certain how stable a post-Kim regime would be or how long it will last.

Gradual reform is the scenario for North Korea favored by the governments of China and South Korea, which have the most to lose if North Korea implodes or war breaks out. These two have contributed the greatest resources (economic and political) to try to keep North Korea


from disintegrating. By the early 2000s, North Korea showed some signs of pursuing limited reform in the economic realm, although it has since backtracked somewhat on the path of reform.¹³ But regardless of what happens in North Korea, a new infrastructure of broad regionalism is being built in Northeast Asia among South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States. North Korea can voluntarily join in this growing regionalism or not. At some point, it may find that it has no choice.

In the meantime, Northeast Asian integration will proceed with or without the extensive cooperation of North Korea. Northeast Asian cooperation exists in three main areas: military security, economic cooperation and energy, and “human security” issues such as environmental protection, migration, and the transnational flow of disease. North Korea has so far been reluctant to sign on to cooperation in many of these areas, and although North Korean involvement would be an important contribution, further regional integration can continue without it – at least in the short-term. In the long run, North Korea cannot remain an island of isolation in the midst of a steadily integrating region. Even – indeed especially – if the North Korean regime becomes unstable, resolving the “North Korea question” will be critical for regional cooperation to continue and deepen. Alternatively, North Korea may become the point of contention over which neighboring countries will come into conflict. If the latter turns out to be the case, Northeast Asian regionalism will suffer a major setback, and North Korea will play the role that the Korean peninsula as a whole played one hundred years ago: the focus of regional rivalry, competition and conflicting interests. South Korea has moved beyond that role; North Korea, hopefully, will be able to do so as well.

A lasting and stable peace regime in Northeast Asia must begin with a resolution of the “Korea problem” at its center. This does not necessarily mean unification, which is a very remote possibility at this point, but will

at least involve normal diplomatic relations among all the countries in the region and reduction of hostilities between Seoul and Pyongyang. The first step should be the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States and between North Korea and Japan, followed by (or simultaneous with) a peace treaty ending of the state of war on the Korean peninsula. The latter would include the US, China, and North and South Korea as signatories. Northeast Asia is coming together, but it will remain unstable without North Korea integrated more fully into the region, which in turn requires a deeper and more positive relationship between the two Koreas. At the moment, unfortunately, the trend seems to be in the opposite direction.

¹³ Becky Branford, “N. Korea Struggle to Control Changing Economy,” *BBC News*, 26 August 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7538009.stm>.



*Peace and Security in the Non-traditional
Dimension*

The Development of Jeju Local Diplomacy

Cooperation and International Development

Multilateral Approaches for Human Rights

Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia

The Development of Jeju Local Diplomacy: Cooperative Interaction of the Diplomatic Actor

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Introduction

With the democratization of Korea in 1987, and the restoration of local government in 1991, South Korea's localization trend is continuing to the present day. Concurrent with the globalization wave, Korean local governments are not at the 'bottom' of dealing with the order of central government business, but the avant-courier of international exchanges. Globalization and localization have currently been performing simultaneously and many local governments have been facing the challenges of upgrading the quality of life for their residents and improving the local community through various kinds of international interchanges. Under these circumstances, international activities were emerging at the local government level in the late 1990s. This phenomenon, referred to as the 'internationalization of localities', has been recently become known to the public as 'local diplomacy'. Diplomacy is generally accepted by the inherent action of the central government. Nowadays, the necessity of local diplomacy should be recognized, even though it is not implemented by the plenipotentiary power of central government to local government. Rather, it means that "the localities as a

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main body have no choice but to do a limited action plan for their own localities' sake" beyond the traditional framework of state-centered diplomacy (Park Kyung Kuk 2006, 31). In this way, conceiving the necessity of local diplomacy is to know the contextual requirements of the new diplomacy recently raised. First of all, there have been different ways of extending diplomatic operations. These methods include the diplomacy of bilateral relations at the regional and international level, and also to agendas at the local level. Secondly, in this regard, the range and extent of diplomatic functions begins to rapidly escalate at the national level to different and various spheres. Third, expanding today's local diplomacy facilitates other actors, including the numbers and types (cf. Thakur 2007, 1), to participate in the process including private enterprises, multinational corporations, NGOs, and regional and international organizations. Diplomatic agenda's diversification, the expansion of the extent and range of diplomatic actions, and the enlargement of diplomatic actors are the driving forces for the new diplomacy. And so, likewise, local diplomacy has been emerging as a new condition in this diplomatic context.

At the present time, local diplomacy is not well recognized for its ability to contribute to regional development. Academic research in this field is also at the initial stage domestically. The typical type of the international exchanges revolve around sisterhood relations to establish the building of partnership ties between cities. Therefore, the concept of local diplomacy is only to appreciate friendly relations (Ko Kyung Min 2008; Chung Se Gil 2008). In doing so, the organizational capacities of local autonomies are left in a weak state (Kang Taek Koo 2007).

If local diplomacy, would be willing to be reflected on new trends, however, there is evidence to suggest a turning point for paving a new way. The agenda setting of local diplomacy, its range and domain, and enlargement of its actors should be strongly taken into consideration. With regard to this issue, we take track 2 diplomacy as the point of departure. In other words, for changing the cognition of local diplomacy and expanding diplomatic capacity, it will be essential to bridge the gap between the public sector and private sector. New diplomacy will be

required.

In order to increase the level of local diplomacy in South Korea, the purpose of this article calls attention to the central problems of active local diplomacy. These are track 1 and track 2 diplomacy, and the strengthening of track 1.5 diplomacy, which imply the cooperative interaction between track 1 diplomacy and track 2 diplomacy. This paper uses a case study to illustrate the realities of Jeju Special-governing Province's diplomatic activities. Jeju, with its justification and symbolic representation as an International Free City as well as World Peace Island, has been coming face to face with various kinds of international functions and cooperative actions, and promoting the local economy from a pragmatic perspective. Accordingly, this paper reviews the theoretical applications of types 1 and 2 diplomacy, and creates an analytical framework as to how the interaction of the two diplomacy types will function in the context of its governance. We shall successively review the realities of the local diplomacy in Jeju and also attempt to show the potential for its growth, discussing the advantages and peculiarities of the environment.

A Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework of Local Diplomacy

1. The Characteristics of Local Diplomacy

Local diplomacy is a policy representing the autonomy and decentralization in a locality, and includes the actions of carrying out cooperation and exchanges between the local governments of two nations. In general terms, local diplomacy could be viewed as an indigenous sphere of activity, and the institutional autonomy guaranteed by the national government is indispensable to carry out this activity. Full local government participation should be compulsory. In this regard, the position of local diplomacy could be considered as the "destination of decentralization and last state of the authority transfer of national business." (Ko Kyung Min, 2008, 135) But, if the leading actor of local diplomacy is the local government, performing the only formal actions, it

would not be enough to have the characteristics of local diplomacy. But if the only leading actor of local diplomacy is local government, this is not enough to be truly representative of local diplomacy. Local government should involve and stimulate different actors to participate in order to improve the outcomes of local diplomacy.

Considering the status of local diplomacy as the supplementary, supportive, and corrective actions of national diplomacy, or comparing local diplomacy to national diplomacy as micro-diplomacy and para-diplomacy minimizes the possibility of its range and sphere for effective local diplomacy (Park Kyung Gook 2006, 30). Local diplomacy, unlike national diplomacy, handles non-political, and non-military functions. And so, freed from the external central government environment, it is capable of carrying into effect the continuity and stability of exchanges (Yang Hyun Mo et. al. 2007, 102). Therefore, local diplomacy is free to adopt different coordinative agendas, compared to traditional state-centered diplomacy, and has merits for taking advantage of these informal lines of diplomacy (Ko Kyung Min 2008).

The question is, how can national diplomacy and local diplomacy be developed with acceptable parameters of conformity and compatibility? Strictly speaking, local diplomacy is obviously behind national diplomacy. Local diplomacy however, while remaining compatible with national diplomacy, should strive for a self-reliant role on the basis of its unique positions and characteristics. Consequently, local diplomacy need not perform national diplomatic activities, such as engaging in military concerns, but do diverse kinds of exchanges and cooperation for the promotion of friendships and mutual development based upon interactive trust. Fundamentally, local diplomacy carries out the general missions except the political, and military realms of national diplomacy. In this regard, local diplomacy is mainly concerned with, developing and executing economic interests. Additionally, the real potential for local diplomacy is in environmental conservation, social development, human rights, detentes, cultural exchanges, and peace building for the global development of international exchanges and cooperation (Ahn Sung Ho

1998, 234-35). Likewise, local diplomacy is compelled to focus on the orientation of shared interests for each party's mutual development rather than for their exclusive interests.

In order to do that, local diplomacy needs to extend its scope and range for the participation of many actors. The participants in local diplomacy have the opportunity to take advantage of all the potential benefits. In this context, track 2 diplomacy could be supplied for the implications of local diplomacy.

2. Diplomacy Type: Track 2 Diplomacy and Track 1.5 Diplomacy

Generally, diplomacy can be divided into two types; the first is track 1 diplomacy for the mission of the state, and quasi-states, the second is track 2 diplomacy for the action of such entities as privates, NGO's, and the business of multinational corporations through informal channels. With local diplomacy's transformation from national to local interests and engaging civilian spheres, the monopoly of the diplomats is broken. This is particularly due to having to cope with the limitations of the issues surrounding international relations.

Actually, today's diplomacy reveals the characteristics of networking, including the private actors beyond the formal actors of diplomacy. Many actors, including governmental, private enterprises, and NGO's, play a leading role in accomplishing their duties, and this takes the form of public diplomacy (Kim Sang Tae 2002). This current form of diplomacy has been coming from thinking about the effective promotion for the public's senses rather than the circumspect understanding, and the maximizing of national interests using the old styles of the formal letters of diplomats (Newsom 1988, 23).

Track 2 diplomacy is "informal, nonstructural interaction, the significant conditions take practical potential conflict for granted that appeal to the common human ability responding to goodwill and reasonableness" (Davidson & Montville 1981, 155). For example, America was using what was called Ping Pong diplomacy as a form of civilian

activities. Also, Zimbabwe marked the ending of the time-consuming civil war, easing the consciousness of danger for white people. In this manner, track 2 diplomacy can lead to change in terms of psychological perspectives, and contribute to working out more efficient diplomatic goals (cf. Davidson & Montville 1981, 153-56).

Also, according to Montville (2006, 24), track 2 diplomacy has a point of excellence for healing the trauma of history and contributing much toward peace. He continues by commenting on, first, that track 2 diplomacy manages to function at the roots of the trauma of peoples and states, the psychological cure of a violent conflict. He points out that "track 2 diplomacy invented the process of searching for the possible resolutions in the eyes of the public, supporting the decision-makers." This is the second role. Third, track 2 diplomacy influences the cooperation of economic development. Fourth, it inflates developmental strategy and the integration of civilian-society building (Montville 2006, 16). Likewise, track 2 diplomacy directs our attention to make up for track 1 diplomacy areas not covered by independent missions.

The role of unofficial dialogues is not formal conflict resolution through peace settlements but they are helpful in doing conflict management, detente, confidence building, and local identification formation. Like this, track 2 diplomacy dialogue should not be considered as bringing about instant outcomes like conflict resolution, but rather holding coordinative and long-term views (Kaye 2005, 3). Take for example the case of reconciliation between Germany and France. This has been widely recognized as an example of the importance of institutionalized dialogue and cooperation in the process of conflict resolution. South Africa provides the example of its nullification of apartheid and adoption of accommodation (Lieberfeld 2002, 355-72).

Seen from the point of view mentioned above, where global conflict issues are concerned, track 1 diplomacy and track 2 diplomacy can be clearly discerned. The negotiation at state levels such as the repeal and cessation of war can be done by track 1 diplomacy. On the other hand, the self-awakening and action for getting rid of cultural structural violence

and for improving such global issues as the environment and development can be accelerated by track 2 diplomacy (Nan 2003; Chigas 2003). A noteworthy consideration is of the value of track 2 diplomacy effects on track 1 diplomacy. From the perspective of functionalism, a theorist of regional integration asserts, especially in the process of conflict resolution between the states and peace building, that only the interactions between formal and informal fields can be reached. Strengthening the cooperative actions of the nonpolitical fields is to mutually enjoy the profits, to enlarge the spill-over for the generals (Mitrany 1966, 38). This, again, can possibly be done to the peace-making or peace-sustenance processes through the sustainable experienced learning in the political fields of attracting international cooperation.

In this context, track 1.5 diplomacy shall be essential for the cooperative interaction between the formal and informal spheres to carry out diplomatic activities. Of course, up to now, the definition of track 1.5 diplomacy hasn't existed. On this, according to Nan (Nan 2003, 9), is defined as the "informal interaction between the formal delegations of state." Two years later, he redefined it as "done by the informal organs, the diplomacy intervened by the bureaucrats." (Nan 2005, 165) To that extent, track 1.5 diplomacy is academically in its early days, and the general idea is also a triangular concept. But whoever is an object, and if the methods of conducting the diplomatic actions can come to a consensus, to some degree, ambitious diplomatic goals and fruits could be accomplished with the combination of track 1 diplomacy and track 2 diplomacy rather than continuing a split between the two. Accordingly, track 1.5 diplomacy is said to be a diplomatic style reaching negotiations and compromises by way of the informal contact of formal and informal delegations. In this regard, track 1.5 diplomacy can be defined as the cooperative interaction of diplomacy between track 1 diplomacy and track 2 diplomacy.

By the way, when it comes to understanding track 1.5 diplomacy from the perspective of local diplomacy, the diplomatic actor of the formal and informal, as well as the ways of implementation are becoming more and more important. Great attention has been shown to the question of how

track 1 diplomacy and track 2 diplomacy combined together lead to cooperative interaction. Like this, the governance of track 1.5 local diplomacy can be taken as a principal way of propelling this issue of cooperation into consideration.

3. Analytical Framework: Local Diplomacy Actor and Action Structure

In the present paper we shall examine the case of Jeju local diplomacy, focusing on the established formal and informal levels of diplomatic actions within the context of track 2 diplomacy. Additionally, the study purports to reveal the level of track 1.5 diplomacy, pushing forward within the framework of civilian government cooperation. When the range of analysis is set up like this, the analytical focus is aimed at the exploration of the level of track 2 diplomacy, such as informal delegation participation, beyond track 1 diplomacy. The level of track 2 diplomacy for diplomatic actors are enterprises, NGO's as well as nearly all private actors. The diversity of local diplomacy is indispensable to the development of track 2 diplomacy. For the connection between the formal and informal actors performing the cooperative interaction, it is necessary to control for the interaction of various actors. The action structure for linkage cooperation coordination of track 1.5 local diplomacy's actors are also becoming a precondition.

In this paper we will endeavor to infer and elucidate Jeju local diplomacy at an actor level and elaborate on the action structure of activities in connection with this issue. Above all, at the level of being an actor, local diplomacy's participation in various kinds of actions and formal spheres in the localities will be widely extended. Next, in the various action's structural context, many of the local diplomatic actors can achieve common goals through linkage and cooperation, and if necessary, coordination. For the purpose of local diplomacy, there are issues that are raised; such as how much the agenda of local diplomacy varies, and how to evaluate the accomplishments of local diplomacy. However, narrowly defining 'actors' and the actions of local diplomacy contributes to

articulate analysis. Local diplomacy is, therefore, at the initial stage of contributing to the greater development of, and providing concrete implications towards a comprehensive understanding of track 1.5 diplomacy.

The Analysis of Jeju Local Diplomacy

The concept of local diplomacy has not been fully introduced domestically within South Korea. Almost all local government actions still remain at a beginning stage of development (Park 2006; Kang 2007). Given local governments' slight actions across the local diplomacy spectrum, they have yielded little action, or results. Also, Jeju is not an exceptional case. Nevertheless, there has been enough activity to exert itself to perform active local diplomacy, taking Jeju's recent local diplomacy initiatives into account.

We present here an outline, with reference to Jeju International Free City and Jeju Island of World Peace as the framework of policy for local diplomacy. Our second aim is to review the realities of Jeju Special Self-governing Province and to examine three parts: international exchanges, international cooperation, and international commerce. A third aim is to synthesize the programs of Inter-Korea Exchanges and Cooperation, and the action plan of Jeju Island of World Peace.

1. The Policy Basis of Local Diplomacy


Jeju has been pushing the establishment of an International Free City enacting the 『Special Law of International Free City』 on April 1st, 2002. According to the enactment, the “free international city is envisioned as a place that allows the unrestricted movement of people, capital and goods, thereby attracting a significant increase in the volume of business being carried out in Jeju. The need for such a place stems from the acknowledgement at a national level of the need to be competitive in the fast evolving global economy entering the 21st century” (Jones Lang Lasalle 2000, 8). In order to accomplish this, the Jeju government aims to

establish a 21st century strategic plan to develop into a center of world-class tourism, finance and logistics by taking advantage of Jeju Island's natural resources and locational attributes.

But, due to a lack of institutional basis, governmental support, and autonomy, Jeju Free International City has been at a low ebb. For the betterment of this, given the special autonomy to Jeju, the 『Special Law of Jeju Special Self-governing Province Establishment and Special Law of International Free City Promotion』 was set on February 21st, 2006. Additionally, along with the creation of the Special Self-governing Province, Jeju has been launching missions for revising the 『Comprehensive Plan of Jeju International Free City』 by strengthening its enhanced authority and autonomy. Four core industries (clean tourism, primary industry, education, and health care) and at same time based upon these, an advanced industry (IT, BT), or '4+1 core industry' has been implemented by the local government (Jeju Special Self-governing Province 2006).

A precondition of the creation plans and implementation of Jeju Free International City are that projects require national government approval and involvement. In actual practice, projects are initiated and developed at the local, Jeju level, and then submitted for national government approval. This, is resulting in the balanced development for converging local development from the center to the periphery through the local advancement of Jeju. What is more, by upgrading the incomes and welfare of Jeju people, it signifies a local development policy to better the quality of life as an end goal. Keeping a concrete focus on the endeavor that the unrestricted movement of people, capital and goods, thereby attract a significant increase in the volume of business being carried out on Jeju, the international exchanges and cooperation should be essential in the success or failure in its mission. Of course, the priority of Jeju International Free City has been weighted heavily on foreign direct investment. In the near future, the strategy of participating in the various kinds of actions and involving actors prepared for local diplomacy will need to be carried out.

<Figure 1> Organization of Local Diplomacy in Jeju Special Self-governing Province: Bureau of Free International City



Sources: Jeju Special Self-governing Province web site (<http://www.jeju.go.kr/>)

* () manpower

Reflecting on these requirements, Jeju local government has set up exclusive sections for local diplomacy. According to the organizational formation of Jeju Special Self-governing Province, local diplomacy affairs bear a majority of the responsibilities within the headquarters of Jeju Free International City <Figure 1>. But, the international cooperation for affairs concerning tourism and the environment is responsible for the related sections <Table 3>. Prior to the establishment of Jeju Special Self-governing Province (July, 2006), the department of International Free City Tourism was in charge of tourism. Right after the government reorganization, the tourism section was then transferred to the department

of Culture, Tourism and Transportation, and the headquarters of Jeju Free International City was organized for the responsibility of local diplomacy, embracing the duties associated with an international free city. Referring to the existing studies (Kang 2007, 141-42), this organization is comprised of 2 sections and 2 teams having a total of approximately 51 personnel. There are branch organizations in all areas of the country. Adding the JDC's (Jeju Development Center) emphasis on investment attraction and public development for the promotion of Jeju Free International City, the overall organizational infrastructure of Jeju Special Self-governing Province for local diplomacy is well prepared.

In the meantime, Jeju has been designated as a beacon to produce, and spread the message of peace as 'World Peace Island' becoming effective on January 27th, 2004. It has as its objective, the world free from all threats. It is to construct the networking of knowledgeable people in the field, and physical distribution of material among the social community. It intends to contain the positive peace endeavors of getting rid of different kinds of structural violence, as well as negative peace such as the absence of war. In other words, there has been established an island devoted to eliminating all kinds of dangers, such as war, human rights abuse, environmental and social crime, poverty, and social discrimination. Throughout the 'Pan-residents action movement,' it aimed at comprising a 'Jeju embodiment of World Peace Island', one step further, to a 'Pan-national global level of expansion' (Jeju Special Self-governing Province 2007a, 4). The action plan of World Peace Island read as follows; (1) the realization of a Jeju peace community for securing human rights and social welfare, (2) the drive of the International Free City for enlarging local, national, and global exchanges, (3) the presentation of a development model of environment-friendly searching for harmony between human beings and nature, (4) the pioneering role in performing the reconciliation and collaboration of inter-Korea relations and the peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia' (Jeju Special Self-governing Province 2007a, 4).

<Table 1> Missions Related to Local Diplomacy in Jeju World Peace Island

Name of Operations *of 17 total operations	Project Status Date / Activity	Related Government Post	
		Central	Jeju
2. Wax Museum in International Peace Center	- completed	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Unification, Ministry of National Defense	Peace and Cooperation Division
6. Having Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks	- The 17th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks :05. 12. 13-16	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Unification, Ministry of National Defense	Peace and Cooperation Division
7. Sending Tangerines to North Korea	- In 2005 · tangerines 3,049t, carrots 7,000t - In 2006 · tangerines 260t, carrots 4,100t	Ministry of Unification	Mandarin Management Division
8. Hosting Jeju Peace Forum	- The 3rd Jeju Peace Forum:05.6.9-11 - The 4th Jeju Peace Forum:07.6.21-23	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Peace and Cooperation Division
14. Hosting International Conference	- ASIAN ASEM the Senior Officials' Meeting - Korea-China-Japan ministerial meeting	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Peace and Cooperation Division
15. To Attract International Organizations	- To attract UN affiliated international organizations	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Peace and Cooperation Division
16. Inter-Korean Peace Festival	- Having a conference with Ministry of Unification, Inter-Korean Peace Festival organizing committee	Ministry of Unification	Peace and Cooperation Division
17. Multi-party Peace Cooperation Body	- Having a conference with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Peace and Cooperation Division

Source: Jeju Special Self-governing Province (2007b, 22).

The expectations are for 'Jeju World Peace Island' to take positive steps forward for the peace, cooperation and operations to lead to the peaceful settlement of the Korean peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia. World Peace Island will function as the center of international peace and exchanges, as a conference place of summit diplomacy, the choice and for international organizations and international conferences. All these duties fall under the mission of World Peace Island. Its Peace education is also available for local residents and tourists, as well as foreign visitors. A long-range goal, in order to be a successful international free city, is the anticipation that Jeju will engage in preventive measures to reduce the likelihood of war, in the power struggle of ideological cleavages, and with the military confrontation in Northeast Asia, thus contributing to building a Northeast Asia peace system.

At the time of designating World Peace Island, according to the selection of 17 action plans of peace empowerment missions, various acts of local diplomacy activities have been performing intergovernmental collaboration between national and local parties <Figure 1>. A department of peace cooperation has been established to facilitate these missions. At the civilian level, a 'Jeju World Peace Island for Pan-Resident Action Association' has been instituted. At the beginning of 2005, there was an initiative for the Pan-Resident Movement organization to be transformed from the personality of a civilian governmental partnership at the initial stage, and gradually transform the organization to a civilian corporation. Also, this organization is continuously discovering themes for the peace program in the form of propositions, public subscriptions as well as in itself. It is pushing forward the peace practicing missions, linking the peace institutes and infrastructures with financial administrative support (Cheju-do 2005, 4-5).

2. The Present Condition of Local Diplomacy

1) International Exchanges

International exchanges are interchangeably used to push forward the

cooperation, promotion and common interests planning among different groups such as private citizens, organizations, enterprises, and for governmental issues rising above race, religion, regime, and ideology (Kim Pan Suk 2000, 10). The mission of local diplomacy domestically has been mainly centered upon sisterhood relationships, a friendly cooperation with foreign local governments. Jinju City in Kyungsang Namdo Province was the first Korean city to have sisterhood relations with Eugene City in the state of Oregon, USA commencing in 1961.

As shown in <Table 2>, Jeju Special Self-governing Province began establishing formal external relations in 1986, beginning with Hawaii, USA. As of May, 2008, it has fostered relationships with 26 cities in 9 countries in the form of sisterhood relations and friendship cities. Regionally, it converges in the Asia region, especially in China and Japan, compared to North America, Europe, or Oceania. Relations with these two countries are relatively active. Observing the periodic progression of relations established, there were 4 cases in the 1980's, 12 cases in the 1990's, and 10 cases since 2000. At the level of Jeju Special Self-governing Province, it is sustaining 13 city relationships in 8 countries. At the level of Jeju's administrative cities, Jeju and Seogwipo, maintain relations with 17 cities in 4 countries.

Interestingly, there have been few sister city relationships established since the launch of Jeju Free International City, in 2002. It is generally thought to be strongly in favor of doing so, but Jeju has shown small outcomes; Jeju Special Self-governing Province has established 1 relationship and Jeju City 2 cases since 2006.

<Table 2> International Exchanges Of Jeju Special Self-governing Province

Classification	Jeju Special Self-governing Province		Administrative Cities			
Classification	Jeju Special Self-governing Province		Jeju City		Seogwipo City	
Classification	Sisterhood Cities	Friendship Cities	Sisterhood Cities	Friendship Cities	Sisterhood Cities	Friendship Cities
Cities / Countries	U.S.A	Taiwan	Japan	U.S.A	Japan	China
	Hawaii (1986)	Taipei (1997)	Wakayama (1987)	Las Vegas (1997)	Kinokawa (1987)	Sanya (1999)
	Indonesia	Australia	Hyogo Prefecture	China	Karatsu (1994)	
	Bali (1989)	Tasmania (1997)	Sanda (1997)	Yangzhou (2000)	Kashima (2003)	
	Russia	Japan	China	Kunsan (2001)	China	
	Sakhalin (1992)	Shizuoka (2000)	Shandong Laizou (1995)	Hunchun (2007)	Xingcheng (1996)	
	China	China		Japan		
	Hainan (1995)	Dalian (2001)	Guilin (1997)	Beppu (2003)		
	Portugal		U.S.A	Arakawa (2006)		
	Madeira (2007)		Santa-Rosa (1996)			
		France				
		Rouen (2004)				

* () year

Source: Jeju Special Self-governing Province (2007c).

2) International Cooperation Sector

International cooperation means that the local government cooperates in globalization policies of the central government, or independently to support the developing country, or that the local government cooperates with the local government of a foreign country and an international body in order to attain the common goals. (Park 2006, 96-97). As of March 2008, Jeju Special Self-governing Province International Cooperation Field had joined seven international bodies <Table 3>. Since 1992, Jeju Special Self-governing Province has attended the ‘Korean-Japanese Strait Governor meeting’ in which participants from Cholla Nam Do, and Gyeongsangnam-do on the Korea side attended, with Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, and Yamaguchi participants from the Japanese side. Jeju Special Self-governing Province joined ‘North East Asia Regional Government’(NEAR) and ‘United Cities and Local Governments’(UCLG),

which are professional organizations in mutual cooperation with each other. Jeju Special Self-governing Province has joined other organizations related to the economy, tourism and environment sectors.

In June 2007, Jeju Special Self-governing Province advocated the ‘Jeju Process’ for a Northeast Asia multiple nations security cooperation initiative in ‘The Fourth Jeju Forum’ (Ko Song Yun 2007). In the Fourth Jeju Forum, it was discussed how Northeast Asia needs nations’ security cooperation more than ever, and urged the realization of the Jeju Process which refers to the Helsinki Process. The written declaration stressed that the ROK Government must be central to, and take the measures necessary for the process of a multiple nations security discussion to be realized as soon as possible. This would be in order to bring governments in the Northeast Asia area together, and the process emphasized a constructive dialogue discussion body which includes non-governmental groups. The discussion about the ‘Jeju Process’ in the Jeju Peace Forum opened a new possibility of seeking international cooperation using Jeju’s local diplomacy.

<Table 3> Jeju Special Self-governing Province Membership in International Organizations

Membership in International Organizations	Year Joined	Related Department
NEAR: The Association of North East Asia Regional Governments	1996	Peace and Cooperation Division
KUSEC: Korea-U.S. Economic Council. Inc.	2002	Peace and Cooperation Division
UCLG: United Cities and Local Government	2004	Peace and Cooperation Division
PATA: Pacific Asia Travel Association	1985	Tourism Marketing Division
ASTA: American Society of Travel Agents	1995	Tourism Marketing Division
ICLEI: International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives	2005	Environment Policy Division
AFHC: Alliance For Healthy Cities	2005	Public Healthy Division


Source: Jeju Special Self-governing Province (2007c).

3) International Business Sector

Recently local governments have put an emphasis on export promotion of their respective enterprises and specialties, and this export promotion policy is the local governments' trade policy which directly affects the import and export of goods. In this field, Jeju Special Self-governing Province's overall trade quantity is showing a steadily increasing condition, but it has not reached a satisfactory level. <Figure 2> shows the results of the import and export balances by year.

Since 2000, the recorded balance of trade deficit is becoming larger, little by little, with the 2006 deficit being the highest on record. Jeju International Free City has been strongly promoting foreign investment as the way of the future. As seen in <Table 4>, enterprises from Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Taiwan have guaranteed to invest approximately 1.47 trillion won, and already among these, 483 billion won has been invested in seven projects. In the tourism development field 1.4 trillion won is being invested in 5 projects, while in the IT and BT fields, 741 billion won will be invested in 2 projects. (Jeju Special Self-governing Province Free International City headquarters Investment Policy Division, 2007).

<Figure 2> The Actual Import Export Record of Jeju-Do (unit: \$100,000)



Source: Korea International Trade Website (<http://www.kita.net/>), statistics of imports and exports of provinces.

<Table 4> Contracted Foreign Investment in Jeju:

Field	Investment Business	Investor (country)	Investment Amount	Stage of Investment
Tourism Development	Convention Anchor Hotel	Targalder (Hong Kong)	2,847,000,000 Won	Ground Breaking : '07. 6
Tourism Development	Polo horse riding place	Polo Country Club Co.(Singapore)	232,000,000 Won	Environmental impact assessment submitted
Tourism Development	High class Recreation Facilities	ADG company (U.S.A)	3,267,000,000 Won.	project expectant designation.
Tourism Development	Yearae resort-type residential complex	Berjaya(Malaysia)	600,000,000 USD	Ground Breaking : '07. 10. 23
Tourism Development	Myth, History Park	Berjaya (Malaysia)	200,000,000 USD	Ground Breaking : '07. 12. 21
Tourism Development	Total		1.3946 trillion Won.	
IT & BT	Medical project	Bota Medi (HongKong)	60,000,000,000 Won.	60Hundred Million Won. Invested
IT & BT	The Semi-Conductor project	Winbond (Taiwan)	14,100,000,000 Won.	stock buying completed
IT & BT	Total		74,100,000,000 Won.	
Total			1.4687 Trillion Won.	

Source: Jeju Special Self-governing Province, Free International City Investment Policy Division (2007c).

3. Inter-Korean Cooperation and Exchange Projects

According to article 12 regarding the definition of the trade actor(s) concerned, "The transactions between South Korea and North Korea are regarded as inside national transactions" in the 'Inter-Korean cooperation and exchange law' which are hard to regard as local diplomatic projects. But, in the contents of the cooperation and exchange projects, including the character of the typical international interchange and cooperative projects, Jeju Special Self-governing Province's inter-Korean cooperation and exchange projects have been continuous since 1998 in the fields of

humanitarian aid, exchange visits and economic cooperation.

First of all, foreign news agencies have paid attention to the humanitarian aid dimension for one of the projects, the 'Sending Tangerine Oranges Movement' for Inter-Korea exchange and cooperation projects, which the foreign news evaluated as "Vitamin C Diplomacy" (Asian Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2002). After the 6-15 summit talks, Jeju Special Self-governing Province added contributions of carrots, grass seed support, medical supplies, undergarment support and flood damage rehabilitation equipment, among other items <Table 5>. From 1998 until 2007, Jeju Special Self-governing Province sent a total of 48,000 tons of tangerine oranges, which represented excess production in Jeju province, to North Korea to help solve food shortage issues. The Sending Tangerine Oranges Movement of Jeju-do, created a new opportunity for large scale exchange visiting events. That is, North Korea authorities invited people from the Jeju Special Self-governing Province four times as a symbol of gratitude for the continuous support of North Korean food aid.¹ Jeju Special Self-governing Province governor, including the chairman of Jeju Special Self-governing Province assembly, scholars, government officials, public citizens, and journalists visited North Korea exhibiting a large scale human interchange of cooperation between the south and north.

It opened a new era of human interchange at a local level. Especially, without arbitration of the central government, 'Jeju Center for Inter-Korea Exchange and Cooperation' directly consulted with North Korea's Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation and visited North Korea thanks to Korean Air, with Jeju to Pyongyang nonstop flights, a significant and special meaning. In the meantime, Jeju Special Self-governing Province is fostering economic cooperation for an enterprise which produces high value 'hand-peeled garlic' using North Korean workers. With arbitration from the 'Korean Sharing Movement', Sangwadel

Agricultural Products Inc. agreed with Jengsung Medical company to build a plant in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, and from October, 2006 entered into production.

Through this enterprise, Jeju Special Self-governing Province has opened the possibility of sightseeing, along with other potential agricultural-related ventures such as livestock raising. This demonstrates the possibility of future, increased economic cooperation and development. Importantly, the Sending Tangerine Oranges Movement and the large scale human interchange has led to mutual trust. During the fourth trip, when Jeju Special Self-governing Province people visited North Korea, they had a conference for the economic cooperation enterprise.

<Table 5> Jeju Inter-Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Projects

Project	Quantity	Supporting Organization and Institute.
'Sending Tangerines Movement'	1998 100t, 1999 4,336t, 2000 3,031t, 2001 6,150t, 2002 4,000t, 2003 7,500t, 2004 8,107t, 2005 3,049t, 2006 260t, 2007 11,500t	Ministry of Unification, Jeju Special Self-governing Province, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, Tangerine Agricultural Cooperative Federation
'Sending Carrots Movement'	2000 2,000t, 2001 4,000t, 2005 7,000t, 2006 4,100t	Ministry of Unification, Jeju Special Self-governing Province, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, Tangerine Agricultural Cooperative Federation
'Sending Winter Clothes Movement'	2002 5,000 units, 2004 600 units.	Gwangju YWCA, Jeju Council of The National Unification Advisory Council
Grass Seed Aid	2003 2t	Namjeju-gun
Flood Damage Rehabilitation Aid	2006 construction material 40 million won, 2007 Jeju tangerine juice 80 million won.	Jeju Special Self-governing Province
Medical Supplies Aid	2004 1400 million won; 2005 1300 million won; 2007 5 million won.	The Institute for Peace Affairs, Jeju-do Medical Association.

Source: Jeju Development Institute (2008: 213).

¹ 1st visit to North Korea (2002. 5. 10_15) 253 people, 2nd visit to North Korea (2002. 11. 25_30) 257 people, 3rd visit to North Korea (2003. 8. 25_30), 4th visit to North Korea (2007. 11. 12_14) 70 people, a total of 4 times of 836 people.

Jeju Special Self-Governing Province has thus far established positive local diplomacy initiatives to foster the North Korea interchange

cooperative of The Sending of Tangerines Movement since 1998, and was responsible for the Jeju peoples' movement in order to magnify larger scale inter-Korean cooperation, exchange projects and exercises. In 2000, the Jeju Special Self-governing Province governor was honored as the chief director of the Sending of Tangerines Movement and the mayor, provincial directors, religious leaders, and cultural people participated in the inquiry committee. This committee composed the 'Jeju Islander Movement for Helping North Korea Compatriots' headquarters where people participate together to sponsor visiting North Korea. In 2001 it was renamed the 'Jeju Center for Inter-Korea Exchange and Cooperation' and continuously develops the projects.

On July 1st 2006, the Jeju Special Self-governing Province established a new administrative 'Peace and Cooperation Division', and started exchanges with North Korea, representing a tangible local government dimension from a local diplomacy perspective <Table 5>. Also, in 2007 April, the Culture and Tourism Committee of the Jeju Special Self-governing Province passed 'Amendment regulations about Jeju Special Self-governing Province Inter-Korea exchange and cooperation'.

Through this regulation, Jeju Special Self-governing Province established the 'Inter-Korea Exchange and Cooperation Committee' (Newsis 2007/12/12) composed of members of the provincial assembly, and representatives of citizen's organizations. The committee will be able to support the policies for projects of the Inter-Korea Exchange and Cooperation Committee in general.

The Inter-Korea Exchange and Cooperation Project of Jeju Special Self-governing Province is in charge of its administrative financial support in order to independently pursue and achieve the goals of the cooperative project which is based on the support of the producers and islanders. Jeju Special Self-governing Province takes charge of the administrative financial support, the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and Tangerine Agricultural Cooperative Federation take charge of collections and purchases, and the Jeju Center for Inter-Korea Exchange and Cooperation headquarters takes responsibility for the application and

execution, delivery and monitoring etc. This division of labor structure will continue to form as the public-private partnership enterprise develops (Ko Sung Jun et al, 2006; Jeju Development Institute, 2008)

Evaluation of Jeju Local Diplomacy and Developmental Direction

1. Evaluation of Jeju Local Diplomacy

Jeju Special Self-governing Province is relatively well equipped institutionally for its public sector to undertake the roles and functions of local diplomacy. First, from an institutional perspective Jeju has been developing its own political personality as a free international city and as an island of world peace, and additionally has the support of the central government to pursue these aims. These activities are giving rise to some tangible political ability in Jeju's handling of its own affairs.

The international free city and the island of peace which symbolizes Jeju, and its official status provides the impetus for local diplomatic activities to take place. These two symbolic projects have international directivity, which is an internationalization of the local sector, or a contribution of international peace to the local sector. According to this, the local government maintains the Jeju Free International City headquarters which takes exclusive responsibility of foreign investment. Also, this division has a peace team and an exchange team which takes charge of international exchanges and cooperatives. They take charge of the practical enterprises of the Island of World Peace. But, when compared to institutional circumstances, the results from the official international exchanges, international collaboration and international commerce field has exhibited a minimal level of outcomes.

The Jeju Free International City started 5 years ago. The Island of World Peace project started 3 years ago. Yet so far it's purely symbolic and has not experienced actual, concrete operational performance. Of course, recently, and as a result related with Jeju Free International City, foreign investment is appearing little by little. But, at the local diplomatic level,

there is no activity. The establishment of sisterhood relationships and amicable city contracting initiatives are maintaining Jeju's presence in the international exchange field. Also, in the international trade field, export increases are not visible and there is the aspect where the balance of trade will deteriorate as time goes by. This information does not show how to reach a plan. After the 2002 Jeju Free International City creation, they expected local diplomacy activity to increase, through joining various international bodies or by international conference participation, and for these activities to spread to other ventures such as international collaboration. But, a balance of trade deficit still exists and the anticipated developmental returns have not materialized.

And, since the 2005 designation as an Island of World Peace, the expected activities related with foreign public information and establishment of sisterhood relationships have not reached expectations. There have been no official international exchanges with foreign self-governing bodies, designated as an activity of the peaceful city. Even if you consider that local diplomacy has had a short history and is in an elementary phase (Korean local self-governing group internationalization foundation, 2006; Kang Tak Ku, 2007), generally, Jeju Special Self-governing Province's local diplomacy is at a low-end level. Consequently, the local diplomatic activities of Jeju Special Self-governing Province have to become a continuous and results-oriented process. But there are many differences between such official performance evaluations, based on data of the local government, and the results of the practice of the World Peace Island project, with its center and connections, and the Inter-Korea Exchange and Cooperation Project. There are some difficult projects to be implemented only at the local level, and those projects need the central government's help <Table 1>.

The Jeju Peace Forum was initiated as a venue for leaders from the public and private sectors to jointly promote peace, and even though it is held biannually, or 5 times per decade, it should not be underestimated. And the 'Sending Tangerines Movement' appears firmly established as a symbol of the island of world peace project and has now been maintained

for approximately a decade. Jeju islanders have visited North Korea four times, which is evaluated as a reciprocal exchange visit.

It is hard to find such reciprocal exchange visits in other local areas. And the mutual trust which is formed with these projects has made the discussion for agriculture cooperation feasible. It should be evaluated as a good result in local diplomacy initiatives. Also, the process which motivates these projects is not the unilateral domain of the public sector, but of government-civilian sector cooperation under the leading civil committee. Mutual cooperation will be able to be evaluated as a developmental possibility of Jeju local diplomacy.

2. Direction of Jeju Local Diplomacy

We observe that Jeju local diplomacy achievements are at a low level, but there are a few exceptional cases. The institutional circumstances of the local government are much better than other local areas and there have been some successive projects, so there is a possibility of development. From here we will suggest two tracks, an analysis and evaluation of the local diplomacy according to the analytical frame discussed before, observing the local diplomatic actors, and secondly, proposing a practical structure for Jeju's local diplomatic development direction.

1) Active Participation of Track 2 Diplomatic Actors

At the actor level, Jeju Special Self-governing Province's international interchanges and cooperation is concentrated at a track 1 level. The local government maintains sisterhood relationships with numerous foreign self-governing provinces, or friendship city relationships. These projects have a trait of which the framework is of state-centered diplomacy. For example, the international collaboration project leads international body of similar participants. Like this, Jeju Special Self-governing Province is limited to the international interchange and cooperative project levels of track 1 diplomacy. There are various accomplished international exchanges and cooperative projects at the private sector level, but official

statistics of the local government do not include them. Like this local diplomatic activity which is accomplished officially at a track 1 diplomatic level, it cannot escape the frame of the friendly exchanges which are formal on a large scale, and the limits which make the possibility of being visible from the perspective of track 2 diplomacy volitions. The necessity of track 2 diplomacy in conjunction with track 1 diplomacy will consequently be supported.

We can pay attention to the 'Island of World Peace' related project as a local diplomatic actor field. All 17 projects which comprise the skeletal structure of this enterprise, mainly with support from the central government, are showing the characteristics of a local governmental cooperative project. As seen in <Table 1>, the 17 local diplomatic projects in compliance with the designation plan of Island of World Peace requires enormous budgets. It is impossible to carry out projects without the administrative and financial support of the central government. Because of this limitation, projects currently in progress cannot show visible (track 2) results. One exception is the 'Sending Tangerines Movement'. For the implementation of the practical projects, they established the 'Pan Islander Practice Council for the Island of World Peace' which forms public-private partnership cooperation among organizations. Private sector efforts, and others that Jeju Special Self-governing Province initiated, such as the Jeju Free International City headquarters, and the 'Peace and Cooperation Division' were established as a substructure which take exclusive responsibility for peace projects and interchanges, and cooperation etc.

Tangerine farmers, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the Mandarin Oranges Agricultural Cooperative Federation cooperates with the central and local government. They have continued the Sending Mandarin Oranges Movement with support of the center and the local government, and this program has resulted in Jeju islanders visiting North Korea four times, having been invited by North Korean authorities. Discussion of the above shows the implications drawn from the vitality of the private sector in local diplomatic territory. And this demonstrates that track 2 diplomacy and the magnification effects with track 1.5 diplomacy,

with the interaction of the public · private sector, contribute to the visible results of local diplomacy. Actually, similar efforts are appearing in some other sectors, but the limit is clear. The limits thus far have been the peace projects related to the Island of World Peace and the Pan Islander Practice Council established for private sector involvement.

And, as seen in the establishment of operation regulations by the local assembly, the exclusive responsibility of organizations (Peace and Cooperation Division), saw participation from public and private actors but the public sector leads the projects by and large. Review at this point where the organizations' activities have passed 3 years, the role of the private sector is limited. The Pan Islander Practice Council' held a seminar for Okinawa's peace policy and exchange and cooperation with Jeju (2006. 11). The Pan Islander Practice Council also visited Okinawa Peace City (2006. 12), and a Jeju peace charter was proclaimed (2007. 7. 1). The Inter-Korea exchange and cooperation project, which has traits of cooperation of the public ·private sector seems to be the only private peace practice activity. (The Chemin Ilbo 2008. 1. 15). Of course, if we consider the necessity of professionalism and infrastructure which is necessary for the projects' implementation, it is inevitable. The important issue which can not be overlooked is that local diplomatic activity which is implemented without participation of the private sector is weak. The vitality of peace practice activities must seek a base from the dynamics of civil society which in turn leads to a tangible peace movement. Jeju Special Self-governing Province will lead the civil society's voluntary participation, through its peace cooperative and practical projects. It is one of the important tasks to solve for a peace practice project to be possible. This is the circumstantial evidence for the necessity of track 2 diplomacy.

2) Cooperative Interaction Between Local Diplomatic Actors and Local Diplomatic Governance

Jeju Special Self-governing Province advocates local diplomacy where various actors participate in each sector, connect with each actor, and secure the practical structure which enable them to cooperate for the

processing of projects. But, the existing local diplomacy practice structure does not have the frame for connection, cooperation, and regulations. International exchanges and international collaboration are mainly tasks for the local government. It is hard to find private cooperation and mediation within the civil sector. The Inter-Korea Exchange and Cooperation Project is a part of the project of the Island of World Peace, and the public private cooperation organization exists independently. Their relationship between actors are not so close, and local governments and the specialists leading the projects with the participation of civil society groups cannot escape the level which is visible with everyone's participation.

Also, the practical structure in Jeju local diplomacy generally formed loose cooperative relationship connections between various actors, but is far from an integrated practical structure which is able to connect, cooperate, and mediate. It is necessary to establish local diplomacy governance for Jeju Special Self-governing Province's local diplomacy with a practical structure of connection, cooperation, and mediation. The concept of governance has various understandings according to the paradigm and area of study, thus there are many incorrect criticisms about the application of the governance concept. (Seo Chang Rok et al, 2006; Im Seng Hak, 2006).

It can be understood that governance forms the network where national, market, and civil society actors are positioned horizontally enabling the establishment of a democratically transparent policy to execute, a rule system which is based on the materiality system. (Lee Yeon Ho et al, 2007:169). From this point of view, governance roles are as a mediation actor to achieve agreement and cooperation between various actors in the decision-making process. The decision which is made through dialogue, cooperation, mediation of state, market, and civil society is much better than a decision made by the state alone or 'invisible hand'. It is then able to reflect the participation and demands of the civil society, efficiency of the market and legitimacy of the state well. Now consider the local diplomatic governance pursuit of cooperative

interaction between track 1 and track 2 diplomacy. The relations of various organizations must be horizontally connected, allowing each track to have the maximum authority of self decision, and it must be the discussion body which discusses the direction of local diplomacy and its priority. Consequently, Jeju Free International City and the Island of World Peace can be an axis of Jeju Special Self-governing Province's local diplomacy. For local diplomacy in the long-term context, Jeju Special Self-governing Province must try to form local diplomacy governance within the frame of connection and cooperation of the private and public sector.

Conclusion

Diplomacy may be divided into two major camps according to the actors: official track 1 diplomacy and informal track 2 diplomacy. Dividing local diplomacy widely with official diplomacy and informal diplomacy may overlook the importance of interaction between track 1 and track 2. Without the interaction between tracks, even local diplomacy may accomplish some goals independently, but it is hard to treat local diplomacy issues of expanding scope, and territory, from a systematic viewpoint. Consequently, the necessity of 'track 1.5 diplomacy' is proposed. Cooperative interaction of track 1 and track 2 sectors could attain the aim of local diplomacy. The conflict and cooperative issues which occurs in the international community are hard to treat only at a track 1 level, because of the influence of globalization, localization, and information-oriented society.

The selective use of 1.5 diplomacy need not damage the indigenous activity of track 1 and track 2 diplomacy; the actors can select whatever track cooperation is necessary. Especially when there are different participants between local diplomacy and national official diplomacy. It is important to track 2 diplomacy, and at the same time the value of track 1.5 diplomacy becomes more important. Local diplomacy focuses on the international interactions and cooperation which include indigenous diplomatic acts of the various actors and sectors, and are not limited by a

specific actor or sector. Developmental possibilities of local diplomacy can be magnified by cooperative interaction based on integrated connections. But, considering Jeju local diplomacy remains in an elementary stage, track 1 diplomacy that is, the role of the local government is relatively important. Compared to public sectors, private sectors have limitations in the interchanges, cooperation, information, manpower, budget and contact channels etc. That is, when the private sector can not solve the problem for accomplishing a particular track 2 diplomacy goal, the role of the local government's mediation and support becomes important. Consequently, the local government supports various activities of the community in different ways for the development of local diplomacy, acting as a connection-ring role which mediates demands of contradictions from various groups. (Yang Hyeon Moo et al 2007 and 22).

One more important point of necessity for the development of local diplomacy is the diversification problem of a cooperative agenda. Interchange and cooperation between local governments is the main current diplomacy, and the interchanges are conducive to friendly relations, and a close adhesive style of cooperation, humanitarian aid, support, etc. (Pak Kyeong Guk 2006; Kim Kyu Ruun 2007, 207; Jang Se Gil 2008). It has value as a flexible diplomatic method, the small-scale cooperation of the local dimension, which increases mutual understanding through interactions and cooperation of the various fields from the non-political sector. In this context, the agenda of local diplomacy will exceed the establishment of sisterhood relationships, and of international body joining or friendship cities which have become stereotypical. The need is to expand its territory to various and much needed areas of environmental protection, sustainable development, human rights movements, anti racial discrimination, solidarity, the relaxing of international tensions, peace movements, increasing the ability of administrative capacity and democracy, humane assistance and poverty extirpation, health issues and social development, and cultural exchanges. (Korean Local Self-governing Internationalization Foundation 2006, 169, 437).

In conclusion, local diplomacy must be launched with a

comprehensive developmental strategy as it becomes integrated with a global city development plan. Local diplomacy is a new trend of current diplomacy, and the need to recognize local diplomacy requires many different dimensional approaches compared to national diplomacy. Various non-official actors participate in local diplomacy and perform cooperative diplomacy and information exchange via the establishment of mediation mechanisms between public and private actors. When actors are enabled to participate beyond the traditional limits and segregations of diplomacy, local diplomacy is empowered to officially and actively participate in new issues such as human rights, peace, and the environment, thus breaking its stereotypical role.

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Cooperation and International Development: North Korea, Inter-Korean Economic Exchanges, and Westpolitik

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Introduction

Few, if any, cases of successful development in nation states have historically been achieved without the one or the other form of cooperation with external partners. The reasons for this are widely accepted in the related literature. Lack of specific resources, technologies or other inputs requires import, and as a consequence, sources of hard currency revenue, which usually means the production of export goods. Differences in relative comparative advantage make it feasible to trade with neighbors. And since national economies never exist outside a political context, economic exchanges are caused or supported, hindered or promoted by international relations.

There are many instances of cooperation in Northeast Asia, ranging from the security-related Six Party Talks to the various FTAs and ASEAN+3. To illustrate how such cooperation proceeds, which impacts it can have, and what some of the major obstacles are, in this paper we will explore a specific case that is of the highest relevance for all countries in the region.

We will start with inquiring why international economic cooperation takes place, and what makes North Korea special in this regard from a systemic point of view. South Korea will be treated as a representative case for the rather ambiguous “international community”, including its

unique features that are derived from a strong political interest in North Korea and its development. Special attention will be given to the North Korean motives, since these provide clues as to how cooperation must be structured to make it constructive and cooperative, rather than turning into yet another instance of confrontation.

After a brief review of North Korea’s record of international economic cooperation, we will arrive at the point where a proposal for a successful development policy based on international economic cooperation will be developed from South Korea’s perspective including the legacy of the German experience, suggesting a hitherto underestimated yet fairly realistic path to the institutionalization of peace, security and mutual prosperity in the East Asian region.

Rationale and Framework for Economic Cooperation

In Korea as in the rest of the world, time and other resources tend to be scarce. This is the foundation for the common belief in social sciences that although the actual reasons may vary, interaction rarely happens without a goal or a purpose. This is also true for economic exchanges.

Usually, such relations take place between private actors, either individuals or firms. Although we compile statistics of “Korea’s” or “the EU’s” foreign trade or FDI, this terminology actually describes the cumulative efforts of individual, non-state actors from these political entities. Of course, in reality, private economic activity directed at generating profits inevitably merges with political goals. This is the case even in the most liberal economies. By way of taxation, investment promotion, basic research, education or environmental and safety regulations, the host country of private companies provides support in the form of public goods or enforces what it regards as proper standards. It finances social security systems and the redistribution of wealth within society. However, the main actors of international economic cooperation are private entities.

Exemptions are state-owned or state-guided companies. These exist in every country but are usually relatively small in numbers. Despite privatization plans, South Korea has about 300 SOCs, including Korea Development Bank or Yonhap News Agency. Through administrative guidance, this group of directly state-influenced actors can be increased. South Korea has a long tradition of utilizing its large business conglomerates for political purposes. However, in a democratic and liberal environment, such a policy can quickly become the target of public criticism, as the case of Hyundai Asan has shown. It is important to note that with or without state guidance, economic activity that is not profitable will sooner or later lead to bankruptcy. As long as a company is privately owned, it cannot spend more than it earns in the long run. In fact, this is one of the main arguments in favor of privatization – the healthy effect on competitiveness and productivity provided by a credible exit option.

While this is common sense to us, the perception of people who have grown up under classical socialism differs very strongly. There, the economic motive exists on the individual and the collective level, but it is also clearly subordinated to political goals. Firms are not only owned by the state, they are part of the state and act on behalf of the whole society. In such an environment, foreign economic exchanges are rarely conducted as the individual activity of a company. Rather, they are at least directed, if not coordinated and conducted, by the state and its agencies.

It would be a grave mistake to assume that only socialist or developmentalist countries use political influence to guide economic activities of their citizens and companies. The United States has demonstrated a strong readiness to pursue political objectives by means of sanctions, embargos, tariffs and import quotas. South Korea has experienced this in the late 1980s when it was twice designated by the USTR as a Priority Foreign Country under Section 301 of the Trade Act. Even before the “war on terror”, North Korea has been subject to a variety of direct and indirect sanctions, including those on exports, aid, finance, tariffs, technology transfer, and access to assets (see Rennack 2006, Frank 2006a). The United States has used its power to block North Korea’s access

to international organizations such as World Bank, IMF, or ADB.

If we want to understand the status and the prospects of inter-Korean economic exchanges, it is crucial to be aware of the dichotomy of economic and political interests, the different weight these have in the respective countries, and their varying direction. What might seem compellingly logical from the South Korean perspective might be shared neither by Pyongyang nor by Washington, and vice versa. In fact, this is what has happened repeatedly in the past although such differences are reluctantly admitted by officials. Economic exchanges between the two Koreas are a highly political issue with a multitude of opposing goals, but they also have to make simple economic sense in order to be sustainable. Especially the latter, I would argue, is not properly understood by the North Korean side. All this turns inter-Korean economic cooperation into a highly complicated, multi-dimensional issue.

South Korea finds itself in a particularly difficult situation. While the North pursues its political goals through state agencies, the South must do so under consideration of the economic interests of its own domestic companies and taking into account the political and economic motives of third parties such as China, the United States, Japan and the EU. The matter is further complicated by the fact that these actors also have their own interactions with North Korea that shape their perspectives on inter-Korean exchanges. The international environment does not exist as a clearly defined entity, such as the United Nations or the WTO; but it is nevertheless there and sets the frame within which the two Koreas can operate. Not for the first time in its history, Korea is seen by many as part of, or key to, another agenda. This does not make maneuvering in the sea of international relations easier.

The South Korean side is therefore faced with a number of tasks:

- Define its political goals with regard to North Korea clearly;
- Ensure economic feasibility of exchanges if conducted by private companies, even if these are politically motivated and supported;
- Understand (not share) North Korea’s motives and strategies for economic exchange;
- Actively shape an international environment that is supportive of South

Korea's goals and duly considers North Korea's constraints

On the following pages, we will focus on the latter two issues, based on the assumption that these will also impact third countries' considerations.

North Korea's Motives and Strategies for Economic Exchange

While simplistic characterizations of *chuch'e* as autarky are clearly off the mark, it would be hard to argue that North Korea has been overly active in promoting international economic exchanges. They are needed, but not liked and actually feared. This corresponds both with the general characteristics of socialist systems, as well as with the specific experience and environment of North Korea.

The imperialists' "aid" which they term "greatly helpful" to the progress of other countries and nations is nothing but a noose for plunder and subjugation... East European countries that accepted "cure" offered by imperialists are now in the grip of worsening socio-economic crisis and disputes. Any attempt to solve issues with the help of imperialists is little short of leaving one's own destiny to a herd of ferocious wolves. One should not harbor any illusion about foreign forces nor idolize them in order to discard the idea of depending on them.... Dependence on outside forces in the progress of countries and nations is as dangerous as poison (KNCA, 10.06.2000).

Socialist countries strongly depend on their dominating ideology for political stability and coherence (Kornai 1992). They are built on the understanding of the world as being divided into antagonistic classes that are in eternal struggle, until the working class finally wins and eliminates the bourgeoisie. This claim is (or has been) understood by almost every citizen in socialist countries. The capitalists exploit the workers by extracting profit from their work and keeping it; the very idea of a socialist revolution is based on the argument that this unjust relationship has to be ended (Marx and Engels 1848). Accordingly, conducting economic exchanges with capitalists from a socialist perspective equates to participating in the exploitation of workers. Consequently, following

orthodox socialist logic, such exchanges should not take place at all. This has been very different in reality, but we must be aware that the socialist side always felt and feels uneasy about trading with the class enemy.

In North Korea as a specific case of socialism, in addition to the aforesaid considerations the idea of nationalism plays a key role for the evaluation of international economic exchanges. North Korea is highly skeptical of interdependency, pointing at the post-1876 experience with Japan and mindful of the post-1945 attempts by the Soviet Union and China to gain political influence over Korea by making it economically dependent. This leads to a policy that regularly baffles foreign investors and trading partners. Ever since the early days of the DPRK, economic partners felt robbed, betrayed, and ripped off (Frank 2008). North Korea's foreign economic policy has been characterized by a short-term perspective, frequent reversals, and breakups. Ironically, the very success of an economic relationship inevitably leads to its end because it raises suspicions of a loss of independence. The fear of ideological contamination adds to these reasons for volatile behavior:


The most serious lesson of the collapse of socialism in several countries is that the corruption of socialism begins with ideological corruption, and that a breakdown on the ideological front results in the crumbling of all socialism's fronts and ends in the total ruin of socialism.... Giving priority to ideological work is essential for accomplishing socialism. (Kim Jong-il 1995)

As my personal experience from various capacity building measures with North Koreans in Europe and in Pyongyang indicates, they are largely unable to understand that international economic exchanges should be mutually beneficial. Private companies from capitalist countries are regarded as representatives of their respective states, even if this does not reflect reality. They are treated accordingly, which can and does lead to grave misunderstandings. The new environment since the late 1990s has modified this situation to some extent, but its basics are still true. Economic cooperation and exchange are seen by North Korea as part of its international relations. In the case of non-socialist partners, these are a game of antagonism and confrontation, just like the Six-Party Talks (see

below).

It does not matter whether the partners are socialist or capitalist. In terms of foreign trade relations, today's international partners seem to be in a situation strikingly similar to the one prior to 1960, when North Korea extracted significant contributions from China, the Soviet Union, and its Eastern European satellites. In 2005, the EU's imports from North Korea were 48 million Euros as opposed to 192 million Euros in exports; the deficit - a de facto subsidization of North Korea - was 114 million Euros or 237% (source: Eurostat). Obviously, even the distant Europeans find it difficult to separate short-term political measures such as aid and assistance from long-term exchanges in the form of trade and FDI. It is no surprise that the situation is even worse for the much more directly involved South Korea and China. Chinese imports to North Korea in 2005 were 1.085 billion US\$, creating a 118% deficit of 588 million US\$ against exports worth 497 millions. In 2005, South Korea's transfers to North Korea were 715 million US\$ including aid, tourism etc., exceeding inflows by 375 million US\$, or a deficit of 110% (source: KITA). This means that from China, the EU and South Korea, North Korea has received a de facto economic subsidy of at least 1.1 billion US\$ in 2005 alone. This is based on official numbers, so we can expect the actual amount of one-way transfers or preferential loans to be even higher.

The skill of the North Korean side in conducting this game is remarkable, given the near absence of any hard fact that could be used to coerce the other side into accommodating North Korea's wishes. The multilateral international environment is playing a major role in enabling this player who is weak in absolute terms to become strong in relative terms, as the chart below shows.



As long as North Korea is faced with one foreign partner, chances are good that it will be inferior in this bilateral relationship. It is therefore crucial for the North Korean side to create a system of bilateral relationships that have the potential for balancing each other. In the ideal case, the overwhelming superiority on partner 1 is offset by partner 2 (and 3 by 4), provided they try to “drag” North Korea into exactly opposing directions. If C is bigger than A minus B or B minus A, North Korea can determine the actual direction of movement almost at its will. Such a perfect match will be hard to achieve in reality; however, it becomes evident that the actual direction is unlikely to be what any of partners 1-4 had in mind.

Based on this outline of North Korea's strategy, we can expect its external economic relations to be characterized by bilateral multilateralism and a fear of facing a unified international community. This adds to the aforesaid elements, namely a principal distaste for cooperation with capitalist partners, the perception of private companies as being representatives of their states, and a lack of understanding for long-term profit.

Under such conditions, the best strategy for economic cooperation with North Korea would be to have no such cooperation at all. In fact, this is what is true for most states and companies in the world. However, such denial is not an option for South Korea because of the military threat from the North and the national interest of reunification. Others, such as China, Japan, and the United States, have also been coerced into having a political interest in North Korea because of their desire to prove themselves as responsible patrons in the region, to justify remilitarization, to support the global war against terror, to deal with the nuclear issue and for fear of a bad example/proliferation. All these are powerful reasons that make it very difficult for these countries not to deal with North Korea.

But all these motives are political. Natural resources aside, it would be difficult to find any compelling incentive for private companies to engage in economic cooperation and exchange with North Korea, especially if we include the difficult business environment and the high risk. Accordingly, the state of international economic exchange with North Korea is highly atypical, but not incomprehensible.

Although this sounds like an oxymoron, it has to be noted that interaction or cooperation based on the power relations and motivations as mentioned above will naturally be confrontational. North Korea wants to extract as much as it can from its partners and pays little attention to their interests. The international partners, on the other hand, have a strong desire to use economic interaction to achieve political goals related to North Korea, ranging from unification to regime change, denuclearization, improvement of the humanitarian situation, enlarging/defending their zone of influence, justifying presence in the region etc. It is not surprising that such a context will result in a continuous sequence of cooperation and conflict, escalation and de-escalation.

In order to achieve a more stable environment, ways must be found to produce cooperative interaction. From North Korea's perspective, the "ideal" partner should have the following characteristics. Smaller (in terms of power) states are preferred over bigger ones, because they have less potential of being a serious threat and can be easier balanced.

Geographically more distant partners are preferred over neighbors, because they are less likely to have a direct interest in North Korea and its domestic affairs. Autocratic systems are preferred over liberal democracies, since they are less likely to raise political demands related to human rights, have a more transparent command structure and allow for long-term relationships with their usually relatively stable ruling elite. Multilateral relationships are preferred over bilateral ones, because they provide room for alliances and for maneuvering, and prevent the direct confrontation that is inevitable in a bilateral relationship in case of opposing interests. Finally, the North Koreans would prefer formal and institutionalized cooperation over informal networks, because this is a source of prestige, allows to retreat behind negotiated clauses in case of disagreement, and corresponds with the formalized power structure in North Korea itself.

From this perspective, it makes sense that the Six Party Talks have progressed as a game of confrontation in the past. They are an ad hoc initiative started with the sole (political) purpose of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The members include such economic and political heavyweights as the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, the 12th largest economy in the world with a GNI of almost 900 billion US\$. This is over 34 times the estimate for North Korea (BoK 2008). With the exception of the U.S., all are direct neighbors. Against the criteria identified above, this must inevitably lead to confrontational interaction. In the following section, we will explore the record of North Korea's international economic contacts so far in order to further validate the claims made above, and to look for a set of partners that would match these criteria as closely as possible.

North Korea's Record of International Economic Exchange

After the failure of agriculture-based economic reforms since 2002 has become obvious to the leadership in Pyongyang (see Frank 2005 and

2006b), the remaining alternatives are (1) a prolonged economic and food crisis, which will lead to a further destabilization of the domestic political situation and a significant weakening of the international posture of North Korea and leaves nuclear brinkmanship as the only highly risky card to be played in the hope of external inputs of aid, or (2) economic modernization with a focus on export promotion, the utilization of cheap and disciplined labor, the extraction and refinement of natural resources, and the rehabilitation of the once developed industrial sector. The latter option is obviously preferable, but it comes with a few strings attached. In addition to the risk of spreading the “reform virus” among the urban population and losing the grip on the dynamics of change, a successful modernization along the path as outlined under (2) requires international economic cooperation. While there are signs that the North Korean side has understood the inevitability of choosing (2) unless they want to risk a second “arduous march”, it seems to be unwilling, hesitant or unable to open Pandora’s Box of cooperation with the international community.

The record of North Korea’s international economic exchanges so far is not completely disappointing; it also helps to highlight a number of major political drivers behind this careful and often reversed opening. Preferential trade with socialist partners virtually collapsed around 1990, adding up to North Korea’s structural economic difficulties. Attempts at generating the political will for economic support in capitalist countries such as the United States through nuclear blackmail worked in 1994 but failed in 2002. Playing the nationalist tune was much more successful, leading to massive inflows of resources from South Korea. On the other hand, the once intense economic exchanges with Japan collapsed ever since the aftermath of the 2002 Koizumi visit and the Japanese focus on the abduction issue, with trade declining in the range of about -20% annually ever since.

As indicated above, the United States has used its might to inflict economic damage on North Korea in the hope of extracting political concessions. Most prominently, this includes the highly indicative Banco Delta Asia(BDA) issue. As North Koreans, international analysts and even

the United States alike noticed with surprise, this minor case of 25 million US\$ hit a nerve. It developed a symbolic nature that effectively cut off North Korea’s international financial transactions out of fear of banks all over the globe to face the same retaliatory measures as BDA. This must have destroyed all possibly remaining illusions in Pyongyang about their future in the international economic system with the United States as an active adversary. Ever since, we notice fresh efforts at reaching at least a neutral relationship with Washington.

In the past, unless dictated by necessity, North Korea has carefully avoided entering into binding multilateral agreements.¹ Although a socialist country since 1948, the DPRK was neither a member of the socialist block’s military alliance (Warsaw Pact, founded in 1955) nor of its economic forum (Council of Mutual Economic Aid, founded in 1949), although it participated as an observer in the latter. Certainly influenced by historical experience, Kim Il-sung had sought to keep his country at arms’ length away from its two major allies in Beijing and Moscow soon after the end of the Korean War and Stalin’s death in 1953. He was worried by the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its attack on Stalinist leadership style and the propagation of peaceful coexistence with the class enemy. Kim was equally unhappy with the extreme policies of Mao, including the risky 100 Flowers Movement and the Great Leap Forward, knowing that similar adventures could cost him his power. The chuch’e ideology has been developed against this background. As discussed above, the DPRK concentrated on a multitude of bilateral relationships with socialist countries for the purpose of extracting a maximum of support while minimizing concessions that had to be made in return.

UN membership was out of reach for a long time since both Korea’s claimed it exclusively. North Korea’s ability to react to changing conditions

¹ According to the CIA World Factbook, North Korea is a member of: ARF, FAO, G-77, ICAO, ICRM, IFAD, IFRC, IHO, IMO, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, NAM, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO.

was demonstrated by its agreement to joining the UN separately in 1991, reluctantly acknowledging the new international environment and South Korea's establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (1990) and China (1992). Such a step had long been avoided by both Koreas since it was commensurate to the official recognition of the other side as a legitimate and sovereign state. But with dashed hopes for a veto by Moscow and Beijing against South Korea's membership, Pyongyang had to accept. This episode shows that North Korea does indeed react, if not even bow, to international pressure if its interests are affected.

Infrastructure modernization continues to be a priority of North Korean economic policy. In May 2007, finally the first test run of trains on the restored tracks along the West (Kyongui Line) and the East coast (Tonghae line) between the two Koreas could take place. The meaning was more symbolic, but it also reflected the North's desire to show signs of goodwill after the Feb. 13th agreement. In December 2007, the first regular cargo service across the DMZ started, although among pessimistic forecasts and speculation that it was an attempt at boosting the popularity of Roh Moo-hyun and his liberal party ahead of the presidential elections in South Korea. The cooperation between North Korea and Russia on the modernization of railways continued. Russian estimates of a railway rehabilitation project (around 2 to 7 billion US\$) suggest that this will be a major effort, although progress so far has been slow. After a Rodong Sinmun note in November 2007 on a visit by the Russian Railway Company, the North Korean Central Television reported in March 2008 that Russia and North Korea had agreed to start work soon on repairing the railway linking Russia's Far East city of Khasan to the DPRK's northern port of Rajin. In June 2007, it was reported that the DPRK agreed with Russia to allow foreign ships enter and leave the port of Rajin in the Northeast; a similar measure had already taken place in 1991 but was taken back in 1994 because of the nuclear crisis and a lack of interest. The meanwhile soaring economic growth in China and Russia could, however, lead to better results this time.

International economic cooperation was started in the field of

telecommunication. On September 3, 2007, the 22nd meeting of the North-East Asia Telephone and Telecommunications Co. Ltd. Directors' Board was held in Pyongyang. In January 2008, CHEO Technology, a subsidiary of Orascom Telecom, the fourth-largest Arab phone operator based in Egypt, announced that it earned the first commercial license to provide mobile telephone services in the DPRK. North Korea's state-owned Korea Post and Telecommunications Corporation holds a 25 percent share of CHEO Technology.

Efforts at human resource development added to the impression of a concerted effort at improving the country's social overhead capital with an international focus. According to a report by Radio Free Asia, the about 6,000 North Koreans who took the TOEFL test of English proficiency between September 2005 and December 2006 fared better on average than Japanese and only a few points below South Koreans, indicating that for those who do have access to English education, the quality is quite high, and raising hopes that a modernization of the North Korean economy and society, once the political environment is there, would not be hindered by the state of human resources.

Corresponding with the overall line of development as announced in the New Year joint editorial, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology has been founded, staffed and financially supported at least partly by international contributors. It is modeled after the example of the Yanbian University of Science and Technology. The language of instruction is English. The President of PUST is a Korean-American and former head of a U.S. university. The plan is to have 600 graduate and 2,000 undergraduate students by 2012. Involved is also the President of Pohang University of Science and Technology in South Korea. In April 2008, North Korea announced a new five-year plan for the development of science and technology to last until 2012.

The North Koreans continued their efforts in 2007 to improve economic performance by new means and reaching out to international partners. An "e-shop" section was added to the DPRK's official business information site (www.dprk-economy.com). The 11th and so far largest

annual Pyongyang International Summer Product Exhibition was held from May 12-15, 2008, hosting over 180 foreign (though mostly Chinese) businesses. And despite neo-conservative trends in ideology since August 2007, an official North Korean scholarly publication (*Economic Studies*) argued quite pragmatically in January 2008 that the DPRK's trade structure should be remodeled in order to match the demands of the capitalist market, that goods should be processed at home before export rather than being shipped right away as raw materials, that international demand should be taken into consideration, and that market niches should be identified and utilized. The Kaesong Industrial Zone is growing despite many difficulties. Production passed the 300 million US\$ threshold by the end of February 2008, and in July of that year, the number of North Korean workers passed the 30,000 mark. The number of tourists that had a chance to visit Mt. Kùmgang from South Korea meanwhile exceeds 1 million, each of them being suspicious and a risk in the eyes of the North Korean authorities, but also a source of much needed hard currency. Tragic incidents such as the shooting of a female tourist are indicators of the high level of uneasiness on the North Korean side.

A Supportive International Environment: Is East Asia the Answer?

This brief record of North Korea's international economic interaction demonstrates what has been worked out in the sections above: a mix of reluctance to cooperate, fear of being dragged into dependency, but also the understanding that economic cooperation can be beneficial. But is there a possible alliance that would correspond with North Korea's interests while not being perceived as another field for confrontational interaction? Is there an alliance of "ideal partners", being small, far away yet close enough, autocratic, multilateral, and formalized?

For a long time, only the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) seemed to match these criteria; however, the economic potential was mediocre and North Korea's efforts not very successful. North Korea joined NAM in

1975, demonstrating its refusal to be a satellite of either China or the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. In addition to economic contacts, the DPRK tried to export its *chuch'e* ideology. Kim (1981: 124) argues that the major reason for these efforts was of political nature, to create "a favorable international situation for an all-Korean revolution, thus hastening the victory of world revolution." With the collapse of the bipolar world order, the emphasis on NAM seemed a matter of the past. However, in late August 2007, an article in the *Rodong Sinmun* reemphasized the traditional North Korean position, pointing at a renaissance of its old policy under new circumstances. NAM was described as a means of defending sovereignty, and as a tool by which smaller countries could voice their interests in the context of international organizations that are usually dominated by big powers. An article on September 1st, 2007, confirmed this position and the willingness of North Korea to actively participate and demanded solidarity, as well as close cooperation in the economic and technological fields.

Interestingly, NAM has a stronghold in Southeast Asia, which coincides with the rise of ASEAN as the most hopeful nucleus of regional integration in East Asia. North Korea has been remarkably active in that region, with the year 2000 marking a breakthrough. One month after the first-ever summit meeting with the South Korean President in Pyongyang in June 2000, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Paek Nam-sun attended the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Bangkok to join this process that was started in 1994. While the intention might have been a backdoor entry to direct talks with the United States, it also opened an opportunity to formal and regular exchanges with ASEAN members. North Korea expressed a clear interest in dialogue and participation.

ASEAN seems to be perfectly suited for a cooperative solution. The single member states are relatively small. Most of them are also not too much interested in North Korean domestic affairs; in fact, non-interference is explicitly one of the core principles of ASEAN, and the case of Burma has demonstrated that these are not just empty words. Not all political systems of ASEAN members can be described as authoritarian; however,

Western-style liberal democracy has not taken a firm hold in all member countries, either. None of the ASEAN members is (yet) a direct neighbor of North Korea, but they are culturally and geographically close enough. In fact, North Korea already has well-developed bilateral relationships with many member states. The number of ASEAN members is currently 10, an expansion is being discussed. Progress has been reached in terms of formalization, too. Obviously, ASEAN meets the criteria for cooperative interaction. Equally importantly, the United States is not a member of ASEAN. If China joins ASEAN, this would not change the assessment by the North Koreans since Beijing is an ally, although one that is watched with equally as much curiosity as suspicion. However, China adds the heavy economic weight to ASEAN that has been missing in the case of the traditional NAM. It remains to be seen how North Korea would react to the inclusion of South Korea and Japan into ASEAN+X, and whether this would turn into confrontational interaction.

The official position of the North Korean side on ASEAN in the past years has been remarkably friendly. Appeals for a peaceful resolution of the Korean question and the nuclear issue have been interpreted as reflecting the position of the DPRK government and denouncing the U.S. position. The North Korean media (Rodong Sinmun, Minju Chosòn) carry articles praising ASEAN each year on August 8th, marking its founding anniversary. The tone is exemplified by the following quote from the 1999 article: "In particular, ASEAN has resolutely rejected the hegemonism and strong-arm policy of outside forces to control ASEAN politically and economically, and dynamically struggled to defend the sovereignty of the member nations." (KCNA, August 8th, 1999). In his speech at the ARF meeting in July 2000, North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Paek Nam Sun stressed that "...the DPRK government will make active contribution to the joint exploration of the ways for peace and security suitable to the actual conditions of Asia in conformity with purpose and ideal of the forum." (KCNA, July 30, 2000).

The North Korean readiness for cooperation seems to have gained momentum after the successful nuclear test of 2006 and the agreement

with the U.S. of February 2007. In August 2007, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs left for the annual ARF ministerial meeting, the official media issued more than just the usual few sentences informing about his departure. Under the title "DPRK Government will strive for Peace", details of the speech of Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Ui Chun were reported. Pak reminded the ARF that "it is indispensable for the ASEAN regional forum to thoroughly keep the essential principles of respect of sovereignty, non-interference in other's internal affairs, peaceful co-existence and ban on the use of force in order to fulfill its mission as a unique forum for political dialogue in the region" (KCNA, August 5, 2007). The North Korean government's blueprint for its future regional cooperation is reflected in the 2007 article commemorating the ASEAN founding anniversary: "[ASEAN] has exerted big efforts to protect sovereignty of its member nations and achieve common prosperity and development while rejecting the outside forces' interference in the internal affairs of the countries in the region and the policy of domination aimed to put those countries under their control politically and economically." (KCNA, Aug. 8, 2007).

But ASEAN has more to offer to North Korea than economic cooperation without too many questions about the domestic political situation. It might also contain an interesting model case for North Korean attempts at rebuilding their economy without risking a sudden collapse as witnessed in Europe. Especially Vietnam enjoyed great attention since Fall 2007. In September of that year, talks were held in Pyongyang between the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland (DFRF) and the delegation of the Central Committee of the Fatherland Front of Vietnam. In October 2007, only a few days after South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun returned from the second inter-Korean summit, the North's media were full with reports about a visit by Nong Duc Manh, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, praised the Vietnamese achievements in building their economy, a process "followed with deep attention" in

North Korea (KCNA, Oct, 16, 2007). He also thanked Vietnam for supporting „the expansion of cooperation between the DPRK and ASEAN and its member nations“, hinting at a possible advocacy role of Hanoi. The North Korean Premier Kim Yong Il traveled to Hanoi and met the Vietnamese Prime Minister. The leading figures of the North Korean delegation were the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Trade, and the Minister of Agriculture, indicating the priority of economic interests. Not only a 2008-2010 Plan for Exchange in Culture, Arts, Science and Education between the two countries was signed, but also a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of agricultural science and technology. The North Korean delegation then went on to Laos in early November 2007. In late November 2007, a delegation of the Vietnamese Farmer's Union visited Pyongyang.

A look at trade and investment flows of North Korea further underlines the importance of ASEAN+X countries for North Korea. Total North Korean trade in 2006 consisted of exports worth 947 million US\$, and imports worth 2,996 million US\$ (source: KOTRA). These numbers are, however, still below the level of 1990 (1,733 and 2,437 million US\$ for exports and imports). The ten largest trading partners in 2006 were, in that order: China, Thailand, Russia, Japan, India, Germany, Singapore, The Netherlands, Sweden, and Taiwan. China and Thailand alone combined about 69.2% of all North Korean trade. North Korean trade with the Asia Pacific region amounted to almost 83% in 2006. Remarkably, this share grew by 5.6% compared to 2005, while trade with all other regions (Europe, Africa, America) declined in the double digit range. If we include inter-Korean trade, China's share of North Korean trade was 40%, followed by South Korea (30%) and Thailand (9.4%). Looking at these data, it is fair to state that North Korean foreign economic exchanges are strongly focused on the surrounding region. This, of course, mainly refers to the two neighbors China and South Korea. However, with Thailand and Singapore, two members of ASEAN are among North Korea's main trading partners, as well as four states that more or less strongly aspire for ASEAN+X membership (China, Japan, South Korea and India). Russia can

also be, with some discount, regarded as a regional power.

Outlook: "Westpolitik" as South Korea's New North Korea Strategy?

If we summarize the arguments above, we arrive at the following seven conclusions:

First, without efforts at capacity building in North Korea and the development of an understanding for the constraints of private firms, a long-term and stable international economic cooperation will be very difficult.

Second, despite legitimate political objectives, international partners of North Korea will fail in the long run if they do not ensure economic feasibility of their cooperation projects.

Third, North Korea needs a supportive international environment for industry and export-based economic modernization, which is the only option to prevent a further deterioration of the domestic economy and a destabilization of the regime.

Fourth, the international perspective on North Korea is far from being unified, reflecting a great number of political objectives with varying priorities.

Fifth, the past has shown that although active support from the U.S. is not necessarily needed for North Korea, active opposition by the United States will prevent Pyongyang from being able to utilize the opportunities of international economic cooperation.

Sixth, an analysis of North Korea's situation and its preferences as exhibited in the past years and decades indicates a specific profile for cooperative interaction with international partners. Under certain conditions, such interaction will inevitably be confrontational.

Seventh, taking into account the proven North Korean economic focus on NAM and East Asia, and considering demonstrated interest in the ARF and bilateral cooperation with countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and others, ASEAN+x has the potential of serving as the environment for

cooperative interaction.

ASEAN members are not homogenous and hence have different perspectives on North Korea. However, they share a strong interest in the Chinese market and in keeping the U.S. influence at a minimum. A military conflict on the Korean peninsula will in all likelihood involve the U.S., Japan, South Korea and China, spill over to Taiwan and wreck havoc on the economies of the East Asian nations as well as the whole world economy. Therefore, all ASEAN members would serve their own interests if they supported closer cooperation with North Korea - be it enthusiastically or cautiously.

North Korea would benefit significantly from integration into a framework of regional cooperation. On the political side, it would inherit the group's international recognition and even gain political support against outsiders. Domestically, the leadership could display this as a success of its policy and as a sign that it was worth standing tall despite all hardships. Economic support by rich and generous South Korea is a double-edged sword for Pyongyang. Assistance would appear less threatening ideologically to Pyongyang if cooperation with the Southern brothers could be cloaked in the dust of multilateralism. A regional organization might also help breaking the stalemate that has so far prevented access to the richest source of finance, Japan. Tokyo has lost its role as a major donor and trading partner in the past years, but certainly not the potential. Membership in an alliance could also become the one reliable alternative to nuclear arms that many involved parties have been looking for. This would, however, suggest a close and multi-faceted cooperation beyond a loose alignment. Such cooperation is at least not impossible, given the integrating potential of China and the relative acceptability of ASEAN for North Korea. The absence of the USA, the principle of non-interference, and geographical and cultural proximity are helpful.

Ernst Haas (1958: 16), looking at the post-1945 European experience, defined integration as a process "whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations

and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states". Will North Korea shift its loyalties to a new center, following Haas' definition? This is hard to believe, knowing the strong emphasis on nationalism and the direct connection of the leadership's legitimacy with national independence. However, societal development is a dynamic and multilevel process. It would not be the first time that the creation of common features such as governing bodies, regulations, symbols and currencies would be followed by a modification of identity, norms and values. Short-term gains such as economic growth and regional security alone suggest that integrating North Korea into frameworks of cooperation is worth the effort. In the long run, the feeling of security and intensified contacts with the partner countries on the micro-level will have their impact on other issues of concern such as human rights and political freedom.

South Korea has once decided to follow Willi Brandt's approach to deal with the other part of the country indirectly, via its allies. At that time, it modified the term "Ostpolitik" into "Nordpolitik", targeting Beijing and Moscow. The new way to Pyongyang this time might lead westward via Southeast Asia, adding "Westpolitik" to the already successful Northern approach.

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Multilateral Approaches for Human Rights: On Challenges of Building a Human Security Regime in Northeast Asia

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Introduction: Human Rights in International Relations

From a theoretical perspective, survival is a predominant goal for each nation state under the anarchy of international relations. The political security issue has to be taken into account as the most serious consideration. On a continuum of considering national security, a nation state is preoccupied by the issue of economic development relating to international trade and finance. In terms of policy priority, human rights issues have been treated with a secondary or tertiary priority next to political security and economic trade issues. Although violations of human rights such as genocide and crimes against humanity can cause individual pain and anguish and sometimes involve a burden placed on the international community, human rights have always been considered after survival and prosperity. It is also true that even in academic society human rights are given far less attention by social scientists than interstate disputes and trade.

The little attention on human rights is a result of several practical factors. First, the human rights issue has been considered in relatively recent times, mainly after World War II. Despite a long history of human rights discourse in Western countries, the early 20th century has confirmed and recognized dehumanizing practices such as the slavery

system, inhumane punishment, and other types of atrocities against human beings. The practices of Nazi atrocities during World War II demonstrated the necessity of international conventions and legislation to secure peace and human rights. As a result of priceless lessons, the international community agreed on minimal regulations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights under the leadership of the United Nations.

Second, despite concerted efforts for human rights by international society, human rights have been regarded as a domestic issue of a sovereign state with a few exceptions like Northern European countries. It is indisputable that even mentioning human rights violations in other countries could be criticized as interference in domestic affairs. Therefore, international collaboration and/or coordination on human rights violations have encountered various legal and practical obstacles.

Third, the reality of international politics admits a fact that human rights issues have frequently been utilized as a policy tool by major powers to intervene into the domestic politics of the third world countries. This type of conflicting perspective on the human rights issue can be summarized with a controversy between universalism of Western countries and relativism (culturalism) of third world countries.

Despite the various controversies and disagreement on human rights issues, there is a consensus that the ultimate goal of human rights studies is to share the understanding of multilateral dimensions of human rights. Human rights violation in one country triggers other political and economic responsibility in other neighboring countries. The high level of international interdependence requires a greater level of interstate cooperation by neighboring and relevant states, such as building a regulatory apparatus against human rights violations.

The development of the international community has dramatically decreased the possibility of the outbreak of militarized interstate disputes. Unlike the traditional practices of the mercantilist approach, economic disputes have also been resolved by a peaceful structure of norms and

regulations. This type of new trend opens the possibility of resolving the various conflicts and problems by international institutions or regimes. Liberal institutionalism provides the chance to take care of domestic human rights violation through interstate cooperation.

As mentioned above, there is a theoretical and practical inconsistency between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Reconciliation of sovereignty with humanitarian intervention is more likely to be achieved by multilateral than bilateral efforts. Based on the necessity of multilateral coordination and collaboration concerning human rights violations, this paper will specifically address the possibility of a multilateral human rights regime in Northeast Asia as an alternative to accomplish the Jeju Process, which refers to building a multilateral cooperative institution. Theoretically, this paper adopts the concept of “human security” as a framework within which human rights, environment, individual wellbeing, and other humanitarian issues interact as an institution or regime of humanitarian intervention.

After reviewing the contemporary multilateral security regimes, this paper will discuss the possible factors to explain the success and failure of multilateral approaches. Discussing these critical variables for the regime building allows a researcher to apply the theoretical model to investigate the possibility of the human rights regime in Northeast Asia.

Research Scope and Method

In terms of logical consistency, the sample selection is important. Since there are only a few cases of multilateral cooperative regimes, it is literally impossible to randomize samples. I selected four cases across the world; the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union (AU). Concerning the lack of cases for a randomized sample, there is a justification for intentional sample selection in analyses. Although the lack of data availability for international regime building impedes the random sampling for my analyses, I overcome these

limitations by using the comparative research method, Most Similar System (MSS) design.

The theory of comparative research argues that comparative methods are important tools to organize logically testable hypotheses rather than to simply test a methodological technique. Although, the comparative method is basically concerned how to select sample cases in order to test the hypotheses with theoretical consistency. Based on the logic of the MSS design, I selected four similar international regimes: the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Inter-American System, and the African Union. Since the CSCE has been transformed to OSCE and the OAU to AU, the internal reliability could be in question. As long as the institutions inherit goals associated with a cooperative multilateral regime, the institutions should maintain the internal consistency.

As Przeworski and Teune (1970) argue, the MSS design begins with the selection of cases that are as similar as possible in terms of various dimensions in units. This approach means that the MSS methodology controls for similar systemic factors and allows for covariance between dependent and independent variables.

My sample institutions share various common factors in terms of multilateral cooperative institutions. First, all of the aforementioned sample institutions share a common goal; multilateral human rights regimes as a supranational entity regulate domestic affairs of a member state.

As Przeworski and Teune (1970) point out, the MSS design maximizes and controls for the similarities among samples, and it tries to find covariance between the dependent and independent variables. The MSS approach has been criticized for having an over-determined case selection. In other words, as long as any factors differentiate the selected samples and co-vary with the dependent variable, these factors can be considered to explain the variance in the dependent variable. This could be a weakness of the MSS approach. On the contrary though, as far as the sample case and variable selections are based on theory instead of

methodological convenience, the MSS can produce a reliable case selection and logically sound outcomes.

Various dimensions of my sample institutions are similar except in relation to dependent and independent variables. The cooperation and conflict levels, dependent variables, vary among the sample countries. Domestic political and economic conditions, independent variables, vary as well. Therefore, these domestic factors could be possible candidates for variance in cooperative events. So, according to the logic of the MSS design, the selection of variable and sample cases in my research could be characterized as simply covariance-seeking. However, it is a viable test method for this research because each variable is theoretically justified.

Theoretical Discussion: Human Rights and Regime Building

1. Human Rights and Human Security

Modern states of the Western World have been bounded by the norm of sovereignty and nonintervention that was formed in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia, which ended both the Thirty Years' War and the Eighty Years' War. During the Thirty Years' War, a religious war between Catholics and Protestants, each side broke the territorial integrity of other states under the cause of protecting followers' life and liberty from the threat of heretic forces. As regret for the past intervention, European countries adopted a principle of sovereignty and nonintervention within the boundary of a country. The internal affairs of a country should exclusively belong to a sovereign state and its leader. The principle of sovereignty and nonintervention has been violated several times even after 1648 by imperialist states. Particularly, Napoleon invaded his neighboring countries that posed no threat to France simply with a justification of liberating the peoples from the absolute power of an oppressive monarch. The Congress of Vienna was an attempt to stabilize the order in Europe after the Napoleonic War. Since the congress reassured royal legitimacy and reactionism that aimed to return to the map before Napoleon, it was a

momentum that strengthened the rule of nonintervention and sovereignty. In the 20th century, the human rights issue raised a serious challenge to the rule of nonintervention and sovereignty that consisted of the foundation of the modern international system. After the end of World War II, allies who defeated Nazi Germany and witnessed their atrocities agreed on the necessity of international law that would enable the international community to punish war criminals through legal procedures. The international concern on human rights issues has begun to be openly expressed and embodied by the United Nations Charter declared in 1945. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a momentum of increasing attention and encouraging international cooperation on human rights abuses around the world. The declaration in 1948 reflected the liberal perspective on the human rights issue that supported the norm of humanitarian intervention and opposed the rule of sovereignty and nonintervention. Although these types of declarations are inclusive by design, the legal competence of them is still in question since these declarations were not rectified by individual countries but instead through resolutions carried in the General Assembly of the UN.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide proposed for signature and ratification in 1948 and entered into force on 12 January 1951, can be considered not only as a fundamental challenge to the rule of nonintervention but also as a major progress in the history of human rights. In the 1990s, the International War Criminal Court has held the trials against war criminals who planned, organized, ordered or executed genocide.

Despite the supportive argument on the effectiveness of declarations, resolutions, conventions as well as international laws ordained by the supranational organizations such as the United Nations, there is no efficient policy tool to punish the crimes against humanity in a given country. When a dictator under an authoritarian regime violates personal integrity rights of a political minority within the boundary of a sovereign state, there is substantially little chance for the international legal system to relieve the violation of the individual human rights except by

ostracizing the authoritarian ruler by the use of collective military measures. In terms of the improvement of ongoing violations of personal integrity rights, the militarized intervention, even endorsed by the legitimate international organization can guarantee little chance of achieving the restitution and restoration of victims whose rights were in danger by authoritarian rulers. In the course of militarized intervention, the people suppressed by their own political leaders are victimized by multinational forces. In reality, communist states and Muslim countries uphold the relativism emphasizing cultural and historical distinctiveness and denying the universal nature of human rights. These countries regard the comments on the practice of human rights by other countries as an intervention in a domestic affair by an imperial state.

Despite the opposition to the internationalization of human rights issue, there is a slow but gradual improvement in the institutionalization of human rights protection. The current international relation can be characterized with the increasing trend of complex interdependence (Nye and Keohane 1977). The complex interdependent international system ensures multiple channels of communication and transportation. Under the international system of complex interdependence, even hegemonic states cannot control the interactions and communication not only between governments but also between governments and individuals. Therefore, a state supporting relativism and opposing universalism cannot prevent the human rights issue from internationalizing by individual activists as well as other states.

The next important feature of complex interdependence is that the hierarchical order among foreign policy issues is disappearing. As I mentioned before, the military security issue has almost always overruled other international policy issues such as international trade, the environment, and human rights. In terms of policy priority, the human rights issue has been treated as the least significant policy issue. In other words, economic and human rights issues have attracted public and international attention so long as these issues are able to guarantee national security and to promote national interest abroad. As the

probability of military conflicts decrease, economic development issues receive more attention. In terms of national capability, various factors such as economic capacity, technological ability, and the degree of democratic institutionalization have been included as a soft power, contrasting with hard power and military capability. The importance of socio-economic dimensions in national power emphasizes the human rights, democratization, and institutionalization of various social relationships, which have been treated as secondary features of national power at most.

The development of mutual interdependence has considerably reduced the possibility of employing military capability as a substantial policy alternative. Under the world of mutual interdependence, a country normally engages in exchanges in social, economic, cultural, and humanitarian affairs. The increased interactions can dissuade even an aggressive state from using military capability. Instead, the tentative aggressor will rely on nonviolent policy tools such as negotiations, coordination, arbitrations, and mediations to accomplish national policy goals since the cost of aggressive military measures is so great in comparison to the benefits from the military adventure in domestic dimensions as well as in international dimensions. The destructive power of nuclear weapons is so great that they can annihilate the human species and numerous other species on earth. Due to their immense destructive power, nuclear weapons have served as a deterrence policy tool instead for actual and useful policy measures. As much as nuclear weapons are dangerous, the deployment of conventional weapons lead to a devastating results under the mutually interdependent interstate system where individual quality of life and personal security are interconnected with interweaving interactions among various members in an open international system.

The development of mutual interdependence increases the significance of the non-conventional security area in current international relations. The non-conventional security issue is so inclusive that it consists of human rights, environmental issues, natural resources, global warming, poverty, starvation, refugee, disease control, and so forth. The significance

of non-conventional security blurs the boundaries of nation states and the hierarchies of policy issues. The transition of international order and the dynamics of international relations prepared the notions of traditional security and nontraditional security (Ullmann 1983; Mandel 1994; Lynn-Jones and Miller 1995). The traditional security presented by the realism emphasized the military security from an external threat. Military security is no longer a useful analytical tool to understand the international relation of complex interdependence since the current interstate relationship is not limited to the affairs of nation states but reflects various policy dimensions of various levels of actors. The nontraditional security issue covers environmental contamination, infectious disease, food and energy crises, refugees, terrorism, human rights violations, and poverty. These issues are related with domestic affairs therefore, and there appear to be sovereignty problems in order for the international community to take care of these issues. This trend reflects the expansion of the security notion and the theoretical integration of the two major schools in international relations; realism and liberalism. The one underlines the importance of military security from external threats and the other sheds more light on domestic impacts on international relations.

The integration of two major perspectives in international relations has brought the new concept of security, human security, which is so inclusive and ambiguous that it covers the issues of national military security to the issues of personal psychological stability. Due to the conceptual ambiguity and inclusiveness, scholars in international relations have raised doubts about the analytical availability of the concept of human security. Despite the analytical limitation, there is an expanding denominator in international relations and domestic politics. As I discussed before, the current environment of international relations is characterized by the complex interdependence. The overarching structure of complex interdependence is illustrated with the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability. The sensitivity refers to the speed of responses with which a change in an actor affects to a change in another actor. The vulnerability indicates the availability and costliness of a possible alternative when an

actor faces changes in behavioral patterns of other actors.

Under the complex interdependent system of sensitivity and vulnerability, changes of individual human rights conditions in a country have direct and indirect impacts on that in neighboring countries. In other words, human rights issues are marked as critical in the discussion of human security as long as it is respected that human rights violations are not exclusively subject to a sovereign state. Instead it is an international malady requiring coordinated and coercive measures of the international community both domestically and by joint action.

Since the human security issue is broadly inclusive, this paper will limit the scope to the discussion of human rights. Under the international system of sensitivity and vulnerability, an international regime is an effective measure to prevent, denounce, remedy, and ultimately eradicate human rights violations in a country. Based on this logical reasoning, this paper will discuss the international regime in regard to human rights violations. Even if research mentions human security as an analytical concept, it is literally impossible to discuss various dimensions of human security issues in a framework of analysis.

Under circumstances where some countries take a hostile stand toward the international coordination to reduce human rights violations regarding it as an intervention against sovereignty, the international community continues to develop its role and activities through the formation of international regimes. Therefore, human rights issues need to be considered within the framework of an international regime in general, and a multilateral security regime in particular. The international regime theory is a trial to understand the international relation through the integration of realist and liberal perspectives (Haggard and Simmons 1987, 492). The discussion of human rights issues within the framework of human security is a theoretical expansion of international relations theories which are almost opposite in their assumptions and approaches. With the practical necessity of national policy and theoretical adjustment of two contrasting perspectives, the next chapter will discuss the regime theory and the cases of regional multilateral regimes.

2. Multilateral Human Rights Regimes and Functional Integration Theory

1) Formation of International Regimes and Functionalism

In the broadest sense, the integration theory of functionalism is an applicable framework to analyze the formation and transformation of international regimes around world. Concerning the concepts of multilateral entity, there are a number of variants such as association, organization, institution, regime, and custom. Scholars in international relations have ascribed the different concepts of multilateral entity to the degree of institutionalization. The conceptual disagreement has resulted from the differences between the limitation of sovereignty and the benefit of membership in an international entity which is assembled by voluntary consent of each member state.

According to the early definition of Puchala and Hopkins (1982), regime is regarded as an existing entity relating (a) practical policy issue(s) that means principles, rules, and norms explaining the regularity in behaviors of nation states, which are basic units of international interactions. Since the behavioral regularity does not necessarily verify the existence of a regime, the definition of regime is reestablished through the discussion of logical induction. The regime is defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1982, 186). Krasner (1982) further discusses the subordinate concepts of international regime:

Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.

The inclusive definition of regime is a useful analytical tool in the sense that individual behaviors of international actors are affected by the presence of international regimes. Therefore, it could be a theoretically critical effort to figure out major factors on the formation and transformation of a regime. In the broadest sense, a regime is a structure

that regulates the behaviors of individual actors in international relations. It is logically consistent that one applies the functionalist integration theory on the formation process of an international regime. Although there could be theoretical disagreements about the approach combining integration theory and regime theory, the integration process is based on the multilateral relations instead of bilateral relations. The integration pursues an institutionalization with which nation states coordinate and collaborate to establish international order. These features of cooperative institutionalization connect the regime theory and the integration theory (Ruggie 1975, 559; Ruggie 1993, 11). In other words, integration is defined as a persuading process in which multiple actors with different national identities transfer their loyalty, expectation, and standard of political behavior to a higher authority (Haas 1958, 16). A major feature of integration is the process that nation-states agree on in forming a higher authority and transferring their sovereignty to it. Deutsch et al. (1957, 5) define integration as a process that a certain group of people obtain mutual trust on peaceful transition and thereby built the institution, the custom, and the community spirit with a boundary. From the perspective of social contract theory, when each member in a tentative international regime is strongly confident that integration will be able to guarantee the individual interest as well as survival, it will voluntarily participate into the integration process and transfer the sovereignty of each member to a higher authority, the international regime.

During the 1960s, research on the international organization and regional integration caused a lively debate on the probability of integration through cooperative policies among the sovereign nation states (Haas 1964; Keohane and Nye 1975). If integration is considered in a continuum of cooperative process in international relations, one can incorporate regime theory and integration theory in a research method. Early studies on regional integration emphasized the establishment of a formal organization among multiple international actors who faced a hardship requiring international cooperation. Later, integration studies shed more light on the behaviors of individual states in a purport of the

institutionalization and regime formation. Thereby, integration theory and regime theory found the theoretical linkage point. Both theories share a theoretical assumption that each individual state is willing to limit its sovereignty and autonomy in order to resolve a common problem and thereby to increase national interest through the coordinated efforts of any relevant international actors.

Both the participation in an international organization and the formation of international regime involves volunteer renouncement of national sovereignty on behalf of higher international authority that can provide security and welfare. The limitation on sovereignty by regime is more likely to be *de facto* rather than *de jure*. On the other hand, the limitation on sovereignty by an integrated organization is based on the agreed rules and norms. In terms of the development of international organizations, the difference between a regime and an integrated organization is not as clear as the terminology itself declares. The classification simply means the difference in the level of organizational autonomy with respect to the national sovereignty of each member country. The formation of an integrated organization is not a matter of time but a matter of fact (Deutsch et al. 1957: 6), which means that organizational integration is not a natural process as time passes where a regime spontaneously begins working. Instead, the integration process requires a voluntary and coordinated effort to establish and maintain law and order among nation states. The initial phase of integration appears to be the regime building phase in which member states try to build mutual trust and to assure basic principles of behavior. The developed phase of integration is the transformation from international organizations and institutions, ultimately to an integrated entity, which each member country accepts as a central authority.

2) Factors Affecting the Creation of a Multilateral Regime

In terms of the level of integration of a regional regime, Europe has advanced faster than any other region in the world. From the 1950s, European countries have concentrated their collaboration on avoiding

annihilation of the human race as a result from the nuclear confrontation of the Cold War. This type of collaborative effort to avoid common abhorrence became a world wide phenomenon in the 1990s. In spite of regional variances, the regional integration movement is on the threshold of international progress not only in Europe but in Africa and Latin America. Contrary to the global trend of regional integration, East Asia is lagging behind. Even if regional variance appears to explain the integration processes around world, it is not as clear as it is assumed. Since the European Union is the only viable case of regional integration in the history of modern international relation, there is no other case to test the theoretical applicability of the integration theory.

The integration theory emphasized the factors that affect the process and possibility of organizational integration by multiple political entities in international relations. The discussion about these independent variables for the integration process has become comprehensive as neo-functionalism began to refute the traditional functionalism. While functionalism assumes that integration is spontaneously achieved once the progress starts, neo-functionalism refutes the gradual progressivism and discusses the possibility of regressive movement in the integration process. The neo-functionalists argue that the domestic factors of each member country can affect the speed and direction of an integration process. For example, the attitude of political decision makers is a critical factor for the integration process (Keohane and Nye 1975). When political leaders maintain consistent interest from the integration, political leaders will provide political support and it promotes the integration, and vice versa. Regime theory also discusses the importance of interest perceived by individual actors in the process of regime building (Krasner 1982, 11). In this sense, integration theory and regime theory deal with the same dimension from different perspectives. Political leaders' support and opposition on integration is a function of the gain and lose which is associated with the domestic and international politics of integration. The difference between regime theory and integration theory lies on the unit of analysis. While the regime theory employs the individual state as a unit of

analysis, neo-functionalism integration theory regards an individual political leader or a group of the political elite as a unit of analysis.

Neo-functionalism integration theory discusses not only the factors reflecting domestic political dynamics but also the factors at a nation state level and the factors at a dyadic level of participants in the integration process. The dyadic level factors are related to the commensurability between two countries in economic development, national power, degree of democratization, value system of the political elite, domestic political stability, and the political elite's capacity of response.

National interest is one of the major factors for integration when a nation state is assumed as a unitary and rational actor in international relations. Since participants of the integration process create common interest through collaboration, distribution of the created interest is a critical factor for the success and failure of the integration. As the realist perspective argues, nation states pay more attention to relative gain than absolute gain under the anarchy under which there is no central authority. Therefore, distribution of expected interest is always a critical factor for cooperation. When considering the national interest through the integration process, decision makers try to expand national capability in terms of explicit indicators such as dependence of foreign trade, dependence of energy imports, financial balances and possible threats from other countries. When participating countries improve national capability and decrease negative dimensions of national prestige through integration, the integration process can be accelerated. If the cooperation involves collaboration and coordination, the cost of integration is also as important as the benefit of integration. Concerning the cost of integration, political and social costs are as important as the economic cost. When both political and economic costs of integration are low enough to tolerate, political leaders are willing to pursue the integration process.

Regarding disintegration, using military measures at the dyadic level is the single most important factor determining the failure of integration. The integration process is preconditioned by mutual trust among participant countries. However, military measures weaken the mutual

trust and ultimately fosters the disintegration process. The cultural gap among participants has negative impacts on the integration process. When participants emphasize the ethnic, linguistic, and religious discrepancy, the adjustment cost of the integration process will rise no matter how great the benefit.

As I discussed before, domestic political factors are also critical for the success of the integration process. When a political group, negative on the integration is politically activated and when economic conditions remain in a long term recession, domestic factors of politics and economics have negative impacts on the integration process. As integration theory emphasizes the role of the political elite, elite groups with exclusive attitudes will resist the integration process. When a ruling class who benefits from the international and domestic order before integration predicts a loss of vested interest, the ruling class turns out to impede the integration process. This type of complicated process is called a politicization of integration within which conflict interests and competing groups try to acquire public support and policy tools in order to resolve the conflicts and competitions by a means of equal distribution of the benefit.

Case Studies of Multilateral Regimes

1. Council of Europe (CoE)

Europe, devastated by unprecedented disaster of World War II in 1945 favored the idea of European integration through the creation of a regional cooperative organization. The political experiment in human history is marked by the cooperative effort to build a council of Europe, which political leaders at the moment expected to resolve the historic animosity among the peoples of Europe. Sir Winston Churchill announced his design to create a council of Europe in his speech at the University of Zurich in 1946. According to the history of the CoE, there were two competing schools of ideas. While some preferred a classic definition of an international organization with representatives from administrative

branches of each state, others supported a political council of parliamentarians or congressmen. Compromising the two seemingly contrasting ideas, the CoE created both a council of parliament and council of administration. The dual structure of the international organization affected the design of other European organizations such as the European Community, NATO, and OSCE as well. The Council of Europe was founded in 1945 by the Treaty of London, which was the Statute of the Council of Europe signed by 10 initial member states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

CoE is the oldest regional organization that has sought European integration with emphasis on specific policy goals such as the rule of law, respecting human rights, democratization, and cultural cooperation. As Eastern and Central European countries underwent democratization during the early 1990s, the number of CoE member states has dramatically increased. At present, the CoE consists of 47 member countries and represents 800 million people in Europe. Member countries of the CoE officially pursue economic and social progress and protect the shared ideal and principle as a plan to achieve the harmony of members' interests.

As part of a continuing effort to facilitate judicial collaboration among the member states, CoE regulates cyber crimes, terrorist activities, corruption, organized crimes, and human rights with over 200 agreements and treaties. In a sense that European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) attract attention around the world, CoE places a higher priority on human rights issues. Not only state parties but also an individual citizen can raise a lawsuit in ECtHR to claim individual human rights. CoE created various institutions and organizations to respect human rights such as the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, protection of social rights under the European Social Charter, linguistic rights under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and minority

rights under the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. CoE also pays attention to social justice and institution building in a process of political democratization and institutionalization of socio-political dimensions including equal opportunity in education member countries, education programs for youth, athletics anti-doping for fair competition, and management and control of the quality of medicine. The emphasis on socioeconomic justice reflects that CoE has tried to realize peace in a positive sense and ultimately to contribute to the integration of Europe through the cooperation among the member states. Facilitating coordination and collaboration among the member countries, CoE achieved a number of agreements and charters. However, unlike the EU, member countries under CoE preserve their sovereignty, delegate the authority through agreement, and cooperate with each other based on the common value and political preference. Instead of transferring the sovereignty to an international organization, CoE has put emphasis on the autonomy of each member state.

Despite the minor discrepancy in an operating goal, EU and CoE has quested the same goal of European integration. In terms of integrative process, it is possible that CoE is less developed than the EU since CoE has weaker restriction power on its member countries. On the other hand, CoE had led the inclusive cooperation among various countries not only in the European continent but in neighboring areas. The fact that the EU and CoE have shared the same official flag since 1980 signals the cooperative relationship between these two international organizations. They are not competing with each other to attract supports from member countries. The EU and CoE have reinforced their cooperation particularly in culture, education, rule of law, and human rights areas. The EU is expected to join the European Convention of Human Rights. At the Warsaw Summit in 2005, European heads of member states urged the EU to join the Convention for policy coordination of human rights. In terms of consistency in judicial cases, the European Court of Justice of the EU and European Court of Human Rights of CoE have tried to prevent contradictions in judgment.

The cooperative effort between these two organizations can be evaluated as an important attempt towards mutual assistance between two different international institutions. Since Europe has multiple and active international organizations for the purpose of facilitating human rights, democratization, rule of law, regional development and prosperity, and environmental protection, the European case can be regarded a waste of time and resources. However, this type of multiple organization provision can work as a safety net for ensuring human security through international coordination.

2. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

As the name of the organization refers CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been founded with the purpose of establishing a multilateral security commission. During the 1950s of the Cold War when European countries had been divided into two ideological blocs, every country in Europe was under the threat of national security, and survival itself. Under the shadow of the Cold War, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Molotov, suggested a European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe in the meeting of foreign ministers of four major countries, the U.S., the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. However, the United States and the West European countries rejected the suggestion since the Western bloc suspected dissolution of NATO and exclusion of the U.S. from the regional security system in Europe.

Despite the constant suggestion of collective security efforts during the 1960s by the Soviet Union, there was not any concrete outcome for a regional security regime. In the 1970s the international circumstances dramatically changed as the U.S. and the Soviet Union had recognized the necessity to release the tension of the Cold War under the conditions of balance of terror created by nuclear weapons. During de Gaulle's administration, France withdrew from NATO and took an independent stand on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which meant the split of the

Western bloc. As Great Britain and China appeared to be new nuclear powers, major countries around the world agreed on the need to relieve the tension between the Eastern and Western blocs. In 1969, Willy Brandt, Chancellor of West Germany initiated the Ostpolitik to improve relations with East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union and in 1971 the Soviet Union and West Germany concluded the mutual nonaggression pact. President Nixon of the U. S. declared the Nixon doctrine which emphasized national interest rather than ideology. In 1972 President Nixon visited Moscow and Beijing, which signaled the reconciliation between the Eastern and the Western blocs and signified the end of the ideological confrontation. During his visit to Moscow, Nixon agreed on opening the commission on security and cooperation in Europe. Through three years' of negotiations and dialogues, the countries of the Eastern and Western bloc adopted the Helsinki final agreement and launched the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) on June 30, 1975. CSCE provided the main framework for the multilateral cooperation not only in the military-political area such as the early warning system, conflict prevention, and military trust building but also in the human security areas such as the economy, environment, and human rights. After enlarging the active role in conflict prevention and in the postwar rehabilitation, the 1990 Summit in Paris discussed the reorganization of OSCE to adjust to the new international order of the post Cold War. At the 1994 Summit in Budapest, member countries agreed on reorganization from a conference of loose cooperation to an institution reinforcing the effectiveness and the organizational structure.

Currently, OSCE consists of 56 nations from 3 continents and takes a comprehensive approach in three major issue areas: military security, economic development, and humanitarian security. The military security issue covers armament control, borderline management, conflict prevention, reformation of military organization, and maintenance of order in the postwar reconstruction area. Economic issue includes monitoring the economic development of participating countries and fighting against any threat to economic stability and security; combating

against money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities, promoting good governance, supporting transport development and security, and assisting with migration management. In the human security issue, OSCE tries to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms by strengthening various social institutions such as the rule of law, the principles of democracy, nondiscrimination, and the equal opportunity of the ethnic and social minorities.

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) as a major institution for human rights, manages the election assistance for the institutionalization of democracy, gender equality, and equal opportunity for ethnic minorities. ODIHR pays special attention to equal opportunity and socio-political discrimination of the Roma and Sinti populations who migrated from India between the 9th and the 14th centuries and who were dispersed across Europe. OSCE firmly believes that not only the political military dimension but also the humanitarian dimensions are necessary elements for the security and prosperity, sustainable development, and democracy in the region.

Unlike other regional organizations, OSCE initiated from the military security issue and extended its scope to economic, environmental, and humanitarian issues. By supporting exchange and cooperation in economics and environment, CSCE during the Cold War era contributed to easing tension between members of NATO and members of the Warsaw Pact which had antagonized each other in politics and military areas. The extended exchange in non-political and non-military areas seems to be a part of functionalist approach that ultimately facilitated the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. This historical momentum has been remarked as an institutional development from a commission to an organization for common values like common security, democracy and a market economy. As the Charter of Paris declares, OSCE redefined the new phases of regional security by emphasizing the human security and reforming the organization and has played a decisive role as a comprehensive regional security regime during the post Cold War era. The Charter of Paris underlines human rights, democracy, the rule of law,

economic freedom, social justices, and social responsibility for the environment.

3. Inter-American System

Having its headquarter in Washington D.C., the Inter-American System consists of 35 member countries of the Western hemisphere. The Inter-American system comprises the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and several other subregional organizations, entities and institutions. The history of the Inter-American System began in 1826 as Simon Bolivar convened the Congress of Panama with the idea of creating an association of states for a common army, mutual security agreement, and supranational congress. On the process to create a regional cooperation regime, Bolivar continuously warned of the threat of imperial intervention of the United States. Gran Columbia, Peru, United Provinces of Central America, and Mexico agreed to create a community of the newly independent countries in the Western hemisphere at the time. However, Only Gran Columbia ratified the agreement for creating the organization. With the outbreak of civil war, Gran Columbia was split into Columbia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. As Central America collapsed, the effort for a united organization turned out to be a failure.

The current organization of Inter-American System was shaped at the Ninth International American Conference in 1948 which was led by George Marshall, the Secretary of State of the United States. Facing the common threat from the communist countries, participants signed the OAS Charter and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the first international expression of human rights principles.

During the Cold War era, the major objectives of the Inter-American System were to strengthen peace and security in the American continent and to support the representative democracy based on non-interventionism. The details of the objectives are as follows: peaceful resolution of conflicts among member countries, joint military response to

aggressive threats, disarmament of conventional weapon, and the socio-economic development through coordinated disarmament. Acknowledging that poverty is one of the major factors that undermine democratization in the American continent, member countries made a coordinated effort to achieve economic, social, and cultural development. As the Cold War ended in the late 1990s and democracy flourished in Latin America, the Inter-American System sought a transformation of its organization and goal. Responding to the international and domestic politics, the Inter-American System supported democratization in the member countries. As a part of the system's effort toward democracy, the Inter-American System supervised the corruption of civil servants and supported the election processes of municipal as well as central governments. Needless to say, the organization put a higher priority on the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and intervened into the civil wars in Nicaragua, Surinam, Haiti, and Guatemala. The organization also successfully mediated the boundary disputes between Guatemala and Belize and between Peru and Ecuador.

Besides these traditional activities for regional peace, the organization supported free trade and the sustainable development of member countries. Environmental problems have emerged as important policy issues of multilateral coordination for technological cooperation such as maintaining biological diversity, responding to climate change and natural disaster, and preserving coastal areas. The organization monitors individual cases for human rights abuses. These days, the organization extends its scope to non traditional threats such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms dealing, trafficking in persons, institutional corruption, and organized crime.

4. African Union

In 1963, the Organization of African Unity was founded to rid colonial vestiges and apartheid and to facilitate unity and solidarity among African countries. By fostering interstate cooperation, OAU was designed to

preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity within the framework of the UN's regulation. As a regional community, OAU effectively responded to external threats with a series of international meetings to protect the common interest and to maintain a coordinated standpoint. Based on its accomplishments, OAU member countries issued the Sirte Declaration calling for the establishment of an African Union with a view to accelerating the process of integration among the African countries. After one year's preparation, member countries accepted the draft of the constitution of the African Union in the summit at Lome, Togo in 2000 and enacted the constitution in 2001. The member countries determined the roadmap to establish the AU at the Lusaka Summit and initiated the AU by holding the convention at the Durban Summit in 2002.

The AU as a regional organization is a supranational federation consisting of 53 African states and was established to terminate the interstate conflicts among African states, to create a common market for economic prosperity, and to secure democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. Accepting the heritage of the OAU, the AU was established as a new institution for regional integration in Africa. AU would work as a major regional institution to facilitate socio-economic integration and to guarantee regional security and peace.

Following the example of the EU, the AU plans to achieve integration through economic cooperation among the member states as the functionalism theory discusses. Since the OAU set economic integration as a major objective from the initial phase, African states have established independent plans for the development and cooperation with the agreements such as the Lagos Plan of Action and Final Act of Lagos.

The reason emphasizing economic development through regional integration is that it is connected to the aspiration for a better life shared by African peoples. Though OAU pays major attention to human rights issues, it is not possible to attain the goal in human rights without considering economic development, conflict resolution, and peaceful settlements, which are the minimum requirements for a humanitarian quality of life. Among other things, there is a remarkable and gradual

achievement in the human rights issue in terms of organizational development. In 1981, OAU created the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights. Based on these charters of human rights, OAU founded the African Human Rights Commission in Banjul, Zambia. The African Human Rights Commission is a semi-judiciary authority protecting basic human rights as a major mission and is empowered to interpret the charters of the African Union.

The foundation and administration of semi-judiciary authority indicates organizational integration in terms of the institutionalization of an international regime. However, this standard is not applicable to the African cases because of the economic hardship in Africa. Due to prolonged drought and other natural disasters, starvation and epidemics spread out to African states in 1980. Facing these disastrous conditions, African states organized Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER). African states recognized that without resolving poverty, famine, and disease in Africa, the human rights issue is a vain hope to achieve. Therefore, African states have to consider economic development in a first step.

During the 1990s, African states shared the necessity of coordinated response to social and economic problems and stipulated the idea in a charter or treaty. In 1991, members of the African Union concluded the Abuja Treaty for creating an international economic community in Africa. Through six stages of economic integration, member countries planned to build the African Economic Community (AEC), which was initiated in 1994. The executive committee of the AU presented an ambitious plan to create a common currency and a central bank for member countries and to assemble a Pan-African Parliament that would integrate not only economic institutions but also political ones. African countries recognized that foreign debt has been a major impediment to economic growth and discussed a coordinated negotiation strategy with creditors in 1997. OAU tried to ensure military security and regional stability and to resolve militarized interstate conflicts and civil wars by building the "Mechanism

for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution" in 1993. In the early 2000s, AU member states recognize the serious conditions in Africa; the disastrous conditions in Africa persists and that even after 40 years of independence, personal lives are under imminent threat. It is, therefore virtually impossible to achieve stable development in the region. In order to prevent military disputes and to ensure development, AU member states agreed on building an early warning system and organizing an African standing force. By supporting the postwar recovery programs and the democratic institutionalization, the AU takes a leading role in building the African community free from conflict and poverty. The AU also discussed and coordinated various non traditional security issues: environmental deterioration, terrorism, fatal diseases like HIV and malaria, international refugees, and the proliferation of firearms and mines. As I discussed before, the most chronic problem in the African community is a presence of a vicious circle that reinforces the negative factors for African development. For example, militarized disputes destroy the agricultural infrastructure and deteriorate agricultural productivity. The scarcity of food can cause regional conflicts among ethnic groups and nation states. In this sense, it is hard to say that the effort of the AU has been successful for the integration and development of African states. However, it is worthy to note that the AU employs regionally coordinated responses to common threats and challenges.

The Human Security Regime in Northeast Asia

1. The Multilateral Dialogue in Northeast Asia

A remnant of the Cold War still remains in Northeast Asia and neighbor countries maintain a competitive relationship in their military, politics, and economics. In Northeast Asia, the threat to conventional and non-conventional security tends to increase. The security threats associated with conventional and nonconventional issues have a negative impact on peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. A multilateral cooperative dialogue is emerging as an attractive alternative to manage traditional and

non-traditional security threats including proliferation of nuclear weapons, territorial disputes, arms races in conventional weapons, organized crime, drug trafficking, refugees, and human rights violations. In reality, it is hard to expect that a multilateral dialogue in Northeast Asia can be developed into a multilateral cooperative institution to substitute the traditional regional order. There are a number of attempts for official and informal multilateral conferences such as ASEAN +3, ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), ACD (Asia Cooperation Dialogue), CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia), CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific), NEACD (Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue), and PIF (Pacific Islands Forum).

Despite ongoing attempts to establish a multilateral institution in East Asia, there have been few advances. There are structural limitations in developing multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia. East Asian countries have little experience with operating multilateral dialogues or conferences. The accumulation of bilateral relationships dominates the regional order in East Asia. While Northeast Asian countries have experienced deepened mutual interdependence in politics and economics during the 1990s, their multilateral cooperation has not been institutionalized to any meaningful degree.

In the conventional security area, the development of multilateral cooperation has been associated along with the evolution of the six-party talks for the North Korean Nuclear crisis, which has been recognized as a common threat to Northeast Asian countries. Therefore, neighbor countries engaged in collaboration and coordination processes to ensure irrevocable and verifiable denuclearization. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the six-party talks encourages the expectation to develop the six-party talks into a multilateral cooperative institution. Since the critical factor in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis is the American confidence of the willingness of North Korea to denuclearize, the multilateral structure of six-party talks depends on the American

leading role in the multilayer structure of bilateral relationships.

Under the circumstances that the multilateral approach in security and economic issues undergoes hardship, it is harder to establish a multilateral cooperation institution in the non-conventional security area. The North-East Asia Sub-regional Programme for Environment Cooperation (NEASPEC) including South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan, Mongolia, and Russia, has held meetings from 1993 and has promoted cooperation on the policy dialogues for the Yellow Sand, decreasing air pollution, the extinct species protection, and nature conservation. Korea, China, Japan, and Russia organized the Northwest Pacific Action Plan to mitigate pollution and to preserve nature in the Yellow Sea and East Sea. South Korea, China, and Japan organized the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM), Environmental Cooperation-Asia (ECO-Asia), and Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET). The relevant parties in Northeast Asia are unconcerned in multilateral efforts to establish an international regime in human rights, refugees, and organized crime, which are sensitive issues regarding their domestic affairs.

Under the post Cold War international order, non-traditional security issues are gaining more importance and they require international coordination to prevent calamity. Known as the necessity of international coordination, non-conventional security issues appear in the agenda list of the regional organizations such as APEC, ARF, ASEM, and ASEAN+3. Particularly, regional organizations in Europe like the EU, CoE, and OSCE consider military security, economic development, and human security as a so-called cooperative trinity for the success of international integration. Other international organizations in Latin America and Africa tend to deal with the human security issue in a similar context as European organizations do.

As discussed before, since human security is comprehensive to include various factors from individual quality of life to interstate conflicts, it is not easy to reach a general agreement on the definition of human security. However, human security is defined as the “protection of individual happiness and dignity or security of individual daily life.” Despite the

agreement on the need to prevent non conventional threats, conflicts between sovereignty and human rights protection used to impede the progress of a regional institution particularly in Northeast Asia.

The Bangkok Declaration in 1993 argued that while the nature of human rights is based on universalism, the practical rule and regulation on human rights is dynamic and transforming along geographic, historic, cultural, and religious characteristics. In other words, the Bangkok Declaration emphasized the specific nature of Asian human rights in a continuum of a controversy between the Western universalism and cultural relativism (Lee 2007, 331). Violent states denying universality and absoluteness of human rights would justify human rights violations and discrimination of minorities with the reasoning of the relativism (Donnelly 2003).

The North Korean government officially defined human rights with subordinate elements such as sovereignty rights, rights to live, rights of equality, and rights of development. Since people under foreign powers and in an underdeveloped country cannot even consider personal rights, sovereignty rights and rights of development have to be included in the concept of human rights. That is a typical case of the relativist approach on human rights. The North Korean regime analyzes conceptual elements of human rights and assigns priority on each element based on historical background and social characteristics of its own.

As far as human rights are concerned, the Chinese response is not quite that different with that of North Korea. Since China mostly put a priority on the One-China Policy, the Chinese government has employed sensitive and direct measures against any attempt to separate Taiwan from China. China has regarded human rights issues raised by foreign powers as a hegemonic conspiracy to threaten the integrity and unity of the nation. Since economic development has occupied a dominant place in the national agenda, the Chinese government assumes a limitation on personal integrity rights, rights of life, and personal dignity as an inevitable tradeoff between human rights and national progress, which is based on relativist understanding of human rights. Though rapid

economic growth in China has improved the quality of life, the level of domestic democratization is not as advanced as its economic development. Despite the economic reformation, the Communist party dominates political order in China. Any activities threatening the political system have experienced inhumane punishment such as torture, imprisonment, compulsory labor, and execution in public. Taking an opportunity of economic trade and civilian exchange like the Chinese hosting of the Olympic games, Western states have continuously requested China improve its condition of human rights. The Chinese government authority argues that human rights are a matter of domestic affairs. Therefore, any intervening comment on human rights can be regarded as an infringement of sovereignty.

Russia was also a communist country, and the human rights conditions were not much better than that of China and North Korea. Even if Russia has been a member state of the Council of Europe since 1996, its human rights conditions are in an alarming state. More than anything else, it is not desirable for Russia to admit Western intervention concerning the human rights conditions of China and North Korea. Like China, Russia consists of many ethnic minority groups. Facing the separatist movement of Chechnya, Russia would not agree to create a human rights regime because the human rights conditions might invite international intervention and agitate domestic political stability in Russia.

Because the human rights issue is critical to China and North Korea, a multilateral human security regime will face tough opposition from its former allies, who will be suspicious of the intentions of Western hegemonic states. The Chinese antipathy of the human rights index published by Freedom House and the U. S. State Department effectively represents their political standpoint of creating a human rights regime. Due to the weakness of democratization and respect of human rights, North Korea will consider its domestic political stability and China will take into account possible separatist movements of ethnic minorities.

For the United States, South Korea and Japan have been traditional allies who have shared common values of democracy and market

economy in North East Asia. In terms of grand strategy, development of these traditional allies would be a key factor for regional stability and thereof, American national interest. Compared to North Korea and Japan, South Korea and Japan have achieved a remarkable success in democratization and human rights respects. Through the democratization process during 1990s in South Korea, the human rights conditions have been improved in spite of several poisonous institutional provisions and practices such as the National Security Acts and discrimination of minorities. With respect to the human rights violations, Japan is as bad as South Korea because of institutionalized discrimination of ethnic and social minorities.

Establishing a multilateral cooperation regime with the issues of military security, economic development, and human security, relevant parties in Northeast Asia pay more attention to military and economic issues than human security. While South Korea, Japan and the U. S. with pluralist democratic societies have little adjustment cost for human security regimes, North Korea, China, and Russia face domestic and international burdens for them to accept the international standards for human rights and democracy.

2. Key Factors for Human Security Regime in Northeast Asia

Common security and prosperity in Northeast Asia can only be achieved through the coordinated efforts to strengthen democracy and human rights respect among relevant countries. Reviewing the successful multilateralism in Europe, sustainable development and regional stability have been guaranteed with an institutional arrangement where the liberal democracy supports human security. In Northeast Asia, relevant parties have more emphasized military and economic issues than humanitarian issues. Without considering the significance of human security issues, the multilateral cooperation regimes in security and the economy cannot attain the ultimate goal of establishing a multilateral regime in Northeast Asia. In this section, I will discuss critical factors to impact the success of

multilateral cooperation regimes.

1) National Interest

As functionalist theory argues, negative factors for multilateral cooperation regimes in Northeast Asia are related to domestic factors of each individual country. The most critical factor for a multilateral regime is what kind interest each country can get through regime building. This paper will not discuss the personal interest of the ruling group which is also an endogenous key factor. Other things being equal, the presence of a common threat will be a critical factor which decreases the cost of undesirable consequences since the relevant countries are willing to coordinate to prevent disaster.

The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 are cases in point. The financial threat enables cooperation in the financial area through ASEAN Plus Three, combining ASEAN and Northeast Asian countries. The success of multilateral cooperation can be summarized in the Chiangmai Agreement that involves an extended ASEAN Swap Agreement. The Chiangmai Agreement was addressed in the conference of finance ministers of Asian Plus Three as a part of the annual meeting of the Asia Development Bank in May, 2000. The common threat of the Asian financial crisis facilitates the willingness to cooperate in a given issues area. By the same token, the North Korean nuclear crisis has been recognized as a common threat that can go far beyond the regional stability in Northeast Asia. If North Korea, a supporter of terrorism, proliferates nuclear material, North Korea's ability to develop nuclear weapons threatens not only the regional stability but global peace and security. The shared perception of the North Korean nuclear threat enables the multilateral security regime, the six-party talks.

Considering the multilateral security in Northeast Asia, it is plausible to organize a coordinating regime preventing an undesirable consequence. However, it is far behind the global trend for Northeast Asian countries to establish a comprehensive multilateral security organization due to the leading role of the United States, a global hegemonic country. Since the

international order in Northeast Asia is based on the multiple dyadic alliances formed and functioned by the leading role of the United States, there is no willingness for the United States to shape a multilateral security regime. Despite the formal agreement in principle, the United States wants to preserve its vested interest without taking a risk of changing the status quo in Northeast Asia. However, the United States pays token respect to the multilateral cooperation because of a moral obligation for cooperative international relations. What the U. S. wants to obtain through the multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a collaboration to create mutual interest through a multilateral security organization but a coordination to prevent the worst consequences of a North Korean nuclear weapon. In some sense, China shares the similar understanding on the multilateral dialogue in Northeast Asia since China also prefers the status quo for its vested privilege.

It is clear that there is no common threat with respect to human rights in Northeast Asia. With respect to the human rights regime, China and North Korea are constrained by domestic political cost. For example, North Korea has vehemently criticized the U.N. human rights resolution suggested by the European Union and Japan. The U. S. and Japan can coerce North Korea to improve domestic human rights conditions and to resolve the Japanese abductees' problem. North Korea would not accept the proposal and China would support North Korean opposition to the human rights regime.

Concerning non-traditional human security issues such as food scarcity, infectious disease, and refugee issues, cooperation of Northeast Asian countries is developed only to an elementary stage. The reason for such a passive attitude to a human security regime in Northeast Asia is that participant countries have to pay the domestic and international adjustment cost without getting any substantial national interest.

2) Distribution of National Capability

Since international regimes are collective goods or public goods for the international community, distribution of power among states is a critical

factor affecting the formation of regimes. International regime simply means an institution, in general, to protect international order and to set rules and standards of international interactions, which are collective goods for the international community. According to power preponderance theory, hegemonic countries as a rule-setter can have critical influence in building international institutions. On the other hand, the balance of power theory argues that similar distribution of power can impede the creation of international regimes.

Keohane (1980) argues that when a hegemonic state takes a leading role in providing international public goods, the foundation and operation of an international regime can be effective. The reason that a hegemonic state is positive in regime building is that a hegemonic state can preoccupy the interest by creating institutions and rules. A hegemonic state prefers the status quo that is maintained by regional stability. When a hegemonic state establishes an international regime, the hegemon as a rule-setter participates in regime building on behalf of its own interest. According to hegemonic stability theory, absence of a hegemonic state results in the failure of an international regime.

On the other hand, Stein (1982) argues that when a hegemonic state cannot provide the international public goods, international regime, small states call for collective efforts and are willing to cooperate to replace the hegemonic stability. An international regime is established and operated by volunteer agreement, when individual states share a common understanding for the utility of an international regime.

These two seemingly opposite perspectives are actually discussing the same characteristics of an international regime. Presence of a hegemonic country is able to mitigate the cost in regime building. In the long run, the efficient function of an international regime is guaranteed by volunteer participants not by hegemonic dominance enforcing international order. In considering the Northeast Asian case with respect to the distribution of power, the presence of a hegemonic state worked as a critical factor for regime building. The United States, a hegemonic power, created international order in Northeast Asia with bilateral relationships instead

of multilateral relationship.

While China is emerging as a challenging power in Northeast Asia, China is not strong enough to revise the international order. The United States is not willing to change the status quo. Japan lacks both capability and willingness to change the order created by the United States at least for a while longer. In terms of regional distribution of power, neither China nor Japan is preponderant to dominate the regional order. International order in the geographical Northeast Asia is more likely to be the balance of power system than to be the power preponderance system. In Northeast Asia where the United States dominates the regional order and China and Japan check with each other, the human rights regime is only possible by the leading initiative of the United States. In other words, the United States evaluates that a human rights regime in Northeast Asia can contribute to regional stability and national interest as well. It is clear that the human rights regime will face fierce opposition from China and North Korea. Unless the United States can expect enough interest to compensate the cost from Chinese opposition, the U. S. is unwilling to provide an international human rights regime in Northeast Asia.

In Northeast Asia where major powers are passive in establishing human rights regime, it is a proper approach for minor states to cooperate to establish a regime. However, there are only a few countries supporting democracy and human rights in Northeast Asia. Even after enlarging the scope to East Asia, there are only a few in this specific area.

According to Huntington (1991), half of the entire democratic countries in the world have been democratized during the period of “the third wave” from 1974 to 1990. In terms of democracy, China and North Korea are still far behind international standards. Among ASEAN member countries, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are ruled by totalitarian government. Indonesia and Thailand are in the process of transformation from authoritarian to democratic governments. In a sense that democratic Singapore takes a relativist approach on human rights issues, it is a difficult task for Asian countries to establish human rights regimes.

Asian countries under authoritarian government are less likely to

create human rights regimes than democratic countries since the domestic political cost is unbearable for domestic expectations of democratization. Therefore, in order to create a humanitarian regime in Asia, a comprehensive approach is desirable to cover humanitarian issues such as the environment, refugees, and disease control.

3) Shared Culture

It is controversial, the causal relationship between culture and regimes. Culture is defined as the shared patterns of behaviors and interactions, cognitive constructs, and affective understanding that are learned through a process of socialization (Diamond 1994). On the other hand, the regime is defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1982, 186). As far as conceptual definitions are concerned, the concepts of culture and regime reflect the similarity and the shared denomination among relevant actors. In terms of logical reasoning, it is hard to delineate the causal relationship, whether a shared value system causes institutional integration or integrated institutions facilitate the common value system. However, it is easy to say that these two factors systemic integration and shared culture are mutually reinforcing.

Since relevant parties for regional integration and regime formation take place in a geographically defined area, they tend to share culturally common denominators in a nominal context like Confucianism culture in Northeast Asia, Christian traditions in Europe in general, Catholicism in Latin America, Muslim in the Middle East. However, these similarities are in some sense nothing but superficial in their nature. Despite geographical contingency and cultural similarity, Northeast Asia has not developed any common cultural identity in modern history. On the contrary, historical background and experience was used to impede formation of an international regime. In the late 19th Century, Japanese imperialism invaded and colonized the Korean peninsular and the Northeastern part of China. During the World War II, the Japanese army committed

unprecedented atrocities in its neighboring countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Since the Korean War, South and North Korea have been hostile to each other and they are still under the influence of the Cold War. Since China adopted an open door policy and market economic system, the current interactions in Northeast Asia seem to be considerably improved in terms of trade volume with South Korea and Japan. While the economic exchange extends the common interest and facilitates cooperation among South Korea, China, and Japan, the United States recognizes the emergence of China and wants to check Chinese military expansion in the region.

Due to historical memories of negative interaction, cultural similarity cannot have a positive impact on regime formation and ultimately on regional integration in the near future. It is clear that the historical disputes in East Asia are not likely to escalate into a militarized dispute. The confrontation around the historical issues magnifies the differences and minimizes the positive impact of cultural similarity.

4) Experience of Multilateral Dialogue

It seems *prima facie* that accumulated practices of multilateral dialogues have a positive impact on the formation of an international regime. In some sense, it is a tautological statement. However, I would like to emphasize the significance of coordinated efforts for multilateral regimes and integration. As the European case illustrates, European states have recognized and shared the necessity of multilateral dialogue in various issue areas such as military security, economic cooperation, and human security. The necessity of an international regime had European states accumulate the traditions and experiences of negotiation and compromise. As the cooperation theory discusses, it is apparent that multilateral cooperation occurs when relevant participants ensure maximization of interest (collaboration) and minimization of political cost (coordination).

The accumulated success of cooperation will strengthen mutual trust in the cooperative interaction and will ultimately enable integration in the long run as the European Union has achieved. The accumulated

experience can transform the perception of cooperation from a zero-sum game to a positive-sum game under which all participants can maximize their interest without infringing others'. Compared with the Inter-American System and African Union, European, CoE and OSCE have shared more experiences for multilateral cooperation. In terms of historical experience, Northeast Asian countries lack any meaningful trial of multilateral cooperation.

Conclusion: Jeju Process and Human Security Regime in Northeast Asia

Following the example of the Helsinki Process, the Jeju Process has targeted the formation of a multilateral security dialogue both at a governmental official level and at a non-governmental specialist level in Northeast Asia. However, I discussed earlier, multilateral cooperation consists of three major dimensions: military security, economic development, and human security. This paper focuses on the formation of the human security regime in Northeast Asia. In considering the formation of a multilateral regime, there are various negative factors for the relevant parties to resolve; (1) a historical rivalry between Korean and Japan and between China and Japan, (2) ongoing conflicts on territorial sovereignty among Korea, China, and Japan, (3) the absence of common interest through multilateral cooperation, (4) differences in domestic political and economic systems, (5) a remarkable dissimilarity in the level of economic development, (6) lack of cooperative efforts and experience, (7) and the lack of community spirit and common identity.

In order to cope with the listed adversities and to establish human security in Northeast Asia, the relevant parties have to recognize that (1) multilateral cooperation regimes are not a trial to revise the status quo and to infringe the interest of hegemonic powers, (2) human security issues are becoming more important than traditional military security under the interdependent international order, and finally (3) the multilateral regime for human security will bring more interest than cost.

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*Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Its Implications for Regional Politics*¹

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Introduction

Environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia began with the end of the Cold War when political and ideological confrontations in the region dissipated. The resulting normalization of diplomatic relationships between former Cold War enemies including South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea), China, and Russia paved the way for intergovernmental dialogues on a host of regional issues. In the midst of such post-Cold War political changes, the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, also known as the Rio Earth Summit) was a decisive event that led to the initiation of environmental cooperation in the region. Following UNCED, the governments of Northeast Asia established several official environmental cooperation channels that have made a steady progress over the past fifteen years.

Environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia demonstrates two notable features: namely, the institutional development that distinguishes it from other cooperative efforts in the region, and non-legally binding nature of intergovernmental environmental agreements. Despite regional characteristics including geographical proximity, cultural and historical homogeneity, societal interaction, and economic interdependence that

¹ A substantial part of this article comes from the author's published paper, "Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Non-binding Agreements and Regional Countries' Policy Interests" in *Pacific Focus*, Vol. XXII, No. 2, Fall 2007, pp. 77-112.

may facilitate a high level of regional integration, attempts to institutionalize regional cooperation have not been effective in Northeast Asia because of a strong emphasis on sovereignty and mutual distrust among countries in the region. As such, the institutional development of current environmental cooperation including financial arrangements, joint project implementation, and the establishment of a secretariat is a new phenomenon in Northeast Asian regionalism. This development is remarkable when one considers that one general characteristic of East Asian foreign relations is the avoidance of formal arrangements of regional issues.

Another feature of environmental cooperation in the region is that it has been conducted through non-binding agreements. While the agreements entail reciprocal promises or actions for implementation on the part of the individual parties, none of them contains formal clauses that describe the parties' commitments as binding obligations or legal sanctions for non-compliance. Consequently, the interpretation and implementation of the agreements are largely up to the governments of the member countries and their practices are not subject to formal scrutiny under the agreements. Compared with the European experience that represents a highly legalized environmental cooperative framework established through a series of legally binding protocols, the Northeast Asian case offers an example of low legalization and arguably exemplifies a trend against legalization in regional environmental cooperation.² It seems that the countries in the region accept non-binding cooperation as a

² To address the problem of acid rain, European countries concluded the Convention for Long Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) in 1979 and continued to reduce emissions further through the Helsinki Protocol (1985), the Sofia Protocol (1988), the Oslo Protocol (1994), the Aarhus Protocol (1998), and the Gothenburg Protocol (1999). For pollution in the Mediterranean Sea, the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution (the Barcelona Convention) was concluded in 1975, followed by the Protocols on Marine Dumping and Emergency Oil Pollution (1975), the Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas, and the Athens Protocol on Land Based Pollution Source (1980). Additionally, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea have been protected by the Oslo Convention (1972), the Paris Convention (1974), and the Helsinki Conventions (1980 and 1990). The Oslo and Paris Conventions were replaced by the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) in 1992.

means to achieve their policy goals of safeguarding sovereign environmental decision making while at the same time coping with regional environmental problems. The countries emphasize actual projects based on environmental cooperation.

Despite its non-binding nature, institutionalized environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia is nonetheless viewed as a workable regime to address regional transboundary environmental problems. These cooperative efforts reduce uncertainties through information exchange, expand complex interdependence, and promote the habits of dialogues over regional issues between countries in the region. Cooperation enhances domestic environmental governance of member countries through the implementation of agreed projects. Moreover, the non-binding nature of current environmental framework gives the member countries flexibility in determining the limits and scope of cooperation. Pursuing non-binding cooperation also positively impacts regional peace and stability since it avoids imposing any constraints on state sovereignty accompanying the conclusion of legally binding international agreements. Likewise, considering the assumption that environmental degradation may cause domestic and international conflict, the current path of environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia functions as a useful instrument that prevents transboundary pollution from escalating to traditional security matters.³ In other words, environmental problems have created strong incentives for collective action in Northeast Asia, which further provides a potential foundation for broader forms of peaceful relations in the region.

Against the above backdrop, this paper reviews the institutional development of environmental cooperation to address transboundary pollution in Northeast Asia. It further explores the implications of current trends in environmental cooperation as a workable regime for stability and security in the region.

³ About this assumption, Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity and Violence* (Princeton University Press, 1999).

Issues for Cooperation: Transboundary Pollution in Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia consists of an eco-community defined by geographical proximity and seasonal weather patterns that make domestic pollution within one state easily transferable to neighboring states thereby causing transboundary environmental problems. Acid rain, marine pollution, and yellow sand and dust storms are all transboundary pollution issues in Northeast Asia that are critical topics in regional environmental negotiations. There are growing concerns about climate change and marine resource depletion in the region; however, these issues have not been fully discussed yet in current regional environmental frameworks while they are the issues best tackled through regional policy coordination.

Acid Rain

Coal consumption is responsible for 90 percent of sulfur dioxide (SO₂) emissions and is the predominant causative factor leading to acid rain. While all countries in Northeast Asia discharge SO₂, transboundary acid rain in the region is linked primarily to China's coal consumption which accounts for two thirds of the country's primary energy source. China's share of the emissions has continued to rise in recent years reaching 1.53 billion tons in 2003 alone, or 28 percent of the world's total.⁴ Consequently, China is the largest SO₂ emission source in the world, emitting more than 20 million tons per year. As China's coal consumption is projected to rise to 3.7 billion tons in 2020, so will its annual SO₂ emissions unless China takes radical steps to reduce emissions. In comparison, Japan's coal consumption in 1997 was 132 million tons and is expected to be 145 million tons in 2010; Korea's coal consumption was 34.7 million tons in 1997 and is projected to be 60 million tons in 2010. Despite

their projected increases in coal consumption, Japan and Korea have reduced SO₂ emissions significantly. For instance, Korea reduced its SO₂ emissions by 5 percent per year during the 1990s, cutting emissions from 1.6 million tons in 1990 to 526,596 tons in 2001 to 499,000 tons in 2003 and slightly more 400,000 tons (408,462) in 2005.⁵

The existence of transboundary pollution, particularly acid rain, in Northeast Asia was discovered through scientific research both in Japan and in Korea in early 1980s.⁶ Recent research in Japan still indicated that approximately 50 percent of SO₂ emissions in Tokyo in winter come from China.⁷ A study conducted by Seoul National University in collaboration with the Chinese Science Research Institute found that 49 percent of Korea's air pollution originated in China.⁸ Consequently, it is unsurprising that China is a main source of transferred acid rain in Korea and Japan given that Chinese provinces located on the east coast of the Yellow Sea are designated as the Acid Rain Control Zone due to high SO₂ emissions and rainfalls in excess of critical acid precipitation loads. Visible damage caused by transboundary acid rain, however, has not yet been identified in Korea and Japan. While some reported ecological damage, such as spindle tree blight in Japan's Nikko National Park and changes in the tree species in the mountains near Seoul, may have been caused by acid rain, there has been no decisive evidence linking transboundary acid rain to this ecological damage. Rather, according to research, Korea and Japan are

⁴ EIA Country Analysis Brief, China, available at: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html>.

⁵ The statistics of air pollution emissions by the National Institute of Environmental Research of Republic of Korea, available at: <http://airemiss.nier.go.kr>.

⁶ One measurement program initiated in Japan in 1983 showed the high precipitation of sulfuric ions primarily on the part of the country facing the East Sea (Sea of Japan) during wintertime. A 1992 report by the Japanese Central Institute of Electric Power Industry estimated that China generated 50 percent of the sulfur ion emissions that contribute to acid rain in Japan; Korea produced 15 percent and Japan the remaining 35 percent. In 1987, the Korean National Institute of Environmental Research (KNIER) conducted four studies on the acidity in rainfall on Baekryung Island, located in the Yellow Sea, which does not have any significant emission sources. These studies proved that Korea and Japan are directly exposed to polluted air from China due to seasonal wind in the region, blown from the continent to ocean.

⁷ Research and Information Center, Global Environmental Research of Japan in 1999, The Environment Agency of Japan, 1999, p. 140.

⁸ China Waste and Environmental Technology Weekly, 2004.

naturally sheltered from acid rain, by-and-large, because the chemical structure of their soil may neutralize the precipitation's acidity.⁹

Marine Pollution

The Yellow Sea, encircled by China and the two Koreas, has been contaminated by coastal area development projects, domestic river pollution flowing into the sea, marine dumping, and oil spills. The Yellow River in China carries 7.5 million tons of heavy metal pollutants into the sea annually along with 21,000 tons of crude oil from offshore drilling in the Bohai Bay, which is located in the northern part of the sea.¹⁰ Recent joint investigations conducted by Korea and China showed that the level of heavy metal pollution and oil concentration in the sea's main body is higher than natural concentration levels and that the overall pollution level is much higher near the coastal areas of the countries. The East Sea (also known as the Sea of Japan), bordered by two Koreas, Japan, and Russia, is reported to be clean as indicated by the several joint and individual investigations have shown no significant degradation in the East Sea/Sea of Japan.¹¹ However, its future is uncertain due to increasing land-based pollution, industrial waste dumping by Korea and Japan, and potentially dangerous nuclear waste dumped by the former Soviet Union. The most common but urgent threat to regional seas is frequent oil spills by marine accidents that cause extensive damage to marine ecosystem as demonstrated by the Nakhodka oil spill (6,240kl) in 1997 in Japan's coastal area and the recent Taean oil spill in December 2007.

⁹ Shigenori Matsuura, "China's Air Pollution and Japan's Response to it," *International Environmental Affairs*, Vol.7, No. 3 (1995), p. 241.

¹⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, *Hwankyung Oykyo Pyeonram* [Environmental Diplomacy], (Seoul: MOFA, 1998), p. 230.

¹¹ Since 1984, the Korean government has selected four sites in the regional seas —three in the East Sea and one in the Yellow Sea— for waste dumping which increased from 5.64 million tons in 1997 to 7.1 million tons in 2000 and 8.88 million tons in 2003. Government of the Republic of Korea, MOFAT, *Hwankyung Oykyo Pyeonram*, [Environment Diplomacy] (Seoul: MOFAT, 2004), pp. 91-98. The government document admits that Korea is the only country to dump wastes into coastal waters in such a large volume.

Hwang-sa

Another environmental issue in the region is the yellow dust and sand storms(DSS), referred to as hwang-sa (kosa in Japanese), which originate in the dry regions of northern China and Mongolia and shift to Korea and Japan in the spring due to the region's prevailing westerly winds. Hwang-sa has been worsening because of China's rapid desertification which turns about 2,330 square kilometers into desert annually.¹² China's annual production of yellow sand is estimated at about 20 million tons. In Korea, the level of dust concentration in the air increases two to four times during the hwang-sa period which causes problems in public health (e.g., sore eyes and respiratory infections), agricultural products, dust-sensitive industries (such as semi-conductor manufacturing), and transportation. The Korean government began taking significant steps toward coping with hwang-sa in 2002, when large-scale yellow sand events caused school closings and flight cancellations.¹³ Although not as extensively exposed as in Korea, Japan also suffers from dust storms which cause yellow snow and brown rain.¹⁴

Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia was initiated following the Seoul Symposium on UNCED and Prospects for the Environmental Regime in the 21st Century in Seoul held in August 1992. Despite the early hesitation of member countries, the seriousness of domestic environmental degradation and international concerns about the regional and global effects of their domestic pollution pushed the governments to pursue

¹² Lester Brown, "Dust bowl threatening China's future," Earth Policy Institute (23 May 2001), <http://www.earth-policy.org/Alerts/Alert13.htm> accessed June 23, 2005.

¹³ Chu Jang Min et al., Dong-buk A Jiyeok eui Hwangsa Pihae Boonsuk mit Pihae Jeogam eul uyi han Jiyeok Hyupryuk Bangan [Study on the Analysing Northeast Asian Dsut and Sand Storm Damages and the Regional Cooperation Strategies I], Korea Environment Institute (KEI) Research Report RE-01 (Seoul: Korea Environment Institute, 2003), pp. 74-86.

¹⁴ Lester Brown, "Deserts invading China," http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/Epr/Epr1_ssi.htm accessed October 10, 2005.

regional environmental cooperation. Chinese government officials also sought assistance from the international community in addressing its ever-worsening environmental problems accompanied by rapid economic growth. Korea has demonstrated a strong commitment to environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia since the country is directly influenced by pollution from China while its own pollution emissions affect Japan though to a far lesser extent. Salient environmental damage as the case of the Nakhodka oil spill pushed the Japanese government to seek more effective measures. Countries came to believe that regional cooperation is an effective way to address transboundary pollution in the region.

NEASPEC

The first intergovernmental meeting, entitled the Northeast Asia Sub-regional Programme of Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) was launched in 1993 by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission of Asia and Pacific (ESCAP) in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).¹⁵ All regional countries including China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, and Russia, participated. North Korea has not joined. The NEASPEC's governing body, the Senior Officials on Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia (SOMECEA), convenes the annual meeting and makes all policy decisions concerning substantive and financial matters related to the Programme. Five priority areas for cooperation have been identified including the "Demonstration of Clean Coal-fired Power Plant Technology."¹⁶ The ESCAP acts as the interim secretariat to the NEASPEC because the issue of setting up the secretariat

¹⁵ For information about the NEASPEC, refer to <http://www.neaspec.org>.

¹⁶ Four other areas include: Operation and Maintenance Training for Reduction of Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂) in the Older Coal-fired Electricity Generation; the North East Asian Biodiversity Management Programme; North East Asian Seed Research and Information Base for Forests and Grasslands; and Environmental Pollution Data Collection, Intercalibration, Standardization, and Analysis.

remains unresolved despite the Korean government's consistent offer to host the office.

The NEASPEC has made considerable progress during the past decade. The Framework of the NEASPEC was adopted in 1996 and the Vision Statement for Environmental Cooperation in North East Asia and the Core Fund based on voluntary contributions of the member countries were concluded in 2000.¹⁷ The Vision Statement provides policy guidance to the NEASPEC for the twenty-first century. The NEASPEC has pursued, in particular, the development of a sub-regional action plan for improving the particulate abatements systems and emissions from coal-fired power plants in the region with targets and a timeframe.¹⁸ Two training centers, the Northeast Asian Center for Environmental Data and Training and the Northeast Asian Training Center for Pollution Reduction in Coal-fired Power Plants were established in Korea. Technical audits of selected coal-fired power plants were conducted in China and Mongolia and, with the ADB's financial support, the Regional Technical Assistance Project for Northeast Asia provided assistance to China.

NOWPAP

The North-West Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP) was launched in 1994 under the auspices of the UNEP's Regional Seas Programme.¹⁹ The NOWPAP's primary goal is to preserve two regional seas, the Yellow Sea and the East Sea (also known as the Sea of Japan). The countries bordering these seas including China, Japan, Korea, and Russia are the

¹⁷ For the Core Fund, Korea made a US \$200,000 contribution, and Japan and China contributed US \$170,000 and US \$50,000, respectively. As of the time of this writing, Russia and Mongolia have not pledged to make contributions.

¹⁸ UNESCAP, "Improving efficiency of particulate abatement systems of CFPPs in NEA," available at <http://www.unep.org/ie/capact/ppp/pdfs/escap.pdf> (accessed 27 October 2005).

¹⁹ UNEP's Regional Seas Programme launched in 1974 aims to address the accelerating degradation of the world's oceans and coastal areas. The 13 areas include the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the ROPME Sea Area, West and Central Africa, Wider Caribbean, East Africa, South East Asia, the North-East Pacific, the North-West Pacific, the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, South Asia, South-East Pacific, and the South Pacific.

participants.²⁰ Five priority projects have been identified including information management, a survey of national environmental legislation and policies, a regional pollution monitoring program, and cooperation in marine pollution emergency preparedness and response. The UNEP served as the interim secretariat of the NOWPAP until 2004 when the Joint Regional Coordination Unit (RCU, the secretariat) was established. The NOWPAP Trust Fund was formed in 1997 to finance the projects. All member countries annually contribute 5 percent of the targeted amount of the Fund (US \$500,000) and then submit additional voluntary contributions. Although the member allotments to the Fund in the first year (1997) totaled US \$315,000 which amounted to only 63 percent of the target, the annual allotments have been unchanged to date.²¹ At the ninth Intergovernmental Meeting in 2004, the interim secretariat recommended that the contributions to the fund be increased and stabilized at US \$1 million per year and that the scale and proportions of the contributions among members be modified and reviewed from time-to-time.²² Issues related to increasing the Fund and the modifying member contributions were again raised at the tenth Intergovernmental Meeting in 2005. Due to the conflicting interests of the member countries, no agreement was forthcoming.²³

²⁰ North Korea did not participate in the Plan from the first intergovernmental meeting. Yet, North Korea was represented at the seventh meeting in Vladivostok in 2002 and still reserves the option to become a regular member of the meeting.

²¹ Japan contributes US \$125,000, 25 percent (5 percent basic and 20 percent additional); Korea US \$100,000, 20 percent (5 percent basic and 15 percent additional); Russia US \$50,000, 10 percent (5 percent basic and 5 percent additional), and China US \$40,000, 8 percent (5 percent basic and 3 percent additional). The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea, *The Trends of International Cooperation for Marine Pollution* (Seoul: Korean Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries), 1997, p. 208.

²² Report of the Ninth Intergovernmental Meeting on the NOWPAP, Busan, Korea, pp.2-4 November 2004. UNEP(DEC)/NOWPAP/IG.9/11, p. 12.

²³ Regarding the Trust Fund, Japan refused to further increase its contribution and insisted that all member countries should contribute equally, saying that its contribution would have a cap of 25 percent of the total targeted amount of the Fund. China criticized Japan's position and insisted on the differentiated responsibility and the adoption of the UN scale of contribution based on the member countries' financial capacities. Korea and Russia proposed to engage in fundraising from private sectors. Report of the Tenth Intergovernmental Meeting on the NOWPAP, Toyama, Japan, 24-26 November 2005. UNEP/NOWPAP IG.10/10, pp.15-16.

The NOWPAP has recently undergone a significant institutional development. Four Regional Activity Centers (RACs) were opened, one in each member country, in order to share the responsibility of monitoring and assessing marine pollution in the region.²⁴ NOWPAP's RCU was finally established in Korea (Busan) and Japan (Toyama) in 2004, and the joint RCU offices were fully operational as of April 2005. Establishing the Secretariat was an important development because the office has the authority to coordinate agenda setting, financial arrangements, and project implementation. The issue of coordination of activities between the RCU and the four RACs was discussed at the NOWPAP Intersession Workshop in July 2005 and the NOWPAP members requested the RCU to ensure synergy among RAC activities. The most important institutional development in NOWPAP was the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Regional Cooperation on Preparedness and Response to Oil Spills in the Marine Environment of the Northwest Pacific Region and the related Regional Oil Spill Contingency Plan (RCP) for the NOWPAP, which was presented at the ninth Intergovernmental Meeting in 2004.²⁵ The MOU and the RCP stipulate that NOWPAP member countries may request assistance from other members in case of marine incidents and that the requested members should use their best efforts to render assistance.

The NOWPAP on Marine Litter Activity Plan (MALITA) that was approved at the tenth Intergovernmental Meeting in November 2005²⁶ is being implemented with the Trust Fund since March 2008. In addition, NOWPAP has been seeking to collaborate with marine preservation

²⁴ The four RACs are the Special Monitoring and Coastal Environment Assessment Regional Activity Center (CEA/RAC, Japan), the Data and Information Network Regional Activity Center (DIN/RAC, China), the Marine Environmental Emergency Preparedness and Response Regional Activity Center (MER/RAC, Korea), and the Pollution Monitoring Regional Activity Center (POM/RAC, Vladivostok, Russia).

²⁵ UNEP(DEC)/NOWPAP/IG.9/11.

²⁶ UNEP/NOWPAP IS. 1/4, "Establishment of Marine Litter Activity (MALITA) in the NOWPAP Region," p. 4, Proposal by RCU to the Intersessional Workshop of the NOWPAP, Seoul, Korea, 25-26 July 2005.

programs in East Asia to share information which may eventually lead to joint activities. The GEF/UNDP/IMO Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) and the UNDP/GEF/Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem Project both indicated an interest in cooperating with the NOWPAP.²⁷

TEMM

To further promote environmental cooperation, China, Japan, and Korea launched the annual Tripartite Environmental Ministers Meeting (TEMM) in 1999. Three priority areas were identified for cooperation including strengthening community awareness and exchanging information, preventing air pollution and protecting the marine ecosystem, and promoting cooperation on environmental industries, technology, and research. The TEMM has been expected to be similar to Europe's Ministerial Conference for the Baltic and North Sea Preservation which brought about a dramatic increase in regional environmental activity in that area. As a high-profile and widely publicized event that generated great public expectation, the Ministerial Conference in Europe brought the environmental issues previously relegated to the back burner at regional forums to the forefront.²⁸ The ministerial meeting is an effective instrument in environmental cooperation particularly because the participants in the meeting have decision-making authority on environmental issues. The agreements from the meetings are credible and their implementation has been prompt. The Ministers of the TEMM have shared their concern about the DSS problem which has worsened due to droughts and land degradation in northern China. They agreed to make joint efforts to improve monitoring and develop early warning network systems for DSS in collaboration with the UNEP, the ADB, the UNESCAP, and the United Nation Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

²⁷ Available at <http://www.pemsea.org> (accessed 20 October 2005).

²⁸ Peter Haas, "Protecting the Baltic and North Seas," in Haas, Keohane, and Levy, *Institution for the Earth*, p. 173.

To this end, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) approved US \$500,000 to implement the DSS project and the ADB also approved a regional technical assistance project for US \$500,000 on "Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia." Operating at the highest level of the region's cooperative framework, the TEMM receives reports from the other cooperative channels and, through the announcement of a Joint Communiqué at annual meetings, attempts to provide guidelines for comprehensive environmental cooperation.

As described above, for the past decade, environmental cooperation at the multilateral level in Northeast Asia has been well established in these standing forums for environmental negotiations. The countries have adopted "frameworks," "guidelines," "conclusions," "joint communiqués," and "memorandum of understanding" which serve as useful instruments for implementing cooperation. The agreements guide the behavior of the member countries in such a way as to produce collective action in harmony with the goals and shared convictions that are specified in the regime principles. The member countries agreed to accept specific requirements including the basic contribution of 5 percent to the total amount of the NOWPAP Trust Fund, and the use of their best efforts to render assistance to member countries when requested to do so under the MOU/RCP. They also agreed to make voluntary financial contributions and to help other member countries cope with environmental problems through technology transfers, financial, and human resources. Decisions are reached through consensus and, if no agreement is forthcoming, member states often accept arbitration. The countries also share their experiences with the implementation of environmental protection measures at annual meetings, which encourages the member countries to make progress while ensuring they do not "lose face" in environmental negotiations.

The agreements virtually reflect a high degree of political commitment on the part of governments although they do not delineate the obligations or duties of member countries regarding monitoring, reporting emission data, and implementing reviews that would be critical to the legally

binding environmental cooperation. Neither binding technologies nor effluent standards are adopted. The issue of concluding a convention, let alone a protocol, has never been brought to the negotiation table. This non-binding feature of environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia is due to the rejection of key member countries of the legalization of this cooperation. Both China and Japan even opposed the use of such terms as “legal” or “legislation.” During the initial negotiations for NOWPAP, for instance, Japan insisted that it would not sign any legally binding statements. It further insisted that the terms “convention” and “protocol,” which are included in the Action Plan, be deleted.²⁹ In response, the UNEP stated that the Action Plan Draft is a general description of the UNEP’s Regional Sea Programme, and therefore, Japan’s position was unacceptable.³⁰ China, however, also opposed any terms that could be regarded as legally binding, asserting that the Action Plan should not restrict relevant existing and future national legislation. Subsequently, all terms implying legality, except for the general description of the UNEP Regional Sea Programme, were deleted from the NOWPAP. The MOU for implementing the NOWPAP Regional Oil Spill Contingency Plan (RCP) demonstrates another example. As expressly stated in Article 5, the MOU and the RCP do not establish legally binding obligations among NOWPAP members.³¹ Since the parties’ intentions largely determine whether they will make the MOU binding, this unambiguous statement regarding the MOU’s non-binding nature reflects the unwillingness of the NOWPAP countries to accept any binding agreement, even in emergency situations such as oil spills.³²

²⁹ Report of the 3rd Meeting of Experts and National Focal Points on the development of the NOWPAP, UNEP (OCA)/NOWPAP, WG 3/6 (1993), p. 5.

³⁰ The substantive aspects of UNEP’s Regional Sea Programme are typically outlined in an ‘Action Plan’. The components of Action Plans normally address environmental management issues, such as environmental legislation and institutional and financial arrangements.

³¹ The MOU on Regional Co-operation Regarding Preparedness and Response to Oil Spills in the Marine Environment of the Northwest Pacific Region, available at <http://merrac.nowpap.org/html/download.asp?f=2FINAL%20MOU%20as%20agreed%20by%208th%20IGM.pdf>.

³² Mallesons Stephen Jaques, “MOU,” available at www.mallesons.com.

The UNEP has expressed concern about the region’s cooperation without legalization. At the ninth NOWPAP meeting in 2004, the UNEP interim NOWPAP coordinator pointed out that the weakness of the framework’s legal foundation, combined with insufficient financial resources, has delayed the effective implementation of the NOWPAP for the past 10 years. Taking up the UNEP’s concern, the members agreed to set up a mid-range to long-term plan for strengthening NOWPAP.³³ The adoption of binding agreements, however, does not seem to be a feasible policy alternative for the region. Instead, the states in the region clearly emphasize “practical performance,” that is, a project-based, action-oriented, pragmatic approach to environmental cooperation without legalistic proceedings in negotiations.

Bilateral Environmental Cooperation

States in Northeast Asia have developed notable bilateral ties to facilitate cooperation on environmental matters. Japan has promoted extensive bilateral environmental cooperation particularly with China based on its multi-billion yen official development assistance (ODA) program, and developed broader regional cooperation that includes other Asia-Pacific countries. Since the fourth loan package (1995 to 2000), Japan officially designated environmental protection as a priority and has urged Beijing to use its ODA to sponsor environmental projects.³⁴ Separate from ODA

³³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), Republic of Korea, ‘Report of the Ninth Intergovernmental Meeting on the Northwest Pacific Action Plan’ (in Korean), (Seoul: MOFAT, 2004), p. 11.

³⁴ Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China began in 1979. From that time to the present, approximately 3.1331 trillion yen in loan aid (yen loans), 145.7 billion yen in grant aid, and 144.6 billion yen in technical cooperation, has been dispersed. The yen loans to China have been declining since 2000 because of Japan’s economic and fiscal constraints, and due to domestic opposition against aid to China based on China’s military buildup, economic growth, human rights records, and, more arguably, from the declining degree of appreciation from China not to mention the fact that China has ironically been providing ODA to states in the region. For the fiscal year of 2004, Japan extended its loan to China, totaling 85,875 million yen, financing six environmental projects and one higher education project in the country.

assistance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, reorganized as the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry or METI in 2001) also provided assistance to China's power generation sector through the Green Aid Plan (GAP) which was initiated in 1992 to provide technical support to address pollution problems in Asian countries. Projects in China accounted for more than half of the GAP's total budget.³⁵ Japan is by far the largest and most comprehensive foreign supporter of China's environmental protection efforts and has played a significant role in keeping environmental issues on China's policy agenda. This bilateral cooperation enhances Japan's diplomatic relationship with China. Japan has promoted bilateral environmental cooperation with Korea in a more equally developed partnership since there is no official Japanese aid program for Korea. Korea and China have also expanded their cooperation at the bilateral level.

Effects of Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Environmental Preservation

Environmental cooperation in the region is practiced to expedite joint responses to environmental issues. These cooperative efforts have resulted in significant progress in addressing transboundary pollution. States in the region have enacted numerous new environmental laws that are influenced by pre-existing regulations in neighboring states. As considered above, the reduction of pollution emissions in Korea and Japan reflect a general trend in the region in favor of strengthening environmental regulations. In this vein, financial and technology transfer mechanisms have been established and environmental management capacities of the countries have been likewise improved. For instance,

³⁵ Japan worked on almost all of the possible technologies and completed many demonstration projects in China. See, Oshita, S.B. and L. Ortolano, "The Promise and Pitfalls of Japanese Cleaner Coal Technology Transfer to China," *International Journal of Technology Transfer and Commercialization*, Vol. 2, No. 4, (2003), pp. 351-368.

Japan established the Japan-China Friendship Environmental Protection Center in Beijing in 1996 in order to support the enforcement of China's environmental standards with testing and monitoring equipment supplied by Japan. Japanese yen loan has contributed to environmental protection and capacity building in China, recently manifested by the development of the "Environmental Model Cities Plan" since 1997 in order to apply Japan's advanced pollution control measures to selected cities in China (i.e., Chongqing, Dalian, and Guiyang). Japan also funded the construction of a computer-based environmental information network aimed at linking 100 cities in China along with reforestation projects in regions where desertification has been progressing rapidly. The majority Japan's technology demonstration projects, accomplished via aid programs in China, have been successful including circulating fluidized bed boilers, simplified flue gas desulfurization, coal briquetting plants, and coal preparation technologies. Yet, the same projects have experienced difficulties when broader application has been sought beyond the demonstration level. Likewise, Korea also established the Environmental Science and Technology Exchange Center in China in 1999 to oversee joint research and technology transfer along with personnel and information exchanges.

Multilateral cooperation projects also have been effective. The NEASEPC projects of the pollution reduction in coal fired power plants in China and Mongolia would have positive effects in reducing air pollution in the region. Dust storm monitoring towers are now installed in Gobi, Loess plateau, and Inner Mongolia, and the measurement networks, which are widely dispersed throughout East Asia, are now generating valuable data to lend an accurate prediction of hwangsa. In addition, after activating the NOWPAP regional Oil Spill Contingency Plan, the NOWPAP member countries joined hands in fighting the Taean oil spill, the worst oil spill incident in Korean history which transpired in December 2007. With the assistance from the NOWPAP Marine Environmental Emergency Preparedness and Response Regional Activity Center (MERRAC in Korea, about the RACs, refer footnote #22 in this

paper), China sent a ship with experts and sorbents on board and Japan dispatched a team of experts to join the efforts to help clean-up the oil spill.³⁶ Additionally, Joint NOWPAP Oil Spill Exercises among NOWPAP countries have been conducted in order to assess coordination among them in dealing with oil spill emergency preparedness and response.

The effectiveness of regional environmental cooperation is also measured by the degree to which a regime is “perceived” to resolve the problem that prompted its creation.³⁷ A recent survey conducted by the Korea Environment Institute (KEI) of government officials and experts from China, Japan, Korea and Mongolia demonstrates that 87 percent of the respondents agreed that environmental cooperation has made progress in the past 10 years and that cooperation has affected their domestic environmental policymaking processes. Most respondents agreed that jointly addressing environmental concerns has contributed to building common interests with regard to environmental protection in the region. Yet, only 47 percent of respondents agreed that environmental cooperation contributes to improvements in environmental quality in the region. Insufficient coordination and a lack of enforcement mechanism were highlighted as the primary causes of the less than stellar track.³⁸ Although the survey result may cast doubt on the real impact of environmental cooperation in the region in reducing pollution, to fairly measure the effectiveness of cooperative efforts in Northeast Asia, one must consider that it is still at an early stage of development. Since large-scale cooperative projects have only recently begun, time will have to pass before outcomes can be accurately assessed. Furthermore, the practical measure of a regime’s effectiveness should involve a comparison with what would have happened if the regime had never existed. In this sense,

³⁶ UNEP NOWPAP’s News, available at http://www.roap.unep.org/program/NOWPAP_News.cfm

³⁷ Marc Levy, Oran Young and Michael Zürn, “The Study of International Regimes,” *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 1(3), (1995), p. 291.

³⁸ For this survey, Chu Jang Min et al, Dongbuk A Hwankyung Hyupryuk Chyegyue Hyoyoolhwa Bang-an Yunku [A Study on Innovative Measures of Environmental Cooperation Mechanism in Northeast Asia], KEI RE-17, (Seoul: KEI, 2005).

environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia has made positive progress in addressing regional environmental problems and its future seems bright.

Implications of Environmental Cooperation for Regional Politics

Environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia has also contributed to regional peace and stability. In many respects, it has been difficult to think of Northeast Asia as “a regional community” rather than merely a geographical region because of its dark history of colonialism and the resulting distrust and hostile nationalism evidenced in the relationships of the regional powers. Indeed, the memories of Japanese military invasions have shaped Korea’s and China’s modern national identities as well as their foreign policy orientations. Both countries view their modern history as a story of oppression and humiliation at the hands of Western and Japanese imperial power and strongly believe in the inviolability of state sovereignty. Despite growing economic and social interdependence, Korea and China are constantly suspicious of Japanese initiatives on regional affairs. While Japan’s extensive bilateral aid packages have been partly a reflection of its feeling of moral obligation to its past invasions, the official gloss Japan has placed over its period of colonial rule, including the distortions of historical events in textbooks, the Prime Minister’s controversial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine where fourteen class A World War Two criminals are memorialized along with the Japanese war dead, and ongoing territorial disputes stemming from Japan’s military invasions, has frequently led to diplomatic friction between Japan and its neighbors. Likewise, this behavior has aroused public anger at Japan and engendered nationalistic sentiment in Korea and China.³⁹ Political manipulations often complicate such situations which have been precisely the result as the Chinese government encourages anti-Japanese sentiment

³⁹ Japan is involved in a variety of territorial disputes including the status of Diaoyu-Senkaku island with China, Tokdo-Takeshima island with South Korea, and Northern Island territories with Russia.

at home in an attempt to unify a country whose ruling ideology is increasingly viewed with skepticism.⁴⁰ For its part, Japan has pointedly assumed a low profile in Northeast Asian politics. In this context, it is not surprising that the development of a genuine regionalism has been difficult in Northeast Asia.

Despite these setbacks, the transboundary nature of environmental problems has provided the impetus for the countries of Northeast Asia to seek effective regional cooperation. As described above, the institutional development of environmental cooperation has helped the regional countries to address transboundary pollution, and as such, environmental problems do not seem to be a source of interstate conflict in Northeast Asia. Instead, environmental cooperation is expected to serve as a catalyst for collective actions in other issue areas in the region. A literature review on international cooperation theories reveals several mechanisms by which a regime may help to promote further cooperation among countries.⁴¹ Current trends in environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia affirm that these mechanisms, albeit to a limited degree, are observable. They include (1) reducing uncertainties, (2) deepening and broadening ties of interdependence, (3) promoting reciprocity, and (4) developing a habit of dialogues. The following considers each of these four mechanisms in turn.

1. Reducing Uncertainties: Joint research and exchanges of information and experts have reduced uncertainty by enhancing the understanding of the primary causes of transboundary pollution and policy interests of the member countries, and suggested which measures may effectively address the issues. Such joint activities and sharing of research methods and technologies may have expanded interdependence in environmental governance among countries.

⁴⁰ *The Economist*, 'Japan and America', Vol. 377, No. 8453 (19 November 2005), p. 43.

⁴¹ For environmental regime theories, K. A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1986); P. Haas, R. Keohane, and J. Levy, *Institution for the Earth* (MIT Press, 1993); D. Victor, K. Raustiala, E. Skolnikoff, *The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments* (MIT Press, 1998).

2. Expanding Interdependence: Environmental cooperation has also created new opportunities for expanding the existing economic interdependence between regional countries since it links environmental technologies with markets. As mentioned above, the TEMM has adopted the further development of the environmental industry as one of its three cooperative agendas. In some sense, the huge and rapidly expanding environmental industry in Northeast Asian states and the complementary nature of environmental technology levels among the players have also driven environmental cooperation. For instance, Japan is a global leader in environmental technologies such as in air pollution control and energy sectors, and is looking to penetrate the fast growing market in the Asia Pacific region. In addition, the Korean environmental market has been growing steadily by over 10 percent per year, reaching US \$16.2 billion in 2004. The market is expected to exceed US \$36 billion in 2010.⁴² Finally, the Chinese government plans to invest US \$192 billion in environmental protection during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). Specifically, the Chinese government's pledge to make the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games the "Green Olympics" accelerated the expansion of its environmental market for advanced environmental technologies and services. China is already a fierce battlefield for advanced countries vying for shares of the environmental market.

Japan's emphasis on strengthening China's environmental regulations, as a condition for the yen loans, was expected to increase demand for advanced Japanese environmental facilities and equipment in China.⁴³ While the Japanese ODA and GAP have committed to helping China develop its own environmental industry and technologies, and its ODA is "untied" meaning that companies from the developed countries including Japan may only bid on funded projects by teaming up with local industries from developing countries, Japanese firms have accumulated

⁴² Republic of Korea Environmental Market, http://www.globe-net.ca/market_reports/index.cfm?ID_Report=723

⁴³ Information from an interview with a manager from the Japan-China Economic Association, Tokyo, Japan, November 1999.

business experiences and developed personal networks in China through aid programs including demonstration projects and personal training and exchanges.⁴⁴ The MITI (METI) supported certain private sectors by providing trade insurance to compensate for their possible financial burden in full-scale joint ventures with local companies in China and other developing countries.⁴⁵

Similarly, Korea has sought markets in China for its intermediate-level technologies that might be more suitable to the Chinese situation than highly advanced Japanese technologies.⁴⁶ For example, Korean electrostatic precipitators are adjudged to be effective for reducing emissions in China's small- and medium-sized factories. Korea also opened the Korean Environmental Technology Exhibition Center in Beijing in 2001 to foster a bridge between its environmental industries and the Chinese market.⁴⁷ At the same time, Korea has sought the transfer of advanced environmental technologies from Japan, which has been Korea's principal supplier of technologies, along with the United States. Since Japan has stressed that meaningful technology transfer should be arranged in such a manner that private firms gain mutual benefits from these transactions, overall technology transfers have been hindered due to the competition between private companies in the two countries.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, Korea hopes that environmental cooperation will further facilitate the transfer of advanced technologies from Japan.

⁴⁴ Susan Pharr and Ming Wan, "Yen for the Earth: Japan's Proactive China Environmental Policy," in M. B. McElroy et al. (eds.), *Energizing China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 623.

⁴⁵ Shouchuan Asuka Zhang, "Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies from Japan to China," in *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 19 (1999), 553-567.

⁴⁶ Kang and Chang, *Dongbook-A Kyungjae Hyupryuk*, pp. 71-8.

⁴⁷ The Center provides information about the Chinese market and exhibits the environmental technologies of Korean companies. With this effort, 20 Korean environmental companies were able to obtain US \$2 billion of experts, brightening the forecast for further growth of business activities in China. "The environmental industry," available at http://eng.me.go.kr/user/policies_view.htm?msel=b7&seq=7&filename=7_industry_01.html&table_name=me_new_industry, accessed 28 July 2005.

⁴⁸ Mitsubishi, NKK, Mitsui transferred incinerator technology to Samsung, Jindo, Ssangyong, and Koron Engineering in Korea. Kang and Chang, *Dong-Buk A Kyungjae Hyupryeok*, p. 68.

Lastly, China emphasizes the balance between economic growth and environmental protection, arguing that the fundamental way to solve environmental problems in developing countries is to support their efforts to achieve development, resulting in a "win-win" outcome for both the environment and development. The exorbitant costs of curbing domestic pollution have led Chinese leaders to seek financial and technical assistance from the international community. According to China's State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), it will cost at least 110 billion yuan (approximately US \$13.3 billion) annually to cope with acid rain alone, which contaminates roughly 30 percent of the country's territory.⁴⁹ China views environmental cooperation in the region as an effective way to obtain technologies and financial assistance to curb its domestic pollution. In fact, China has been a top recipient of Japanese bilateral aid and also received the largest portion of Korea's aid. In sum, environmental cooperation extends the scope of economic interdependence of countries in Northeast Asia through the development of regional environmental industry and the expansion of linkages between environmental technologies and markets.

3. Promoting Reciprocity: Current environmental cooperation also creates ample opportunities for more diffused forms of reciprocity in regional politics. Due to insufficient experience with policy coordination at the regional level, the relationships between Northeast Asian countries have been based on a strict policy of reciprocity or "give and take" analogous to a classical barter transaction. Such narrow reciprocal bargaining is in fact fragile as it has been frequently disrupted in tune with any abrupt changes in regional politics, which in turn results in unexpected diplomatic friction.⁵⁰ Through various environmental cooperative channels over multiple environmental issue areas, states

⁴⁹ "China's acid rain pollution worsens in 2003," in *People's Daily Online*, http://english.people.com.cn/200403/25/print20040325_138514.html, accessed 3 October 2005.

⁵⁰ Kenneth Conca, "Environmental Confidence Building and Regional Security in Northeast Asia," in M. Schreurs and D. Pirages eds., *Ecological Security in Northeast Asia* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1998), pp. 41-65.

become involved in complex interdependencies in regional ecology taken as a whole although individual states may become enmeshed in stark polluter-victim relationships and/or one-way dependencies in a specific environmental issue area.

4. Developing the Habits of Dialogues: The political implications of environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia include institutionalized habits of dialogue among the member countries, which thus develops a shared sense of regionalism. While the Northeast Asian region has been the focus of many studies of traditional security relations and rapid economic success, the region lacks many of the economic, social, and political institutions that have made Europe and North America increasingly independent and contributed to the formation of a positive sense of regionalism. Research on regional cooperation in Northeast Asia mainly explore the factors that have restricted the institutional development in Northeast Asian politics. In this context, the institutional development of environmental cooperation casts a long shadow that will facilitate future regional cooperation in the other issue areas.

In sum, current environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia demonstrates that shared environmental problems create tangible political opportunities to promote peaceful, cooperative relations in regional politics. In particular, given the steady progress in environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia, the positive externalities for regional peace and stability resulting from such cooperation may be extensive.⁵¹

Conclusion

Environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia has been driven by governments since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which led to the incorporation of environmental issues into Northeast Asian foreign policy agendas. The countries in the region have adopted non-binding cooperation as the

⁵¹ Ibid.

central instrument to achieve their shared policy goal to develop a collective mechanism for coping with transboundary pollution while safeguarding their sovereign environmental decision-making and economic interests. Environmental cooperation has made significant progress in institutionalizing cooperation, although it is a new arrival to Northeast Asian politics which has heretofore experienced an historical absence of institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation.

Environmental cooperation has thus served as a workable instrument for environmental protection in Northeast Asia. The non-binding nature of cooperation allows the regional powers to gain greater flexibility and to achieve swift consensus in negotiations since ratification of the agreements is not required.⁵² For instance, when Japan proposed to extend the NOWPAP Regional Contingency Plan's (RCP) geographical coverage to include the eastern part of Sakhalin Island, the NOWPAP interim coordinator noted, in accordance with UNEP's legal advice, that if all members agreed with the proposal, there would be "no legal obstacle" in the NOWPAP to block it because the MOU/RCP does not create any legally binding obligations.⁵³ The extension of NOWPAP/RCP's coverage was agreed to at the tenth Intergovernmental Meeting in November 2005.⁵⁴ Non-binding cooperation also keeps environmental negotiations out of the political spotlight thereby encouraging ongoing dialogue regardless of political developments in the region. The best evidence for this is that most meetings have been held as scheduled even when overall diplomatic relationships between the members have soured over issues such as the security dilemma, Japan's wartime guilt, and trade friction.

⁵² For discussions about effectiveness of formal/informal, binding/non-binding international agreements, see Charles Lipson, "Why are some international agreements informal?" *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (1991), pp. 495-538; Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance," *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2000), pp. 37-72.

⁵³ United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP(DEC)/NOWPAP/IG.9/11, "Report of the Ninth Intergovernmental Meeting on the Northwest Pacific Action Plan," Busan, Republic of Korea, 2-4 (November 2004), pp. 9-10.

⁵⁴ UNEP/NOWPAP IG. 10/10, pp. 16-17 (Resolution 6).

Environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia demonstrates that it has, albeit limited, implemented certain functions of international regimes that reduce uncertainty, expand complex interdependencies, and consolidate the habits of open dialogue. Although current environmental cooperation in the region has not realized its full potential as a regional instrument for economic and political negotiation, it may eventually have positive spillover effects on other issue areas in regional politics in the long-run. Thus, recent institutional developments in environmental policy cooperation in Northeast Asia are a noteworthy case of how non-binding cooperation may promote a shared sense of regionalism among countries whose relationships are otherwise defined by concerns over maintaining state sovereignty, mutual distrust, and mutual rivalries.

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