제주평화연구원

  [caption id="" align="alignright" width="149"] Somei KobayashiAssociate Professor of College of Law, Nihon University[/caption] 1. Shaking Okinawans’ Identity on a Small Island The Okinawa Islands are an island chain located southwest of the Japanese mainland which include Okinawa-honto, the largest island, as well as about 160 other small islands. The area is well known as a resort paradise with many tourists visiting it each year from across Japan and other countries as well, particularly South Korea and China. However, Okinawa has also witnessed tragedy. Its people carry with them tragic memories from their experience of battle against the United States in the Second World War. In March 1945, U.S. forces landed in Okinawa and fought the Japanese military, leaving a quarter of the Okinawan population dead by the end in June 1945. Both U.S. forces and Japanese soldiers killed the Okinawan people and, in some cases, Okinawans were forced to kill themselves.   In April 1952, the Treaty of San Francisco was signed, and Japan recovered its independence, but Okinawa remained under U.S. occupation during which the U.S. built many facilities for military use there. The islands were a strategically significant focal point as the so-called Keystone of the Pacific. Though the U.S.-occupied Okinawa was returned to Japan in May 1972, the strategic importance of Okinawa for the U.S. has not changed. More than 70% of U.S. bases in Japan that are exclusively used by U.S. forces are located in Okinawa prefecture. The existence of U.S. military bases threatens the peaceful existence of Okinawans, leading them to request a reduction in the impact on the islands. The Japanese government has also frequently announced its intention to realign, consolidate, and reduce the facilities and areas of U.S. Forces Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, and reducing of the impact of the bases through other measures. Still, no reduction has been forthcoming.   Okinawa was once called Ryukyu, and it was an independent kingdom before its annexation by Japan in 1872. The Okinawans (Ryukyuans) are a peace-loving people who do not seek conflict. Together with this, Okinawans distrust the military, due to their supreme sacrifices in the tremendous violence of the Japanese and the U.S. forces stemming from the annexation of the islands by Japan in 1872 to today. Distrust of both U.S. forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces linger throughout Okinawan society. For this reason, they wish to build peace without resorting to military power. However, a dispute on a small island has shaken this identity.   2. The Dispute over the Military Deployment on Ishigaki Island Ishigaki Island, or Ishigaki-jima, a remote island at the southernmost point of the Okinawa (Ryukyu) Islands Chain, has been divided by a dispute over the deployment of Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces to the island. In 2004, the Japanese government officially put forward the “China Threat Theory” for the first time since the end of the Second World War in 1945. The National Defense Program Guidelines published in fiscal year (FY) 2005 and thereafter, as well as the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005–2009), stated that China, with its naturally major relevance for regional security, is continuing to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its navy and air force. These documents recommended that attention be paid to future action on the part of China.   In 2010, two official documents on Japanese national security policy were released. First, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and beyond set out national defense policy in responding to potential attacks on offshore islands. Though the guidelines did not mention this, the context made it clear that the response target was China. The Self-Defense Forces would respond to attacks on Japan’s offshore islands by quickly deploying mobile units to prevent and reject the (Chinese) invasion, in cooperation with other permanently stationed units. Second, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011–FY2015) announced a policy of enhancing the operational capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces, in particular the ground forces, on remote islands. This document outlined a plan for deploying coastal surveillance units and first-response units with ground-based anti-ship missile launchers.   Following guidelines and programs, the deployment of the Ground Self-Defense Forces to remote islands like Yonaguni-jima, Miyako-jima, and Ishigaki-jima was envisioned. This has only been accelerated by increasing tensions between Japan and China since 2013 over the Senkaku dispute. This would be the first time the Self-Defense Forces stationed in Okinawa would be strengthened since the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. In 2016, a new coast guard unit was established on Yonaguni-jima, and the deployment project of the Ground Self-Defense Forces is currently developing steadily in Miyako-jima.   Although Vice Minister of Defense Kenji Wakamiya turned the decision on whether to deploy Ground Self-Defense Forces over to Yoshitaka Nakayama, the mayor of Ishigaki, in November 2015, Nakayama did not commit himself for two and a half years because the issue was hotly disputed on the island. Opposition groups asserted that the deployment of a military unit with anti-ship missile launchers would increase the risk to life and property in Ishigaki because an enemy might attack the unit with a first strike. Others argued in favor of the deployment, emphasizing the possible benefits, including reinforcing the security of Ishigaki-jima itself against China and the revitalization of the regional economies on the island.   On July 2018, Mayor Nakayama expressed his understanding of the need for deploying the military to the island and allowed the Ministry of Defense to begin actions for deployment. However, the mayor failed to achieve a consensus among the residents in favor of the deployment. In fact, an Ishigaki citizens’ group claimed that the deployment plan should be voted on in a referendum. In January 2019, the group presented a petition to the city council demanding the establishment of local regulations on referenda. The petition was signed by 30% of all voters on the island. In February, the city council rejected the bill on referenda for its inappropriate timing to enable a referendum on the deployment issue. The small island is divided on the issue, and it has shaken the peace-loving identity of Okinawans and their preference not to depend on military power.   3. The Key to Resolving the Global Issue: Ishigaki and Jeju The dispute on Ishigaki-jima has distressed the people of Ishigaki. Some hope for a peace that could evade the presence of the military and could be achieved in cooperation with China. Others assert that the base can help oppose China. There is also discussion over the benefits that could accrue from the deployment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces unit to the local economy of Ishigaki. All opinions have merit. It will be difficult to settle the dispute, so the people of Ishigaki are struggling with the divisions in their community.   However, few Japanese are concerned with the Ishigaki people or Okinawans who are confronting such difficulties. Essentially, both the topic of national security and that of the revitalization of the regional economy are critical problems and must be considered by Japan as a whole, not just Okinawans. As the Jeju naval controversy indicated, the scope of Ishigaki’s issue is not limited to Japan. Instead, it can be found dwelling in many areas, societies, and nations. Thus, this is not a local but a global issue, and it can only be settled through the united effort of will on the part of civilians. The Ishigaki dispute and the Jeju case will provide a key for resolving difficult global issues.   Dr. Somei Kobayashi is an associate professor of College of Law, Nihon University. He received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. in Social Sciences from Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan. He specializes in Korean Studies and International History of East Asia during the Cold War.    

  [caption id="" align="alignright" width="150"] Jung-Yeop Woo Research Fellow/Director of the Center for the American Studies at the Sejong institute[/caption] As I am about to discuss the role of Jeju Island in light of recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, I have to acknowledge, in advance, that my family is from Jeju. My parents still live there. Thus, I have to admit that my sense of scholarly objectivity could be perceived as slightly compromised in this article. Due to the potential bias in my article, I have had to think more carefully about how I could make the case to readers.   We have observed that the year 2018 saw dramatic changes in North Korea’s relationships with its neighbors. Compared to 2017, during which everyone was concerned about the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula, we have had much less tension this year. The inaugurations of President Moon Jae-in and President Donald Trump the year before had laid the foundation for North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to undertake a markedly different approach to North Korean diplomacy in 2018, though it is unclear yet whether we will be able to achieve our desired outcomes. Beginning with the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea, in February 2018, Chairman Kim initiated a string of diplomatic moves that led to multiple inter-Korean summits, one in which President Moon visited the North and the sacred Mount Paekdu, and the first ever U.S.-DPRK summit meeting in Singapore. The second meeting between Chairman Kim and President Trump is scheduled to take place later this month in Vietnam.   The developments that took place during the first half of 2018 led to growing speculation, especially in the media and among politicians in South Korea, that Chairman Kim would visit the South sometime during the latter half of 2018. During the Pyongyang Summit in September 2018, both leaders agreed that Chairman Kim would visit Korea “in the near future.” President Moon emphasized that “in the near future” meant “in 2018” barring unforeseen setbacks. Even though the visit did not materialize in 2018, discussed as a potential destination for Chairman Kim was the southern island of Jeju and a hike up the famous Mount Halla located on the island. There were many reasons behind this idea. Not only does Jeju provide a more convenient location for Kim’s security detail, his mother’s family is known to be from the island. Furthermore, following President Moon’s visit to the sacred Mount Paekdu in September, Mount Halla, for obvious reasons, was considered by many as the logical choice for Chairman Kim’s visit.   The visit to Jeju Island also made sense in other ways. The first is the symbolism associated with the island. In 2005, the South Korean government declared the island of Jeju as the “Island of World Peace.” This is a testament to Jeju islanders’ pursuit of global peace and prosperity. The island is also befitting of a visit by Chairman Kim given that it has meaningfully hosted numerous heads of states from different political systems in the past. For example, it hosted a meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and South Korean President Roh Tae-woo in 1991, signaling the end of the Cold War and the hostile relationship between South Korea and the USSR. In 1996, South Korean President Kim Young-sam met with U.S. President Bill Clinton, followed by a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. Chinese President Jiang Jemin also visited the island.   Another importance of Jeju is that it is home to an array of institutional and civilian mechanisms devoted to the attainment of world peace. The Jeju Peace Institute and its renowned Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, and the Jeju International Peace Center highlight some of these efforts. Jeju Island as a symbol of peace was further cemented when the “National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Events” was established in 2000 to uncover the role that the South Korean government played in the April 3 uprising incident during the Cold War. This truth-seeking committee published a report in 2003 which led to President Roh Moo-hyun’s public apology to the island of Jeju and its inhabitants. Following President Roh’s apology, the island was officially recognized as the “Island of World Peace,” and has served as a symbol of human rights, peace, and prosperity ever since. Given the symbolism, history, and the existence of institutional and civilian mechanisms dedicated to the attainment of peace, it is easy to understand why Jeju can offer much to further improve inter-Korean relations.   In fact, we have already witnessed Jeju’s contributions to inter-Korean relations in the past when, from 1999 and 2010, its famous mandarins were sent to North Korea as part of South Korea’s diplomatic initiative, popularly labeled the “Vitamin C Diplomacy.” Interestingly, following President Moon’s visit in September 2018, North Korea gifted pine mushrooms as a gesture of goodwill. In response, President Moon and the Jeju local government agreed in November to reciprocate the North’s gesture by sending Jeju mandarins to the North. Of course, the role that a local government can play in inter-Korean diplomacy is not without limits. If history is any indication, especially in South Korea, the diplomatic initiative could easily become unintentionally politicized and construed as a political ploy rather than a genuine pursuit of peace and prosperity between the divided Koreas. If so, a gesture of goodwill could quickly turn political, which could pose a problem for the Moon administration in terms of diplomatic continuity. Therefore, the Jeju government as well as institutional mechanisms located on the island, led by the Jeju Peace Institute, should not approach the recent developments as inter-Korean issues per se but rather as the pursuit of broader issues such as peace and human rights. Thus, it is important to consider the potential visit by Chairman Kim as part of the broader theme of Jeju in order to cement its reputation as the permanent island of peace.   Dr. Jung-Yeop Woo is a research fellow and the director of the center for the American Studies at the Sejong Institute. Previously, he was a Research Fellow and the Director of its Washington DC office. He was also a postdoctoral fellow at the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California. His areas of specialty include ROK-US alliance, security on the Korean peninsula, foreign military intervention and the relationship between foreign policy-making and public opinion. His recent publication includes Foreign Intervention in Civil Wars (2017) Korean Voters’ Decision: On the 2012 General Election (in Korean, co-edited with Park Chanwook and Kim Jiyoon). Dr. Woo received his B.A. in business administration from Seoul National University, an M.P.P. from Georgetown University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

  [caption id="" align="alignright" width="150"] PARK Ihn-hwiProfessor, Ewha Womans University[/caption] As President Moon Jae-in took office, the South Korean government began delivering peace messages to North Korea. The 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics enabled South Korea, North Korea, and the United States to hope for the resumption of talks and tackle the Korean Peninsula’s security issues in a fundamental manner. The diplomatic progress between South Korea and North Korea, between the U.S. and North Korea, and between North Korea and China, which continued in the last year, was, in retrospect, a series of unexpected events.   We were able to see that North Korean denuclearization and the Korean Peace Regime were being realized through the three inter-Korean summits, the resumption of North Korea-China summits which were halted for more than six years, and especially the U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore. However, peace does not happen easily. Likewise, inter-Korean relations and the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, which have persistently experienced vicious cycles since the end of the Korean War, will not change overnight.   The South Korean government and the international community came to understand that a more well-defined and definite policy framework is necessary to bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula. In this context, there are two main roles that Jeju Island, which is known as the “Island of World Peace,” can perform.   First, the Moon Jae-in administration is pursuing an active engagement policy toward North Korea for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Although inter-Korean projects made little progress due to the their linkage to progress in the denuclearization of North Korea, it is expected that the Moon administration will seek a more vigorous engagement policy once the U.S. and North Korea narrow their differences on a roadmap toward North Korean denuclearization and accomplish substantial results at the second U.S.-North Korea summit planned for the end of this February. However, it is not just the government that needs to endeavor to implement a positive engagement policy toward North Korea. There should be a division of labor among various actors in diverse fields in our society. And Jeju Island, in this case, can be an important actor to carry out this role.   Jeju is a Special Self-Governing Province which has long been conducting inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges regularly, including tangerine donations to North Korea. When considering a local government’s role in the development of inter-Korean relations, people usually think of Gyeonggi Province or Gangwon Province, which both border North Korea. However, Jeju is the only area that is designated as a “Land of Peace (Island of Peace)” in South Korea, and the Jeju Forum, which is holding its 14th forum this year, has drawn keen attention not only from Koreans but also from world leaders whose interests concern world peace. Establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula can be achieved not only through a single government's efforts but requires cooperation among diverse actors in society in this regard, Jeju can be the most reliable partner.   Second, resolving North Korean issues and establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula are not just a Korea-specific matter. Thus, the role of the U.S., China, and other neighboring countries currently in talks for the Peace Regime should be taken into careful consideration and this well reflects the international characteristics of the problem. As is already known, agendas addressing which countries should be included in, or party to, a declaration ending the Korean War show that the issues related to the Korean Peninsula are deeply connected with world peace.   The reason why Korean Peninsula issues are intertwined with world peace is that settlement of the North Korean conundrum and a Korean Peace Regime will result in structural changes in the Northeast Asian regional security environment. Jeju symbolizes peace in Northeast Asia and also peace in the world, not just peace on the Korean Peninsula. Jeju is the most international area in South Korea and by hosting events such as the Jeju Forum it has become the most frequently visited location in Northeast Asia for world leaders whose interests concern world peace.   Indeed, there are several precedents where Jeju’s international role has contributed to peace on the Korean Peninsula. For example, the Roh Tae-woo administration launched a foreign policy initiative called Nordpolitik to take advantage of the end of the Cold War. As a result, South Korea was able to reestablish diplomatic ties with the former Soviet and China, and Mikhail Gorbachev, the then-General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet and the last President of the Soviet Union, visited Jeju in April 1991. Due to the longstanding friendly relations between the Soviet and North Korea, Gorbachev hesitated to visit Seoul right away. Instead, he chose Jeju as a partner for peace, demonstrating that Jeju can be the most relevant place to deal with peace-related issues not just on the Korean Peninsula, but also in Northeast Asia and the world.   The complete denuclearization of North Korea and building an enduring Korean Peace Regime are not easy tasks. Those goals will not be achieved overnight and there may be obstacles throughout the process. Therefore, North Korean denuclearization and the Korean Peace Regime processes require the wisdom and efforts of the whole nation. Meanwhile, Jeju will sometimes make its own efforts and sometimes cooperate with the government to engage North Korea. Thus, Jeju will play a key role in tackling Northeast Asian and international issues arising from security changes on the Korean Peninsula.   In international politics, there is a term called “convening power.” Convening power enables a convener to an important agenda in the international community, bring interested parties together in an environment that encourages and facilitates the exchange of ideas, and convert this power into an important source of influence in international politics. Jeju possesses this convening power such as through the Jeju Forum and it should be strategically used in the Korean Peace Process.   Furthermore, some key North Korean figures may visit South Korea in the future to discuss the Korean Peace Process. In this case, Jeju can be the best place by providing a favorable ambience for talks and easing any political discomfort. Hopefully, Jeju makes the best out of its symbolic significance and convening power during the Korean Peace Process.   PARK Ihn-hwi is a professor in the Division of International Studies at Ewha Womans University. Prof. Park’s area of expertise includes international security, U.S. foreign policy and Northeast Asian international relations. He received his Ph.D. in international politics from Northwestern University in 1999. Prof. Park can be reached at ihpark@ewha.ac.kr.

  [caption id="" align="alignright" width="150"] Hyun-Wook KimProfessor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy[/caption] Recently, United States Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun visited Pyongyang for working-level talks with his North Korean counterpart Kim Hyok Chol. After returning to Seoul, Biegun announced that the location of the next US-North Korea summit will be Hanoi. The United States made concessions on the location North Korean leader Kim Jong Un reportedly wants to hold a bilateral meeting with the Vietnamese leadership which would be a very important event during his state visit to Hanoi and further burnish his image as the leader of a normal state.   Things are progressing smoothly for the summit between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un. They have already agreed on the dates of the meeting. They aim to specify what they had previously agreed to in Singapore last year. However, the two leaders will need a more detailed agreement this time. Trump needs to achieve a positive outcome from the summit due to the US domestic political situation, which is very critical of him, so he can boast about the positive achievements of the summit and argue that he is doing the right thing in removing the North Korean threat and advancing denuclearization efforts. If the summit can achieve the lifting of sanctions, Kim Jong Un will also be happy given his aim for the summit is to lift sanctions so that he can initiate economic reform measures in North Korea.   Contrary to these expectations, the focal issues do not seem to be evolving smoothly. North Korea now insists that corresponding measures should come from the United States first before North Korea takes denuclearization measures. As North Korea has taken many significant measures already, such as destroying the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and returning the Korean War remains of American servicemen, now it is the United States’ turn to offer some corresponding measures. This North Korean position has been consistent. Even in his most recent New Year’s speech, Kim Jong Un made it clear that it is now up to the US to take significant measures.   The US position, in contrast, has been fluctuating. In the beginning, it maintained the position of ‘denuclearization first, incentives later.’ But that has begun to change. It has recently shifted to accept the North Korean position of ‘simultaneous actions.’ At the end of last year, in order to find a pathway for a dialogue between the US and North Korea, Biegun announced that the US was resuming humanitarian aid to North Korea. This was a significant signal to North Korea that there would be some lifting of sanctions by the US first before North Korea takes significant measures for denuclearization.   The core of the deal between the US and North Korea lies in what the inter-Korean Pyongyang Joint Declaration outlined. In the declaration, North and South Korean leaders stipulated that when there are corresponding US measures, North Korea would destroy and dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facility. It also said that North Korea would dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile launch site under the observation of international experts. But the US position is that there should first be a declaration and verification of the nuclear capabilities of North Korea.   In a January 2019 speech at Stanford University, Biegun made several important points about the denuclearization of North Korea. First, Kim Jong Un made it clear that he would destroy and dismantle plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) sites beyond the Yongbyon facility, though how to do it, including inspections and verification, would be discussed in working-level talks with North Korea. Second, a comprehensive declaration of the entire North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program and missile capabilities should be done. Biegun implied that though this is not an imminent issue, it should be done sometime in the near future. Third, the ultimate objective of the US is removing not only nuclear weapons but also other fissile materials, inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), launchers, and other weapons of mass destruction.   Returning to Biegun’s recent visit to Pyongyang, it seems that the two sides still showed significant differences in their respective stances. North Korea wants to lift sanctions first, and the US might want North Korea to accept inspection and verification of nuclear facilities like Yongbyon. Concerning sanctions, Kim Jong Un mentioned in his New Year’s speech the resumption of operations at the Gaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourist resort. However, normalization of the Gaesong complex is currently in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and it will be difficult for the US to make an exemption.   If the second summit fails to come up with detailed outcomes, it will have negative consequences for both Trump and Kim Jong Un. For Kim Jong Un, failure to lift sanctions would entail domestic economic hardship. Even though he stressed economic development by his people’s own efforts in his New Year’s speech, it would not be easy for Kim Jong Un to assuage the North Korean people’s complaints. Lifting sanctions is an essential requirement for North Korea’s economic reform measures.   For Trump, failure to achieve detailed and substantial measures to denuclearize North Korea would bring him in for harsher criticism of his North Korea policy. Amid Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s ongoing investigation into Trump, he would face an even worse domestic political situation.   As Biegun mentioned in his Stanford speech, the US is ready with a contingency plan involving harsher sanctions and possible military option in case North Korea does not denuclearize. The possibility of this plan remains low, for now. But as the US presidential election draws closer, there is not much time left for the US and North Korea to make a deal on denuclearization.   Hyun-Wook Kim is a Professor at Korea National Diplomatic Academy. He has PhD in political science at Brown University. His research areas include US-ROK Alliance, US-North Korea relations, etc. He can be reached at hwkim08@mofa.go.kr.

  [caption id="" align="alignright" width="148"] Won Hee-ryongProvincial Government of Jeju[/caption] As governor of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, I am delighted to join Jeju’s residents in celebrating the 14th anniversary of the designation of Jeju Island as an “Island of World Peace.” The winds of peace have been blowing across the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia since the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. Three inter-Korean summits and the first ever talks between the leaders of the United States and North Korea were held last year. This year is likely to see a second U.S.-North Korean summit and a return visit by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Seoul. Finally, the two Koreas and the United States are set to eliminate the last remnants of the Cold War and embark on the path of peace and coexistence. However, we have a long, unforeseeable way to go toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a peace regime. It is a daunting task to achieve complete nuclear disarmament, but it is no less difficult to build a peace regime and new order to dissolve the Cold War system. North Korea’s nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to world peace. This is the reason why we need to help the North to disarm itself and join in efforts to establish a permanent peace. For this purpose, inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation are important above all else.   Jeju Province Will Lead Local Governments in Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation. Jeju Province was the first municipality in South Korea to initiate inter-Korean exchanges, starting with its “vitamin C diplomacy” of donating mandarins and carrots to the North. In November, last year, Jeju resumed the mandarin donations, after an eight-year hiatus, in acknowledgement of a gift of pine mushrooms sent by Chairman Kim Jong-un.   Jeju Will Lead the March toward Peace and Coexistence Again. First, in accordance with the changes in inter-Korean relations, Jeju Province will redesign the “five plus one projects,” which have been proposed to the North since 2014, and expand its cooperation into the economic sector on top of humanitarian aid. To make the most of the momentum in inter-Korean exchanges, Jeju will perform its due role by inviting North Korean delegates to the Jeju Forum, international sports events and the Global Geoparks Conference. Second, I hope that the leaders of the two Koreas will reaffirm their determination to peacefully unify the divided peninsula when they visit Mt. Halla on the island, as they did at Mt. Paektu in the North last September. To advance the image of Jeju as an “Island of World Peace”, timed with Kim’s likely visit to Mt. Halla, I will make full preparations to welcome him, along with Jeju residents, to help an atmosphere of inter-Korean reconciliation and peace. The province’s Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Committee will expand its organization to engage in new joint projects with the North as well as implementing inter-Korean projects via the South-North Liaison Office. Third, the province will restructure the Island of World Peace project. It will also fine tune 17 peace-themed projects, including the Jeju Forum, in accordance with developments so that they take more concrete shape. The province will enhance its brand as an island of peace by completing the Jeju Peace Park project, developing tour routes with the theme of peace and producing tour programs jointly with the North. The Jeju Forum is a venue in which political leaders, policymakers and experts from across the world gather together and exchange insightful views on peace in the world and co-prosperity beyond the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The 14th Jeju Forum, to be held in May under the theme of “Asia towards Resilient Peace”, will focus its discussions on how to end continuing conflict and build sustainable peace. The peace initiatives suggested and reviewed at the Forum will be utilized in denuclearizing the North and building world peace.   We will Harness the Global Potential of Jeju Islanders through International Promotion. The Global Congress of Jeju People will be held for the first time in October this year to unite all Jeju natives living across the world to make the most of their capacities to develop the island. The province will assist the Congress in creating opportunities to experience Jeju culture, while upholding the values of peace and human rights. During the Congress, the province will seek to attract tourists drawing on its municipal brand as an environmentally clean island, export Jeju products, invite foreign investment and benchmark outstanding foreign policies. To this end, it will promote further exchanges with United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) and Pacific Rim Park members as well as strengthen cooperation with other organizations on the island.   On the 14th Anniversary of the Island of World Peace, Jeju Will Take a Leap as a New Island of Peace President Moon Jae-in said that “peace is the economy” in his address on the 73rd anniversary of national liberation on August 15 last year. It is one of the missions and tasks of the Island of World Peace to contribute to the prevention, mediation and resolution of disputes and conflict around the world. The peace that Jeju pursues is not only meant to resolve international conflicts but also to achieve a “greater peace” that can expand personal freedom, guarantee social justice, pursue economic prosperity and let nature and humans coexist. Jeju will make continued efforts to realize greater peace on this island to foster harmony between people, between humanity and community, and between people and nature to the ultimate end of establishing peace on the peninsula and in the world. I would like to ask my fellow Jeju residents for their interest and support in these endeavors and join us on the path towards a new peace in the era of the peace-economy.   Thank you.   January 27, 2019 Won Hee-ryong, Governor of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province   Source: http://www.jeju.go.kr/dojisa/talk/speech.htm?page=2&act=view&seq=1168843

  [caption id="" align="alignright" width="170"] Cho Sung-Youn济州国立大学社会学教授[/caption] 对于生活在韩半岛上的南北韩居民而言，2018年的意义非同寻常。因为南北韩领导人在板门店举行了两次南北韩首脑会谈，美国和北韩的领导人也在新加坡举行了首脑会谈。会谈的举行之所以让许多韩国国民皆大欢喜，或是因为美国和北韩的首脑举行会谈开创了历史先河，而且会谈的结果将给韩半岛居民的生活带来翻天覆地的变化。文在寅总统和金正恩委员长对通过“完全无核化”措施实现韩半岛无核化、南北韩关系的改善、年内宣布战争结束、将“停战协定”转变为“和平协定”等议案达成了共识。虽然韩国前任总统金大中和卢武铉也曾与北韩领导举行过首脑会谈，但这次会谈给韩国国民带来的期待不言而喻，韩国国民心中都产生了“时代已变，韩半岛终于迎来新时代”的想法。   韩国国民在过去70年间生活在潜在战争依旧存在的阴影中。北韩和南韩都拥有大规模军队，互相憎恨，互相仇视。独裁国家北韩在过去70年间的统治权一直世袭，而在这70年间，韩国也经历了李承晚、朴正熙、全斗焕体系，一直处于军部独裁政治的体系下。南北韩都将“停战”这一“准战时状态”视为维持政治权利的手段。正因如此，韩国被困在兵营国家(The Garrison State)的框架下，自小习惯于兵营文化。在学校里、公司里，都充斥着军队式文化。从这一点来看，在韩国走向民主主义国家的道路上，兵营国家体系正是最大的绊脚石。   从韩国解放之后直至上世纪80年代末，全世界一直处于冷战状态下。以美国为首的发达资本主义国家将包括苏联在内的社会主义国家定义为“敌国”，并对其进行牵制和攻击，一直保持对立状态。其后苏联和中国的社会主义体系瓦解后，冷战体系也随之消失。然而，韩国却依旧生活在冷战的阴影中，民主化步伐止步不前。保守派将市民们的民主化要求诬陷为“从北（遵从北韩）”行为，并对他们进行镇压，打着“反共”和“国家安全”的幌子维持了政权。韩国社会在“烛光革命”后才打破了僵局，开始消除这一壁垒。这种变化之所能够实现，正是因为文在寅政府得到了韩国国民的无条件支持。   笔者希望，能以南北首脑会谈和北美会谈为契机，南北韩发表“终战宣言”，并走上讨论“和平协定”之路，韩半岛能就此结束战争状态，迎来和平时代。诚然，这条路上必定布满坎坷，也不能一蹴而就。但笔者认为，目前我们终于打开了走上和平时代的“窄门”。我衷心希望今后南北韩能缩小军费规模，加强经济合作，能让全体南北韩离散家属共聚一堂，韩国国民能去随时去平壤或元山游玩。   和平之岛“济州岛”和军事基地   随着冷战结束后南北韩之间形成和解氛围，韩半岛上的战争危险也日益减少，但唯有一个地区——“济州岛”，违背了历史的发展潮流。韩国战争结束后，除了一部分警备兵力以外，并没有其他军队驻扎在济州岛上。由于韩国军队的“主敌（主要敌人）”是北韩人民军，军事基地和军队兵力主要集中在三八线一带。正因如此，相对而言济州岛一直是没有战争威胁的，非常和平的地区。尽管过去韩国兵力主要集中在三八线一带，但韩国军其后却在韩半岛南部设置新的军事基地，最具代表性的地区便是济州岛。   首先行动的是韩国空军。1988年韩国空军发布计划，表示将在济州岛大静县摹瑟浦地区建设空军飞行场。当时韩国空军打算在包括艾尔特(Altteureu)机场地皮在内的197万坪（约6.5平方公里）土地上设置飞行场和相关设施。按照该计划，3个村庄将不得以地被迁走。对此，除该地区居民以外，济州岛的很多市民社会团体都展开了反对运动，飞行场建设计划最终未能成行。   紧随其后的是海军。2001年韩国国防部表示，将在济州岛西归浦安德面和顺港建设海军基地。对此，居民们与市民社会团体携手展开反对运动，海军基地建设案也未能成行。然而，韩国海军在2005年春季发表了规模更大的计划：计划投入8千亿韩元，建设12万坪（约0.4平方公里）规模的基地，安排7500多名海军常驻于此，包括韩国海军特遣舰队的主打战舰“宙斯盾舰(KDX-3)”在内的20多艘舰艇将系泊于此处。从那时起，围绕设置海军基地的争论便从未停止，且长久未得到解决，济州岛民也陷入了正反意见的漩涡中。计划之初，将预计地点定为“和顺港”，但遭到了强烈反对，其后又将预计地点改为“为美港”，最终又变成了江汀浦口。每次海军基地预计地点的更改，都会在相应地区掀起正反意见的激烈争论，导致地区共同体被破坏。在江汀村，围绕海军基地的建设，正反双方之间进行了长达10余年的对峙和矛盾，导致村庄共同体支离破碎，给当地居民留下了无法平复的创伤。   2017年3月，江汀海军基地建设完成还没多久，韩国空军表示将在济州岛设置空军战略基地。可以说，他们终于开始着手推进曾被推迟的计划。韩国空军早在1988年就曾计划在济州岛设置战略空军基地，但当时未能成功推行计划。空军在1997年又将该计划包含在国防中期计划中，但因海军基地建设而被推迟。考虑到当地居民的反对，韩国空军把基地的名字改成“南部探索救助部队”，并表示将从2021年开始着手建设。那他们要在哪里建设基地呢？他们计划将在城山一带兴建的“济州第二机场”作为军民两用飞行场。据悉，虽然该计划还没有被正式公布，但从济州第二机场的计划阶段起，政府的各部门已经对此达成了共识。所以可以说，空军基地进驻济州岛是时间问题。如果济州第二机场成为军民共用的飞行场，10年后，济州岛将会变成设有海军基地和空军基地的，在韩国最为重要的军事地区。那么，济州岛很有可能变成威胁东亚的军事基地，而不再是“和平之岛”。   济州岛民与和平之岛   在南北韩解冻氛围正酣之际，韩国军队建设济州基地的步伐却在稳步推进，继江汀海军基地之后，城山第二机场的空军基地建设也在顺利展开。然而，建设军事基地并未受到济州岛民的欢迎。海军基地在建设过程中遭到了强烈的反对，驻扎在海军基地的士兵及其家属与江汀村居民格格不入。在军事基地相关人员和当地居民之间的矛盾持续不断的情况下，考虑到相互之间的矛盾，驻扎军队的军人子女在入学时，无法选择江汀小学，只能去离得较远的其他学校。这便是大韩民国海军在济州岛的真实写照。   韩国国防部、海军和济州岛当局从未体察当地居民的疾苦，而是选择了无视。海军以妨碍工程进行为由，要求江汀居民和市民社会团体代表赔偿数十亿韩元。如果韩国海军继续持这样的立场和态度，就无法与当地居民进行交流，更无法和谐相处。   济州岛曾在日本统治末期，即亚太战争时期，被卷入日本军的战斗，面临过斩尽杀绝的危机。在摆脱日本的统治后，济州岛民在这片解放空间中又受到了左右翼对峙的影响，导致4.3事件的发生。当时，济州岛民遭到了韩国军队和警察大规模屠杀，大部分人都被打上了“赤色分子”的烙印。牺牲者家属背着“赤色分子”的污名生活，目睹了屠杀的居民也担忧自己也会被诬陷为“赤色分子”，而不得不三缄其口。对济州岛民而言，4.3事件是心灵上无可抚平的伤痕。一直到70年后的现在，这两种经历都在济州岛民的记忆里蒙上一层阴影，并使得济州岛民开始对军队驻扎有可能会带来的战争和大规模屠杀感到恐慌。   韩国前任总统金大中于1997年曾经表示济州岛应成为“和平之岛”。对此，包括济州大学教授在内的知识分子群体提出“和平之岛”指定方案，济州岛当局向中央政府要求将济州指定为“和平之岛”。卢武铉总统则于2005年正式把济州指定为“世界和平之岛”。这如实地反映出，济州岛民想让济州成为“落实韩半岛和平、构建东北亚和平体系之不可或缺的国际交流及和平之地”的意志。从这一点来看，在21世纪济州岛所追求的最大目标是，实现“和平之岛——济州”，即“忘却4.3事件的伤痕，并构建和平的济州”。   韩国政府和济州岛当局并没有意识到，推进海军基地的建设与“和平之岛”政策自相矛盾，还有人表示，在济州岛设置海军基地对济州成为“和平之岛”不会构成任何障碍，甚至还有人发言称，设置海军基地将有助于提振济州岛的经济。在韩国国防部以经济为依据，试图说服济州岛民时，济州岛民并未考虑经济上的得失，而是开始关注让济州岛成为“和平之岛”的具体方案。江汀居民数年来的反对运动，以及市民社会团体，包括天主教界在内的宗教界的反对运动持续不断，这些运动的意义并不止于保护自己的村庄和济州岛，而是逐渐变成了将济州岛发展成“和平之岛”的“和平运动”。笔者认为， 或许我们能够从他们身上看到济州岛和平运动的未来。   韩国海军曾经表示，今年10月将在江汀海军基地举行国际观舰式。他们打算邀请世界30多个国家的海军舰艇到场，举着“济州之海，怀抱世界和平”的口号，上演华丽的庆典。与济州居民互相对立，并试图凌驾于当地居民之上的韩国海军，真的能成为世界和平的主体吗？这反而会给已经受苦10余年的江汀村留下伤痕。江汀居民和济州岛民想问，韩国海军究竟是为了谁而举行观舰式呢？韩国海军，乃至大韩民国的军队能够成为保护济州岛民生命和财产的军队吗？没有得到济州岛民支持而举行的活动能否承诺和平，这着实令人担忧。

  [caption id="" align="alignright" width="170"] Yu Jin-eui济州特别自治道议会议员[/caption] 3月19日，济州地方法院对一位老奶奶进行了证人询问。那位老奶奶姓金，年近九十。在发生4･3事件时，她因涉嫌违反国防警备法，曾经在监狱里服刑。她作为重审申请人出庭并进行陈述，当时她的声音震撼了整个裁判庭。时隔70年，她终于能在重审裁判中，说出了自己恨海难填的人生。正值19岁花样青春的她被警察逮捕，身受严刑拷问后被移送到陆地刑务所服刑。然而，没有任何一家媒体对金奶奶证言中有关“警察”的内容进行过报道。   证言的大致内容如下：一名警察（不清楚是否为干部）意图玷污她的身体，在她言辞拒绝后，便付出了惨痛的代价。她在拘留所遭到严刑拷打，并被移送到了陆地刑务所。法庭的审判官、检察官和辩护人似乎只关注当时是否进行了正式裁判。我们不得不回头思考，韩半岛解放后，济州岛经历了“4･3事件”这一骇人听闻的事件，当年“女性”的处境究竟如何呢？。   作为少数群体(Minority)的女性   尽管“少数群体”会有各种不同的背景，但我们可以将“少数群体”定义为“被主流边缘化的群体”。“少数群体”并不单纯地意味着“人数少的群体”，而是与拥有权力的主流——“多数群体(Majority)”相对的概念，因为发生4･3事件时，济州岛民的人数更多，但也不能将警察和军人视为“少数群体”。那么，何为“少数群体”呢？虽然分类标准各异，也有互相重叠的部分，但通常根据种族、宗教、民族、出生地区、性别、年龄、政治倾向(理念)等来划分。除此之外，还可以根据居住地为本土或岛屿、使用标准语(相当于中国的“普通话”)或方言等因素来划分。综上所述，4･3事件爆发时的“少数群体”为居住在济州岛的所有人，而 “女性” 则是其中的代表性。   女性受害案例   4･3事件并未在战争时期，而是在二战结束后，当时以苏联和美国为中心，全球重构东西冷战体系时，发生在济州岛上的惨剧。尽管如此，“多数群体”却试图消灭济州岛上的“少数群体”。   2003年发布的《济州4･3事件真相调查报告》中指出，在共计14,028名牺牲者中，男性为11,043名(78.7%)，女性为2,985名(21.3%)。这足以证明当时济州岛民的人权曾被肆意践踏。   • 将产妇全裸示众: 警察以丈夫逃跑为由，将怀孕的产妇一丝不挂地挂在朴树上，并用长剑和铁枪杀死的事件。(出自《济州4･3事件真相调查报告》) • 强迫男女性交: 将村民关在仓库里，无情地殴打他们，当时发生的事情惨不忍睹。他们监禁村民，并强迫他们性交，还用火烧女子的要害部位。以至于到了晚上，四处弥漫着腐烂的臭味，让人难以入睡。我绝不认为，他们是神志正常的人。(Hong Gyeong-to证言，出自《济州4･3事件真相调查报告》) • 因为是武装队的家属: Lee Deok-gu（武装队的总负责人） 5岁的儿子Jin-woo和2岁女儿也死了。据居民们转述，当时Jin-woo哭着请求饶命，警察官让他朝爸爸所在的山跑，Jin-woo朝着山那边跑，警察官却在背后扣动了扳机，Jin-woo应声倒地。（《韩民族日报》90.4.6） • 不许儿子入籍：一名姓杨的女子想要的并不多。即使自己留在娘家的户籍下，像个没嫁出去的女人她也不在乎，但她希望自己的儿子和孙子们上到原来的户籍上。她只是想给子孙们入籍。因为他们没有加入户籍，就无法获得自己所持有的宅地和旱田的所有权，过去那么多的财产都落入了毫无关系的人手上。（《济州特别自治道议会4･3白皮书》） • 脱光姑娘的衣衫: 爬上犀牛峰西北侧的陡坡，前往“陡峭洞穴(地名，Monjugial)”的路上，可以看到海边有很大一块儿像鸟喙的岩石。因此，此处得名“鸟喙岩（地名，Saeng-yi-bong-o-ji）”。人们在那儿也发现有一名已经身亡的姑娘，她出身善屹里，被发现时，她全身被剥得精光，实在是惨不忍睹。​   在整个4･3事件期间，类似于上述的残忍事件不断发生。连在战争中被严厉禁止的集体屠杀行为亦是比比皆是。此外，有些人没有经过审判，就被直接移送到陆地刑务所，到目前为止仍然音信杳然。正因如此，我敢断言，4･3事件发生时所有济州人都属于“少数群体”。   经历过4･3事件的济州人一直以来接连不断地要求“查明真相”、“恢复名誉”。在今年迎来4･3事件70周年之际，新政府执政后，承诺将为解决问题而不懈努力。政府必须要恪守承诺，并尽早洗刷历史上少数群体的冤屈。最后，衷心希望韩半岛和东亚乃至全人类的共同价值——“人权”与“和平”能在济州这一重要的发源地起步，并不断发扬光大。

[caption id="" align="alignright" width="151"] 济州特别自治道议会政策咨询委员 Cho Baek-gi[/caption] 时光倒流70年，1948年12月10日，在巴黎举行的联合国大会上，与会各方一致通过了《世界人权宣言》。在更早的1945年，《联合国宪章》中明确提出，人类应对人类历史上最为残酷的两次世界大战和以纳粹大屠杀为代表的战争及屠杀进行反思，并尊重所有人的基本权利。《世界人权宣言》将《联合国宪章》宗旨具体化，被评为人类史上最为美丽的承诺。   当时，联合国由不同经济发展阶段、不同意识形态、不同政治体系、宗教和文化背景的58个成员国组成。成员国组建了“联合国人权委员会”，以促进并鼓励每个人不受种族、性别、语言和宗教歧视，并享受基本人权及自由的尊重。此外，还以地区和文化背景为依据，选定了8个国家，并成立了联合国人权宪章“起草委员会”。代表各个地区的起草委员们耗时两年共进行了1400次投票，最终发表了《人权普遍宣言》。他们在该宣言草案的内容中反映出了不同的文化和包含在全球主要法律体系、宗教及哲学传统里的共同价值。因此，目前在全球范围内，任何人在任何地方都可以得到《人权普遍宣言》的保障。   世界各国代表为通过《世界人权宣言》而展开激烈争论之时，在世界主流的边缘、韩半岛的边缘“济州”却发生了针对岛民的无差别镇压和屠杀。当时，韩半岛已摆脱日本的黑暗统治，并恢复了国家主权，然而，美苏两国军队以北纬38度为分界线，分别驻扎在韩半岛南北两侧，使得韩半岛不得已地处于分裂状态。韩国国内的政治领袖们根据理念分成互相对立的左右两派，美国和苏联也逐渐走向冷战对峙。最终，在解放3年后，根据联合国决议，仅在实际上可以进行投票的韩半岛南侧举行普选，并成立了“大韩民国”政府。在韩半岛北侧也随即成立了名为“朝鲜民主主义人民共和国”的另一个政府，韩半岛的分裂逐渐成为了定局。   然而， 在韩半岛南侧，济州作为唯一拒绝举行普选的地区，付出了极为残酷的代价，即“济州4.3事件”。解放以后，韩半岛在社会经济层面上极为不稳定，人口急速增加、失业率极高、粮食短缺、霍乱流行。除此之外，因美国军政府的“大米收集”政策以失败而告终，使得济州地区的理念分歧和政治混乱最终导致“济州4.3事件”的发生。1947年3月1日在济州举行了“纪念3.1节济州大会”，警察开火导致6人死亡，6人受伤，这成为了“济州4.3事件”的导火索。在整个济州，全岛民参与举行“3.10官民联合总罢工”来表示抗议，要求对负责人进行处罚，并要求防止类似的事件再次发生。对此，美国军政府却动员军队和警察，以非法拘捕、囚禁、暴行、拷问等丧尽天良的方法进行镇压，并采取强制措施，还助长右翼团体“西北青年团”展开恐怖袭击和各种野蛮行径。最终，在1948年4月3日凌晨，济州民众的抵抗之火就此燃烧。   尽管当时联合国在二战战胜国美国和苏联的主导下敦促人类对战争和屠杀进行反思，并为了确保人类的基本权利得到尊重而准备通过《世界人权宣言》这一“国际大宪章”，但在世界的边缘——东亚地区，在美国主导下构建冷战秩序的过程当中，发生了国家暴力导致无数民众惨烈牺牲的悲剧，如济州4.3事件、台湾2.28事件和冲绳事件等。东亚民众的固有尊严、平等、不可转让的权利被“国家”彻底破坏。他们多年来只能忍受残忍的屠杀，侥幸活下来的幸存者在几十年的岁月中只能被迫保持沉默，屏气敛迹。半个世纪后的今天，虽然直接的暴力已结束，但真正意义上的东亚和平与人权保障还未能实现。尽管一部分的真相查明工作已经开始，但“过去”仍然支配着韩半岛和东亚地区，阻碍着东亚地区的和平与共同繁荣。“济州4.3事件”的悲剧并不仅仅是局限在济州地区的问题，台湾和冲绳等东亚其他地区民众的悲剧也不再局限于东亚，已成为全世界人民都要感到伤痛并应致力解决的全球性人权问题。   “叛乱之岛”济州比任何时期都更受关注。目前，悼念“济州4.3事件”的浪潮逐渐扩散到全韩国各地，除济州岛以外，还在首尔光化门广场和全国20个地区设有焚香所，并举行了各种悼念仪式和文化活动。在“济州4.3事件70周年、2018济州访问年”之际，为了与全体韩国国民和全世界人民一起纪念济州4.3事件70周年，济州岛以4.3事件的伤痛作为和解、共赢、和平、人权的未来价值，正在推进4.3事件“悼念凭吊、文化艺术、学术、交流合作、世代传承”5大领域的135项事业。在民间领域，以济州道内69个与4.3事件有关机构组成的“4.3事件70周年纪念事业会”为主导，与全国市民社会团体、文化艺术界、劳动界、学界、女性团体等一同展开4.3事件70周年纪念项目。其宗旨是集中全济州的一切力量，以解决济州4.3事件留下的问题。   在此过程中，为了彻底解决4.3事件相关问题，如查明真相、恢复牺牲者名誉、赔偿及补偿、处罚责任人等，我们必须不遗余力，以防“为了搞活动而搞活动”。查明4.3事件的真相和恢复牺牲者名誉不应该仅仅止于指出错误的事实，而应让每个人从长时间的沉默和恐惧中摆脱出来，亲口说出自己所经历的伤痕与痛苦。我们倾听他们的伤痛并形成共鸣，并通过支持和联合，恢复被蔑视、被鄙视、被践踏的个人尊严和价值，这才是更为根本的、真正意义的治愈，也是名副其实的“查明真相”。   我们能营造出一个《世界人权宣言》曾经承诺的，普遍人权的尊严和权利均能得到尊重的美丽世界吗？70年前通过的《世界人权宣言》是当时的产物，从今天的角度来看，仍留有不少时代局限性。目前，在叙利亚、缅甸等全球各地战争和屠杀仍在相继发生。不仅如此，在日益加剧的贫困及不平等现象面前，人类的尊严和价值却无能为力。尽管如此，我们仍应以乐观的态度深信“历史总是在进步”，为了营造更美好的社会而全力以赴，其一便是学习过去的历史。但这不应该是单纯地列举或介绍历史事实，或是进行概念的死板教育。我们学习过去历史的目的是为了改写现在和未来的历史。   韩国海军对江汀生命之岩实施爆破，破坏江汀村居民的生活根据地和共同体，建设了江汀海军基地。这是国家以另一种形式来破坏自然和人类的暴力行为。抛开济州第2机场建设方案和持续进行的济州岛军事化等目前济州所面临的问题，只关注和解、共赢、和平、人权的价值，只是“金玉其外, 败絮其中”。《世界人权宣言》序言明确承认，“为使人类不致迫不得已铤而走险对暴政和压迫进行反叛，有必要使人权受法治的保护”。济州岛民通过“济州4.3事件”的历史，比任何人都更清楚地领悟到，抵抗和面对那些压迫人类基本自由和尊严的权力和非正义，才是正义之道。像济州4.3事件一样的残酷历史不再出现在济州、韩半岛或是东亚地区，这是当今社会所有成员应肩负的使命。济州4.3事件既是大韩民国的历史，也是世界的历史。

  [caption id="" align="alignright" width="148"] 济州4.3和平财团理事长 Yang Jo-hun[/caption] “济州4.3事件” 致使无数的平民百姓被屠杀，其根源在于韩半岛分裂和冷战结构。韩半岛分裂源于美国和苏联以北纬38度为界，将韩半岛一分为二。日本军解除武装是三八线在国际法上的依据。因此，至1945年末，日本军解除武装后，部署三八线的根据也已随之消失。   尽管如此，第二次世界大战的胜战国——美国和苏联却未撤走军队，并一直将三八线作为美苏两国军队的分界线。直至1947年，围绕战后世界秩序的主导权，两国展开了激烈的“冷战”对峙，韩半岛也随之陷入到了理念对立的泥淖之中。   最终，济州岛民也被卷入其中。1947年3月1日，警察开火事件发生后，济州岛民以“全体罢工”表示抗议，最终遭到了惨烈的镇压。1948年，济州岛民展开支持南北统一的“反分裂运动“，却因此发生了残酷的流血牺牲事件。   1948年5月10日，南韩举行了单独选举。但在此次选举中，只有济州岛因未达指定投票率，而导致投票结果无效。美国军事政府因此受到打击，此后便派遣美军上校，将其任命为济州地区总司令官，为了举行重选而展开了残酷的镇压。然而，6.23重选最终亦以失败而告终。至此， 作为在南韩唯一拒绝进行单独选举的区域，济州岛被载入了史册。 1948年8月李承晚政府年执政后，在美军的支持下，在济州岛中山间地带展开了“焦土化行动”。政府军对平民百姓进行了无情的屠杀，并烧毁了中山间地带95%以上（4万余间）的房屋。包括儿童和老年人在内的无数善良民众在此次行动中牺牲了自己无辜的生命。   自古以来，济州以“三无”闻名于世，即没有小偷，没有乞丐，也没有大门。尽管济州的自然环境较为恶劣且极度贫穷，但济州的居民却能同舟共济，过着安逸祥和的生活。然而，如此民风淳朴的地方共同体在经历4.3事件后被破坏得“体无完肤”。   这是在济州历史上最为可悲的惨剧，但在过去的半个世纪里，在济州岛乃至整个韩半岛，“4.3事件”却成为被禁忌的字眼，沦为了“未曾有过的历史”。过去，李承晚政权和其后的军事政权歪曲了这一事件的真相，将其定义为“（由北韩势力主导的）共产暴动”，并被永久尘封于历史中。面对家人的含冤而死，遇难者家属却三缄其口，连祭奠都要私下进行。 以该事件为题材写诗或发表小说的作家都无一例外地被拘留。然而，仍有许多人前赴后继地为查明真相而努力。到了2000年，韩国政府终于制定了《济州4.3事件查明真相特别法》，在政府主导下调查该事件的真相。由国务总理担任政府调查委员会委员长一职，并于2003年发布了真相调查报告，将“国家权力践踏人权”的事实公诸于众。据该委员会估算，4.3事件的遇难者总数约为2.5万~3万人。 当时，卢武铉总统基于该调查结果向济州岛民和4.3事件的遗属进行了正式道歉。国家对过去历史进行调查并公布结果，总统向受害者进行道歉等，在韩国历史上都是闻所未闻的，这不仅在恢复4.3事件的名誉上具有重大意义，也成为了大韩民国步入人权国家行列的重要契机。 韩国政府于2005年将济州岛指定为“世界和平之岛”也与此不无关系。《世界和平之岛宣言》前文中提到将济州岛指定为“世界和平之岛”，其宗旨如下：将创造性地继承济州“三无精神”的传统，将济州4.3事件的悲剧升华为“和解”和“共赢”，并秉承为实现和平永驻而努力的领袖外交精神，为世界和平做出贡献。   卢武铉总统特别强调，“济州历经‘4.3事件’这一历史性的悲剧，经历‘真实’与‘和解’的过程，并树立了梳理过去历史的普遍标准和榜样。” “真实”与“和解”，成为了解开4.3事件问题的新钥匙。   “请各位来此低头致敬。由于我们所有人都是牺牲者，我们宽恕所有人。所有人一起树起此碑石，希望死者安然长眠，生者携手并肩。”   政府于2003年在济州岛下贵里安设了慰灵坛，将“护国英灵碑”和“4.3遇难者英灵碑”等聚集以此，并在碑石上篆刻了上述碑文。这意味着，将英灵的汇集于此，集结了开启未来和解的智慧。 此前矛盾最为激烈的“4.3遗族会”和由退休警察组成的“济州警友会”于2013年宣布无条件和解。以此为契机，为了治愈4.3事件的伤痛，济州岛消除“激进”和“保守”理念间的隔阂，实现了政府与民众的和解。这标志着，济州正在克服韩国最难以消除的矛盾——理念分歧。 韩国延世大学教授Park Myeong-lim在对这种现象进行研究后表示，“世界上任何一个地方都没有实现过“加害者与受害者”、“镇压与抵抗”、“政府与民众”的和解，济州已经成为了全世界学习“宽恕”、“和解”、“共赢”的典范。   现在，我们正处于在韩半岛摒弃老旧冷战结构的重要时刻。因此，即将举行的南北首脑会谈和北美首脑会谈备受全世界的瞩目。今后，南北韩居民不应再因韩半岛分裂而深受其害。   我认为，70年前在济州岛上牺牲的遇难者心中唯一的夙愿也许就是“一个祖国“，即“统一政府”。在这一时刻，我们需要追求的目标同样也是“韩半岛和平”。为此，恢复南北韩之间的信任是重中之重，但也不能一蹴而就。   衷心希望在4.3事件的和解精神下，南北韩之间错综复杂的矛盾能一个又一个地被化解。同时也希望在迎来4.3事件70周年之际，我们能够实现济州岛民当年的夙愿，即克服韩半岛分裂、实现韩半岛统一，同时也希望济州4.3事件能成为大韩民国史册中闪光的一页。

  [caption id="" align="alignright" width="150"] Yang Jeongsim(韩国大真大学人文学研究所研究教授/济州4.3事件70周年范国民委员会学术委员长)[/caption] 70年前，1948年4月3日凌晨2点，济州岛汉拿山及附近的山火岳烽烟四起。然而，济州4.3事件的起点并不是1948年4月3日，而是1947年3月1日。“4.3”是包括从1948年4月3日至1954年解除汉拿山禁足令为止整个过程的一种象征。 韩国政府曾在《济州4.3特别法》将“济州4.3事件”如下定义：以1947年3月1日为起点，在1948年4月3日发生的骚乱事件，以及直至1954年9月21日在济州岛发生的武力冲突以及在镇压过程中居民们惨遭牺牲的事件。将1947年3月1日定为4.3事件的起点，对查清4.3的爆发原因具有重要意义。也就是说，1947年济州岛3.1节纪念大会结束后，警察开火造成居民身亡，结果导致美军政府进行了残暴的镇压，最终成为了4.3事件的重要导火索。 1947年3月1日，“3.1节28周年纪念大会”在济州北小学举办，有3万多岛民参加了该大会。在“学习3.1革命精神，争取统一独立”的口号下，济州岛民给予了绝对支持，当年参加纪念大会的人数为有史以来的最多的一次。在纪念仪式结束后，一个孩子被警察的马踢倒，群众对此表示抗议。从陆地派遣来的支援警察却向他们开火，导致了6名未武装居民死亡，8人受伤。一位抱着小孩的20多岁女性和济州北小学学生也在此过程中中枪倒地。为了对该事件表示抗议，济州岛民于3月10日进行官民总罢工，美军政府的干部和警察也参与其中。然而，美军政府和警察不仅不认错，反而还从陆地加派警察，并派遣西北青年会进行了无情的镇压。自3.1事件后，美军政府持续进行野蛮镇压，这成为了次年引发4月3日起义的原因。 4.3事件的另外一个重要的背景是，民众为了抵制南韩单独举行选举并实现南北统一政府所进行的斗争。包括金九先生在内的部分民族领袖认为，1948年5月10日单独进行国会议员选举会导致民族分裂，因此，表示出了反对意见。在全国范围内也爆发了反对选举的斗争。济州岛地区的投票率不到一半，最终3个选举区中有2个区的选举结果无效。如此一来，济州岛成为了唯一抵制5.10单独选举的地区。然而，济州岛民对此付出了非常残酷的代价，将近十分之一的济州岛居民遇难，并度过了长达40年的艰辛岁月。以2017年7月25日为准，仅依照特别法被认定为“牺牲者”的人数就多达14,233名。考虑到这是通过牺牲者申报而获得的数据，实际身亡的人数也许更多。韩国政府发布的《济州4.3事件真相调查报告》中指出，遇难者中至少有80%是因遭到警察和军人等“军警讨伐队”的肆意妄为而牺牲的。军警讨伐队和武装队的对峙夺走了无数济州岛民的生命。1948年10月17日，韩国国防警备队9团团长Song Yo-chan通过布告表示，若有人进入在离海岸5公里以外的中山间地带通行，就将其视为暴徒并会强行击毙 。从此之后，中山间地带的100多个村庄被烧毁，村民被强制移居到了海岸地区。 从1948年10月末到1949年3月，军人和警察讨伐队展开“焦土化行动”，进行了集体屠杀。 在部分村庄里，他们夺走了小孩而和女性等大部分居民的生命。最具代表性的例子是“北村里事件”。1949年1月17日，在北村里的入口“宽阔石田(地名，Neobunsoong-yi)”陡坡，武装队突袭军队车辆，造成了1名军人死亡。为了报复他们，军人突如其来地烧毁了整个村子，命令所有居民聚集在北村小学操场，进行了疯狂的屠杀，还把剩下的人抓到附近的旱田，疯狂开枪，最终夺走了350多人的性命。第二天，数十名分散在附近村庄里的居民也难逃厄运。 韩国战争(即朝鲜战争)爆发以后，在“预备拘留”的名义下，又有无数人因此而无辜牺牲 。所谓的“报道联盟加入者”、“重点监视对象”及“入山者家属”被“预备拘留”被处刑，并在西归浦、济州海、济州飞行场、西卵山火岳等地被集体水葬或在被击毙后遭掩埋。除此之外，对被收押在全国各地刑务所的人立即执行了死刑。据估计，因“预备拘留”而遇难的牺牲者和在刑务所遇难的牺牲者人数达3,000多名。尽管大部分的遇难者都是普通老百姓，但他们却被叫做“赤色分子”。 济州岛在孤立中逐渐沦落成了血多、泪多、尸体多的“三多岛”。   以1998年4.3事件50周年为契机，民众要求政府方面查明真相、恢复牺牲者名誉的呼声日益高涨，在全国范围内，掀起了“制定济州4.3特别法”运动。为了在迎来新千禧年之前制定“特别法”，济州岛民、遇难者遗属和市民团体奋不顾身地举行了斗争。最终《特别法》在1999年12月16日通过，从政府层面制定的真相调查报告《济州4.3事件真相调查报告》于2003年10月15日公诸于众。该报告将4.3事件定为“倚仗国家权力践踏人权的事件” 济州4.3事件不仅导致了无数人力和物资方面的损失，还破坏了共同体。然而，查明真相运动的过程，同时也是化解济州岛民内部矛盾的过程。就如“4.3遗族会”和“济州警友会”之间的和解一样，我们在树立清算过去历史的最佳典范。对济州岛民而言， 即使4.3事件的伤痕依然在心头，但抚平伤痕的努力仍然在进行。   今年是4.3事件70周年。70周年或许是仍然在世的受害者及其遗属能够展开的最后一次“记忆斗争“，也是迎接下一代的新转折点。我们应在历史悲剧中重温“和解”与“共赢”的价值，同时提高“和平”与“人权”价值，努力让这些价值延续至我们的下一代。我们应如何迎接下一代才能防止4.3的悲剧“固化”呢？这将是新“记忆斗争”的开始。