Jeju Peace Institute

CHUNG Jae-Won (Professor, Kookmin University)Currently facing tension against the West following the Ukrainian crisis, Russia is taking an anti-US/anti-West stance on the surface under state leadership, but there is a need to focus on its behavior to become an active actor in the liberal market economy under liberal democracy as opposed to standing in its opposition. In summary, Russia clearly recognizes that it cannot reject the current (neo-) liberal international political economic order in order to prevail past the interference of core Western countries, amidst limitations in terms of Russia’s position and role within the global capitalist system. As a country that is unable to lead the global capitalist system, Russia cannot reject the (neo-)liberal order and transition into policy directions such as isolationism or nationalism, even if such changes are state-led, if it wishes to engage in development efforts for its Far East and Siberian regions or grow into a Eurasian great power that connects the Asia-Pacific region to Europe. In addition, although Russia appears to strengthen its anti-West stance and implement an Asia-centric policy, such as the establishment of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East amid tensions with the West, reinforcement of its alliance with China, diversification of its oil and gas exports to non-Western regions, and participation in various international organizations such as the Eurasian Economic and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, such efforts do not constitute a fundamental paradigm shift. Therefore, Russia may use its geopolitical uniqueness as an instrument, moving against (neo-)liberalism in relation to the West while seeking cooperation under principles of (neo-)liberalism with Asian countries including Korea.Furthermore, since Russia may also actively establish cooperative partnerships with Western state capital depending on its developmental needs, Russia’s brand of liberalism may appear as though it is pursuing two contradictory policies depending on the geopolitical and geoeconomic situation facing Russia and Eurasia. In conclusion, it seems clear that large-scale development projects in the Eurasian region are likely to a capital flow toward the real economy as opposed to the financial economy, and although countries in this region are lacking in terms of progressive discourses for development and growth, Korea must nonetheless pursue a differentiated strategy with a progressive and harmonious independent approach.AuthorCHUNG Jae-Won (Professor, Kookmin University)

SHIN Jung-wha (Associate Professor, Dongseo University)Under the influence of the reorganized East Asian order in 2010s, the relations between Park Geun-hye government and the Japanese Cabinet of Shinzo Abe have worsened over the history issues and their China policies. The pattern of the security and economic cooperation evading the historical disputes since the normalization of ties with Japan in 1965 has broken down. The conflicts between Korea and Japan over history have subsided with the U.S.-brokered agreement on comfort women on Dec. 28, 2015. However, during the negotiations on the accord, anti-Japanese and anti-Korean sentiments were rekindled in Korea and Japan, with their perceptions of the comfort women issue still remaining wide apart. Yet more pertinent is the difference in their treatment of China that has emerged as a super power. South Korea, as a middle power, regarded the rise of China more as an opportunity for its economy and security than as a threat, and implemented hedging policy toward China. However, Japan perceived China as a threat and tried to check the rise of China with its self-help and balancing policies while asking Korea for cooperation on its China policy. The different postures of the two countries toward China have weakened their cooperation on economic and security affairs. If South Korea needs Japanese cooperation for its national interests, it has to cope with the hedging dilemma of maintaining the strategic partnership with China amid its alliance with the U.S. and its security cooperation with Japan and the U.S. When South Korea succeeds in doing so, it could win support from Japan to denuclearize the peninsula and achieve peace.AuthorSHIN Jung-wha (Associate Professor, Dongseo University)

KIM Jin Ho (Professor, Dankook University)The cause of new disputes in Northeast Asia lies in the success of the Chinese policy of reform and door-opening and the Communist Party’s resultant stronger grip on power and greater influence on politics (typified by Communist Party-based centralism), economy (reform and door-opening policies), military (with modernization of its military), society (Chinese type of socialist society) and culture (spiritual civilization befitting the Chinese socialist system). The campaign of the authoritarian government to build up national power is based on stronger leadership of the Chinese Communist government led by Xi Jinping. Therefore, the Communist government led by the “leadership core” (Communist party, military and political leader) is expected to maintain the One Belt, One Road Initiative under the vision of Chinese dream (中國夢) for a longer term. Given the fact that the Chinese leadership actually preferred the strict unified order of the School of Law (法家) in political and military affairs to the traditional Confucian ideology which used to govern social, administrative, educational and family systems, it should never be overlooked that the Communist Party exerts far greater influence than any other social organizations over Chinese politics. This paper will investigate the international affairs of Northeast Asia in the perspective of South Korea, examine the Korea-China relations and foresee the changes in the bilateral ties. It is also aimed at exploring the fundamental tasks lying ahead of the Korea-China relations and seeking the solutions by identifying the points of dispute between academic groups and scholars of the two countries. For instance, it is one of the purposes of this paper to answer questions such as why the Korea-Chinese ties matter, what elements affect the Korea-U.S. and Korea-China ties, and how do the inter-Korean relations influence the ROK-U.S. and Korea-China ties. The structural contradiction in the Korea-China ties can be attributed to the historical changes in the ties of the two countries, their divergent purposes and responses to the hegemonic rivalry of the world powers in the region. This paper seeks to find the root cause of the conflicts and the kind of efforts the involved parties have to make to reconcile the intrinsically problematic issues and improve their relations. In its conclusion, this paper stresses the unique characteristics of the inter-Korean and ROK-U.S. ties, as the realities of the international politics as well as the domestic politics of South Korea tend to underscore the importance of the security alliance between ROK-U.S. The alliance constitutes the basics of South Korean diplomacy with the U.S. and China.AuthorKIM Jin Ho (Professor, Dankook University)

YI Seong-Woo (Chair of Conflict Resolution Program, Jeju Peace Institute)The inauguration of the conservative Trump administration has raised both expectations and concerns that it would establish an East Asia policy different from that of the Obama administration and even from the conventional policies of the Republican Party. Amid the anticipation of a fundamental change in the foreign policies of the U.S., the basic line of the Trump administration is seen as based on its judgement that the Obama administration failed to safeguard U.S. interests and check the rise of China. The Trump administration also hinted at strong measures to secure both its security and economic interests in East Asia. It also indicated adamant posture against the nuclear arms and missile development by North Korea amid its confrontation with China. The aggressive posture to resort to military response to the nuclear threats of the North amid the shift from neo-isolationism to U.S.-first policy posed a major threat to the Korean peninsula during the early days of the Trump presidency. At the same time, the U.S. demanded renegotiation on Free Trade Agreement with Korea to redress its trade deficits with the East Asian countries. The FTA emerged as a major issue between Korea and the U.S. as the Trump administration pushed aggressively for renegotiation of its terms — the opposition of the American industrial sector notwithstanding — as to boost employment and productivity. The alliance between the two countries is also challenged by many issues, including denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The U.S. implements comprehensive sanctions against North Korea, including secondary boycott, for denuclearization of the North, which requires the cooperation of the Moon Jae-in government of Korea. For its part, Korea needs to regain the wartime operational control of South Korean forces, establish “kill chain,” the Korea air and missile defense system, as well as deploy the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system, and build nuclear-powered submarines to respond to the threats of North Korea. It should also take joints steps with Japan and the U.S. after settling certain pending issues, such as the military information exchange pact with Japan and comfort women.목차YI Seong-Woo (Chair of Conflict Resolution Program, Jeju Peace Institute)

LEE Yong Wook (Professor, Korea University)Since 2013, there has been a pronounced need for cooperation with regard to a financial safety net on both global and regional levels under the leadership of the G20 and the IMF. The policy cooperation for a financial safety net on global and regional dimensions may, paradoxically, weaken the legitimacy and function of financial cooperation in East Asia. From the perspective of East Asia, although policy cooperation with the IMF is a necessity, it may prove to be a double-edged sword depending on its conditions and structure, based on the current status of financial cooperation in East Asia. The negative possibility implied in the metaphor of a double-edged sword is that financial cooperation in East Asia may eventually operate as a mere junior partner to the IMF. Therefore, now more than ever, there is an urgent need for capacity-building with regard to financial cooperation in East Asia. The 2018 ASEAN+3 summit is an opportunity and challenge for Korea’s financial diplomacy. In the coming year, Korea will serve as the joint chair country of the 2018 ASEAN+3 summit, and face an opportunity to lead capacity-building efforts for financial cooperation in East Asia. In particular, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) concluded by the ASEAN+3 in 2010 will be reviewed for the first time to be revised at the 2018 summit, while the 2018 summit will determine the success or failure of financial cooperation in East Asia. In this context, this report presents the following three policy directions for Korea’s financial diplomacy toward a new leap forward for financial cooperation in East Asia. The first is the establishment of “We-Ownership” for financial cooperation in East Asia. The second is the reflexive contextualization of the “moral hazard discourse” that occasionally emerges in the negotiation process, and the reinforcement of trust among member states through the said effort. The last is the discourse diplomacy to share a vision to present financial cooperation in East Asia as a model for financial cooperation in other regions, beyond a means of “systemic survival.”

CHA Taesuh (Research Fellow, Institute of National Interests, CAU)This paper aims to examine the implications of Donald Trump’s presidential election victory with regard to the global political economic system, and the foreign policy direction of the new administration in the United States.To this end, by analyzing the continuity and changes in post-Cold War US grand strategy, this paper reveals that the Trump administration will deploy a new Jacksonian foreign policy that deviates from the existing liberal consensus. Furthermore, this paper predicts the impact of Trump’s foreign policy on Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, and, in conclusion, discusses the historical significance of Trump’s election victory on the future of the liberal world order as well as its implications with regard to Korea’s national strategy.AuthorCHA Taesuh (Research Fellow, Institute of National Interests, CAU)

YI Seong-Woo (Chair of the Conflict Resolution Program, Jeju Peace Institute)In the political circles of the Republic of Korea, the relationship with North Korea has served as a litmus test for one’s ideological tendencies. Meanwhile, in international political theories, the impact of public opinions on a country’s foreign policies has become a controversial topic.This research has applied the classification system used in American academy to Korea’s inter-Korean policies. The American academy have classified the preference of public opinions into four types through the combination of internationalism and isolationism preferences in security and economic matters when it comes to the country’s foreign policies. Applying the model, this paper has classified Koreans’ preferences into four types such as functionalism, sunshine policy, nuclear disarmament first policy, and support for North Korean collapse, according to Koreans’ positive and negative attitudes toward economic and security exchanges and cooperation with North Korea. This study analyzed the survey data compiled for eight years from 2007 to 2014 by Gallup Korea at the request of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. The analysis results indicate that functionalism, which pursues cooperation in the fields of economy and security, stands at 44.47%, the largest proportion among the four options. Meanwhile, from time to time over the eight-year period, support for the nuclear-disarmament-first policy—which advocates cooperation in security matters but isolation in economic fronts—topped the list when North Korean military provocation surged.The multi-year survey results also demonstrate that support for the sunshine policy reached the 85% mark during the Kim Dae-jung administration, whereas more than 76% of Koreans prefer the nuclear-disarmament- first policy during the Park Geun-hye administration. Therefore, this research concluded that the preference of public opinions impacts Korea’s inter-Korean policies less than the change of administrations in the Republic of Korea or the intensity of effects of North Korean military threats on the direction of public opinions.

DOH Jong Yoon (Chair, Regional Integration Program, Jeju Peace Institute)This paper considers the ‘Two Plus Four Agreement’ and draws several implications for the Korean reunification. German reunification was formally completed first by the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990, and then by the ‘Two Plus Four Agreement.’ While the former treaty bears legal significance in that it integrated two different legal systems, the latter is politically meaningful as it finally resolved the ‘German Question’, a legacy of World War II, and consequently ushered in a new era for the European international order. The meaning of the Two Plus Four Agreement can be summarized as follows: first, it served as a means by which the reunification of Germany was internationally approved second, it signified a complete end of the World War II third, it symbolized the total victory of the US over the Soviet fourth, it provided a model for peaceful settlement of conflict where the losing party retired with neither warfare nor surrender and fifth, it provided the basis for the integration of Eastern Europe into Western Europe. This negotiation process has direct implications for Korea and offers hints about what kinds of efforts and external conditions Korean reunification would require.

HWANG Jihwan (Associate Professor, University of Seoul)Alliances and partnerships are two distinct concepts, both in theory and policy. South Korea and the U.S. have been allies since they signed the treaty in 1953, formalizing the bilateral relationship as an alliance. Still, ROK-U.S. relations have been widely perceived as a partnership as well as an alliance. It would be helpful to reconstruct the terms so that they are considered complementary. Particularly in light of China’s recent criticism of the ROK-U.S. alliance as a Cold War relic, it is necessary to transform the alliance into a combination of a comprehensive strategic military alliance and a global partnership. Currently, the alliance is undergoing a transformation, and it is also facing substantive dilemmas over the North Korean nuclear issue and changes in the U.S.-China relationship. While the recent development of the alliance seems aimed at increasing South Korea’s contribution to global issues, the path is riddled with obstacles. Imperative as the globalization of the ROK-U.S. alliance is, it is equally necessary to define its identity to enable a proactive response to the ever-changing security environment. This paper emphasizes the need for concurrent development of the military alliance as well as the partnership. Militarily, the ROK-U.S. alliance should focus on the defense of the Korean peninsula, with a simultaneous effort to globalize the bilateral partnership.

HAN Byung Jin (Assistant Professor, Keimyung University)We are currently witnessing an emerging trend with regard to approach to North Korean politics, which places emphasis on the influence of the so-called symbolic, cognitive elements on actors’ choice, including the redefinition of North Korea as a “theatre state.” The author would like to discuss the operating mechanism of North Korean policies based on human being’s diverse cognitive bias as identified in recent psychological studies. This is part of the effort to explain North Korean politics on a personal level. Combined with political and economic factors, psychological factors contribute to the stabilization of North Korean terror politics and control. This paper focuses on the analysis of psychological factors rather than the description of political and economic situations. A micro-understanding of North Korean politics paves the way for the Republic of Korea to come up with more specific responses to North Korean threats. At the end of this paper, the author would like to present our “asymmetric strategies” designed to attract North Korea to the table of peace and dialogue.