

Five Misinterpretations of the Ending of the Cold War

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The evolution of Soviet strategy in Asia, 1969-1991

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Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity and the Long Peace of East Asia: What Lessons Can They Offer to the World?

Timo Kivimäki (University of Bath)

CONTENTS

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Foreword

- 02 Han Intaek**
(President, Jeju Peace Institute)

Article

- 04 Archie Brown**
(Oxford University)
Five Misinterpretations of the Ending of the Cold War
- 16 Sergey Radchenko**
(Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies)
The evolution of Soviet strategy in Asia, 1969-1991
- 27 Timo Kivimäki**
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**Han Intaek**

President, Jeju Peace Institute

The Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, which the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI) annually organizes, is an important opportunity for scholars, political leaders, diplomats, and activists from around the world to discuss current issues regarding peace, prosperity, and multilateralism; it gives our scholarly activities an important practical anchor as well as a point of reflection.

This journal intends to be a bridge from one Forum to the next. Throughout the year, it wants to follow up on ideas brought forward within the Jeju Forum and establish new angles for the next. At the same time, it aims to provide an independent platform for our readers to better understand the environment and circumstances surrounding East Asia and the world. Specifically, the *Jeju Forum Journal* publishes manuscripts analyzing events that shaped the world we live in today; events that are expected to have severe repercussions on relations between states; foreign policies of certain states that can affect other states' actions; and other issues that are widely discussed among the public, scholars, and global leaders today.

The three articles in this issue are contributed by the participants of the 2021 Jeju Forum. The first article is written by Professor Archie Brown, who participated in the plenary session "The Peaceful Ending of the Cold War: Interpretations and Lessons." After establishing the importance of ideas, personalities, and engagement policies, our first author Archie Brown finds that the Cold War would not have ended without Gorbachev and a negotiation-ready Reagan.

The second and third articles are contributed by the participants of the plenary session “The Korea-Soviet Summit and Jeju, Island of World Peace.” Professor Sergey Radchenko too emphasizes Gorbachev’s importance for Sino-Soviet rapprochement – the critical turn in Soviet strategy – that affects Russia’s strategic relation to Asia till today. While Russia’s military was and is a guarantee for respect in Asia, negotiating steady economic relations with all countries behind the iron curtain brought Asia closer together and propelled Russia to its best position since the 1970s. Finally, Professor Timo Kivimäki invites his audience to learn from East Asian negotiation tactics to help de-escalate conflicts, establishing that the region since 1980 statistically outperforms any other region with the lowest fatalities of organized violence.

These three contributions cannot represent all the topics and issues discussed among the speakers at the 2021 Jeju Forum. Still, through these three contributions, JPI hopes the readers will be able to get a glimpse of some of the essential topics and issues shared by the participants who joined the Forum on/off-line.

The Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity has been a premier regional dialogue platform, shaping the discourse to promote peace and prosperity in the region. We hope that the *Jeju Forum Journal* will help expand the ideas that have been brought up at the annual forum and stimulate discussions for future forums.

Five Misinterpretations of the Ending of the Cold War

Abstract

There are some generalizations about the end of the Cold War which are widely believed but are greatly misleading. The following five are among the most popular *misinterpretations* of the Cold War's ending: (1) The Cold War ended with the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991; (2) The Reagan Administration's military build-up forced the Soviet Union to concede defeat in the Cold War; (3) The Soviet Union's inability to compete with the West economically left it with no option but to reform; (4) A Western ideological offensive against Communism, led by Ronald Reagan with important help from Margaret Thatcher, forced the Soviet Union to change its thinking; (5) If Mikhail Gorbachev had not been chosen as Soviet leader in March 1985, some other Soviet leader would have had to pursue similar policies and the Cold War would still have ended largely on Western terms.

Introduction

Different criteria of what constituted the Cold War can produce different answers to questions about it, including its periodization. That suggests it is problematical to speak about 'wrong' answers to, for instance, the question, "When did the Cold War end?". If, to take an example of special significance to readers of the *Jeju Forum Journal*, the division on the Korean peninsula between a Communist state in the North and a democracy in the South means the Cold War never did end, then millions of words have been written in vain. It makes better sense, however, to regard the Korean question as an unresolved part of *the legacy* of the Cold War². As commonly understood, the Cold War was, above all, a political, economic and ideological rivalry

- an intense struggle by all means short of hot war - between the United States and its NATO allies, on the one side, and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact client states, on the other.

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1. Archie Brown is Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Oxford, a Fellow of the British Academy and an International Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His most recent book is *The Human Factor: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Thatcher, and the End of the Cold War* (2020). His other books include *The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in the Modern Age* (2014; Korean edition, 2017), chosen by Bill Gates as a book of the year; *The Rise and Fall of Communism* (2009); and *The Gorbachev Factor* (1996).
 2. The Cold War's ending was not a guarantee against its resurgence. Whether the contemporary frosty relations between Washington and Moscow (even colder between Washington and Beijing) should, however, be called a Cold War is highly debatable, for there are many differences between the current relations and the characteristics of what I would call the 'real Cold War'.

Misinterpretation One: Conflating the Cold War's ending with the Soviet Union's demise

If we accept that understanding of what constituted the Cold War, as I do, it is reasonable to view its most salient manifestation as the division of the European continent between a Communist East (more precisely, Eastern and East-Central Europe) and a democratic Western Europe (including the Scandinavian democracies of Northern Europe). The Communist regimes had been, for the most part, forcibly imposed by the USSR on territories Soviet troops liberated from Nazi occupation in the Second World War, leading to continuous Communist rule there from the second half of the 1940s. It was in 1989 that this major component of the Cold War was removed when the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe peacefully ended Communist government without a shot being fired by a Soviet soldier to prevent this. Only in Romania was there large-scale violence, resulting from repression instigated by the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu, who acted independently of (and with no support from) the Soviet leadership. That conflict between Romanians and Romanians ended with Ceaușescu's execution on 25 December 1989.

When the de-Communization of Eastern Europe is taken in conjunction with the transformation of Soviet foreign policy and of the Soviet political system in the second half of the 1980s, it is reasonable to argue that the Cold War was over by the end of 1989. By that time, it made little sense to describe even the Soviet Union itself as Communist. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), conservative Communists complained, had become a 'debating society'. What, in Marxist-Leninist terms, was known as 'democratic centralism' had been a pillar of the Communist system. It involved iron discipline within the party, with extremely narrow scope even for intra-party debate. A united front was presented

to non-party members and, still more, to foreigners.

In 1987-88, such democratic centralism was already withering away and in 1989 it was completely abandoned. Communist Party members publicly espoused different policies and competed vigorously against one another in elections for a new legislature that were held in March that year. Once the party had become openly disunited, the other major pillar of the system, the 'leading role of the party' – a euphemism for its monopoly of power – became increasingly meaningless. The Soviet political system had become different in kind by the end of the 1980s.

The American administration, led by President George H.W. Bush, that took office in January 1989, was, however, unconvinced that the Cold War had ended. Bush, his Secretary of State James Baker, and especially his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft believed that Reagan and George Shultz had been too trusting of Gorbachev. They rejected the outgoing Secretary of State Shultz's view that by December 1988 the Cold War was over. But by the end of their first year in office, events had moved so fast that it made no sense, even to such sceptical 'realists' as Bush, Baker and Scowcroft, to continue to believe that the Soviet Union's relations with the West amounted to Cold War. That ended concretely with the de-Communization of Eastern Europe and it ended symbolically with the Malta summit meeting in December 1989 when Bush and Gorbachev, as the American and Soviet leaders, gave a joint press conference. That had never happened before. Soviet relations with Bush and Baker had become at least as warm as they were in the last year of Reagan and Shultz. The Berlin Wall was demolished with impunity in November 1989, and this clearly presaged the reunification of Germany which occurred the following year.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in the last months of 1991, culminating in December that year, should not, then, be conflated with the end of the Cold War. That ended two years earlier. Moreover, breaking

up the USSR was not a Cold War aim of the United States and its partners. On the contrary, they shared Gorbachev's hope that he would be able to preside over a voluntary federation embracing most of the existing union republics. They made an exception for the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whose forcible incorporation in the USSR in 1940, had always been regarded as illegitimate by the Western powers. But they did not try to exploit Gorbachev's difficulties with these or other nations that made up the USSR. Bush and Baker were worried about the possibility of civil war on Soviet territory and especially about the danger of nuclear weapons coming into irresponsible hands.

The Soviet breakup had numerous causes and antecedents, but it was, above all, an unintended consequence of (a) the pluralization of Soviet politics, (b) the transformation of Soviet foreign policy, and (c) the ending of the Cold War, the first two of these having facilitated the third³. When relations with the West became better than ever before, and a new tolerance prevailed in the Soviet Union itself, previously suppressed desires, including those of various national groups for greater autonomy, could now be turned into political demands.

Misinterpretation Two: A Triumphalist Explanation – The Reagan Military Build-Up

The argument that the Soviet Union, in effect, conceded defeat in the Cold War because they were intimidated by the increased military expenditure of the Reagan administration is widely held but highly misleading. In the mid-1980s the Soviet Union enjoyed an approximate military parity with the United States. Each side had the capacity utterly to destroy the other

and, indeed, to endanger life throughout the entire planet. Yet until the early 1970s the United States had a clear military superiority over the Soviet Union, and in the second half of the 1940s it possessed nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union did not.

At a time, however, when the Soviet Union was clearly *inferior in military strength to the United States, Communism expanded*. Eastern Europe and a substantial part of Central Europe became part of a tightly controlled Soviet bloc during years when the United States alone had nuclear arms. Communism expanded also in Asia when the USA was the world's strongest military power and even in the Caribbean when Cuba turned Communist. The 1961 overthrow of the corrupt Batista regime in Cuba was not in itself a Communist revolution, but Fidel Castro welcomed Soviet economic help and political support, and before long adopted the institutions of a Communist state. Cuban foreign policy also became broadly aligned with that of the Soviet Union.

Throughout the period in which the Americans possessed military superiority, the Soviet leadership made no concessions to the US. They signed agreements only when they were of clear mutual benefit for both the USSR and the US. Examples were the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (banning tests in the atmosphere and under water) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, ratified in 1972, which put strict limits on the missile defence systems that could be built in order to combat intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby maintaining deterrence – what was known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

The response of the Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko

3. Archie Brown, 'The End of the Soviet Union', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2015 pp. 158-165.

- and of Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko - to the Reagan military build-up, including his Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), was to agree that the Soviet Union should build still more missiles. SDI involved massive investment in anti-missile defence to an extent which seemed to the Soviet Union, and to many objective outside observers, to be leading to contravention of the ABM Treaty. Less than two months after President Reagan announced his SDI initiative in March 1983, Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov told the Politburo that all planned missiles must be delivered, that “Everything we are doing in relation to defence we should continue doing” and that the Soviet Union must actively oppose the “imperialist intrigues of our enemies⁴”.

For Mikhail Gorbachev, ending the Cold War was a priority, both because he wished to focus on domestic reform, and not spend ever more resources on the Soviet military-industrial complex, and because he took seriously the danger of catastrophic nuclear war resulting from political misunderstanding, human error or technical malfunction. Yet, there was a reason why all previous Soviet leaders were content with a continuation of the Cold War in which the USSR was recognized as one of the world’s two military superpowers. They took pride in the international prestige this status accorded them, and it also helped to maintain their hegemony at home. If Soviet citizens believed that there was a foreign threat, then it was not difficult for the regime’s leaders and propagandists to portray criticism of the system, or even of particular policies, as a form of treachery.

Moreover, the military-industrial complex was the most powerful institutional interest by far in the Soviet Union. Its representatives vigorously opposed some specific policies of the perestroika era, such as the unilateral cuts in the size of the Soviet conventional armed forces. They resented Gorbachev’s political

priorities and reforms which were undermining the influence of the army and defence industry on Soviet decision-making, and they were suspicious of the relations of trust that Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze were forming with their Western counterparts. If East-West relations were to become friendly, and there was no longer a foreign threat, this would not augur well for the gigantic size and prosperity of the military-industrial complex.

But Gorbachev prevailed, making full use of the fact that he was the de facto leader of the country by virtue of his position as General Secretary of the Communist Party. Accordingly, it was he who spoke for the Soviet Union in the frequent meetings with foreign heads of government, and he took every opportunity to set the foreign policy agenda. As a result of Gorbachev’s domestic reforms, public opinion was also acquiring a new significance. Dread of war was a more powerful sentiment in Soviet than in American society, given that the USSR lost approximately twenty-seven million of its citizens in the Second World War, whereas the US lost well under half a million Americans. A friendly visit to Moscow by American President, and lifelong anti-Communist, Ronald Reagan in 1988 for his last summit meeting with Gorbachev, temporarily silenced critics within the political elite. Reagan’s benevolent manner achieved more than his earlier belligerence. For a broader Soviet public, the Reagan visit appeared to provide tangible evidence that Gorbachev’s policies had made their country - and the wider world - a safer place.

4. Quoted from transcript of a Politburo meeting of 31 May 1983 in Brown, *The Human Factor: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Thatcher, and the End of the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2020), pp. 292 and 455.

Misinterpretation Three: The Soviet Union was forced to reform because it could not compete with the West economically

For Mikhail Gorbachev, and some of those who supported him, the slowdown in Soviet economic growth was, indeed, one of the stimuli to reform. A related stimulus was the technological lag between the USSR and the West (with the Soviet economy also comparing unfavourably with the more recently industrializing countries of Asia). But the forces opposed to reform were formidable. While it was not easy to change Soviet *foreign policy* fundamentally, as Gorbachev did, *to change the economic system* was many times harder. A majority of Soviet government ministries existed in order to administer different sectors of the command economy. Half of the departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU were concerned with the economy. These ministers and department heads had a strong stake in the existing system. That was true also of countless Party officials and factory managers in every part of the country. Collectively, they represented a formidable obstacle to radical economic reform.

An even clearer reason, however, why the economic determinist explanation of Soviet reform and of the end of the Cold War fails to convince is that, by his second year in power, Gorbachev was giving a higher priority to political than to economic reform. The political changes became much more radical with each passing year, and they did nothing to improve the economy. In contrast, any actual economic reform was modest in scope, and it was not until 1990, five years after he became Soviet leader, that Gorbachev was converted to the view that the country should move to an essentially market economy. Accepting that argument in principle, he did not, however, press for it to be put into practice. A fundamental economic reform would mean moving to market prices. This would have

posed great political dangers. So long as prices were fixed centrally, there would continue to be inefficiencies and shortages. But though Soviet citizens complained about empty shelves and queues, they were familiar with them. They were likely to be even angrier if the state subsidies on basic foodstuffs and on the heating and lighting of their apartments were to be removed. By 1990-91, Gorbachev's popularity and that of perestroika, both of which had been high during earlier years, were declining very fast.

In an article published as recently as July 2021, Gorbachev wrote that, in retrospect, he realized that he "should have told people the painful truth" about the Soviet economy and made truly radical economic reforms in 1987-88 which was "politically and economically the right time to undertake them"⁵. That reassessment is almost certainly correct. At that time Gorbachev's authority within the party and state and his popularity in the country were still high. Introducing price rises, with the market making things worse for many people before they got better, would have lost him some support, but he had enough political capital in 1987 or 1988 to survive this. By 1990-91 the economy had gone from bad to worse. It was no longer a fully functioning command economy, for commands were no longer obeyed, but it was not yet a market economy. Moreover, the unity of the Soviet state was under severe threat from nationalist movements. For Gorbachev to put his full political weight behind a move to the market at a time when he was being politically assailed from multiple directions would in 1990-91 have been significantly riskier than in 1987-88. His opponents in the party, government, security organs and the army who put him, along with his family, under house arrest in his holiday home on the Crimean coast in August 1991,

5. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 'Perestroika and New Thinking: A Retrospective', *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2021, pp. 211-238, at p. 218.

could have used any increase in unrest or breakdown of order as an excuse to strike earlier, and with greater chance of success.

Another major reason why far-reaching economic reform did not take place is that the person who was in day-to-day charge of the economy was Politburo member and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Ryzhkov. He had been a factory manager and industrial administrator before entering the central party and governmental apparatus, and the kind of change he favoured was both limited and essentially technocratic. He constituted a major obstacle to any move to market prices. The numerous members of the Council of Ministers who headed economic ministries reported to Ryzhkov. Like him, they clung to the traditional Soviet economic system in which they had negotiated their path to the ministerial summit.

The person who played the most important part during 1990 in persuading Gorbachev of the superiority of a market economy over the Soviet bureaucratic system was his economic aide (for that one year), Nikolai Petrakov. He found it much easier to get Gorbachev to understand and accept his arguments than he did in his meetings with Ryzhkov. When I interviewed Petrakov in Moscow in June 1991, he told me that during his first four years as Soviet leader Gorbachev had confidence in Ryzhkov. By late 1989 he realized that more drastic economic change was required and that Ryzhkov would be opposed to it. That was when he decided to ask Petrakov, a prominent economist of known pro-market views, to become one of his aides. Petrakov also told me of a conversation he had with Ryzhkov in which he argued that there was no need for a State Committee on Prices and it should, therefore, be abolished. Ryzhkov replied, "You're right, but in a few years' time". Petrakov told Ryzhkov that "you talk about the market the way we used to talk about communism - it's always sometime later⁶!".

Misinterpretation Four: A Western ideological offensive forced the change in Soviet thinking

Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher had longstanding anti-Communist and anti-Soviet credentials, and both of them were active in their support of Soviet dissidents and oppositionists in other Communist states. The Soviet army newspaper sarcastically referred to Thatcher as 'The Iron Lady' in 1975, when she was not yet British prime minister but was Leader of the Opposition. The article was intended as ridicule, but she wore the title they accorded her as a badge of pride. It also enhanced her standing in the United States, especially in the Republican Party. By the mid-1980s there was absolutely nothing new about Reagan's and Thatcher's rhetorical battle against Communism, and hitherto it had met only with counter-attacks from Soviet leaders and the regime's propagandists.

What was new was that from late 1983 and in 1984 Reagan and Thatcher were persuaded that the Cold War had become more dangerous and that it was important to try to engage with the Soviet leadership. But Soviet leaders were not convinced that Reagan had changed. In fact, he sent out mixed signals. Sometimes he emphasized his desire for peace and a willingness to engage, but when he combined this with putting vast resources into anti-missile defence, frequently accompanied by hostile comment on the Soviet system, the assumption in Moscow was that the peaceful component of Reagan's 'Peace through Strength' policy was merely for domestic consumption, since Reagan would be seeking a second term in the November 1984

6. Petrakov was not, of course, referring to Communism in the sense of 'Communist system' but to the utopia of a classless communist society - the imaginary goal towards which the party, armed with Marxist-Leninist 'theory', was supposedly leading Soviet citizens.

presidential election.

Writing after the USSR had ceased to exist, the long-serving Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, who under Gorbachev's leadership became head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was dismissive of the idea that either Reagan's ideological offensive or his Administration's military build-up helped to end the Cold War. Dobrynin wrote:

The impact of Reagan's hard-line policy on the internal debates in the Kremlin and on the evolution of the Soviet leadership was exactly the opposite from the one intended by Washington. It strengthened those in the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the security apparatus who had been pressing for a mirror-image of Reagan's own policy. Ronald Reagan managed to create a solid front of hostility among our leaders. Nobody trusted him. Any of his proposals almost automatically were considered with suspicion. This unique situation in our relations threatened dangerous consequences⁷.

That was the atmosphere in the Soviet leadership when Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in March 1985. He was alone in the Politburo at that time in concluding that it was important to try to work with Reagan. Partly as a result of the great authority his position as party leader gave him, and partly through his powers of persuasion, Gorbachev succeeded in getting sufficient support from the Politburo to negotiate with his American counterpart. But there was scepticism on the part of some members of the top leadership team as well as within the military-industrial complex. At a Politburo meeting in October 1986, KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov said, "The Americans understand only strength⁸". That view was widely shared in the Soviet party and governmental bureaucracy, not only within the military-industrial complex. Gorbachev himself was

unconvinced that Reagan was serious about seeking better relations with the Soviet Union. Margaret Thatcher played a significant role in persuading him that Reagan was sincere in his peaceful intentions and also in convincing Reagan that Gorbachev was a different kind of Soviet leader and one with whom he should enter into dialogue.

In every year of his second term, Reagan had a summit meeting with Gorbachev. When they got together in Geneva in November 1985, this was the first time an American President had met a Soviet leader since the Carter-Brezhnev meeting in 1979. Thatcher had met Gorbachev a year earlier than Reagan did. He was invited to make a week-long visit to Britain in 1984 when he was not yet Soviet leader, although he looked the likeliest successor to the ailing Konstantin Chernenko. Gorbachev arrived in London in December that year, accompanied by his wife Raisa and a large entourage. In a five-hour meeting at the Prime Minister's country residence, Gorbachev and Thatcher argued vigorously, but at the same time established relations of mutual respect. At the end of the visit, Mrs Thatcher famously said, "I like Mr Gorbachev. We can do business together⁹."

Gorbachev had an unusually open and receptive mind by any standards, remarkably so for someone who had risen through the hierarchy of the CPSU. He absorbed information and ideas from many sources. There is no evidence that the hard-line rhetoric of Reagan or Thatcher influenced him, but constructive and frank discussion did.

7. Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986)* (Random House, New York, 1995), p. 482.

8. Brown, *The Human Factor*, p. 293.

9. Mrs Thatcher's British interpreter in her 1984 discussion with Gorbachev, Tony Bishop, later said he had felt he was witnessing something close to "a flirtation between two people with much to gain from and offer to each other". For this, and further detail on Gorbachev's important visit to Britain in 1984, see Archie Brown, *The Human Factor*, pp. 50-55 and 124-125.

He took seriously some of Thatcher's arguments about how Soviet foreign policy was perceived in the West. It was Reagan's and Thatcher's turn to engagement with the Soviet leadership to which Gorbachev responded, not their earlier ideological offensive.

Ideologically, Gorbachev felt most at home with European social democrats. He had especially warm relations with the Spanish Socialist prime minister Felipe González and the former West German Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt. Gorbachev was also very open to critical thinking and new ideas emanating from social scientists and specialists on foreign countries within the CPSU. A lot of innovative thinking had been going on in Soviet research institutes for at least a couple of decades before Gorbachev came to power, but its authors had to engage in self-censorship or publish their views indirectly to avoid getting into trouble with the pre-perestroika Soviet authorities. Gorbachev, in contrast, encouraged Soviet specialists not only to think the unthinkable but also to say it out loud. In this changed atmosphere of free discussion, the party intellectuals' own critiques and policy ideas became more radical. Gorbachev was not only receptive to the 'New Thinking', he became its principal exponent.

It was a major speech by Gorbachev, and one into which some of the most thoughtful and innovative Soviet party intellectuals had contributed suggestions, which ended the Cold War in its ideological dimension. This was Gorbachev's address to the United Nations on 7 December 1988¹⁰. It embodied Soviet 'New Thinking' on foreign policy and went beyond what Gorbachev, not to speak of any previous Soviet leader, had said hitherto, with the announcement of both breakthrough practical measures and highly ambitious goals. What he said about imminent massive cuts in the size and composition of the Soviet armed forces caught most attention at the time. Addressing Western concerns

about the superior strength of Soviet conventional forces, Gorbachev announced that they would be reduced by 500,000 personnel over the next two years. Defence officials in Western Europe were impressed by the fact that the cuts were to take place especially in the forces that would be deployed in rapid offensive operations into West European territory.

In a passage of his speech that was both an implied repudiation of previous Soviet priorities and a criticism of the rival American superpower, Gorbachev said that "a one-sided emphasis on military strength" ultimately "weakens other components of national security". More broadly, Gorbachev's message was one of 'live and let live'. He said that the people of every country had the right to decide for themselves what kind of political and economic system they wished to live in. This could be interpreted as giving a green light to the peoples of Eastern Europe to remove their Communist rulers (although Gorbachev's hopes were for radical reform rather than revolutionary change), and the words were taken at face value by the citizens of East and Central Europe the following year. Gorbachev's UN speech represented a radical break with Marxism-Leninism. He called for a "deideologization of interstate relations" and for priority to be given to those values that united all of humanity as distinct from those of any one class, nation or group.

Yet, a great part of the American foreign policy establishment failed to appreciate either Gorbachev's words or the significance of the change in Moscow. That applied both to large segments of the Reagan Administration and to the incoming Bush administration. The leading Soviet specialist in the CIA Robert Gates dismissed Gorbachev's UN speech as a "largely rhetorical flourish" and Brent Scowcroft, already chosen to be

10. For a more detailed elaboration of the arguments contained in this article, see Brown, *The Human Factor*.

National Security Adviser to George H.W. Bush, told a television interviewer in January 1989 that Gorbachev's foreign policy "might be secretly intended to throw the West off its guard" and that "the Cold War is not over"¹¹. The departing Secretary of State George Shultz, in contrast, was hugely impressed by Gorbachev's UN speech. He was also worried about the loss of momentum in US-Soviet relations that looked likely to occur when Bush replaced Reagan in the White House. In his memoirs, Shultz writes that he was "apprehensive that the 'new team' [in Washington] did not understand or accept that the cold war was over"¹².

The Cold War was not quite over at the end of 1988, for Europe remained divided between a Communist East and a democratic West. But it was clear that if Gorbachev was sincere in saying that the people of every country, without exception, had the right to choose the kind of system in which they wished to live, then the days of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe were numbered. Many of the themes and ideas in Gorbachev's UN speech were ahead of their time. They included his concern with "the worldwide ecological threats" that in many regions had become "simply frightening" and his call for a centre for ecological assistance to be set up under the auspices of the United Nations. This was in keeping with his emphasis on values and interests that should unite all of humanity and the need to seek an "all-human consensus on movement towards a new world order". Whether that is characterized as excessively idealistic, even utopian, or – on the contrary – a higher realism, it represented a total break with past Soviet dogma. As Pavel Palazhchenko, Gorbachev's English-language interpreter on that American visit and his interpreter and adviser to the present day, observed as recently as 2020: "Re-reading that speech today, it is difficult to find in it even traces of Marxism-Leninism"¹³.

Misinterpretation Five: Any Soviet leader would have had to do what Gorbachev did

If Western policy had left the Soviet Union with no option but to pursue a constructive and even conciliatory foreign policy, to liberalize and substantially democratize the Soviet system, and to allow the countries of East-Central Europe to eject their Communist rulers and become fully independent, then the agency of Gorbachev would be immaterial. However, as I have argued here, these determinist arguments do not stand up to close scrutiny. More specifically, there is no shortage of information on the opinions, priorities and mindsets of the other surviving members of the Politburo when Chernenko died in March 1985. These men were the only people who, in the context of the Soviet system, were eligible for consideration to be General Secretary of the CPSU.

We know a lot about all ten of these Politburo members. The sources include the memoirs of several of them, interviews with them, their actions, their public and private observations, Politburo transcripts and other archival evidence. On the basis of that knowledge, it is safe to conclude that, Gorbachev apart, none of them would have undertaken radical political reform, introducing contested elections for a legislature with real powers. None of them would have dreamt of declaring that the people of every country had the right to decide for themselves in what kind of political and economic system they wished to live, thereby giving encouragement to national independence movements in Eastern Europe. Those changes, in turn, raised the hopes of the most disaffected nations within

11. Ibid., pp. 241-246.

12. George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (Scribner's, New York, 1993), p. 1138.

13. Pavel Palazhchenko, "On khotel vnedrit' v politiku moral", *Mir peremen*, No. 4, 2020, pp. 119-124, at p. 122.

the Soviet Union itself and ultimately contributed to the breakup of the USSR. That was very much an unintended consequence of perestroika.

Western political leaders were pleasantly surprised by the restraint Gorbachev showed in the face of these fissiparous tendencies. He tried to hold the Union together through a process of negotiation between the federal centre and the republics, with the aim of turning what had been essentially a pseudo-federation into a genuinely federal state. Many of the leading figures in the party and governmental bureaucracy, the army, and the KGB were horrified by Gorbachev's commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes which called into question the very existence of Soviet statehood. Anatoly Gromyko, the son of the long-serving Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, complained about Gorbachev's unwillingness to use "even minimal force" in order "to preserve the Soviet Union". Some senior members of the Soviet leadership (which contained people of very different outlooks) went much further in their condemnation. Vladimir Kryuchkov, who had succeeded Chebrikov as KGB Chairman in 1988, speaking just over a decade later, described Gorbachev's behaviour as the most "treasonous policy" in "human history". Oleg Baklanov, the Central Committee Secretary who oversaw the military-industrial complex, said that "the work of Gorbachev as General Secretary" and of those he promoted to Politburo membership and "who continued to support him and carried out his policy" constituted "the highest form of betrayal of the interests of the state and its leaders"¹⁴.

The dramatic change in the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s cannot be understood without awareness that behind the monolithic façade which, in pre-perestroika decades, the Communist Party presented to its own citizens and the outside world there was, in private, a wide diversity of views among its members.

There was a battle of ideas within the CPSU, which took an esoteric form in the pre-perestroika USSR but came out into the open in the Gorbachev era. At any time, having the party leader on your side played a huge part in determining who would win that battle. Not only the words of the general secretary had a special authority. He also had a substantial power of appointment – very great when it came to choosing his aides and advisers and, less absolute, but greater than anyone else's, in engineering dismissals from and promotions to the Politburo.

Gorbachev, as noted earlier, had greater power in foreign policy than in economic policy where there were a great many veto players within the system and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ryzhkov wielded considerable power. Within a year of becoming general secretary, Gorbachev succeeded in replacing the Foreign Minister, the head of the International Department of the Central Committee, the head of the Central Committee Department responsible for relations with other Communist states, and the top foreign policy adviser to the party leader. That last appointment, of the well-informed and open-minded Anatoly Chernyaev, was at least as significant as the choice of Eduard Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister. Gorbachev also brought into his inner circle a strong group of 'New Thinkers', among them Aleksandr Yakovlev, to whom he gave very rapid promotion within the Secretariat and Politburo of the Central Committee. Yakovlev was especially influential up until 1989. In his last two years in the Kremlin, Gorbachev distanced himself somewhat from Yakovlev who had already been fiercely attacked

14. These quotations are taken from the transcript of a round-table conference in Moscow in 1999, in which the high-ranking Soviet officials who mounted a coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 were questioned by a small group of Western scholars, including the author of this article. The conference was organized by the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Mershon Center of Ohio State University. For further details, see Brown, *The Human Factor*, pp. 293, 296, 455 and 476.

by conservative Communists at a time when they still hesitated to berate the general secretary.

Making full use of his power of appointment, Gorbachev *changed the balance of influence* within intraparty debates. Gorbachev talked a lot and was often criticised for being too loquacious. But he was also a good listener. Since he himself was interested in ideas, and quick to assimilate information, he was influenced by those whose careers he had advanced. What does this amount to? It means that the assertion that Gorbachev did what any Soviet leader would have felt compelled to do on coming to power in 1985 is at least as gross a misinterpretation of political reality as the previous four misleading generalizations discussed in this article. That is not just because Gorbachev had a different mindset from those with whom he sat with round the Politburo table at the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s. It is also a point about institutional power. The party general secretaryship was a repository of vast power in the Soviet Union – until Gorbachev changed that structure so fundamentally that he reduced those powers and that authority (and the new office of President he acquired in March 1990 did not replicate them).

Conclusion

I am far from arguing that all that really mattered in the process of ending the Cold War was one individual, Mikhail Gorbachev. On the contrary, the roles of Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, George H.W. Bush, James Baker, Margaret Thatcher and (on the German question) Helmut Kohl were all hugely significant. And even in the Soviet context, the special importance of Gorbachev is at least as much a point about the distribution of power within Soviet institutional structures as it is about Gorbachev's personality and mindset. In the highly centralized Soviet system, the person who stood at the

head of the party bureaucracy, chaired the Politburo, and was the highest representative of the Soviet Union in international relations was the general secretary. Every general secretary made some difference, the nearest exception to that generalization being the colourless Chernenko. A few – Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev – made a vast difference. But it was only Gorbachev, and while he was still general secretary, whose thinking evolved to the point of rejection of Marxist-Leninist ideology, to which all of his predecessors (differences of interpretation notwithstanding) continued to subscribe until the end of their days.

Thus, the transformation of Soviet foreign policy was underpinned by profound ideational change, most eloquently expressed in Gorbachev's December 1988 New York speech at the United Nations. The 'New Thinking' itself evolved rapidly in the second half of the 1980s, encompassing both international policy and domestic politics. Pluralization of the political system was dramatically manifested in the first genuinely contested elections in the history of the USSR, held in March 1989. Systemic change and the new tolerance in Moscow stimulated and facilitated the democratization and independent statehood of the countries of Eastern Europe in the course of 1989. That metamorphosis, in turn, raised expectations among the most disaffected nations within the Soviet Union. The subsequent disintegration of the USSR into fifteen successor states at the end of 1991 was, in large part, an unintended consequence of the ending of the Cold War and of the removal within the Soviet Union of the Communist Party's monopoly of power. Gorbachev actively promoted, especially from 1988 onwards, the new political pluralism, even though it led to a diminution of central state power and, ultimately, of his own powers, while he attempted, through persuasion rather than violent coercion, to preserve a Soviet state.

In that last endeavour he failed, but the collapse of the

USSR occurred two years after the Cold War ended. It remains, therefore, a great mistake to conflate the falling-apart of the Soviet state with the Cold War's ending. The US administration led by Bush the elder, along with America's European allies, was supportive of Gorbachev's attempts to keep as many as possible of the Soviet republics within a democratized, voluntary, and genuinely federal 'renewed Union', as the Soviet leader termed it. The Cold War was over when Europe ceased to be divided into two hostile camps. Its ending was both symbolized and ratified at the harmonious Gorbachev-Bush Malta summit meeting on 2-3 December 1989. Reflecting the optimism of the time, the Soviet press spokesman Gennady Gerasimov announced, "We buried the Cold War at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea".

The evolution of Soviet strategy in Asia, 1969-1991

*Opinions included hereby do not necessarily align with JPI's perspectives.

Abstract

This article explores the evolution of Soviet foreign policy in Asia from the late 1960s to the early 1990s. It argues that, unable to contribute much economically, Moscow had had to rely on its military posture to project power in the region. In the 1960s-70s, the main Soviet preoccupation in Asia was the containment of China. To this end, the Soviet leaders pursued regional alliances with India and Vietnam while seeking to engage the United States and Japan in a broad anti-Chinese front. These efforts had mixed results. While the Soviets made impressive gains with India and Vietnam, Soviet-Japanese relations stalled over Moscow's unwillingness to compromise on the territorial issue, while the US capitalized on the Soviet fears of China in order to play the two Communist countries against one another. Soviet policy began to change in the early 1980s when, in view of the Soviet Union's growing international isolation, Moscow attempted to re-engage with China. The painstaking process of the Sino-Soviet rapprochement led to full normalization by 1989, opening the stage to a closer relationship between the two countries, which continues to the present day. Meanwhile, Mikhail Gorbachev positively responded to South Korea's normalization probes. Even Soviet-Japanese relations, though still stalled over territorial problem, experienced a degree of revival. However, Gorbachev's tendency to de-emphasize military power led to the decline of Moscow's regional influence, which continued through the 1990s. Renewed investment in power projection under Vladimir Putin has brought Russia back to the table in Asia as a generally unloved but respected Asian player.

Introduction

This article reviews Soviet foreign policy towards Asia from 1969 to 1991. For much of the Cold War the focus of Moscow's foreign policy agenda was actually in Europe. This was because the Soviet Union was primarily a European power, and the Soviet leaders regarded themselves as historically and culturally "European." Moscow's relationship with Asia was

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historically that of a European imperialist power, and the legacy of this experience was that the Soviets wanted to shape Asia, perhaps even to lead in Asia, but they certainly did not see themselves as a properly Asian player. They have always been on the outside looking in. Asia's cultural "otherness" was compounded by Soviet security concerns. By the 1960s – as a result of the Sino-Soviet split – China emerged as the most significant threat to the USSR in the East. Dealing with this threat became the key preoccupation of Moscow's Asian policy for much of the period under discussion.

The article shows how Moscow coped with China in the 1970s – early 1980s, including by leveraging its relations with other regional players like India and Vietnam. This policy underwent change in the 1980s, primarily because of the Soviet Union's international isolation and tensions in Soviet-American relations. The article then explores the continuities and change and Gorbachev's approach to Asia, including his overtures to Japan and South Korea. The conclusion outlines how Moscow's Asian policy changed since the collapse of the USSR, and in which ways it stayed in the same.

The 1970s

In March 1969 the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China fought a brief but intense war over their disputed border. Tensions had been building up for years. Beijing and Moscow had spent the better part of the decade trading recriminations: the Chinese accused their erstwhile allies of betraying revolution; the Soviets responded in kind. By the late 1960s, however, these quixotic concerns had been supplanted by apprehensions of a more traditional type: the amassment of forces on both sides of the border, which in short order became the most militarized frontier in the world.

It is difficult to say in retrospect who was more

justified in their fears. The Chinese leadership were certainly not wrong to draw attention to the lamentable Soviet record of overseas adventures. Moscow's August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia jumped readily to mind: could China, too, fall victim to the Soviet habit of imposing their preferred version of socialism by force? But nor were the Soviets unjustified in considering China a major threat. No one in Moscow could make sense of the Cultural Revolution but its "anti-Soviet" character was there for everyone to see. The Soviet Embassy had been under attack by raging mobs. Chairman Mao Zedong had claimed that much of Siberia had been unfairly annexed by the tsars, and that China had still to present a bill for these past sins. The Soviet leaders were keenly aware of their lack of strategic depth in Siberia, where a single railroad, within a striking distance of the border with China, perilously connected sparsely-populated outposts.²

The skirmishes of March 1969 were thus a logical consequence of a deepening security dilemma and the growing mutual mistrust between Moscow and Beijing. But the clash set in train events that would reshape not just foreign policies of China and the Soviet Union but the global political landscape as such.

As the Sino-Soviet conflict escalated, the Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin tried to reach out directly to the Chinese leadership. His call to his Chinese counterpart Zhou Enlai was not put through: the telephone operator turned out to be an ideologically agitated Red Guard but, like the Soviets, the Chinese were very keen on avoiding a large-scale war. Beijing's worrying only increased when in August 1969 the Soviets initiated a border skirmish along the western section of the Sino-Soviet frontier, and then obliquely hinted at a pre-emptive nuclear strike against China.

2. See Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: the Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy*. Stanford University Press, 2009.

No evidence has emerged thus far that would indicate that the senior Soviet leadership seriously considered a pre-emptive strike but there is still much that remains classified and beyond reach. In any event, arrangements were promptly made for a meeting between the two premiers. Kosygin stopped by in Beijing to talk with Zhou Enlai on September 11, 1969. They assured one another that neither side wanted a war. Of course, neither really believed the other. But the exchange paved way for the resumption of Sino-Soviet border talks, which dragged on for years with little effect.

China's fear of the USSR was what drove Beijing to embrace the United States.³ Initial probes in 1969-70 were followed by Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971, which in turn paved way to President Richard Nixon's ground-breaking visit in February 1972. The Soviets had long suspected China might close ranks with the United States but they were still taken aback when it finally happened. The Sino-American rapprochement and continued hostility in Sino-Soviet relations helped reconfigure Moscow's approach to Asia. The Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev redoubled his efforts to deepen relations with China's neighbours, in particular with Vietnam and India, both of which responded positively.

Moscow's relationship with North Vietnam had experienced ups and downs, partly as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split (Hanoi took the Chinese side in the ideological debate of the early 1960s) and partly because of the militant policies pursued by the North Vietnamese leaders towards the South, which irritated the Soviets who hoped to avoid a conflagration in Southeast Asia. But when the conflict escalated – which overlapped with Brezhnev's consolidation of power in the top Soviet ranks – the General Secretary felt duty-bound to offer political, economic, and military support to Hanoi even at the risk of undermining positive tendencies in US-Soviet relations. Relations between North Vietnam and

the Soviet Union slowly warmed, undoubtedly helped by the growing Soviet involvement in the war effort and Hanoi's realization – especially after the failure of the Tet Offensive – that China-inspired militant strategy was simply not delivering.

The growing rapport between Moscow and Hanoi also owed much to the sharp deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The North Vietnamese leaders came to resent what they called Beijing's great power arrogance, and felt ever less inclined to defer to China, especially after America's defeat. Hanoi thus sought reassurances from Moscow, and the Soviets – seeing a strategic opportunity to entrench themselves in Southeast Asia – offered political support and, crucially, economic aid for Vietnam's ambitious plans of socialist development. In 1978 the USSR and Vietnam signed a treaty of alliance, which was effectively directed against China. Hanoi offered naval facilities to the Soviet Union (the old American base in Cam Ranh Bay), enabling Moscow to project power in Southeast Asia in ways it never could before. The Vietnamese, with Moscow's backing, sought to shape the regional order in Indochina, which led them to invade Cambodia to chase out the brutal dictator Pol Pot, who had relied on China's support. China retaliated in February 1979, launching a short but bloody invasion of Vietnam. These developments brought Sino-Soviet relations to new lows.⁴

Soviet relations with India, by contrast, grew ever closer. India had been important to Moscow's strategy in the "third world" since 1955, when Nikita Khrushchev made his maiden voyage to that country. Under Jawaharlal Nehru, India pursued non-alignment but that

3. The best treatment is still Yang Kuisong, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement," *Cold War History*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000): 21-52.

4. Morris, Stephen J. *Why Vietnam invaded Cambodia: Political culture and the causes of war*. Stanford University Press, 1999.

did not preclude procurement of Soviet economic aid (for example, for the construction of a massive Bhilai steel plant). Moscow maintained neutrality in the Sino-Indian dispute in 1959 and (albeit with vacillation) in 1962, which in effect indicated a pro-Indian position, since as China's supposed ally, it should have come out in Beijing's support. In the mid-1960s, the Soviets were involved in mediation efforts between India and Pakistan but when relations between the two severely deteriorated (during the 1971 war), Moscow effectively sided with India. The two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in August 1971, which became an important victory for Soviet foreign policy in South Asia.⁵

The biggest foreign policy concern for the Soviet leadership in the 1970s was how to prevent China and the United States from forming an anti-Soviet coalition. The announcement of Nixon's visit to China led to soul-searching in Moscow and led in short order to an all-out embrace of détente. Brezhnev promptly invited the American President to Moscow, overriding objections from critics that wining and dining Nixon at a time the United States were ferociously bombing North Vietnam was not in line with Marxism-Leninism. The General Secretary did not care. His broader purpose was to reframe the Soviet-American relationship in a way that would allow these two superpowers to manage global affairs without stepping on each other's toes. He also wanted an entente of a kind, directed against China. Neither of these propositions went very far with the Nixon administration but, following the May 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit, there was a brief blossoming of détente. This was much to Mao Zedong's chagrin: the Chinese leader made no secret of his disdain for détente and suspected that it was a Soviet ploy that would help Moscow cope with China.

Détente proved short-lived. Tensions were there from the beginning, for neither the Soviets nor the Americans

were particularly inclined to suspend their geopolitical rivalry. This was particularly evident in the Middle East, where the Soviets suffered a setback when their client, Egypt's Anwar Sadat, betrayed them, turning the United States instead. There was another set-back in Chile, where a potential Soviet client, Salvador Allende was ousted in a coup by the reactionary general Augusto Pinochet. By contrast, in Africa, the Soviets made gains at American and Chinese expense, for example, in Angola, where their client regime (with generous Soviet and Cuban support) prevailed in a brutal struggle against its rivals. Another Soviet client, Ethiopia, triumphed in a brief war against Somalia, helping entrench the Soviets in the Horn of Africa. Soviet adventures in the Third World helped undermine support for détente in the United States. Jimmy Carter, who became President in 1977, had vowed to uphold human rights in US foreign policy, which upset and annoyed the Soviets, since they found themselves on the receiving end of Carter's criticism. Most ominously, the US appeared willing to overlook China's appalling human rights record, and not just normalized relations with Beijing (in January 1979) but brought themselves into a tacit anti-Soviet alliance with the Chinese.

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership reached out to Japan.⁶ Soviet-Japanese relations had languished for years, despite having been normalized in 1956. There were two reasons for their stagnation. First, Japan fully integrated itself into the US security system in Asia, and the US-Japanese alliance was of course directed against Soviet interests in East Asia. Second, Moscow and Tokyo continued to squabble over territory, with the Japanese insisting on the return of four Southern Kurile

5. Mastny, Vojtech. "The Soviet Union's Partnership with India." *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol. 12, No. 3 (2010): 50-90.

6. For an overview, see Brown, James D.J. *Japan, Russia and their territorial dispute: The northern delusion*. Routledge, 2016.

islands as a condition for signing a peace treaty, which the two countries still did not have.

Brezhnev sought to change this situation. He had two considerations on his mind. First, Japan appeared to be on an upward trajectory. An industrial powerhouse, it was playing a bigger and bigger economic role in the Asia Pacific, and so came to figure prominently in the Soviet leader's strategy for developing Siberia. For instance, Brezhnev expected Tokyo to jump on opportunities to invest in the mining of coal and the extraction of oil and gas in the USSR. To help transport these riches out of the depths of Siberia, the Soviet Union would build another railroad, the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), which would have an additional strategic benefit of being much further removed from the Sino-Soviet border than the existing railroad, built in the tsarist times. Brezhnev even believed Japan might contribute to the building of a railroad. The second consideration was of geopolitical character. At a time China loomed large as a security concern, Japan provided a useful counterbalance to Beijing's hostility.

However, the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement – such as it was – stalled over the unresolved territorial dispute. When Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited Moscow in October 1973 for talks with Brezhnev, he found the Soviet leader completely unreceptive to giving up the Southern Kuriles. Part of the problem was Brezhnev's overestimation of just how much the Japanese desired economic opportunities in the USSR. He thought their interest would trump any territorial aspirations. This turned out to be a mistake. To the extent that Tokyo was interested in economic opportunities in the socialist world, China presented much more interesting opportunities. Relations between Japan and China were normalized in 1972, and then in 1978 the two countries concluded the treaty of peace and friendship, which contained the so called anti-hegemonic clause (widely understood to be directed against the USSR).

The 1970s thus brought important breakthroughs for the Soviet standing in Asia – but also certain setbacks. The key gains were Vietnam and India, the former becoming a Soviet client, the latter – a key partner. Both relationships had anti-Chinese connotations, and both provided the Soviets with new opportunities for projecting their power in South and Southeast Asia. But these gains were more than offset by the insecurities arising from the Sino-Soviet conflict. Beijing remained implacably hostile, while growing closeness between the United States and China – especially in the late 1970s, just as détente in East-West relations withered and waned – added to the list of Soviet grievances.

The transition

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 marked a turning point in Soviet foreign policy in general and in Asia in particular. The United States and China both viewed the invasion as indicative of Moscow's grand strategy aimed towards the South, the "warm seas," and the oil reserves of the Middle East. Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski saw Soviet meddling along an arc of crises, extending from the Horn of Africa all the way to Afghanistan. The Chinese came up with another analogy. Deng Xiaoping argued that Moscow pursued a barbell strategy of expansion, with the emphasis on the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the two geostrategic theatres being connected by a bar – the Malacca Straits. Much in these creative interpretations was groundless speculation.

The actual reason for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was considerably more banal but also reflective of Moscow's insecurities. They worried that the Communist leader of Afghanistan and Soviet client Hafizullah Amin would turn the country over to the Americans, betraying them much as Sadat did in Egypt some five years earlier.

So, the Soviets resolved to overthrow Amin and replace him with a more pliable client. The decision was taken by a small group of individuals – KGB head Yuri Andropov, Minister of Defense Dmitrii Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko – and was imposed on ailing Brezhnev, who signed off, perhaps without fully understanding what he was committing himself to. It became clear soon enough that the invasion was a costly mistake.⁷

The United States condemned the occupation and imposed economic sanctions on the USSR. Carter also shelved the nuclear arms control treaty, SALT-2, which he had painstakingly negotiated with Brezhnev (it was never ratified by the US Senate). He successfully prevented US athletes from taking part in the summer 1980 Moscow Olympics. In later years, President Ronald Reagan extended significant support to the anti-Soviet mujahedeen in Afghanistan, much of which was channelled through Pakistan. The Chinese, too, contributed by training and supplying anti-Soviet insurgents.

Reagan's anti-Soviet rhetoric was met with growing apprehension in Moscow. The American President called the USSR an "evil empire," and argued for meeting the Soviet challenge through the build-up of American power. He ramped up anti-Soviet sanctions in the wake of the declaration of the martial law in Poland in December 1981 and tried to sabotage the construction of the gas pipeline from the USSR to Western Europe – actions that did not endear him to the Soviet leadership. The decision to deploy Pershing-2 missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe added to Soviet fears of a pre-emptive nuclear strike, while NATO's Able Archer command and control exercise in November 1983 seemingly put the Soviet leaders on the edge: they may have believed it was a cover for an actual attack on the USSR. The Soviet nervousness was evident also in the tragic decision to shoot down KAL007 when

the South Korean airliner lost its bearing and flew into prohibited Soviet airspace on September 1, 1983. This incident caused significant damage for Soviet-Japanese relations, since many of the civilian victims were Japanese. It goes without saying that it did not benefit Soviet relations with South Korea, which were in any case extremely limited at this time.

Amid deepening Soviet isolation, the Kremlin began to rethink its foreign policy. The process was not straightforward, since policy making, in the absence of strong steering from the General Secretary, was given to entrenched bureaucratic interests. General Secretary Brezhnev was on his last legs in 1982, a shadow of his former self who had pushed for a breakthrough in Soviet-US relations. But it was Brezhnev who in March 1982, during his visit to Tashkent, announced a programme of improving relations with China. It was as yet a very modest programme but it was a start. Moreover, it was noticed in Beijing, where Deng Xiaoping, too, had been pondering the future direction of Chinese foreign policy.⁸

There were several reasons for Deng's decision to reciprocate. For one thing, the general state of Sino-Soviet relations – a drawn-out military stand-off – was out of line with the priorities of the Chinese leader's economic policy. Reform and opening required a peaceful foreign policy environment, Deng believed. In addition, he had revised his earlier prognosis for Soviet expansionism. Now that the Soviet "polar bear"

7. For a recent discussion of the reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan see Tom Blanton and Svetlana Savranskaya (eds.), "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979: Not Trump's Terrorists, Nor Zbig's Warm Water Ports", NSA briefing book 657 (January 29, 2019), <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/afghanistan-russia-programs/2019-01-29/soviet-invasion-afghanistan-1979-not-trumps-terrorists-nor-zbigs-warm-water-ports>.

8. For details see Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries: the Soviet Failure in Asia at the End of the Cold War*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

appeared stuck in the Afghan quagmire (to which China had of course contributed), it no longer appeared quite as threatening as it did some years before. Finally – and this was perhaps the crucial reason – Deng felt that the Sino-American relationship was not delivering what he had expected. The Reagan Administration had attempted to sell advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan, causing frictions with China, while also denying sensitive technologies to Beijing. Although relations stabilized by the fall of 1982 – no small thanks to Vice President George H.W. Bush’s skilful diplomacy – the Chinese leader decided that he would henceforth try to maintain a more even-keeled foreign policy. This (partial) reorientation set the stage for Beijing’s reengagement in a dialogue with the Soviets. This dialogue was painful and slow, since Deng set conditions on normalization: the Soviets first had to withdraw from Afghanistan and Mongolia (where they had maintained an army since the late 1960s), de-escalate along the Sino-Soviet frontier, and, oddly enough, apply pressure on Vietnam to pull back from Cambodia. In any case, by the time Mikhail Gorbachev took the reins of power in March 1985, the process of Sino-Soviet normalization was already well underway.

Gorbachev

Mikhail Gorbachev inherited a country that suffered from international isolation, that was engaged in protracted counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, that suffered from unsustainable commitments to support far-flung clients in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and that still officially adhered to a revolutionary ideology that few in Moscow took seriously. Gorbachev set out to transform this grim environment, and Asia played a key role in his vision of a new and better world. The early emphasis of Gorbachev’s approach to Asia lay with India. He developed a

comradely relationship with India’s Prime Minister, the dynamic Rajiv Gandhi. In November 1986 Gorbachev and Gandhi signed the Delhi Declaration on a nuclear-free and non-violent world. It was a part of Gorbachev’s broader initiative to rid the world of nuclear weapons by year 2000, which had a certain propagandistic element and reflected the Kremlin’s aspiration to recapture moral leadership from the United States. Gorbachev also attempted to develop economic relations with India, though he was much less successful here. The two economies were not particularly complimentary. By late 1986 – early 1987 the Indian dimension of his foreign policy was beginning to fade against the backdrop of a growing engagement between Moscow and Washington.

Meanwhile, Gorbachev made an important overture to China in his Vladivostok speech of July 1986, which became something of a turning point for Moscow’s Asia policy. By then Sino-Soviet relations had already mellowed considerably from their deep freeze of the early 1980s. There were regular visits and consultations, some at a relatively high-level. For example, in December 1985 Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Li Peng met with Gorbachev in Moscow, telling him that while China was in favour of improving relations, it would never again become a “younger brother” to the USSR.⁹ To Gorbachev’s credit, he responded that the Soviet Union had no such plans. One must in fact credit Gorbachev with precisely this: his willingness to dismantle the mental framework of subordination, which the Soviet Union had imposed on its clients and allies. Within this framework, China was seen as having erred, and had to renounce its sins before being welcomed back under the protective Soviet wing. Gorbachev entertained no such illusions.

Another reason for improving Sino-Soviet relations

9. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

was Gorbachev's positive signalling on the "three obstacles". Early into his tenure, the General Secretary decided that the war in Afghanistan was a "bleeding wound" and had to end. It took a while to leave Afghanistan (the Soviets did not completely withdraw until February 1989), in part because Gorbachev worried about the loss of credibility from abandoning a client to its fate. But even partial, phased withdrawal, helped alleviate Chinese concerns – as did the partial Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia. The Vietnam "obstacle" was not so easily resolved, since the Soviets justly objected to being required to pressure a third country into doing something for the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. But eventually progress materialized on this front as well. With the exception of Afghanistan, the obstacles were not yet overcome when in May 1989 Gorbachev visited China to preside, together with Deng Xiaoping, over the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, in Deng's words, "to close the past and open the future."

When Gorbachev visited China, the country was in the grip of student unrest. The crackdown that was subsequently unleashed by the Chinese government against the pro-democracy protesters led to a sharp deterioration in relations between China and the West. Gorbachev, although personally horrified by the bloodshed, did not resort to sanctions and in fact saw in China's isolation an opportunity for furthering Sino-Soviet rapprochement while bringing India into the triangle as an important third player. This strategic outlook was in many ways a precursor of subsequent Russian advocacy of the multipolar world order, and it constitutes an important element of Gorbachev's legacy. Indeed, rapid improvement of Sino-Russian relations in the 1990s (despite China's dissatisfaction with political reform that led to the Soviet downfall) was in itself a mere continuation of policies pursued by Gorbachev in the late 1980s.

If the Sino-Soviet rapprochement became a success

story, Moscow's relations with Japan did not advance very far on Gorbachev's watch – or since. Tokyo was slow to recognize changes in the pattern of Soviet behaviour and firmly insisted on the "inseparability of politics and economics," which was the euphemism for Soviet territorial concessions as a precondition for improvement of relations, including in the economic field. Gorbachev – much like Brezhnev in his time – was very interested in the economic side of the relationship but seemed unwilling to make the required political concessions. It was not until 1989 that the dialogue between Moscow and Tokyo began in earnest. Still, Gorbachev seemed much more interested in ending the Cold War than with satisfying Japan's territorial pretensions.

Interestingly, even as he was desperate to secure external credits to keep the struggling Soviet economy afloat, Gorbachev refused to countenance exchanging territory for Japanese cash. In the spring of 1991, he rebuffed an effort by the LDP politician Ozawa Ichiro to iron out a deal that would see the disputed islands transferred to Japan for approximately \$26 billion.¹⁰ His April 1991 visit to Tokyo and meetings with Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki also proved futile. At the time, many of Gorbachev's own advisors were in favour of territorial concessions to the Japanese. It is not clear, however, that surrendering these islands would have necessarily produced a dramatically different outcome for Soviet-Japanese relations than what was achieved simply through the intensification of the bilateral dialogue. There were important reasons for the lack of Japanese economic interest in Siberia and the Far East – under Brezhnev, in the 1970s, much as under Gorbachev, in the 1980s (and these still remain in place

10. Radchenko, Sergey, and Lisbeth Tarlow. "Gorbachev, Ozawa, and the Failed Back-Channel Negotiations of 1989–1990." *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2013): 104-130.

today). These include political uncertainties, an opaque regulatory and taxation framework, and logistical difficulties. This is not to say that there was no progress in the relationship. Although the peace treaty was not signed, there was a substantial growth of economic and political ties, as well as people-to-people exchange.

Modest improvements in Soviet-Japanese relations contrasted sharply with a real breakthrough for Moscow's relationship with South Korea. The initiative for rapprochement came from Seoul. The Soviets had long recognized South Korea's growing economic importance, but they were constrained by their relationship with Pyongyang, which began to improve in the mid-1980s after more than a decade of relative estrangement. Gorbachev had even promised to the North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung not to ever recognize South Korea – a promise that flew in the face of the supposedly pragmatic de-ideologized foreign policy that he purported to pursue. Kim did not trust these promises, however. He was particularly perturbed by the Soviet intention to participate in the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul.

Kim had a good reason to be worried. We now know from the documentary record that it was during the Games in South Korea that first channels were established that would lead in under two years to a meeting between Gorbachev and the South Korean President Roh Tae-woo. The two met in San Francisco in May 1990, at which point the Soviets moved rapidly to recognize South Korea. In April 1991 – just when Gorbachev visited Japan for what turned out to be an unproductive attempt to break the deadlock in Soviet-Japanese relations – he also stopped by South Korea, meeting with Roh Tae-woo on the island of Jeju, where he obtained a promise of significant financial aid from South Korea for the struggling Soviet economy. The relationship with South Korea developed rapidly thereafter, very much at the expense of Soviet standing

with Pyongyang.

Kim Il Sung was predictably outraged by what he perceived as Gorbachev breaking his promise not to recognize South Korea. When Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Pyongyang to inform Kim of the Soviet decision to establish diplomatic relations with Seoul, Kim refused to receive him. Shevardnadze was, however, read out a litany of North Korean complaints draped in defiant rhetoric of resisting imperialist ploys. Shevardnadze was also told that now that the Soviet Union was abandoning North Korea, Pyongyang would seek to obtain the nuclear deterrent (in all fairness, however, it has covertly pursued nuclear research for many years). The Soviet Union's collapse at the end of 1991 further undermined Moscow's relations with Pyongyang, both because Russia – itself in desperate economic straits – had no interest of subsidizing a difficult client as the Soviet Union had done, and because the new Russian leadership pursued an ostensibly pro-Western policy, in which North Korea simply did not fit.

Conclusion

Surveying Soviet foreign policy in Asia between 1969 and 1991, one cannot help but notice considerable continuities. One defining continuity is of a geo-economic character. The Soviet Union found itself in Asia but not of it. Because its key industrial and population centers were (and remain) closer to Europe than the Asia Pacific, the USSR found itself largely on the side-lines of the great economic transformation of Northeast Asia. It struggled to develop Siberia and the Far East and looked to foreign investors – mainly the Japanese but later also the South Koreans – for help with what remains a daunting task. Moscow's Asian policy had always been constrained by the hard reality that the only thing that made the Soviet

Union a great power in Asia was (indeed, remains) its military power. Throughout this period, it was present in the region mainly as a threat that had to be addressed or contained. It is little wonder, then, that when the USSR under Gorbachev sought to lessen regional tensions (which included mainly reducing Moscow's own military posture in Northeast Asia), it was rapidly reduced to irrelevance. The 1990s saw Russia's once mighty Navy rust away in grim docks, even as Russia opened its border to East Asian trade, resulting in an influx of cheap clothes from China and used cars from Japan. In recent years, Russia has upgraded its war-fighting capabilities in the region, playing the one card it knows how to play: military power.

There is, however, an important discontinuity – the role of China's in Moscow's Asian policy. At the outset of the period under discussion, China was the main threat to Soviet interests, and most other aspects of the Kremlin's approach to the region were tailored to cope with this threat. Moscow built up its relationship with India and its alliance with Vietnam in large part to counter China, and although Brezhnev's effort to mend fences with Japan had important economic underpinnings, there was also a strategic rationale, directed against Beijing. What the Soviets were not willing to do was to apply the same logic to South Korea (for fear of Kim Il Sung's reaction) or to Taiwan (even though there was a secret back channel between the Soviet leaders and Taipei). This policy of containment of China (for lack of a better word) began to change only in the early 1980s, largely due to the failure of détente and Moscow's own growing international isolation. With Ronald Reagan raining vitriol and threatening new sanctions to punish Moscow for Afghanistan and Poland, the Chinese did not seem so bad after all, especially that Mao was long dead, and Deng Xiaoping appeared interesting in lessening tensions with the USSR so that he would exercise greater leverage vis-à-vis Washington and pursue economic reform at home.

This important shift in Sino-Soviet relations in the mid- to late-1980s (which owed much to Gorbachev's new outlook) produced a wholly new situation by the mid-1990s. Russia, under Yeltsin's leadership, cashed in on the benefit of Sino-Soviet normalization to develop close, even comradely relations with the People's Republic.¹¹ This was despite Boris Yeltsin's embrace of the West early in his presidency. Of course, tensions in Russian-Western relations, such as were occasioned by the West's criticism of the war in Chechnya, neo-imperialist rhetoric in Moscow, and NATO's enlargement to the East, helped propel the Russians and the Chinese towards an entente, which was only developed and strengthened by Vladimir Putin in recent years. China and Russia did not become allies. They agree to disagree on a range of issues (and there are also subtle tensions between the two over Central Asia) but by and large they learned the lesson of the 1960s-70s: it does not serve the interests of their two countries to quarrel. Further to political entente, China has become Russia's key trading partner, importing oil and gas from Siberia, and thus frustrating Western hopes of using trade leverage to extract political concessions from Moscow on the account of its human rights violations, the annexation of Crimea, or the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

The upswing in Soviet relations with China was not matched by similar progress in Soviet-Japanese relations. The key reason was Moscow's refusal to countenance territorial concessions to the Japanese, and Tokyo's resolve to secure the return of the four islands before the peace treaty is signed. This situation persists to this day but the chances of Japan ever obtaining the so called "northern territories" remain as slim as ever. It was easier for Brezhnev to make such concessions

11. Wishnick, Elizabeth. *Mending fences: The evolution of Moscow's China policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin*. University of Washington Press, 2014.

to Tanaka if he wanted to, for he was completely in charge. But Gorbachev already had to keep an eye out for the nationalist sentiment at home. Ozawa Ichiro's misadventures in Moscow (when he angered Gorbachev by trying to broker an explicit islands-for-cash deal) point both to pressures the Soviet leader faced domestically, and his acute sensitivity to any hint of a "sell-out". The same was true of the Presidency of Boris Yeltsin. Although on one occasion (during his November 1997 summit with the Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro), Yeltsin came very close to giving away the islands, in the end he did not. The reason for this was the likely nationalist backlash produced in Russia by such a move, something that Yeltsin (even his mental and physical health declined in the late 1990s) knew only all too well. Nor was any progress achieved under Presidents Putin and Medvedev, for exactly the same reason.

However, Tokyo practically abandoned the policy of non-separability of politics and economics. Soviet-Japanese economic relations developed significantly from the late 1980s, and the current state of these relations make Japan one of Russia's key trading partners in Asia - without, it might be added, any progress whatsoever on the territorial issue. Indeed, it is doubtful that the situation would much improve if the peace treaty were signed tomorrow, simply because economic ties have their logic and do not always depend only on the political climate. In other words, Russia may well have done well not to have made the crucial concessions when it was desperately in need of Japanese cash (as in the late 1980s - early 1990s). It is far from clear what it could have or would have gained. Now that China has become a serious menace to Japan, the feeling in Moscow is that it is rather in Tokyo's interest to move on the question of the peace treaty. Russia's strategic position is in this regard far, far better than it what it had been in the late 1960s.

Finally, after abandoning North Korea to its fate in the

1990s, Moscow reengaged with Pyongyang in the early 2000s. There is little it can offer to the North Koreans, and its political leverage is limited. Its economic relationship with the broken state is certainly not even close to what Moscow currently enjoys with South Korea. Nevertheless, the Russians managed to stay relevant, and their standing with Pyongyang, such as it is, is better than at almost any time since the 1960s. In the 1970s the North Koreans leaned more on China than on the USSR, frustrating Soviet efforts to enlist them in the general anti-Chinese front. In the mid- to late-1980s, the relationship briefly blossomed only to fall apart as Gorbachev pursued normalization with South Korea. But since Putin's ascent to power Moscow has tried to maintain a more even-keeled position on the peninsula, and the North Koreans, grateful for any political support they have from their northern neighbour, have not done anything to derail the relationship.

Overall, then, Russia's position in Asia remains better today than at any point in the 1970s. Not only has Moscow managed to stay relevant despite its economic insignificance in the broader picture of Northeast Asian economic development, but it has also leveraged its ties with China and India, its relatively problem-free relationship with North and its constructive partnership with South Korea, and its intransigent but generally courteous ties with Japan to assert its influence and defend its interests. It remains a player in Northeast Asian politics, and this in itself is an impressive result for a country that is still trotting uneasily in its horse-drawn cart along the super-highway of Asia's 21st century.

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Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity and the Long Peace of East Asia: What Lessons Can They Offer to the World?

Abstract

This paper starts with the realisation that East Asia, since 1980, has been successful in preventing fatalities of organized violence compared to other regions, and compared to its performance three decades before 1980. The paper proceeds by establishing the recipes for the long peace of East Asia: non-interference, and developmental definition of state's purposes. Once there is clarity of the East Asian recipe for peace, this paper moves to the contribution of the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity and similar forums to the East Asian strategy for peace. There the conclusion is that Forums like the JFPP can offer support to several of the elements of the East Asian peace formula. Finally, the paper will investigate whether the East Asian and Jeju recipes for peace and prosperity could offer global prescriptions. Again, the conclusion is clear. The world could learn from East Asia and Jeju: some of the recipes that Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity supports, can be found useful also to the entire world.

Introduction

Jeju, an Island of World Peace, is the location of six major Summit meetings on world affairs. Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity (JFPP) is an East Asian peace forum organised since 2001 by the Jeju Peace Institute, Jeju province, and the Foreign Ministry of South Korea on the Island of Jeju, South Korea. This forum respects East Asian traditions of peace-making and contributes to them.

This paper will first argue that since 1980 the East Asian tradition of prevention of conflict violence has been very successful. This argument will be based on statistics of conflict, and battle deaths in conflict, and success in this paper is defined as an ability to keep fatalities of conflict per population low. East Asia, since 1980, has been successful in this respect compared to

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In addition to purely academic work Professor Kivimäki has been a frequent consultant to the Finnish, Danish, Dutch, Russian, Malaysian, Indonesian and Swedish governments, as well as to several UN and EU organizations on conflict and terrorism.

Kivimäki's recent articles on peace and conflict topics were published in the *Chinese Journal of International Relations*, *Pacific Focus*, *the Pacific Review*, *Social Sciences*, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, *Asian Security* and *Middle East Policy*. In his new books *Protecting the Global Civilian from Violence: UN discourses and practices in fragile states* (London, Routledge 2021) and *Failure to Protect. The Path to and Consequences of Humanitarian Interventionism* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) Professor Kivimäki revealed new patterns in contemporary warfare and made sense of them by looking at political discourses and cases of unilateral humanitarian intervention and UN peacekeeping. His conclusions on unilateral pattern of humanitarian intervention are damning: humanitarian interventions contribute to the increase in the number of fatalities among civilians and to the weakening of state capacity to contain violence. At the same time UN peacekeeping is much more successful.

other regions, and compared to its performance three decades before 1980.

Furthermore, the paper will look at what kind of fatalities of conflict East Asia has managed to reduce. Such analysis reveals that East Asian success has mainly been based on the ability to avoid conflict escalation. East Asia has not generally been very successful at avoiding conflict onset or managing conflict termination: it is the ability to avoid the spreading and deepening of conflicts that the success of East Asian peace strategy is based on. Given this discovery, the explanation of the East Asian strategy of peace must be altered from one that is narrowly based on the obsession to develop to a much broader concept. In addition to developmental obsession that has reduced the regions willingness to fight wars, East Asian strategy of peace is also based on self-restraint with regards to interference in disputes outside country's own borders. Furthermore, it is based on a willingness to change the world in cooperation with others rather than by seeing problems as challenges posed by rogue countries and groups, and by confronting militarily such actors of world politics. East Asia does not aim at progress through military victories over rogue actors, but rather through mutual self-restraint.

Once there is clarity of the East Asian recipe for peace, this paper moves to the contribution of the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity and similar forums to the East Asian strategy for peace. There the conclusion is that Forums like the JFPP can offer support to several of the elements of the East Asian peace formula.

Finally, the paper will investigate whether the East Asian recipes for peace and prosperity could offer global prescriptions. Again, the conclusion is clear. The world could learn from East Asia and Jeju: some of the recipes that Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity supports, can be found useful also to the entire world.

Has East Asia been Successful in the Prevention of Organized Violence?

East Asia, defined as ASEAN countries, Korea, Mongolia, Japan and China, represent about 31% of world's population. During the first post-World War decades from 1946 to 1979, it produced 75-82% of world's conflict fatalities depending on which battle deaths data version one chooses. I will call this period the East Asian belligerent era. During the decades, since 1980, it has only produced 3-7% of world's fatalities of conflict². I will therefore call this time East Asian peaceful era or the long peace of East Asia. The average annual number of fatalities of conflict in East Asia during the peaceful era compared to the belligerent era, is just 5%. Thus, 95% of fatalities of conflict have disappeared! Tønnesson, Bjarnegård, Kreutz and others have specified this by pointing to the fact that peace has emerged in steps, first in Japan, then in Korea, then in ASEAN and finally also in China and Indochina. After the 1980s interstate conflicts and wars (conflicts with more than 1000 annual fatalities) have disappeared almost altogether (Bjarnegård and Kreutz 2017; Tønnesson 2009; Weissmann 2011).

But the long peace of East Asia is not just an exceptional transformation of a belligerent region into a peaceful one. East Asia today (after 1979) is also an exception if we compare it to other regions. If we look at all organised violence,³ we

2. These calculations are based on low, high and best estimates of the PRIO battle deaths data 2.0 and 3.0 (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009; Laciina and Gleditsch 2005). The use of Uppsala and PRIO data for the overlapping years (1989-2008) produce very different results specifically in East Asia (Kivimäki 2014, 40). Consequently, this article does not combine the two data sources in the study of the period before and after 1979. Calculated from UCDP data (Pettersson and Öberg 2020) we can see that the share of East Asian fatalities of all organised violence in 1989-2019 is 3.0% (the subregion East Asia has been added to the data by the author of this paper).

3. Organised violence here includes, in addition to conflicts, also fatal, organised violence against civilians, i.e. one-sided violence, and violence that the state does not get involved in, i.e. non-state violence.

can see that the world average number of fatalities per population in all the years between 1989 and 2019 has been more than 23 times higher than in East Asia.⁴ In fact, if we compare East Asia to Americas, to the rest of Asia, Europe, Africa or any other region, there is not another region that produces as small a number of fatalities of organised violence per population. Thus, we can conclude that the East Asian formula for peace has been successful.

East Asian recipe for peace: developmentalism and military non-interference

Many scholars have suggested that at the core of the recipe for East Asian peace is the region's willingness to develop economically rather than focusing on territorial or ideological ambitions (Bjarnegård and Kreutz 2017; Tønnesson 2009). I have also shown with my own calculations that a developmentalist interpretation of the role of the state does explain part of the long peace of East Asia (Kivimäki 2014, chap. 5; Kivimäki and Kivimäki 2011): regimes that did not define the promotion of prosperity as a task of the state experienced more than 300 times as many fatalities of conflict as countries with regimes focused on development as the main task of the state (Kivimäki 2014, 101). If East Asian states construct the role of the state as an instrument of economic human security of citizens, this makes conflicts less attractive. Furthermore, trade and development are common interests that East Asian states can focus on, and by focusing on things that unite rather than things that divide East Asia has managed to avoid over-emphasizing divisions and conflict (Djiwandono 1994).⁵

The East Asian focus on economic human security has also meant that the idea of responsibility to protect

has not become a vehicle for the legitimization of military interventions. Instead, the East Asian developmentalist attitude pushes the focus away from confrontational regime changes and military interventions. When there are humanitarian issues that are related to poor political administration, East Asian countries are mostly inclined to help host governments of such problems create more efficient governance. The several humanitarian crises of North Korea and the South Korean constructive rather than confrontative approach to them offer excellent examples of the East Asian developmentalist approach to human security. The lack of militarized focus on political rights in other countries has not reduced the development of democracy in East Asia: on the contrary, since 1980 autocratic violence has been reduced more in East Asia than elsewhere (Kivimäki 2010a).

However, the East Asian experience of conflict does not suggest that we should emphasise developmentalism as the main explanation of the long peace of East Asia despite the fact that this has been the main conclusion by many scholars (See for example Tønnesson 2009; Bjarnegård and Kreutz 2017). A closer look at the conflict problem in East Asia reveals that East Asia has not really improved its ability to avoid conflict onset very much. Rather it has managed to avoid the escalation of conflicts. If we use PRIO-Uppsala data (Gleditsch et al.

4. (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=#>), UNDP's Human development data (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/download-data>), Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions data (<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi>) and data on US and other great power interventions from Kivimäki, Timo. Coding of US Presidential Discourse on Protection. University of Bath Research Data Archive, 2019. doi:10.15125/BATH-00535.

5. While Djiwandono described this approach as traditional to ASEAN in the 1990s, the consistency of this approach can be demonstrated by the fact that the China-ASEAN meeting of June 2021 was still described in the media as follows: "During the ASEAN-China meeting, both sides largely downplayed their differences, including over the South China Sea disputes. Instead, they emphasized areas of common concern and cooperation" (Heydarian 2021)

2002; Pettersson and Öberg 2020) on conflict and war episodes and we sophisticate the geographic specification of conflicts by adding the East Asian subregion into the data, and if we also add a temporal distinction between years 1946-1979 and 1980-2019,⁶ we can cross-tabulate small conflicts (with 25-999 annual battle deaths) and wars (with 1000- battle deaths) and pre-1980 years and post-1979 years of East Asian violence. Looking at all conflicts the number has only been reduced by 15% (from 338 to 286), while the number of small conflicts has increased! It may be possible that only bigger conflicts affect economic growth, but then the experience of inter-Korean trade seems to suggest that tension already reduces trade, investment and economic growth. One does not need a major war for that. Thus, it seems unlikely that developmentalism is the main explanation to the long peace of East Asia. The main explanation to the transition from belligerent era to the long peace of East Asia must be related to something that East Asian states do once there already is some disagreement and violence.

If we look at how East Asia differs from other regions, after the beginning of the long peace of East Asia, we will see the same pattern as in the difference between belligerent and peaceful era's in East Asia. East Asia has as many wars as Europe and only slightly less than in Americas, but many more small conflicts (because it also has many more people). While elsewhere the number of small conflicts is 3-4 times that of wars, in East Asia it is 13 times. Clearly, East Asia is special in its ability to avoid conflict escalation.

To reveal the formula of the long peace of East Asia, we will then need to find an explanation to the decline in conflict escalation. If we look at the documents that preceded the great change in East Asia at the end of the 1970s, we can see one doctrinal change that could be related to the drastic drop in conflict fatalities and conflict escalation in East Asia. Of the six fundamental principles

of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation three first emphasise the respect of military non-interference, sovereignty and territorial integrity (ASEAN Secretariat 1976). This document became the foundation of a broader East Asian cooperation in the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN Regional Forum cooperation.

A similar message can be found in the Chinese conversion into the ideology of the long peace of East Asia: Deng Xiaoping rejected the subversive Chinese intrusion into the internal affairs of other countries, the exportation of communist insurgency and the ideological interventionism in his definition of the position of the new China in 1978 (Deng 1978). Deng also emphasised the importance of facilitating economic development as the main function of the state (Deng 1982), but for the question of conflict escalation the Chinese ending of ideology-based interference in disputes and conflicts of other countries may have been a more important contribution to peace in East Asia. Restraint with regards to interfering into disputes outside country's borders seems like a plausible explanation for the fact that conflicts do not spread and become more deadly.

My previous research has shown that since 1946, intra-state wars that have been intervened by outsiders have contributed to two thirds of conflict fatalities in East Asia. Conflicts with external intervention tend to be 3-9 times more intensive than conflicts without such external escalation (measured as fatalities per year). Furthermore, a huge majority of fatalities (up to 98%) of conflict in those conflicts that outsiders, mainly great powers, have intervened, have occurred only after the entry of great powers (Kivimäki 2014, 117-20). Thus, it seems logical that the East Asian rejection of and self-restraint with

6 .It would be more accurate to compare average annual numbers of fatalities, but since the two periods are almost equally long, and since we are mainly looking at relative developments, there is no reason to complicate the discussion by introducing annual figures.

regards to external involvement in the intrastate disputes and conflicts must be a big part of the explanation of sudden drop of conflict fatalities in the region.

This does not, however, necessarily mean that all external interference is detrimental for peace. US deterrence, for example, has often been seen as a pillar of peace in East Asia (George and Smoke 1974; Kang et al. 2017). Military involvement is always an indicator of failure of deterrence, and thus, it could be possible that great power interference in domestic disputes and conflicts is detrimental only when deterrence fails, and punishments must be implemented.

However, if we look at how allies of great powers fare in East Asia in comparison to neutral countries and enemies of alliances, we can see that deterrence cannot be part of the recipe that explains the long peace of East Asia. It is clear that the general unwillingness in East Asia to accept foreign bases, foreign drone-based surveillance and counter-terrorism, etc, means that military deterrence by foreigners has declined in the period of relative peace in East Asia. The new commitment to non-interference, and the reluctance to accept external forces in internal disputes is temporarily associated with the decline of fatalities. Yet, an even stronger evidence can be found in the track record of deterrence in the post-Cold War history of East Asia.

If we look at the impact of the rise of US deterrence after the formal new American commitment to the region decided upon in the US ambassadorial conference in Bangkok in 1950, one cannot see an improvement in the security of the region. About half of the nations experienced more, and half less conflict annually, on average. The East Asian average (as well as the Japanese, Mongolian averages) remained the same during the Cold War and before it after the WWII. If we look at battle deaths, only Malaysia and China were better off during the Cold War US leadership than before it. Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, The Philippines, Thailand,

Vietnam, and Korea lost on average more people in Cold War conflicts than before the rise of US leadership. What is striking is that it was mainly the allies of the US whose conflict fatalities increased most once the US took leadership of East Asian affairs in 1950 (Kivimäki 2010b).

After the ending of Cold War, the US had less interest in deterring undesired developments in East Asia. Yet, except for Cambodia and the Philippines, all East Asian countries had fewer conflicts and battle deaths after the end of the Cold War than before it. The beginning of the War on Terror in 2001 increased the US interest in the region and created some systematic effect on the level of US deterrence. Yet, in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, the number of conflicts and the number of casualties increased slightly, while no effect could be detected elsewhere. The countries whose conflict intensified were the ones where the US used its deterrence most, as conflicts with radical Islamist movements were exactly the focus of US security strategy.

Thus, it seems that the key to security in East Asian is in Asian, rather than American hands, and thus regional processes like the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, can potentially be very influential if they manage to tackle the main challenges to security in the area.

East Asian recipe for peace-making: face-saving and endless multi-track dialogue

Peace-making does not only indicate the ability to end conflicts, but it also gives a hint of the culture that leads to and escalates conflicts. Victory, for example, can be an incentive to further conflicts while the need to protect might be a justification for the defeating of perpetrators of violence or atrocity criminals. If again, conflicts end in formal processes, rather than in informal interaction and self-restraint of conflicting parties, this may

constitute a culture where conflicting parties do not see benefits in informal dialogue, and as a result, there may have a different path to peace or escalation of conflicts than countries with more informal path.

Comparing East Asia after 1979 with other regions and with itself before 1980, reveals three patterns of the long peace of East Asia. First, East Asian conflicts do not seem to end in military victories, especially not into revolutionary victories (Svensson 2011; Kivimäki 2011). Partly this may be related to the rejection of foreign influence that could tilt the balance of power to the advance of one of the conflicting parties, to allow a victory. This may also reveal something about East Asian framing of conflicts: conflicts are not about perpetrators that need to be defeated, but rather they are about disagreements, misunderstandings and policies that emphasise divisive issues too much and disregard uniting common interests. The East Asian approach to peace and conflict is relational, it is not one in which the enemy as an agent is seen as the main problem.

Secondly, conflicts in East Asia are not terminated with peace negotiations (Svensson 2011; Kivimäki 2011). There are only two conflicts, one on the conflict in East Timor, and the other in Aceh, that were ended in peace negotiations. Elsewhere negotiations either did not result in the ending of hostilities, or hostilities were ended already before formal negotiation.

Thirdly, rather than formal processes, in the peaceful East Asia, conflicts tend to end in informal dialogue and mutual decisions based on self-restraint. The two last elements of East Asia peace-making clearly suggest that instead of explicitly negotiating about differences, avoidance of conflict escalation in East Asia is based on informal, quiet dialogue, emphasis on things that unite, and self-restraint.

The percentage of victories dropped from 35.6% to 18.8% when moving from the belligerent to peaceful era. East Asia is also less focused on military victory than the

rest of the world. Furthermore, conflicts do not tend to end in rebel victories in East Asia as often as they used to, or as often as elsewhere in the world. The latter unique characteristic of East Asian peace-making is related to the new prudence and restraint against the support of anti-government conflicting parties in another country. While this used to be rather common in East Asia still in the 1960s and 1970s, it is possible to see from the Uppsala/PRIO conflict statistics that this has not happened a single time in East Asia after 1979 (Kivimäki 2011).

While the Western security paradigm is often focused on sorting out who is right and who is wrong, who is the good guy and who is the bad guy, many East Asian cultures are more hesitant to seek solutions that constitute defeat and loss of face for anyone. Instead, many East Asian cultures are more interested in finding stable solutions that save everyone's face and help everybody to feel victorious (Anwar 1994, 42; Djiwandono 1994). While the Western way to human security and interpretation of the Responsibility to Protect consensus is to identify the perpetrators of atrocity crimes and punish them,⁷ East Asia emphasises self-restraint, and tries to cooperate for human security. As a result, the Western media is often puzzled by the unwillingness of East Asian and ASEAN meetings even to name the perpetrators. The ASEAN meeting of June 2021, for example, was commented in the following manner: "While calling for "self-restraint in the conduct of activities" and urging claimant states to "avoid actions that could complicate or escalate the situation," ASEAN once again demurred from directly criticizing or even naming China." (Heydarian 2021)

7. It is common in the Western literature to treat the idea of Responsibility to Protect as a principle that demands reaction to atrocity crimes, even though that concept of atrocity crime was not even mentioned in the summit outcome document that records the global consensus on R2P.

A more confrontational way can be found in the Wars in Korea and Vietnam during the belligerent era. There security was not offered by peace but by victory of capitalism over communism. According to instructions by the office of the US Secretary of Defense, officers should tell the soldiers that “if the Communists were successful, you would become the slave, body and soul, of as cruel a band of individuals as ever ranged the earth.” (Office of Secretary of Defense 1950) Thus, security based on compromise with the enemy was not an option. Peace had to be achieved through victory. This must be one of the reasons why East Asia used to be belligerent, while currently it is peaceful.

Perhaps even more astonishing than the decline of victories, is the decline of formal peace negotiation in East Asian conflict termination. After 1979, only two of the 48 conflict terminations ended with the help of formal peace negotiation. This constitutes a decline from 14.6% of East Asian conflict terminations to 4.2%. Even the two peace negotiations were not as formal as they normally are. The two negotiations were the East Timor process, where Professor Peter Wallensteen's team was asked to facilitate a hybrid formal/informal effort, and the Aceh Peace Talks, where President Martti Ahtisaari mediated with a group of unofficial academics and businessmen facilitating the process of pre-negotiation and creation of contacts of negotiation (Kingsbury 2006; Merikallio 2005). These negotiations never claimed exclusivity and they were based on the idea of “nothing is accepted until everything is accepted”. This meant that the negotiation process as such was almost entirely informal until the signing of the final agreement.

Instead of formal peace negotiation, conflicts tend to end after informal contacts and independent decisions by each conflicting parties to end hostilities (informal dialogue and self-restraint). While informal, personalistic dialogue has been typical for East Asia, this was not typical for the termination of conflicts that

great powers participated in. Most colonial wars as well as the Vietnam and Korean Wars were terminated in very formal settings.⁸ The share of informal conflict termination which can only be observed as cessation of hostilities (in absence of ceasefires, peace agreements or negotiations) has increased by 18.2 percent points of all conflict terminations from the belligerent to the peaceful era. The large share of informal conflict terminations is an anomaly also in comparison with other regions. The share of informal conflict terminations has increased in most regions of the world, but East Asian share is still much higher than anywhere else.

In most cases of conflict termination, one cannot link any official activity to the process. Rather interaction between conflicting parties and stakeholders take place between academics, media personnel and officials in their private capacity. Instead of allowing these meetings any official capacity or decision-making power, most often the format of East Asian informal peace-making is that after unofficial dialogue, conflicting parties make their individual decisions that echo the consensus arrived at in informal, person-to-person dialogue based on individual ties and friendship.

For academic organizations the facilitation of meetings that officials can use for testing their ideas safely without committing their government or losing their face, is a matter of prestige. Academics with influence and official contacts are often considered more successful in the East Asian academia. At the same time, several East Asian countries consider it legitimate for politicians and officials to get their promotions on the basis of meritocratic virtues. Participation in academic events is therefore attractive

8. Even in absence of a peace agreement, Korea is at de facto peace. The formality of the ceasefire negotiations was clearly a deviation from the Southeast Asian, and current East Asian informality of conflict termination.

to them. Furthermore, yielding to the concepts and ideas arrived at in regional expert meetings is to the meritocratic credit of the entire government. As a result, East Asian unofficial peace dialogue proceeds through the unofficial path to the “fizzling out” of conflicts. The fact that such a way of conflict termination also reflects most East Asian political cultures better than the “best practices” of conflict terminations of those conflicts in which too much authorship was with outside powers, makes the East Asian conflict terminations more sustainable: conflicting parties made their decisions on peace themselves and thus, there is no need to challenge a peace they feel ownership of.

How does the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity contribute to the East Asian peace formula?

It is not possible to measure how much the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity (JFPP) contributes to the East Asian strategy for peace. Yet, on the basis of the identification of the elements that the East Asian strategy consists of, it is possible to investigate how activity like the JFPP supports these different elements.

Already the name of the forum reveals a framing in which human security is not only threatened by war but also by poverty. Peace and prosperity go hand in hand in the East Asian and Jeju peace strategy, and this framing contributes to the East Asian strategy of peace: developmentalism is one of the core framings that make conflicts less attractive.

Secondly, the JFPP practices also sediment a framing that supports non-interference. Discussions are polite and cooperative, rather than adversarial, and regional scholars tend to focus mostly on the definition of their own country’s approaches in their own country’s problems. In this sense the debate does not encourage

interventionism. On the contrary, the respect for sovereignty of each country seems to be an unwritten pre-agreement of argumentation in the forum. Thus, it would be possible to say that JFPP is in line with the East Asian approach to peace.

However, it is the East Asian and global approaches to peace-making and conflict termination that mainly reveal the full JFPP “complicity” in the long peace of East Asia.⁹ The Jeju Forum is linked to the East Asian strategy for peace in its contribution to a specific kind of communication. As a forum the JFPP represents a service to the increased communication between formal and informal peace actors, in the public sector, private sector, academia and governments. In addition to linking various sectors of peace promoting action, the forum also contributes to communication between former and current leaders, and thus, to bring in a longer perspective to peace promotion. The Jeju dialogue also links official and unofficial national decision-makers crucial to peace, with international governmental organizations on a platform that in its unofficial nature promotes freedom of innovation and the development of confidence.

The Jeju Forum clearly demonstrates the culture of face saving and avoidance of harsh divisions. For governments touching sensitive issues and recognizing other conflicting parties may be problematic, and thus informal meetings, often in context of semi-scholarly meetings like the JFPP, are a more flexible option. Behind the JFPP are a research institute and two public entities: the province and the Foreign Ministry. This is typical of the East Asian unofficial peace path. Simultaneous individual decisions to cease hostilities by all conflicting parties are then seemingly independent and they fail to create observable official processes.

9. Quantitative evidence on conflict termination in this article is based on the UCDP data from 1946-2014 (Kreutz 2010).

Thus, it seems that conflicts simply fizzle out as Isak Svensson describes (Svensson 2011).

The East Asian and Jeju strategy of conflict termination does not aim at victory of one side. Instead, it focuses on dialogue between conflicting parties aiming at face saving solutions that leave no-one with an embarrassing defeat. Informal discussions like the ones in Jeju offer ways to help test opinions and consensus and bring ideas into the discussion in a way that does not commit official parties into positions that they will then have to retract from in an embarrassing manner. East Asian dialogues rarely define other side's positions and interests, as for example, the solutions that impose regime change or "good governance" on others. Solutions that such dialogue reaches are then often more genuinely locally owned and, thus, more durable than solutions that one party imposes on others after a victorious battle.

The Jeju Peace Forum has not been optimally successful in this kind of facilitation of dialogue as it has not managed to foster exchange of ideas between conflicting parties such as the two Koreas. To be more useful for the deepening of the long peace of East Asia, it should find ways of inviting North Korean academics and officials in their personal capacity to help facilitate face-saving dialogue.

Lessons to the world

The focus on prosperity as part of the peace strategy can be seen useful also globally. Firstly, a focus that looks at human security and the responsibility to protect people merely or primarily as a political issue, or an issue of prevention of atrocity crimes, is problematic. This is because of the fact that prosperity seems to protect people better than punishment of atrocity criminals. Human security is much more severely threatened by poverty than violence. Less than 100,000 people are

killed by all types of organized violence in the world annually (Calculated from the UCDP data, Pettersson and Öberg 2020), while a greater number of children die every week from poverty-related problems (calculated from Unicef 2019). Clearly, there is more work on poverty-related human security problems than problems related to violence by dictators and terrorists. Thus, there are global lessons from East Asian developmentalism and Jeju focus on prosperity.

Development focus is also globally useful in the prevention of fatalities of organised violence. The UN saves more than 30,000 lives more in its peacekeeping operations (counted together) during years when the development discourse is more prominent than average, compared to years when it is less prominent than average.¹⁰ Here, development discourse's utility for UN success in saving lives excludes the focus on lives saved directly by actual development effort, as the focus here is only on the reduction of fatalities of direct violence. When focused on development the UN operations save a vast number of lives also by reducing the number of fatalities of poverty, disease, hunger, child mortality, mortality at birth, etc.

The world could also learn from the East Asian and Jeju hesitance towards military interventionism. If we focus on the post-Cold War period, we can see that what East Asia has experienced can be perceived globally. The only difference is that there has not been a global hesitance towards external intervention as there has been in East Asia.¹¹ External intervention by great powers is

10. This is calculated by assuming that fatalities of organized violence would continue as they were before UN intervention and then by comparing the effect of UN intervention in years when UNSC debate emphasizes developmental issues to those years it does not. The data is from (Kivimäki 2021a).

11. In the analysis of the effects of intervention in intrastate violence in this paper is based on a data merger and treatment in (Kivimäki 2021b), in which data the source for fatalities of organised violence is from the UCDP Georeferenced Events data (Pettersson and Öberg 2020; Sundberg and Melander 2013).

associated with 5.4 times greater number of fatalities per population, and 5.5 times higher if the intervention is conducted by the US.¹²

If we then look at the change in the number of fatalities per population from one year to the next, we can see that on average intervention predicts an increase of fatalities by 45 times. In this investigation US intervention seems to be less detrimental for the development of fatalities of organized violence. Yet also US intervention predicts an 18 times greater increase in conflict fatalities compared to a situation where US has not intervened.¹³ Thus, it is clear that intervention into internal disputes and conflicts massively escalates conflicts, and thus, to create a long peace of the world, we should learn from East Asia.

The world could also learn from the East Asian and JFPP ideas of face-saving. In Western-dominated scholarship East Asian hesitance to focus mainly on things that divide, is often seen as unwillingness to face realities. This may be the reason why it has been so difficult for the Western scholars to understand why East Asia has not been ready to choose between China and the US in the recent escalation of tension between the two great powers. Peace in Western political discourse is a product of victory rather than compromise. All enemies of Western military operations are dictators or terrorists that one can only in very exceptional circumstances negotiate compromises with. This even though many of the most ruthless atrocity criminals that Western military operations have fought against are former allies whose rise to power some or most Western states have assisted (Al Qaeda, Vladimir Putin, Saddam Hussein, Khalifa Haftar, etc.). Due to the idea of tight association between peace and our terms of peace in the Western security discourse, conflict termination is often seen as imposition of solutions (often from outside the group of conflicting parties). Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, for example, emphasises in his

political memoirs about the need not just to pacify the situation and facilitate negotiation between conflicting parties. The task of peacemakers is to introduce a solution to the political problem and if necessary, to use military power to “sell” the solution (Blair 2010, chap. 8). To enable the imposition of a solution, the enemy must be defeated, and often also embarrassed. In the case of Libya in 2011, the opponent, head of state Muammar Gaddafi was already willing to concede and accept a non-political position of a titular leader of the same type as the queen in the UK, and yet, great powers felt there was a need to humiliate Gaddafi, and deny a face saving option from him (Samuel 2011).

In Syria, hundreds of thousands of fatalities of organised violence ago, there was a process of removing President Bashar al Assad from power in a process that offered face saving for Assad, and there are strong indications that this plan was accepted by the president himself. Yet, according to the author of such dignified exit, the plan was rejected by the Western permanent members of the UN Security Council, who did not want to hear about anything “dignified” in relation to the atrocity criminal of Syria (Ahtisaari 2015; Borger and Inzaurrealde 2015). As a result, Syria became the deadliest conflict in the post-cold war era, while the dictator is still in power.

Again, the East Asian recipe of avoiding imposition of

12. Lagging intervention and lagging fatalities and then correlating the two shows that both the number of fatalities predicts intervention, but also that intervention predicts increased numbers of fatalities per population.

13. While the impact measured this way seems great, it is not systematic in a correlational sense. US intervention and intervention by any great power has a negligible positive correlation with the year-to-year change in conflict fatalities. Yet, because we are not looking at a sample, but all cases, it is legitimate to present averages of changes. This is all the evidence of the track record of interventions (all of the post-cold war interventions by great powers, UK, US, France and Russia, are somehow justified by references to protection), and thus it is legitimate to present how interventions have failed to prevent the loss of lives.

solutions and the aversion of humiliating military defeats and victories can be a global lesson, too. If we look at the strategy of UN peacekeeping and compare it with the strategies of unilateral great power interventions, we can see that the UN approach is closer to the one in East Asia: UN conflict intervention intends to do exactly what Tony Blair suggested one should not settle for. It aims at freezing the conflict in order to facilitate dialogue between conflicting parties. At the same time, most unilateral interventions have defined the “atrocious criminals” in advance and then simply aimed at defeating them.

If we then look at the development of fatalities of organized violence during and after intervention and compare it to the situation before the intervention, we can see that unilateral operations almost always fail to reduce these fatalities while UN operations that do not aim at victorious conflict termination, tend to reduce fatalities. Only one of UN’s 35 latest peacekeeping operations that were not eclipsed by unilateral operations (Rwanda operation in 1993-1996) has left the conflict with more fatalities of organised violence during and after the operation compared to the situation before the operation. Such failure, however, has been characteristic to most unilateral protective operations of the US, UK, France and Russia (Kivimäki 2021c).

Furthermore, if we look at the East Asian approach of focusing on self-restraint more than changing the behaviour of others, we have some global evidence of the virtues of the East Asian approach. In a study focused on US presidential discourse and conflict fatalities, it was possible to conclude that fatalities increased when the US president framed protection as something where one needs to prevent actions of a perpetrator of atrocious crimes, whereas the opposite effect followed when the situation was framed in a way that did not identify someone else whose action needed to be changed for the sake of protection. Whenever the focus was on exercising

power to influence others, US tended to fail to protect more often than when the focus was on doing something oneself or when the approach focused on mutual self-restraint (Kivimäki 2019, chap. 8). Again, the East Asian formula of conflict termination has some useful lessons for the rest of the world.

Conclusions and discussions about the future of JFPP and the long peace of East Asia

East Asia has been very successful at avoiding conflict escalation. The Jeju Process represents and supports many framings and approaches crucial for the successful East Asian strategy to avoid conflict escalation. The JFPP has already made significant contribution in the facilitation of track two diplomacy, as well as in the facilitation of the interplay between different tracks of peace diplomacy. Regional security, according to the experiences of the past, is primarily in the hands of East Asians, and thus initiatives like the Jeju Process have potential for contributing to the security of East Asians.

The world is moving towards the escalation of tension and proxy wars in areas where the Western world is at odds with Russia and China. The approach of the West, but also Russia and China, has been to blame the opponent and frame the conflict as something that can only be ended if the other conflicting party can be defeated or reformed. This is clearly not the East Asian way of conflict de-escalation. Unsurprisingly, no progress has been made to avoid escalating tension and global war. There is a need for dialogue that strictly focuses on issues that could emphasize the common interests of great powers, and that could aim at cooperation and joint action to build on the common interests that unite great powers. For those who oppose cooperative approaches due to their disapproval of the

behaviour of the opponent, we need to remind that even the reform of the other party is easier in absence of an immediate external threat to it. Stalin as the war ruler was the most violent of Soviet leaders. He justified his human rights violations with reference to the external threat. The great reform that ended communism in the Soviet Union did not take place under maximum external pressure either. Soviet Union could find space for improvement only once such external pressure had ended and Gorbachov and Bush Sr. were negotiating major agreements of de-escalation. Thus, to avoid great power war, but also to end Chinese/Russian autocracy or American imperialism (whichever one perceives as real), we need a cooperative, East Asian approach to world politics. Thus, there could be a calling for a new, more globally oriented Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity; one that utilizes the East Asian concept of peace into dialogue initiatives that focus on and aim at global peace and prosperity.

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