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Abstract

Utilizing previous research on personal integrity rights violations, I attempt to expound upon the theory that economic growth and education promotes political stability which in turn might alleviate a perception of relative deprivation and violence in a society. I predict that increases in education and reductions in income inequality might reduce the incidences of state-sponsored repression.

I operationalize income inequality by utilizing GINI coefficients, which measure a population distribution of income on a scale of zero to one. This research employed a time-series cross sectional analysis, which allows better explanation of the relationship between the personal integrity right violation and socio-economic condition. The test results illustrate that there are statistically significant relationships between the human rights violation and subsistence rights as expected.

I. Introduction

Various studies on human rights have accepted that the concept of human rights consists of two main components: positive rights and negative rights. Theoretically, human rights can be conceptualized with two main components such as a negative sense of human rights and a positive sense of human rights.[1] The negative one is related to personal integrity rights. On the other hand, the positive one is represented by subsistence rights. Shue argues there are three basic rights which are inter-related with each other: security, subsistence, and liberty, which are supposed to work together.[2]

No matter how scholars classify various types of human rights, there must be certain relationships among them. It is hard to deny that basic human rights are conditioned by socio-economic conditions. Therefore, examining the relationships among various dimensions of human rights is an appropriate research inquiry. More specifically, I can theorize about what the relationship is between personal integrity rights and socio-economic conditions in view of the current human rights status within developing countries.

While the Western countries have experienced relatively less variance in personal integrity rights violations and the most stability in social and economic conditions, developing countries have reported frequent violations in human rights and deterioration in social economic conditions. It is uncertain if there could be a remarkable improvement of human rights treatment in developing countries. Despite the end of the long, ideological conflict of the Cold War in the late 1980s and its geopolitical influence on political leaders, the modus operandi of prior repressive techniques in controlling a population in many developing countries continued well into the late 1990s and even into the 21st Century. State sponsored repression and even large-scale genocide campaigns have occurred frequently and will likely continue in the immediate future. This being the case, political scientists and other scholars must investigate why and when such

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1. Mark Gibney. and Matthew Dalton, 1996, "The political terror scale." *Policy Studies and Developing Nations*. vol. 4. pp. 73-84.
2. Henry Shue. *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U. S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980) pp. 13-34.

events transpire. Is it a mere desire to maintain political power or economic dominance? Or is it a more complex combination of factors driving states to such behavior.

An empirical analysis is a necessary procedure for providing an appropriate answer to this research question. Since the developing countries cannot afford to accumulate the information on income inequality, there is a certain limitation in this research with collection of the data for the sample countries. Due to the scarcity of data, the temporal domain is reduced to 17 years from 1976 to 1993.[3] Despite this type of limitation, it is noteworthy to analyze the relationship between personal integrity rights and subsistence rights.

As Huntington argues, the democratization process of the developing countries began in 1974 and had partly been completed by the early 1990s.[4] Since it is well known that democratic regime improves the conditions of human rights in developing countries while other types of regime use repression,[5] this period of democratization process deserves a thorough study. As a next step to understand the role of subsistence rights, I would analyze a new data set covering the last decade from 1994 to 2005. This comprehensive empirical analysis would allow me to figure out the influence of democratization on human rights in general.

II. Literature Review

Many scholars of peace studies have considered basic motives like political, social and economic control of a society. Thus basic structural reasons along with other more unique causes of state-sponsored repression need to be addressed. In general, government repression occurs in

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3. Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, 1994, "Repression of human rights to personal integrity in the 1980s: a global analysis." *American Political Science Review*. vol. 88. no. 4, employs a polled cross-sectional data set covering from 1980 to 1987.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Ohlahoma City, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press 1991). pp. 5-7, Huntington's term the third wave, the movement toward democracy, began in Portugal in 1974.
5. Poe and Tate. (1994); Christian Davenport, 1995a, "The weight of the past: exploring lagged determinants of political repression." *Political Research Quarterly*. vol. 39. no. 3

various forms like simple arrests, imprisonment, disappearance and execution. One shared state motive, however, is the perceived threat to a regime by a social, political, or economic actor. Competing social values challenge the established ones and the balance of power within a society might be otherwise altered if the present regime does not act.[6]

Carey and Poe[7] takes the concept of repression a step further by employing a decision-making model utilized earlier by Most and Starr.[8] This model calculates the severity of a threat into four types: 1) variables that influence the perception of a threat, 2) variables that influence their perceived levels of strength, 3) variables that affect the alternatives that appear on the decision-makers menu, and 4) variables that affect the choice among the alternatives on the menu.

Davenport similarly categorizes five criteria of environmental conditions that drive a policy of repression.[9] These include the components of the political economy, the characteristics of the challengers, the challenger's behavior, the availability of different regulatory strategies and the preparedness as well as the influence of the organizations affiliated with the different regulatory strategies. A number of previous empirical studies consider several types of independent variables affecting state sponsored human rights repression. Political determinants of repression are perhaps the most frequently analyzed research topics. However the majority of studies support the notion that a democratic regime is less likely to resort to repression as a policy alternative.[10]

Benson and Kugler test the effects of power parity between the ruling group and the opposi-

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6. Poe and Tate. (1994), pp. 852-872.; Christian Davenport, (1995a), pp. 377-403.; Poe, Steven C. Neal Tate, C. and Linda Camp Keith, 1999, "Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Crossnational Study Covering the Years 1976-1993." *International Studies Quarterly*. vol. 43. pp. 291-315.
7. Sabine Carey and Steve Poe. *Understanding Human Rights Violations: New Systematic Studies* (Aldershott, Ashgate 2004). Poe, Steven C. provides a theoretical explanation to human rights and state sponsored human rights repression.
8. Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr. *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press 1994). pp. 23-24.
9. Davenport. (1995a), pp. 388-390.
10. Zeev Maoz. and Bruce Russett. 1993, "Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986." *American Political Science Review*. 87. 3. 624-638.; Poe and Tate (1994), pp. 852-872.; Davenport. (1995a), pp. 377-403.

tion group upon domestic violence. They theorize that the efficiency with which the government mobilizes domestic resources may preserve domestic peace regardless of the institutional format. A relative parity of power resources between the government and an opposition group may also lead to a higher level of violence.

Davenport additionally argues that certain factors take time to influence political repression. Three of these factors, democracy, political conflict and dependency may have a short-term impact on the level of repression.[11] Democratization and political conflict may also be important when examining the most recent five to seven years. On the other hand, coercive capacity and economic development may not be as important as causal factors according to the statistical evidence.

Krain scrutinizes state-sponsored mass execution by analyzing the effects of international conflict, civil war, extra-constitutional political changes and decolonization.[12] Like simple repression, large-scale executions share several possible causal factors despite the difference in the level of intensity against the citizen. Some of these independent variables are also included in Poe and Tate,[13] and Poe, Tate and Keith.[14] The presence of civil war becomes the most consistent predictor of the occurrence of genocide. One difficulty, however, is separating war deaths from those related to state-related deaths. Other independent variables may have only small or insignificant influences on the probability of state use of repression.[15]

Another commonly researched theory in studying the causes of state repression relates to economic factors. Olson suggests that societal groups that consider themselves unjustly deprived or whose demands for improvement are rebuffed may, in fact, be willing to resort to violence.[16] As a result, the economic elite and the state may respond in a reciprocal fashion thus

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11. Davenport. (1995b), pp. 698-701.
12. Matthew Krain 1997, "State-sponsored mass murder: the onset and severity of genocides and politicides." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. vol. 41. no. 3, pp. 331-360.
13. Poe and Tate. (1994), pp. 865-870.
14. Poe, Tate, and Keith. (1999), p. 295.
15. Krain. (1997), pp. 341-349.
16. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) pp. 26-32.

propagating state-sponsored violence.

Muller examines income inequality, democratic stability, and democratic longevity over a ten-year period.[17] His results reflect very strong negative correlation coefficients between income inequality and democratic stability, indicating that income equality may be important in predicting state violence.[18]

Predictably, increased economic opportunity and more equitable income distribution may lessen the need or desire for those deprived to use force, at least initially. However a likely important intervening variable in this case is education. If economically deprived citizens are educated, they may expect more economic returns and opportunities more quickly. On the other land, those less educated might be less informed and therefore expect fewer economic and social rewards within a shorter time period.

III. Hypotheses and Theorization

The definition of human rights includes different dimensions such as personal integrity rights, subsistence rights and political rights and civil liberty. My research attempts to assimilate these dimensions particularly, personal integrity rights and subsistence rights.

Utilizing variables in prior research by Poe and Tate, we have attempted to boost the explanatory variables by adding two more. My hypotheses focus on the role of education and income inequality as socio-economic indicators with respect to personal integrity rights.

As Davenport theorizes, relative deprivation created by increasing income inequality influences the ruling elites' perception of threat by the public.[19] Since the relative deprivation reduces the cost of challenging the repressive elite, people can easily be mobilized to challenge

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17. Edward N Muller. 1988, "Democracy, economic development, and income inequality." *American Sociological Review*. vol. 53. pp. 50-68.; Edward N. Muller. 1995, "Economic determinants of democracy." *American Sociological Review*. 60. pp. 966-988.
18. Muller (1988), p. 59.; Muller (1995), p. 982.
19. Davenport, (1995a) p. 400.

the ruling elite. Therefore, this situation with higher income inequality affects the ruling elites' perception of elites as well as the decision-makers alternatives to deal with the situation where the economic conditions deteriorate.

> H_1: *The greater the income inequality, the more frequently governments repress citizens and violate their personal integrity rights.*

On the other hand, education level has a complicated impact on human rights repression. The elevation of the education level among the productive-age population can lead to the democratization of the social and political system, which ultimately improves the human rights conditions in the long run. However, the same phenomenon can have an opposite impact on the human rights conditions in the short run. The rapid elevation of the education level among the general public raises the expectation level for economic reward. If the economic system can satisfy the raised expectation level, there will be an improvement of human rights conditions in terms of subsistence rights as well as personal integrity rights. When the system cannot afford to co-opt it, the educated public will turn out to be an unstable social sector, which affects the ruling elites' alternatives and perception of threat by the public. These dual impacts of the elevation of the education level can be hypothesized as follows;

> H_2: *The more educated citizens are, the less often personal integrity rights violations occur because of the short-term satisfaction with economic opportunity*

> H_3: *The more educated citizens are, if not satisfied economically, the more likely they will resort to political mobilization creating a corresponding response from the state in the form of an increase in repression and personal integrity rights violations.*

The education-economic opportunity model is theorized along with the aforementioned hypotheses as:

Preliminary Model 1: Human Rights Repression (HRR) = C + a_1HRR$_{t-1}$ + $a_2$lncome Inequality + a_3Education + a_4Civil War + $a_5$lnternational War + a_6Economic Standing + a_7Economic Growth + a_8Population + a_9Population Growth + a_{10}Democracy + e

The model theorizes that human rights conditions are a function of income inequality and education level and employs other factors as control variables, which are recognized as important independent variables.[20]

IV. Variables and Methodology

My dependent variable, also used by Poe and Tate, is the political terror scale (PTS).[21] This is simply the number of occurrences of torture, imprisonment, political killings and execution, forced disappearances and political imprisonment ranked on a five-point ordinal scale. The data for this scale was derived by Stohl using the reports of both Amnesty International and the U. S. Department of State.[22] Another data regarding human rights by Gibney and Dalton,[23] provides a more complete measurement of personal integrity rights violations, which are also employed by Poe, Tate and Keith.[24]

The independent variables which are additions to the Poe-Tate study include income inequality and education enrollment rates. I operationalize income inequality by utilizing GINI coefficients, which measure a population distribution of income on a scale of zero to one. The higher the coefficient is, the greater the income disparity across a population. Specifically I include the income distribution rates of the highest twenty percent (20%) of a population in

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20. Davenport (1995b), pp. 709-712.
21. Poe and Tate (1994), pp. 860-864; Poe, Tate and Keith (1999), pp. 291-315.
22. Stohl, Michael. 1975. "War and Domestic Political Violence: The Case of the United States 1890-1970." *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* vol. 19. no. 3, pp. 379-416.
23. Gibney and Dalton (1996), pp. 78-81.
24. Poe, Tate and Keith (1999), pp. 298-302.

terms of annual income which is gathered by the World Bank on a regular basis instead of GINI coefficients due to data availability.

Unfortunately, the greatest difficulty in using such data is the variation in the frequency with which it is obtained. Some cases may have data from only one or two time points and some countries have no such information on hand. As a result, changes in income may not appear to occur within each country and when it does, it does not change very much. For the second independent variable, education level, I employ secondary school enrollment rates.

The temporal domain of examination covers the years 1976 to 1993. I include sixty countries and employ a pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCT). While PCT research design enables researchers to test theories over both space and time simultaneously and to thus examine the interaction between two dimensions, it also suffers from statistical difficulties such as autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, which appears when a researcher employs ordinary least square on the panel data. Heteroscedasticity arises in cross-sectional data when the scale of the dependent variable and the explanatory power of the model tend to vary across observations. Autocorrelation is usually found in time series data. Green argues that in most familiar settings, the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) estimator, based on a consistent estimator, has the same asymptotic properties as the GLS estimator, although conditions have to be verified on a case-by-case basis.[25] According to Green,[26] and Beck and Katz, the major hindrance of FGLS seems to be related to sample size.[27] The asymptotic efficiency of FGLS estimators may not carry over to small samples because of the variability introduced by the estimated residual autocorrelation matrix. Beck and Katz also recommend that if sample sizes are large enough, a researcher needs to contemplate a complicated FGLS estimation strategy.[28] As I mentioned before, my sample sizes are as large as sixty countries.

In time series analysis, stationarity is the most important starting point since it is impossible

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25. William H. Green. *Econometric Analysis* 2nd ed.(New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993.), p. 361-364.
26. Green. (1993), 397-399.
27. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995, "What to Do (And Not to Do) With Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data." *American Political Science Review*. vol. 89. no. 3, 634-647.
28. Beck and Katz.(1995), p. 640.

Table 1> Klein Test (Pearson Correlation)

	Democracy	Population Change	Logged Population	Economic Standing	Economic Change	Leftist Regime	Military Regime	British Colony	International War	Civil War	Income Inequality
Democracy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Population Change	-.073** (.01)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Logged Population	-.064* (.018)	.002 (.477)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Economic Standing	.078** (.005)	-.516** (.000)	-.093** (.001)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Economic Change	.020 (.261)	-.179** (.000)	.014 (.332)	.146** (.000)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
					-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Leftist Regime	.029 (.170)	-.014 (.331)	-.038 (.106)	-.003 (.457)	.023 (.228)	-	-	-	-	-	-
						-	-	-	-	-	-
Military Regime	.086** (.002)	.062* (.024)	-.036 (.118)	-.062* (.021)	-.022 (.241)	.449** (.000)	-	-	-	-	-
							-	-	-	-	-
British Colony	.036 (.159)	-.005 (.441)	-.054* (.039)	-.005 (.434)	.021 (.255)	.999** (.000)	.447** (.000)	-	-	-	-
								-	-	-	-
Int'l War	.089** (.002)	.043 (.086)	-.045 (.072)	-.040 (.093)	-.018 (.280)	.463** (.000)	.996** (.000)	.462** (.000)	-	-	-
									-	-	-
Civil War	.118** (.000)	.086** (.003)	.088** (.002)	-.181** (.000)	-.027 (.194)	.290** (.000)	-.033 (.139)	.290** (.000)	.071* (.010)	-	-
										-	-
Income Inequality	-.044 (.074)	.506** (.000)	-.106** (.000)	-.456** (.000)	-.129** (.000)	.065* (.016)	.114** (.000)	.072** (.009)	.107** (.000)	.098** (.001)	-
											-
Education	.056 (.059)	-.782** (.000)	-.162** (.000)	.732 (.000)	.202** (.000)	-.042 (.121)	-.119** (.000)	-.044 (.107)	-.098** (.003)	-.143** (.000)	-.529** (.000)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (1-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.005 level (1-tailed)

to specify a linear model to describe the behavior of the time series with a non-stationary series. The autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function of the dependent variables showed that there is no serious peak on the first three lags.

Despite the fact that I employed the same independent variables as Poe, Tate and Keith (1997) plus two of my own, the results of my model were not as robust as the previous research. This being the case, a strong possibility exists that multicollinearity is plaguing my models.

The Klein-Test for multicollinearity reveals what I originally feared. Table 1 indicates that income inequality and civil war are indeed correlated. The income inequality is more negatively and significantly linked to the logged population variable. The economic variable is slightly tied to the income distribution variable.

Not surprisingly, the education enrollment variable is highly correlated with the economic growth and logged population variable. The coefficients are .202 and -.162 at the .001 level of statistical significance. The population change (-.782) is perfectly correlated with the education enrollment rates in the one-tailed test. Based on the Klein test, I need to build two sets of adjusted models to prevent statistical bias from multicollinearity.

Model 1: Human Rights Repression (HRR) = C + a_1HRR$_{t-1}$ + a_2Income Inequality + a_3International War + a_4Economic Growth + a_5Population Growth + a_6Democracy + e

Model 2: Human Rights Repression (HRR) = C + a_1HRR$_{t-1}$ + a_2Education + a_3International War + a_4Economic Growth + a_5Population Growth + a_6Democracy + e

V. Test Results and Discussion

Despite various statistical problems, I tested the preliminary model with all possible independent variables. While the Poe Model resulted in eight statistically significant independent variables with both data sets, my new model only reflects three independent variables with reasonable statistical significance, lagged personal integrity abuse, economic growth and the presence of civil war. This is attributable to the limited number of cases due to the limited data for income inequality. Although the addition of my new income inequality and education variables has not improved in terms of statistical significance, I tested two different sets of independent variables with the two different sets of dependent variables, the Amnesty International and U.S. State Department data sets.

Unfortunately, income inequality and education fail to get statistically significant coefficients for both the Amnesty International and State Department measurement. However, the model yields consistent results for lagged personal integrity rights, population size, economic standing and civil war occurrence. In an effort to compensate for these difficulties, I opted to exclude several independent variables including civil war, population size and economic growth and organized two models separating income inequality and education. My new models emphasize income inequality, which has an apparently positive effect upon the human rights repression (HRR).

Fortunately, income inequality has more possibilities since it gets statistically significant coefficients for both data sets. These results support the hypothesis: the income inequality leads to personal integrity rights repression. As I discussed before, relative deprivation from income inequality reduces the political cost of challenging against the repressive regime. This means that the repressed can be mobilized to challenge against the ruling elite. And the threatened elites will rely on a repressive policy against the challenging people in order to extend or protect political power. This will result in the state sponsored personal integrity rights violations.

Paradoxically, the State Department data set does not yield the same statistical significance for the education level variable. The new models support the hypothesis that education may, in fact, reduce human rights repression. Perhaps this is because education has a long term effect

Table 2> Comparison of Poe, Tate, and Keith (1997) and New Data Set with Pooled Cross-Sectional Time Series Analyses

Independent Variables	Poe, Tate and Keith (1997)		New data set analysis		Preliminary Model	
	AI	SD	AI	SD	AI	SD
Constant	.071 (.105)	.197 (.103)	4.08 (2.08)	4.08 (2.08)	4.11 (2.90)	4.47 (2.92)
Personal Integrity$_{t-1}$	.652** (.017)	.644** (-.018)	.36* (.16)	.39* (.17)	.33* (.17)	.36* (.19)
Democracy	-.057** (.008)	-.064** (.008)	-.13 (.133)	-.13 (.17)	-.11 (.17)	-.11 (.17)
Population size	.066** (.007)	.057** (.006)	-.09 (.133)	-.11 (.13)	-.09 (.13)	-.11* (.12)
Population change	.005 (.004)	.002 (.004)	.01 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.01 (.02)	.02 (.02)
Economic standing	-.015 (.002)	-.013** (.002)	-.05 (.02)	-.04 (.02)	-.05* (.02)	-.04* (.02)
Economic growth	-.0009 (.0009)	.0036 (.001)	.01** (.01)	.01* (.01)	.02 (.016)	.016 (.01)
Leftist regime	-.174 (.038)	-.080 (.04)	.56 (1.33)	.80 (1.31)	.65 (1.47)	.86* (1.47)
Military control	.086** (.032)	.080** (.032)	.23 (.63)	.17 (.63)	.25 (.66)	.19 (.66)
British culture	-.080** (.026)	-.061** (.024)	-.31 (.366)	-.19 (.35)	-.33 (.38)	-.21 (.36)
International war	.139** (.043)	.135** (.044)	.26 (.23)	.14* (.14)	.79 (.35)	.14 (.29)
Civil War	.504** (.051)	.587** (.054)	.76** (.29)	.77** (.37)	.27* (.27)	.78* (.41)
Income inequality					.002 (.03)	-.003 (.027)
Education					-.003 (.02)	-.004 (.005)
R²	.75	.76	-	-	-	
X²	8911.44	9149.97	835.74	777.07	866.20	785.75
Probability	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
N	247	12471	1071	1071	1071	1071

Note: Main enters are coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses.
*P: statistical significance at .05 level   **P: statistical significance at .01 level

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Table3> New Models with Income Inequality and Education Enrollment

Independent Variable	MODEL I		MODEL II	
	AI	SD	AI	SD
Constant	.37	4.20	3.25	.97
	(.66)	(.64)	(.28)	(.52)
Personal Integrity$_{t-1}$	.006**	.72**	.005**	.68**
	(.001)	(.13)	(.001)	(.11)
Income inequality	.049**	.005**	-	-
	(.011)	(.02)		
Education	-	-	-.01*	-.005
			(.005)	(.005)
International war	.94**	.96	.95**	.95**
	(.013)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Economic change	.008	.01	.01	.012
	(.016)	(.02)	(.02)	(.016)
Population change	-.009	.05**	-.01	.05*
	(.005)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)
Democracy	-.003	-.007+	-.003	-.007+
	(.005)	(.64)	(.004)	(.004)
X^2	7633.94	9420.21	12201.43	12498
Probability	.000	.0000	.000	.000
N	1073	1072	1072	1071

Note: Main enters are coefficients and the standard errors are

+p = statistical significance at .1 level

*p = statistical significance at .05 level

**p = statistical significance at .01 level

rather than a short term effect. The elevation of the education level contributes to the democratization process, which improves human rights conditions. The negative effect from rapid elevation of the education level is minimized. This result means that the elevation of the education level creates more middle class citizens who might support democracy and political stability rather than violence and political instability.

Other variables also provide an interesting picture regarding personal integrity rights violations. The lagged endogenous variable and personal integrity rights violations get statistically significant and consistent results across all model specifications with two different data sets. This means that the current level of human rights violations is significantly and positively correlated with the previous level. It seems to be conventional wisdom at best or a trite remark at worst. However, this finding informs us of the customary trend in respect for human rights.

Except for Model I with the State Department data set, engagement in international war also has a statistically significant and consistent influence on personal integrity rights violations. When a country is involved in an international war, personal integrity rights violations becomes prevalent in a given area. It is still problematic to separate the human rights violations of war participants' atrocities against civilians — genocide and ethnic cleansing — and from that by a repressive regime engaging in the war. Although it is a theoretically complicated question concerning the impact of the two different instances of personal integrity rights violations, it is clear that interstate war results in personal integrity rights violations. Democratization has a limited but consistent impact on personal integrity rights conditions. It is clear that democratization improves human rights conditions particularly in developing countries.

Although change in population size yields statistically significant coefficients, the direction of the effects is inconsistent. Therefore, it is hard to accept that the population change itself has a consistent impact on human rights conditions. Surprisingly, the analysis fails to find an influence of economic conditions on human rights violations.

VI. Conclusion

The socio-economic condition is related to a right to subsistence, which would require other people, as a last resort, to supply food or clear water to those unable to find their own. On the other hand, personal integrity rights is a right to security, which would require other people merely to refrain from murdering or otherwise assaulting those with the right. It could be said that the distinction between subsistence rights and security rights is decisive and significant at the conceptual level. However, it is also possible that there is a certain relationship between these two different types of human rights. My research design focuses on finding the correlation or causality, if any, between them and finds that socio-economic conditions affect the conditions of personal integrity rights.

To provide a balanced view, I will rehearse the weaknesses of my research design. In reflecting on my efforts, income inequality is a commonly-utilized explanatory variable in social science. To exclude it could prove detrimental to any research design however difficult it may be in determining whether economic growth affects another variable or vice versa. Education on the other hand is certainly related to economic growth, which is highly correlated with political stability. Tying together political stability, education and state repression seems to be the next logical step. I have endeavored to take this step and have unfortunately discovered that attempting to dissect precise relationships is often problematic. As with economic growth and democracy, trying to pinpoint a definite linear relationship is fraught with difficulty. If education does promote political stability and therefore less government repression, how important does economic growth become in supporting such a theory. Clearly more research must be done on linking the repression of personal integrity rights and socio-economic conditions especially in the developing world.

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