제주평화연구원

  북한 핵 프로그램은 미국과 남한 안보에 중대한 위협이 되고 있다. 이 문제를 해결하기 위해 1994년 제네바합의(Geneva Agreed Framework)가 채택되었다. 그러나 워싱턴은 북한의 우라늄에 기초한 핵 프로그램을 또 다시 발견하였고 제네바합의는 종결되었다. 그러나 부시 행정부는 대화를 계속하였고, 북한은 심지어 핵 프로그램 해체에 동의하였다. 오바마 집권 후 워싱턴은 대화를 재개하기 전에 북한이 비핵화 의지를 보여주기를 기다리며 별다른 행동을 취하지 않는, 소위 ‘전략적 인내(strategic patience)’를 지켜왔다. 여러 차례의 대화와 2005년 핵 프로그램 해체 약속에도 불구하고, 북한은 2006년 10월 9일과 2009년 5월 25일 핵무기 실험을 감행하며 6자회담의 무효성을 여실히 보여주었다. 그런데도 여전히 6자회담은 북한 핵문제를 다루는 유일한 접근방법이다. 왜 북한은 핵무기를 원하는 것일까? 그리고 미국은 6자회담을 통해 무엇을 얻으려는 것일까?  북한정부는 자국의 핵 프로그램이 전력공급 부족을 해결하기 위한 것이라고 주장한다. 그러나 핵보유국이 되려는 평양의 지속적인 노력을 살펴볼 때 이는 결코 사실일 수 없다. 오히려 북한의 핵 프로그램은 정권생존의 보험 역할을 하고 있다. 이를 지지해주는 세 가지 이유들이 있다. 첫째, 북한은 한국전쟁 직후 핵 프로그램을 시작하였다. 당시 김일성은 소련연방으로부터 원자로를 얻어내려 애썼다. 김일성은 전쟁 동안 유엔군이 압록강까지 전진하면서 자신의 국가가 거의 사라질 뻔한 위기를 겪었다. 중국의 개입이 없었으면 북한은 사라졌을 것이다. 전쟁 후 김일성은 정권 안보에 핵무기가 반드시 필요하다고 생각했을 것이다. 또한 김일성은 미국이 핵으로 중국을 위협하는 모습을 지켜보며 자신에게도 핵무기가 필요하다고 생각했을 것이다. 1950년대 소련연방은 원자로 제공을 거부했지만, 북한의 계속적인 요구에 결국 1965년 연구용 5MW 원자로를 제공하게 되었다. 북한 핵 프로그램은 1980년대 미국 위성사진에 재처리공장 건설 장면이 노출되면서 세계의 관심을 끌기 시작했다. 사용된 핵연료봉은 플루토늄을 분리하기 위해 재처리된다. 플루토늄은 무기급 물질이다. 하지만 민간 전력용 핵 프로그램에서는 재처리 공장이 필요하지 않다. 그러므로 북한이 핵무기 개발 의도를 가지고 있는 것이 분명했다.  둘째, 1994년 미국과 북한은 제네바합의에 서명했다. 즉 북한은 모든 핵 프로그램을 동결하고, 한반도 비핵화 선언을 실천하기로 동의한 것이다. 대신 남한, 일본, EU는 한반도에너지개발기구(KEDO: Korean Energy Development Organization)를 조직하여 2개의 1,000MW 경수로를 건설하기로 약속하였다. 경수로를 건설하는 동안 미국은 북한의 에너지 손실을 보상하기 위해 매년 원유 50만 톤을 제공하기로 약속하였다. 남한은 제네바합의를 이행할 뿐만 아니라 수십억 달러의 경제원조와 투자를 제공하기로 하였다. 북한이 당시 단 하나의 5MW 흑연감속로를 보유하고 50MW와 200MW 원자로를 건설 중이었다는 사실을 고려할 때, 1,000MW 경수로 2개를 건설하고 경수로 건설 기간 동안 매년 50만 톤의 원유를 공급하는 것은 북한 전력공급 문제를 해결해주는 것 이상의 과한 조치였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 북한은 모든 원조를 받는 동안에도 비밀리에 고농축우라늄을 개발하고 있었다. 2000년 남북정상회담, 미 국무부 매들린 올브라이트(Madeleine Albright) 장관의 평양 방문, 북한 인민군 차수 조명록의 워싱턴 방문 등도 모두 핵무기 개발 음모를 감추기 위한 정치적 술책이었다. 북한이 원조의 전제조건으로서 핵 프로그램 포기에 단 한 번도 동의하지 않았다는 사실은 북한이 핵보유국이 되고자하는 분명한 의지를 확인시켜준다.  셋째, 농업부문의 구조적 문제(예를 들어 비료 부족과 불충분한 농지)와 함께 반복되는 가뭄과 기근 때문에 북한은 1990년대 초부터 지속적인 식량부족과 경제적 어려움을 겪어왔으며, 수십만 명의 사람들이 굶어 죽었다는 보도도 있다. 그러나 북한은 인프라를 향상시키고 경제를 개발하는데 필요한 자본이 없다. 한국전쟁 후 미국의 경제제재로 북한은 외국자본의 직접투자를 유치하거나 IMF 대출을 받을 수 없게 되었다. 현재 북한은 김정은 권력승계의 정치적 합법성을 정당화하고, 김정일 정권이 선언한 강성대국 원년이자 김일성 탄생 100주년인 2012년을 축하하기 위해 경제적 원조가 어느 때보다 절실한 상황이다. 이런 이유로 북한은 가능한 많은 경제 원조를 받으려고 애쓰고 있다. 따라서 김정일 정권은 미국과의 협상에서 최대한 많은 것을 얻기 위해 핵카드를 꺼내는 ‘벼랑 끝 전략(brinkmanship)’을 사용하고 있다. 북한은 핵 프로그램을 진행한 이후 미국과의 협상도구로서 미사일 프로그램뿐만 아니라 핵무기를 이용해왔다. 북한은 이러한 협상도구들을 이용해 경제 원조를 얻어내고 경제제재를 완화시켜 정권의 안전을 보장받고자 한다.  6자회담으로는 북한의 핵무기 개발을 과거에도 막을 수 없었고 미래에도 막을 수 없을 것이다. 그렇다면 미국정부가 6자회담에서 얻으려고 하는 것은 무엇일까? 미국정부는 다른 주요 지역 플레이어들이 참여하지 않았던 북미 양자간 합의인 1994년도 제네바합의의 한계성이 재현되지 않도록 다자간 대화를 무엇보다 원하고 있다. 평양이 제네바합의를 어겼을 때 중국과 러시아가 합의 당사자가 아닌데다 북한에 압력을 가하는 것에 반대했기 때문에 워싱턴에서 할 수 있는 일이 별로 없었다. 만약 중국과 러시아가 협상에 참여한다면 북한이 합의를 위반하기 어려울 것이다. 또한 미국이 평양의 위반 행동에 대해 중국과 러시아가 처벌을 가하도록 설득하기가 보다 수월해질 것이다.  북한은 핵무기를 보유하기로 작정한 것처럼 보인다. 미국정부는 북한의 핵무기 보유에 대한 입장에 변화를 보이고 있다. 미국 관리들은 북한이 많은 핵무기를 보유한 것으로 추정한다고 말해왔다. 과거에는 북한 핵문제와 관련하여 워싱턴은 북한의 핵실험을 용납할 수 없는 한계선으로 잡고 있었다. 그러나 최근에는 핵무기 또는 관련 물질의 이전 금지, 특히 테러리스트 단체 혹은 이란이나 시리아 같은 반미국가로의 이전 금지에 보다 초점을 맞추고 있다. 이는 용납할 수 없는 한계선의 변화를 의미한다. 그러므로 앞으로 6자회담은 북한이 핵무기 물질을 계속 생산하는 것과 핵물질을 다른 국가에 수출하는 것을 금지하는데 초점을 맞출 것이다.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* 현 위스콘신대학 밀워키 캠퍼스 정치학과 교수. 텍사스 A&M 대학에서 박사 학위를 취득하였음. 국제 안보와 한국 정치에 연구 초점을 맞추고 있으며, Journal of Politics, British Journal of Political Science, Political Research Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly, Comparative Politics, and Comparative Political Studies 등과 같은 세계적인 정치학 학회지에 논문을 발표해왔음. 또한 ‘1980년 이후의 한국(South Korea since 1980, Cambridge University Press 2010)’과 ‘세계 속의 한국의 부상: 권력, 경제개발, 외교(South Korea’s Rise in the World: Power, Economic Development, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2013 출간 예정)’를 테렌스 뢰리그(Terence Roehrig)와 공저하였음. 재미한국정치연구학회 회장을 역임하였음.

  올해 들어 세 번째로 유럽정상회담을 통한 유럽 재정위기 타결안이 제시되었다. 재정위기의 진원지인 그리스의 현재 GDP 대비 정부 부채 비율은 166퍼센트에 달한다. 이를 2020년까지 120퍼센트로 줄이기 위해 차관을 제공한 은행으로부터 그리스 정부의 채무 부담을 절반으로 삭감한다는 합의를 이끌어내는 성과를 거두었다. 더불어 문제 국가로 지목된 이탈리아와 스페인의 재정파탄을 방지하기 위해 유럽의 구제금융 기금인 재정 안정 기관(European Financial Stability Facility)의 재원을 증대하기로 합의했다.  이는 독일 메르켈 총리가 일컫듯 2차 세계대전 이후 최대 위기인 현 재정위기로 인해 유럽이 파국으로 치닫는 불행한 역사를 되풀이하지 않으려는 유럽의 결의를 보여준다. 그러나 이 포괄적 해결책도 재원 증대의 구체적 방안을 제시하지 않았고, 통화정책의 단일화에 참여하는 17개국의 재정정책 단일화에 대한 실질적 조치를 강화하지 않았다. 비록 유럽 정상이 모여 밤샘 작업을 한 끝에 이룬 업적임에도 불구하고, 저비용의 말 잔치를(words are cheap) 고비용의 해결 방안으로 구현시키려면 앞으로도 수차례에 걸쳐 구수회담이 이어질 것이다. 그렇다면 현재진행형인 유럽의 재정위기가 아시아에게 어떤 함의를 지닐까?  단일화폐의 통용은 필연적으로 각 회원국의 재정 건전성(fiscal soundness)을 요구한다. 그러나 각 회원국 간 재정 건전성의 간극이 크다. 재정적으로 건전한 독일보다 재정 건전성이 결여된 포르투갈, 이탈리아, 아일랜드, 스페인 및 그리스는 부채상환 능력이 부족하다. 문제는 각 회원국의 부채가 상호 깊숙이 연계되어 있다는 데 있다. 왜냐하면 유로존에 참여한다는 점을 악용해 “불량” 국가들은 동등한 이자율로 차관을 확보해 정부지출의 재원을 충원하였기 때문이다. 정부 재원을 자체적으로 충당하려면 세원을 확보해야하는데 이는 저성장 국가에게 정치적 자살행위에 해당한다. 결국 그리스의 재정파탄은 사회 소요임에도 불구하고 긴축재정을 전제로 한 유럽과 국제 금융구제에 의해서만 간신히 해결의 실마리를 찾았다. 동시에 방만한 재정운영을 감독하는 권한을 유럽차원의 초국가기구에게 부여해야한다는 각성도 일었다.  무엇보다 그리스의 재정파탄을 방치하면 자국의 금융기관에 막대한 타격을 입힐 것을 우려한 독일과 프랑스 등 채권 국가들은 서둘러 해결책을 고안하는데 합의했다. 그러나 그리스의 재정파탄이 가져올 일파만파의 혼란을 차단할 금융구제 방안 대신 미봉책만 제시할 뿐이었다. 더구나 파행적 재정운영을 미연에 방지할 수 있는 금융기관에 대한 감독 권한의 제도화나 재정정책의 단일화는 아직도 요원하다.  전후 유럽은 무력 충돌로 얼룩진 과거를 청산하고 새로운 지역 질서를 건설할 목적으로 국가 간 협력증대를 통해 공동의 평화와 번영을 모색하는 유럽통합을 추진했다. 비록 오랜 시간이 소요되었지만, 결국 유럽연합이라는 초국가기구로 유럽을 재편성했을 뿐 아니라 국경 없는 쉥겐 지역(Schengen Area)과 단일화폐가 통용되는 유로존(Eurozone)을 성공적으로 출범시켰다. 나아가 상상의 공동체인 유럽을 마침내 27개국의 회원국이 참여하는 실질적 공동체로서 공간적으로 확대하는 위업을 달성했다. 이러한 쾌거는 범아시아 공동체를 구상하는 아시아 국가에게 고무되는 역사적 사건임에 분명하다.  그러나 영토를 전제로 한 국민국가에 기반을 두는 주권과 초국가기구로의 일부 권력이양을 수반하는 통합 간 긴장 자체가 해소되지는 않았다. 달리 말하자면, 근대국가도 국제기구도 아닌 초국가기구로서 유럽연합이 과연 위계질서에 의거하지 않고 국가를 초월하는 새로운 차원의 권위를 제대로 창출할 수 있는지에 대한 의구심을 종식하지는 못했다. 이를 두고 유럽의 국가주권과 지역통합 간 긴장은 자연스러운 현상이며 오히려 국가주권과 지역통합 간 관계에 관한 새로운 발상이 요구된다는 논의가 이어졌다. 이러한 고민도 유럽보다 지역 통합에 저해요인이 많은 아시아 국가에게 교훈으로 다가왔다.  긴장 속의 국가주권과 지역통합 간 관계를 설정 또는 재설정하는 노력은 궁극적으로 통합의 제도화로 이어진다. 왜냐하면 국가주권이 선점한 권위 일부를 신설된 초국가기구에 이양하는 과정에서 이러한 부분적 권위의 이양이 국가주권의 잠식이나 위축을 의미하기보다 새로운 형태와 방식으로 국가주권을 발현할 수 있는 기회를 제공한다는 헌법에 준하는 근거가 필요하기 때문이다. 즉, 국가주권과 지역통합은 상쇄하는 영합적(zero-sum) 관계가 아니라 보완하거나 필요에 따라서 대체하는 정합적(positive-sum) 관계라는 공감대를 제도로서 내재화해야 한다. 진정한 공동체를 지향하는 유럽의 행보가 바로 이러한 관계 설정 또는 재설정의 제도화 단계에서 제동에 걸리곤 했다. 이 역시 아시아가 지엽적으로 경험한 바이다.  설령 국가주권과 지역통합 간 긴장은 자연스러운 현상이라는 주장에 논리적 결함이 없더라도 정서적 저항을 이완시키기에는 역부족이다. 왜냐하면 긴장 관계는 필요에 따라 우호적일 수도 있지만, 경쟁을 전제하므로 대체로 적대적이고 배타적일 가능성이 농후하기 때문이다. 즉 우호적 긴장 관계는 공동의 평화와 번영을 증대하려는 의지에 의해 재편성된 인위적 결과물에 지나지 않는다. 따라서 그 정당성에 대한 도전에 직면하는 경우, 응전의 방식으로 배타적 관계로 환원될 소지가 크다. 유럽에서는 재정위기로부터 자국의 경제에 대한 타격을 줄이기에 급급한 각개격파(各個擊破)로 드러난다면, 아시아에서는 근대적 영토 분쟁에 더해 역사 새로 쓰기로 나타난다.  현재 유럽에서는 국가주권과 지역통합 간 긴장이 고조되자, 우호적 관계라는 불편한 옷을 벗어던지고 익숙한 배타적 관계로 갈아입는 장면을 반복해서 목격한다. 유럽 공동체의 초석을 제공하는데 기여했다고 자부하는 네덜란드는 공공연히 유로존의 탈퇴를 거론한다. 유럽 지역통합의 수혜자로서 경제적 성장을 달성한 슬로바키아는 유럽차원의 금융구제 방안을 일차적으로 거부했다. 비록 재정위기의 진원지는 아니지만 재정파탄의 벼랑으로 몰린 이탈리아는 국가신용단계가 강등되자 별로 놀라운 일도 아니라며 애써 시큰둥한 반응을 보였다. 유럽연합에 가입했으면서도 유로존에서 발뺌한 영국은 유로존의 참여 유보(opt-out)가 현명한 처사였음을 거들먹거리며 심지어 유럽연합의 탈퇴 여부를 국민투표로 결정하자고 집권당인 보수당이 발안했으나 거부되었다.  유럽헌법 조약의 비준이 난관에 봉착하자 그 대안으로 우여곡절 끝에 체결된 리스본 조약에 의하면, 유로존 회원국의 통화정책 수립은 유럽연합의 독자 영역이다. 즉 유럽 국가가 아닌 초국가기구인 유럽연합에게만 권한이 부여된다. 그러나 실제로 단일화폐의 통용을 유지시킬 수 있는 금융 감독 권한이 부재한 현실을 감안하면 이는 ‘그림의 떡’이다. 더불어 유럽 차원의 법안은 사실상 공용어(lingua franca)인 영어 이외 22개의 언어로 번역되어야 하는 부담을 내재한다. 이는 단순히 복수 언어 간 균등한 번역의 어려움에 그치지 않고 특정 용어의 선택이 지니는 법적 구속력의 간극으로 이어지는 제약을 가리킨다. 게다가 각 회원국의 금융 감독에 관한 법-제도 간 차이점을 상정하면, 유로존 회원국의 통화정책 수립을 실질적으로 유럽연합의 독자 영역으로 구축하느냐에 따라 작금의 재정위기를 계기로 유럽 통합의 향방이 결정된다. 게다가 통화정책과 재정정책은 밀접한 상관관계에 있지만, 유로존의 현실은 이와 동떨어져 있다.  최근 수면 위로 드러난 재정위기는 또한 유럽의 정체성에 관한 근본적 질문을 던진다. 오랜 분쟁의 역사를 뒤로 하고 공동의 평화와 번영을 추구하려는 유럽의 지역통합을 돌이킬 수 없는 정치적 용단으로 명명한다. 이런 맥락에서 단일화폐의 통용을 가능하게 한 유로존의 재정위기는 유럽 공동체의 내폭으로 비화될 수 있기 때문에 엘리트나 일반 시민에게 초미의 관심사이다. 그러나 이에 가려진 수면 밑의 위기인 사회적 통합 문제도 재정위기에 깊숙이 연계되어 있다. 유럽이란 무엇인가에 대한 원론적 질문에 기능적으로 유로가 통용화폐인 공간이 좁은 의미에서 유럽이라고 답할 수 있다. 그렇다면 좀 더 넓은 의미에서 그 공간에서 거주할 권리와 그에 따른 의무를 향유할 구성원은 어떤 자격 조건에 의해 정해지는지에 대한 심의를 필연적으로 수반한다. 아직도 유럽의 정체성 논의는 여러 이유로 기능적 측면에 제한된다. 그나마 하나의 유럽을 꿈꾸는 이상에 들떠 있을 때 단일화폐를 수용했을 뿐 환상이 사라지고 병증이 발견되자마자 치유하기보다 잠재우기에 더 분주한 양상이다. 만약 유럽의 구성원 중 이질적 집단이 재정위기에 가장 취약한 계층에 속하는 경우, 통합이라는 명분 아래 제외와 은닉이 병행되는 모순을 어렵지 않게 예측할 수 있다.  아시아는 유럽 공동체의 행보를 목격하며 공동체 구축이 시작에 불과하다는 사실을 재확인할 수 있다. 공동체 구축 자체는 새로운 정치적 생명체의 탄생을 위한 난산 중의 난산이라는 사실을 유럽이 보여주었고 아시아도 경험했다. 그러나 정작 출범한 공동체에게 스스로 숨을 내쉴 수 있는 생명력을 부여하려는 각고의 노력이 이어지지 않으면, 이 공동체는 탄생과 동시에 급속한 노화를 거쳐 급기야 미라가 되는 수모를 겪게 된다. 이 생명력을 불어넣는 작업은 지역 차원의 거버넌스(regional governance)를 명문화하는 기본법 또는 헌법체제의 구축, 명분상에 그치지 않고 실질적으로 작동하는 경로를 구비한 다층 정치적 권위체(multi-level political authority)의 운용, 그리고 궁극적으로 사고 발생으로 인한 피해의 규모를 줄이는 사후 조치와 더불어 사고 발생을 미연에 방지할 수 있는 위기관리의 제도화(institutionalization of crisis management) 등을 요구한다.  60년 전 장 모네는 유럽의 지역통합을 설계하면서 “사람 없이 가능한 일은 하나도 없지만, 제도가 마련되지 않으면 영구적일 수 없다”라고 평했다. 유럽의 국가주권과 지역통합 간 긴장이 고조되면서 유럽 공동체가 헛돌면, 유럽은 이 난국을 타개할 장 모네가 필요하다고 개탄한다. 유럽에서는 최소한 장 모네가 있었기 때문에 공동체를 출범시켰다고 아시아는 푸념한다. 그러나 지금 목전에 전개되는 유럽을 바라보면서 아시아의 푸념은 지극히 피상적 수준에 그친다는 점을 유념해야 한다. 상상의 공동체를 시공간적으로 구현하는 노력은 정치적 통합을 전제하지만, 이 공동체가 시공간상에서 구성원을 구속하는 권위체로 작동하려면 사회적 통합을 필요로 한다. 장 모네의 평에 감히 첨언한다면 “사람 없이 가능한 일은 없고 제도를 통해야 영구적이 되지만, 이도 역시 사람 없이 불가능하다.”  유럽의 재정위기는 오랜 준비 기간에도 불구하고 살얼음판에서 관중과 선수에게 집단 최면을 걸어 빙상경기를 펼친 데 연유한다. 더구나 응급 처치만 구비했을 뿐 위기관리에 대한 체계적 준비는 불충분했다. 그럼에도 불구하고 장기간에 걸쳐 점진적으로 양적 성장을 거듭한 유럽은 위기관리 체제를 재정비할 잠재력을 지닌다. 따라서 의지만 있다면 살얼음판을 완벽한 빙상경기장으로 바꿀 수 있다. 아시아도 2008년의 경제위기를 해결하는 저력을 보여주었다. 불행하게도 유럽이나 미국보다 앞선 눈부신 경제발전에도 불구하고, 아시아는 능동적으로 새로운 세계질서를 구축하기보다 유럽 또는 미국이 주축이 된 세계질서를 수동적으로 수용하는 구습에서 벗어나지 못한다. 만약 공동체 구축의 능력 자체보다 의지가 결여된다면, 공동체 구축은 시작도 못할뿐더러 설령 공동체가 출범해도 생명력을 상실한 채 문서상으로만 존재하거나 아니면 아무도 영주할 수 없는 사상누각에 지나지 않는다.  능력이 없는 경우에는 업적 평가 자체가 무의미하다. 그러나 능력이 있으면서도 의지가 없어서 ‘기대 이하’의 성과를 거둔다면 힐난을 면할 수 없다. 아시아에게 쏠리는 기대가 점차 커지는데 아시아는 세계질서의 무대 가장자리에서 조역만 맡을 수 없다. 물론 혹자는 이러한 조역 담당을 자처하는 아시아의 행태를 전략적 선택으로 정의하기도 한다. 그러나 만약 아시아가 진정으로 공동체를 구축하려는 과제를 숙원으로 받아들인다면, 아시아에게 유럽의 과거와 현재는 어떻게 지역통합의 다리 위로 국가주권의 강을 건너야 하는지 보여준다. 아시아에서는 유독 국가주권의 강 물살이 거세기 때문에 다리를 두들겨가며 건너는 일도 중요하지만 다리를 건너야 한다는 사명감 자체를 먼저 갖춰야 한다. 아시아의 장 모네가 정치적 용단을 이끌어내는 기적을 바라기보다 아시아는 충분히 도강(渡江)할 수 있다는 생각의 전환을 동원하는 편이 현실적이다. 즉, 아시아란 무엇인가에 대한 인지적 동원(cognitive mobilization)에도 소홀하지 않아야 한다. 또한 유럽의 우왕좌왕은 아시아에게 공동체 내 위기관리 체계를 구비하는 최상의 시기가 바로 출범 이전이라는 점을 시사한다. 왜냐하면  거센 물살은 다리 밑으로만 지나지 않고 간혹 다리 위를 덮쳐 생명을 위협하기 때문이다.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* 현 서울대학교 정치외교학부 교수. 미국 캘리포니아 주립대학 데이비스를 졸업하고 미시건대학교 앤아버 정치학과에서 박사 학위를 취득함. 국방대학교 교수 역임. 현재 네덜란드 레이든(Leiden)대학교 방문교수. 저서로 <통합과 분권의 연방주의 거버넌스>, “Befuddling Executive Power with Executive Unilateralism in the Unitary Executive,” “종교적 정체성, 정치적 정체성, 유럽의 정체성” 등 다수의 논문이 있음.

아시아가 세계 경제의 중심으로 급부상했다.  아시아는 이미 세계 GDP의 27%를 차지하고 있으며, 지난 5월에 발표한 아시아개발은행(ADB: Asian Development Bank) 2050년 보고서는 30년 후에는 이 수치가 더욱 증가하여 세계 GDP의 51%를 차지할 것이라고 전망했다. 세계 선진국의 경제 상황은 계속 후퇴하고 있다. 하지만 호주와 중국, 인도, 인도네시아를 중심으로 한 아시아 국가들은 전례를 찾아볼 수 없을 정도로 급성장을 거듭하고 있다. 아시아는 그 자체가 상호의존성이 상당히 높은 지역이고 특히 동아시아는 국가 간 그리고 세계의 다른 국가와 상호의존 정도가 매우 높다. 그것은 자유 무역과 국제 자금 흐름을 뒷받침하는 세계 경제 체제와 깊은 관계가 있기 때문이다.  아시아의 경제 발전이 아시아와 세계 질서를 어떻게 변화시킬 것인가?  아시아에서는 중국 및 신흥경제국들이 세계 경제에 활력을 더하고 있다. 아시아는 세계 성장의 엔진으로서 뿐만 아니라 경제 위기에 허덕이고 있는 전 세계를 구원해줄 것이라는 기대를 한 몸에 받고 있다. G20을 중심으로 한 새로운 세계 질서는 아시아 6개국을 포함하여 아시아 리더십을 상승시킬 수 있는 발판을 제공하고 있다. 하지만 아시아가 역할을 해낼 준비가 되어 있을까? 그리고 아시아의 제도와 방식이 현재 세계가 직면하고 있는 경제 문제를 해결하기 위해서 일관성 있는 정책 전략을 마련하는데 필요한 토대를 제공할 수 있을까?  최근 발간된 계간지 동아시아 포럼(East Asia Forum Quarterly)에서는 이러한 문제를 언급하고 있다. Shekhar Shah의 글은 최근의 주제 이슈였다. 그는 현재 세계의 실제 경제 변화에서도 나타나듯이, G20은 세계 경제 질서의 새로운 중심이며, G20에서 활동하는 아시아 6개국의 경제는 앞으로 30년 내에 세계 경제 질서를 재건하는데 핵심적인 역할을 할 것이라고 주장했다.  30년이라고 하면 변화 속도가 아주 느린 것처럼 여겨질 수 있지만, 서양과 동양 국가가 직면하고 있는 경제 현실을 직면하고 받아들이는데 그 정도의 시간이 필요할 것이라고 전망했다. 그렇지 않으면 G20 정상회의가 되고자 하는 장기적인 국제 회담으로 성장할 수 없을 것이다. 경제 협력에 있어 느릴 때도 있지만 꾸준함을 보여주는 아시아의 경험을 배워야 한다.  Shah에 따르면 두 가지 우선 사항이 있다. 첫째, G20이 전 세계가 지속적으로 해결해주기를 요구하는 당면 문제에 대해서 2008년 경제위기에서 보여주었던 탁월한 해결 능력을 또 다시 보여주지 못하고 있다는 사실이다. G20이 초기에는 성공적으로 활동했지만 그 이후 별다른 성과를 보여주지 못하고 있다. G20의 아시아 회원국은 ‘국제 법규 제정에 수동적인 방관자이며 법규를 마지못해 따르는 국가’라고 ADB는 주장했다. 이러한 모습을 바꾸어야 하며, 그렇지 않으면 G20은 길을 잃게 될 것이다.  Yiping Huang은 현 경제 체제의 최대 수혜국이라고 할 수 있는 중국은 세계 경제체제의 급변이 아닌 개혁을 원하고 있다고 주장했다.  인도를 포함한 아시아 신흥국이 G20 안건을 수용하기 위해 어떻게 책임을 질지에 많은 것이 달려 있다. G20이 기존의 G7과 마찬가지로 하향세를 걷게 된다면 많은 것을 잃게 될 것이다. ASEAN은 정책 대응방안과 국내 정책 선택을 조정하는데 있어서 상당히 많은 성공과 실패 경험을 갖고 있다. 아시아 회원국은 이러한 경험을 G20에 반영해야 한다. ASEAN의 변화에 대한 지속성과 개방성은 아시아 G20 회원국으로 하여금 G20에 ASEAN 정신을 반영할 수 있는 기회를 제공할 것이다. 이를 통해 세계 경제 질서를 재건해야만 G20이 다음 세대에 더욱 효율적인 역할을 할 수 있을 것이다.  Ishrat Husain은 아시아 경제의 강점을 보면 아시아 국가가 G20의 조종석 아니면 최소한 부조종석에 있어야 하는 이유를 알 수 있다고 말했다. 후세인은 ASEAN+동아시아 6개국 그리고 남아시아의 SAARC(남아시아지역협력연합) 등과 같은 지역 협정을 활용하여 지역 회원국 간에 협의한 사항을 G20의 아시아 회원국을 통해 G20 국가에게 전달할 수 있는 장점이 있다고 설명했다.  세계 경제에서 아시아의 규모와 힘을 고려해볼 때, Mohsin Khan은 아시아가 예를 들면, IMF와 같은 세계 금융기관에게 분명히 ‘기대 이하의 모습’을 보여주고 있는데 이처럼 IMF와 일정 거리를 두기로 한 것은 아시아가 아시아 경제 위기 때 IMF가 했던 역할을 기억하면서 택한 의식적인 행동이라고 주장했다. 또한 아시아는 세계 경제에서 아시아의 권리를 쟁취하기 위해 강압적으로 행동하지 않았으며 그 대신 지역 협정과 제도를 개발해 왔다. IMF에서 정당한 역할을 수행하기 위해서 지역 협정을 무시하지 않았던 것이다. 국제 및 지역 기관은 상호보완적인 방법으로 함께 일할 수 있고 일해야 한다.  Shah는 ‘미국, 중국, 인도 사이의 G3 관계와 같이 분명하고 장기적인 체제를 통해 우리가 준비해야할 미래 발전과 지금으로부터 10년 후의 모습에 대해 생각할 수 있을 것이다’라고 주장했다. 향후 G20 전략을 결정하는데 있어서 이들 국가 간의 관계는 매우 중요하다. 오늘날 인도는 G20 국가에서 단연코 최빈국에 해당한다. 하지만 그럼에도 불구하고 구매력평가기준에서 보면 G20에서 네 번째 최대 경제국이며, 시장 환율에서 보면 열한 번째 최대 경제국이다. 미래를 위해 생산적인 방법으로 협력 관계를 유지하기 위해서 계속해서 노력해야 할 것이다.  지금이 아시아가 세계 중심에 설 때이다. 아시아가 그 시험을 통과할 수 있을까? 판결은 나왔지만 확실하지 않다. 하지만 최근 발간된 계간지 동아시아 포럼은 아시아가 경제적, 정치적으로 준비가 되어 있을 경우를 가정해 아시아가 해결해야 하는 안건을 제시하고 있다.* 이 글의 원본은 East Asia Forum에 게재되었던 것으로, East Asia Forum의 허락 하에 국문판을 배포한다. JPI PeaceNet은 앞으로 East Asia Forum에 게재되는 논문 중 일부를 선별하여 국문으로 배포할 예정이다. 이 글과 이 글에서 인용하는 논문에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 의견으로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관하다.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* Peter Drysdale과 Shiro Armstrong은 East Asia Forum의 편집자들이다

  The elections to the Russian State Duma were held on December 4. Just as in the previous election, four parties crossed the 7% threshold to the Duma and succeeded to enter the lower house of the Russian parliament.  According to the official election results, United Russia, the ‘party of power’ suffered its worst setback when it garnered 49.5% of the vote, compared with 64.3% in 2007. It will enjoy a simple majority in parliament but no longer the two-thirds. This was shock to the ruling party. A public survey held prior to the election showed that United Russia was expected to get at least 60% of the vote.  The central election commission of Russia banned nine anti-Kremlin parties from participating in the Duma elections. The benefits from this measure did not come to United Russia but to the so-called ‘licensed opposition’ parties, which have not challenged the domination of the Kremlin. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation and A Just Russia nearly doubled their seats in parliament with 19.2% and 13.2% of the vote. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) gained 11.7%.  United Russia advocates political stability and the revival of Russia’s status as a super power. It describes itself as centrist and conservative. The Communists, led by Zyuganov since 1993, draw much of their support from older and middle-aged working-class people and pensioners, especially in rural areas. The LDPR led by the populist Zhirinovsky is the third largest party. It describes itself as the anti-Western and right-wing party.A Just Russia led by the former speaker of the upper house, Mironov, was initially established by the Kremlin in 2006. It uses social democratic slogans promoting social justice, order and stability. The party absorbs the moderate left-wing people damaging the second biggest party, the Communists.  There were allegedly widespread irregularities in the polls. An exit poll suggested that United Russia won less than 30% of the vote in Moscow, but after a delay, the result was announced at 46.5%. In Chechnya, ruled by the Kremlin-friendly Kadyrov, United Russia scored 99.5%. A similar result was reported in a Moscow psychiatric hospital.  The websites of Ekho Moskvy, a popular radio station, and of Golos, an independent election monitor was brought down by a massive cyber-attack during the election. Around 400,000 civic observers engaged in election monitoring used social networking sites such as YouTube and Facebook instead to post mobile phone videos about election fraud. Russia is an internet-based society with 50 million internet users, more than any other country in Europe. The internet has replaced books that Russians traditionally used for their leisure, over the long – cold winter.  The rigged election caused large-scale widespread protests in Russia despite the cold weather. The largest rally broke out in central Moscow. The participants were predominantly young and middle class people. Prominent figures from the Yeltsin administration, such as former Prime Minister Kasyanov and former Deputy Prime Minister Nemtsov, joined the rally.  The demonstrations were initially brutally suppressed by the police and hundreds were arrested. But the Russian government changed its position and allowed the peaceful rallies, which were also reported by state television.  The civic protests testify the public discontent with the current governance model of the ruling elite’s predominance. Protesters chanted “Russia without Putin.” This means that Russians are bored with political stagnation and interested in competition on the political scene.  The main reason for the poor performance of United Russia and the nation-wide protests is Putin’s come back to Kremlin. Prime Minister, Putin, has accepted the party’s nomination to run for president next year, while President Medvedev, was expected to take over as prime minister after the presidential election. The elections and the following protests demonstrate that his political legitimacy has been undermined. The damage to the legitimacy is considerably higher, particularly in big cities. In St. Petersburg, Putin’s home town, United Russia got only 34% of the vote.  However, it is not the end of Putin’s political life, because his victory in the presidential election of March 2012 seems to be inevitable. The civic protests have some limitations for political regime change in Russia. First, demonstrators include diverse people such as liberals, nationalists, and communists. Moreover, there is no alternative political leader to Putin. Second, the Russian people still prefer stability rather than change. According to a public survey held in the spring 2011, almost 60% of the respondents preferred a strong leader to a democratic government and 70% preferred a life of security to political freedom.  The ruling elite need a new tactic, which will relieve the current discontent and allow Putin to be re-elected in a credible manner. The new tactic has to pursue ‘renewal’ of the political elite, particularly personnel reshuffles in the state administration.  For this purpose the Kremlin is likely to place ‘liberal’ politicians to the foreground to limited competition in the political arena. Trusted associate of Putin and former Finance Minister Kudrin plans to set up a new liberal party. The pro-government billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov declared a bid for the presidential election in the same context. After the presidential election, a political coalition between this liberal group and the ruling party seems likely.  Then, the current president, Medvedev, is less likely to become prime minister next year. He has to take political responsibility for the poor performance of Untied Russia to some extent because he ran for the election as the party’s top parliamentary candidate. Putin stepped down from leading United Russia into the elections and put Medvedev, who was unpopular in the party, at the head of its campaign. Thus, Medvedev’s political mandate of has clearly weakened.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* Dr. KO, Sangtu, Professor of Area Studies at Yonsei Univ. Graduate School is Chair of Research Committee 42, IPSA (International Political Science Association) and President elected of Korean Association of Slavic Studies. He received his Ph.D in Political Science from Free University of Berlin, Germany in 1996. His publication includes “Russia’s Choice of Alliance: Balancing or Bandwagoning?”, Iwashita, Akihiro(ed.), Eager Eyes Fixed on Russia (Sapporo: Hokkaido Univ, 2007), “Russian Identity under Putin and North Korea Policy”, Jung, Gab Yong(ed.), Politics and Civil Society in Northeast Asia (Seoul: Orum, 2004), “System Transition and State Building in Eurasia: Theoretical Discussion and State Index”, The Korean Journal of Security Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2(2011), “Russia’s Response to the NATO Enlargement”, Korea & World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1(2010), “The Change of Russia’s Power Elite in the Putin Era”, The Journal of Slavic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1(2009), “Strategic Partnership in a Unipolar System: The Sino-Russian Relationship”, Issues & Studies, Vol. 42(2006)

  In the wake of converging interests and deepening relations between India and Japan as well as India and South Korea in economic and political fronts, the idea of a launching an India-Japan-Korea trilateral dialogue seems relevant. The relevance of such an initiative lies in the fact that all the three countries are deepening their economic and security interests by developing institutional framework to address bilateral as well as regional issues. India’s emergence of a transitional power in the midst of diffusion of power and geopolitical transformation at the global level, the trilateral idea would appear attractive for Japan and Korea to engage with India. The rise of China and its assertive stances on territorial issues draw the three countries also to share common viewpoints. Rationale  As interests of countries in the region are converging, dialogues are taking place at bilateral, trilateral and multilateral levels. Trilateral dialogues are taking place between Japan-Korea-China, and Japan-Korea-US and these are successful. India and Japan have already 1.5 Track dialogue in place. Even South Korea, North Korea and the US are trying to have a trilateral dialogue to discuss the nuclear issue. Therefore, an India-Japan-Korea trilateral initiative does not seem out of place. Even there are talks of an India-Russia-US trilateral initiative. Background  The idea of the trilateral germinated during a dinner reception hosted by the Director General of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) in April 21, 2011 in honour of a delegation from the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) headed by Chancellor Joon-gyu Lee. During the visit of India’s Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna to South Korea in June 2010, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the ICWA and IFANS and the visit of the IFANS delegation was the first bilateral between the two think tanks.  This author has been following closely the relationship between India and Japan, India and Korea, and Japan and Korea and felt that these three countries share a lot on various issues. It was felt, therefore, relevant to get the three to a common table to discuss issues of mutual interests.  The idea was floated in the presence of the Joint Secretary (East Asia), Ministry of External Affairs, and South Korea’s Ambassador Kim Joong-Keun who attended the reception. The idea instantly found appeal. I informed both that I shall raise the issue with the Japanese Ambassador Akitaka Saiki in New Delhi, with whom I had a dinner engagement at his residence the following day, April 22. Amb. Saiki welcomed the idea in principle. Subsequently, I followed up the idea by sending e-mails to three of them to move to the next step.  The initial question was at what level the idea should be launched. There was an opinion that the idea should be institutionalized at government-to-government level straight away but found little favour. At this time when the issue of China’s rise is creating anxiety throughout the Asian region, it was argued that the three countries coming together into a common platform might unnecessarily provoke the Asian neighbour. The idea of an India-Japan-Australia-US quadrilateral in 2008 that was aborted before taking off was cited as an example. But the idea of India-Japan-Korea trilateral is not triggered because of China factor. There are a host of other issues in which the three countries can share views.  Following this, Ambassador Kim sent the First Secretary (Political) of the embassy to meet me on 29 April to get more detailed idea of the concept that I had in mind. This was followed by a separate meeting with Amb Kim on 6 July to further fine tune the concept. The first informal meeting between the two ambassadors, Joint Secretary (East Asia) and me took place over lunch on 14 July hosted by Amb Kim at his residence, where the concept was discussed threadbare. It was agreed that the concept is a good idea to launch first at Track II level on annual basis by engaging academics to discuss on issues already identified.  Since I was to travel to Korea from October 27 as a guest of the Korea Foundation for a week and meet several scholars in many think tanks to solicit their responses to the trilateral idea, a luncheon meeting was hosted on 18 October by the Joint Secretary to discuss the next step. It was finally agreed that the concept should be launched at Track 1.5 level by engaging four scholars each from the three countries and discuss the issues already identified earlier in three separate sessions. The host country should organize a keynote speech by a senior official of the government and the officials from the government can have only observer status during the dialogue. It was also agreed that the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (India), IFANS (Korea) and Japan Institute of International Affairs (Japan) should be the nodal agencies for this project alternating between the three countries. It was agreed that India, where the concept originated, should host the first meeting in March 2012. But it transpired during my visit to IFANS, April 2012 would be the ideal time as the Korean scholars will be busy for the Nuclear Security Summit that Korea is hosting in March 2012. Response  I found overwhelming endorsement to the idea from scholars in many think tanks that I visited. The think tanks that I visited are Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA, IFANS, Jeju Peace Institute, Korea Institute for National Unification, Yonsei University, and the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). Even the Indian Ambassador, whom I called on, welcomed the idea.  During a visit to Japan in September 2011 on a separate program, I raised the idea during my meetings with officials in Ministry of Defense, METI and MOFA. The idea found support. Even two former ambassadors to India and some journalists whom I met, endorsed the idea. Issues to be raised  The following topics can be taken up for discussion, though not all of them can be discussed in the first meeting. These are:· ​Global power shift and the issue of a regional institutional architecture· ​Role of the military in the changing environment, in particular the role in peace-keeping operations· ​Nation-state building· ​Non-Traditional Security Issues such as terrorism, disaster management, climate change, environment, cyber security etc.· ​Issue of Regional Security, Securing sea lanes of communications, maritime security, and piracy· ​Global governance Issue· ​Bilateral ties with the US of India, Japan and South Korea· ​Nuclear Issue (cooperation between the three countries) and nuclear safety· Issue of Global/Regional commons· ​Af-Pak· ​China-North Korea-Pakistan nexus vis-a-vis nuclear security threats· ​Competing claims over resources in South China Sea, India-Vietnam Relations and China’s response  Finally, the idea is conceived to be not against any third country but for striving to find common ground for mutual welfare and contribute to the establishment of a peaceful and stable order in the Asia-Pacific.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* Dr. Rajaram PANDA is a leading expert on East Asia. He specializes on security and strategic issues of the region. He earned his Ph.D. from the Jawaharlal Nehru University and has published seven books and around 100 research articles, besides contributing to various websites. He is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

  It appears that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is taking steps to transfer his leadership to his third son Kim Jong-un. Such a hereditary transfer of political power in three generations scarcely has a parallel in modern history and it is difficult to predict whether it will be successful. Recently, the North’s mass media mentioned the name of Kim Jong-un (now in his late 20s) right after those of Kim Jong-il and Kim Young-nam (President of the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium), showing that the process of hereditary transfer of power between the two is well under way, perhaps more smoothly  than observers had expected, at least on the surface. However, public sentiment, which is rapidly becoming alienated from the regime, is likely to become a crucial variable in the transfer of power and the future of relations between the two Koreas. This paper will state some of the factors that will have an impact on the interaction between the ongoing hereditary transfer of power and the change in public feeling. Factors of interaction between the hereditary transfer of power and public sentiment  First, the North’s regime has been unable to secure a means of soothing the feelings of the public, which turned its back on the regime particularly due to the failure of the currency reform in late 2009. In the past, the regime paid scant attention to public sentiment. However, it appears that Kim Jong-il needs to appease public sentiment badly in connection with his plan to transfer power to his son. In early 2010, the North’s National Defense Committee Chairman admitted that his country still had not attained the goal of feeding “white rice with meat soup” to the people, which had been set by Kim Jong-il’s father Kim Il-sung. Such an admission has been interpreted as the gesture of a leader who is sensitively conscious of public sentiment. Kim Jong-il paid an unprecedented three visits to the North’s closest ally, China, in the year after May 2010. However, it was reported that he did not receive a gift from China that would make his starving people happy.  Second, the regime recently prohibited its construction workers in the Middle East from returning home for fear that their return might spread to North Korea the Jasmine Revolution started in that part of the world. The regime displayed its intention not to hide its readiness to shore up the system by purchasing a large quantity of equipment for use against the large-scale street demonstrations it probably fears might be staged by the starving people. Pak Nam-gi, Director of the Planning and Finance Department of the ruling party of North Korea, was executed by firing squad as a punishment for his failure to being about successful currency reform. Recently, a North Korean was executed in public on a charge of providing information on rice prices in the North to South Korea. This ever-more repressive rule indicates that the North is short of soft-power resources. It also indicates that the regime’s internal solidarity is weakening, while the ongoing transfer of power to Kim Jeon-un, who takes after his grandfather Kim Il-sung, has failed to deliver a message of hope to North Koreans.  Third, ordinary North Koreans have come to harbor extreme distrust of and discontent with the party and the leadership amid widespread corruption, including their having to pay bribes to higher authorities, and being squeezed to earn foreign currencies, amid a scenario in which “the rich get richer and the poor get poorer,” and a game of hide-and-seek in which the people try to form their own markets and the authorities try to crack down on them. Amid such an environment, the state-set mechanisms designed to obtain the people’s political consensus, such as Sanenghwal Cholhwa (a periodical session in which self-criticism is forced on the people), have become a session in name only. Such a situation is likely to disturb the workings of the ruling system in the post-Kim Jong-il era.  Fourth, there has been a dramatic change in the consciousness of ordinary North Korean people due to the adoption of materialism as a dominant social value and the rapid spread of information on markets. In particular, the spread of the South’s culture, including TV dramas, pop music, and films, in the North even indicates the possibility of change in the fundamental nature of the North’s regime. Recently, some North Koreans have said that they decided to defect to the South for a better quality of life and better education for their children after watching South-made TV dramas. Nonetheless, the North’s regime is only intent on suppressing the people’s desire for change and stopping the flow of information across the world’s most tightly shut borders in the era of information. Extreme measures taken to justify the hereditary transfer of power  The current situation, in which the North’s people are turning their backs on the regime, leads one to one doubt the efficacy of the efforts to get the North Korean people to idolize Kim Jong-un. The regime has to push ahead with the hereditary transfer of power under such an unfavorable structural environment. The ongoing power transfer process appears to be facing a dilemma, as it is difficult for any type of political power to take root among people who are turning their backs on the leadership.  If the people continue to turn a cold shoulder to the regime with no expectations whatsoever regarding the hereditary transfer of power, and if such a situation deteriorates further, the regime will find it difficult to resist the appeal of taking extreme measures to settle the entire situation all at once. The North’s sinking of the South’s naval vessel ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772) in March 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo Island in November 2010 may have been designed to consolidate internal solidarity by turning the attention of the discontented people to the outside and linking it with an effort to justify the hereditary transfer of power. The recent large-scale island-occupation maneuvers carried out by North Korean troops recently may be a sign of plans for another provocative action against the South.  A more serious problem is that time is not on the side of the North, which continues to reiterate the slogan of the construction of a strong country by 2012. Even the people who are on the market to sell anything in their hands to get something they need are asked to contribute funds to construct a strong country. In such a dire situation, the leadership is likely to perpetrate “a bigger act” out of its obsession with showing something wonderful to the people by the “year of promise.” In other words, “time bomb”-like situations are being provoked here and there to justify the hereditary transfer of power to the people. That being the case, those in the South need to deal wisely with the risk factors created by the North’s ongoing transfer of power and public sentiment towards it.Winning the hearts of North Koreans  The South’s Government should positively review the need to provide food to the starving people in the North on condition of having it monitored by international organizations lest it should be diverted to other purposes. It is not desirable to stick to the strict principle of reciprocity, as we need to approach the matter from a humanistic perspective and to win the hearts of North Koreans. It is also necessary to consider restoring the inter-Korea economic collaboration in the private sector by stages. Our unification policy should start with an effort to cope flexibly with the flow of changes made among the people in the North, despite the succession of the North’s repressive rule.  It will not be easy for the Southern Government to take a consistent attitude toward the North’s regime, which has refused to apologize for the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772) and the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo Island, and its starving people. However, it is by no means desirable to merely watch with folded arms the North Koreans’ miserable situation or the subordination of the North’s economy to China amid the extremely tense situation between the two Koreas.  Inter-Korean economic collaboration should not be viewed merely from a viewpoint associated with the need to confirm the economic collaboration between the North and China. Inter-Korean economic collaboration is useful at least in connection with the need to obtain leverage against the North. It is necessary to build up strategic wisdom in a way that gives hope to the people in the North and promotes their feelings of brotherly affection for the South through the provision of humanitarian support.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* CHIN Haeng-Nam earned a Ph.D. in journalism from Kyunghee University. He specializes in research on the East Asian cultural network, inter-Korean relations, multipartite cooperation among countries in East Asia, Hallyu (Korean Wave), and cultural community, etc.

The largest summit ever held in Korea  The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, which is scheduled to take place on March 26~27, 2012, will be the largest summit ever held in Korea, involving the participation of more than fifty heads of state and the representatives of numerous international organizations. The Government launched the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Preparation and Planning Corps, headed by the Foreign Minister, in March 2011, in addition to the committee, headed by the Prime Minister, formed to organize the event.  As the host country, the South Korean Government is coordinating the agenda to be discussed at the event through the official channels for organization of the summit, such as the Sherpa Meeting and the Sous-Sherpa Meeting, and is playing a leading role in drafting the wording of the conclusion of the event. At the Sherpa Meeting, to be held in Helsinki, Finland on October 4/5, with South Korea presiding, attendees will discuss how to draft the Seoul Communique to be adopted at the end of the Seoul Summit.Serious threats of nuclear/radioactive terrorism and importance of the Nuclear Security Summit  The terms “nuclear security” and the “Nuclear Security Summit” may sound unfamiliar to lay people. Indeed, for many people, the term “nuclear security” may conjure up images of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear arms, or the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran. However, nuclear security is a concept associated with nuclear terrorism. In short, the Nuclear Security Summit is a meeting for discussion of the measures to be taken by countries and ways of promoting international collaboration to prevent nuclear/radioactive terrorism and to protect nuclear/radioactive materials and the relevant facilities from terrorists and criminals.  The Nuclear Security Summit is important because the threat of nuclear/radioactive terrorism faced by the international community is more serious than it appears. It is not easy for terrorists to obtain nuclear weapons or highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, which can be used to make nuclear weapons, but various incidents have occurred one after another concerning the management of nuclear materials. One such incident involved intrusion into an HEU storage facility by a group of armed people in another incident a civilian broke into the security system of a military facility. Cases associated with the illicit transaction of nuclear materials are occurring every year. Between 1993 and 2010, a total of 33 cases involving the illicit possession, transaction, or theft of HEU or plutonium were reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  No less dangerous than nuclear terrorism is the threat of so-called dirty bombs, which use lethal radioactive materials such as cesium. As radioactive materials are widely used in medical institutions, colleges, research institutes, and business facilities and can easily be turned into weapons, the possibility of radioactive terrorism is much higher than that of nuclear terrorism, although the magnitude of the destruction caused would be considerably smaller. As shown by the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident last March, the fear felt by people about being exposed to radiation is no less than that of nuclear terrorism. According to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), more than 150 cases of illicit possession, smuggling, or theft of radioactive materials and nuclear materials have been reported every year since 2005, and more than three-quarters of them are related to radioactive materials.  Considering the foregoing, there is every possibility that terrorists could obtain weapon-class nuclear materials and detonate a weapon in a large city, attack a nuclear facility, such as a power plant, or explode a dirty bomb, using radioactive materials. The level of nuclear/radioactive material-related terrorism threats felt will differ from country to country. However, no one will deny that it should be a common concern of the international community to take preventive measures against nuclear/radioactive material terrorism, when we think of the potentially disastrous outcome of a nuclear/radioactive terrorist attack in this era of globalization in which countries rely on each other more heavily than ever before. Especially, Koreans should note that the country, which relies heavily on outside sources for its economy and politics, is likely to be affected seriously in the event of an act of nuclear terrorism and that is the reason why we should attach importance to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. Major objectives of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit  As the host country, the South Korean Government aims to achieve the following major objectives in terms of substance:  First of all, the Government will strive to make the event a meeting that contributes to the goal of “a world free from nuclear/radioactive terrorism,” which is a major issue related to international security in the post-Cold War period, by presenting realistic objectives and measures for their implementation. (The objectives and implementation measures will be included in the Seoul Communique.) The first Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington DC at the proposal of U.S. President Barrack Obama in April 2010 was primarily declarative in nature, as it presented the basic principles of and directions for nuclear security. In comparison, the Seoul Summit will have significance as an event which aims to move towards putting such declarations into practice.  Second, the Seoul Summit will set up nuclear security-related norms solidly by expanding the scope of discussion, while duly dealing with such issues as countermeasures to nuclear terrorism, the protection of nuclear materials and facilities, and the prevention of illicit transactions of nuclear materials, which were the basic subjects of the Washington DC event. In connection with nuclear safety, which became the focus of worldwide attention following the Fukushima accident, the Seoul Summit will encourage attendees to discuss what synergies nuclear security and safety could have for the prevention of nuclear/radioactive terrorism without blurring the focus of the discussion about nuclear security. The Seoul event will also provide a venue for in-depth discussion about ways of collaboration to protect radioactive materials, concerning which insufficient discussions were held at the Washington DC event. The safe management of weapon-class nuclear materials, i.e. HEU and plutonium, which was the focus of attention at the Washington DC event, will also be a key subject at the Seoul Summit, but we will see to it that the issue of protecting radioactive materials is also dealt with importantly through consultation with other participating countries, as the threat of radioactive terrorism is no less dangerous than that of nuclear terrorism, as stated in the foregoing.  Third, for preventive efforts concerning nuclear terrorism to be effective, it is important that each participating country take measures to step up its level of nuclear security, in addition to ensuring that the Summit’s resultant document is adopted. As the host country, the South Korean Government will do what it can to make the Seoul Summit a fruitful event by encouraging the participating countries to announce voluntary promises about meaningful nuclear security-related measures, such as eliminating HEU, joining the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which are the two leading nuclear security-related conventions, contributing to the IAEA´s Nuclear Security Fund, and establishing nuclear security education/training centers. The South Korean Government is also considering taking measures conducive to the said objectives. Conclusion  An important event like the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul testifies to the enhanced status of South Korea in the international community. It may be said to be a result of the international community’s recognition of the significance of the country, which has held fast to the principle of non-nuclear proliferation even under the nuclear threat from the North and set an example of peaceful use of nuclear power as a nuclear powerhouse.  The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit will go a long way towards developing South Korea as a mature country, as the G20 Seoul Summit did and as the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness Busan 2011 will. It will also serve as a precious occasion that will help Koreans to enhance their globalization insight and capability as well as instilling a sense of pride in future generations.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* PAIK Ji-ah is Director-General for International Organizations Bureau at the MOFAT. He graduated from the International Relations Major, Seoul National University and obtained a Master’s degree from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). After joining MOFAT in 1985, he served as the Consulate General in New York, and as an official at the South Korean Mission to the UN and at the South Korean Embassies in Thailand, Geneva, and Malaysia. At the MOFAT headquarters in Seoul, he served as an officer in charge of collaboration with international organizations and an ambassador in charge of childbirth and aging society-related problems.

  The US-China Summit, which was held at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, became the focus of worldwide attention. At the meeting, the leaders of the two countries presented a new vision of the bilateral relationship using such phrases as "mutual respect" and "collaboration" and "the construction of a mutually beneficial partnership." Indeed, such terms emerged as summit keywords and characterized the meeting in the press. Since the beginning of 2010, following President Barack Obama's visit to China in 2009, the US and China have conflicted with each other over a series of issues including the US sale of weapons to Taiwan, President Obama's personal meeting with Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, the US position on China's claim to islands in the South/East China Sea, the sinking of the South Korean navy ship ROKS Cheonan, North Korea's shelling of the South Korean island Yeonpyeongdo, and US demands for monetary appreciation of the Chinese Yuan and the release of Chinese political prisoners along with Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo. International observers even expressed concern over the possibility of a  new cold war era due to the souring of the relationship between the two countries. The Summit went a long way toward mitigating such concern and showed that the relationship between the US and China was returning to one of mutual collaboration. It is noteworthy that in the joint statement released after the summit, the United States reiterated that it "welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs" and China said it "welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region," thus displaying a spirit of mutual respect. Following the sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010, the two countries became embroiled in conflict amid the competition for greater influence in East Asia, which saw China trying to expand its regional sphere of influence and the US fighting to recover its traditional influence in the region. The Summit showed that the two countries were willing to meet halfway, with each regarding the other as a necessary partner. To summarize, the summit showed that both countries believe the rivalry for influence in the region will go nowhere towards their respective national interests. China should continue to build up its strength as a superpower, a process which requires collaboration with the US both realistically and strategically. For China, regime stability has emerged as one of the most important issues in connection with the forthcoming wholesale switch of power to the fifth generation of leaders in 2012. The US also needs to maintain a collaborative relationship with China, as it has a mountain of problems to resolve including Afghanistan, Iran and the recovery of the domestic economy. It can also be said that the current reality of international politics was reflected at the summit. The possibility has weakened of maintaining the international order under the leadership of a single superpower following the global financial crisis that started in 2008, while a new sense of international multilateralism led by the G2 or G20 has emerged as an alternative global governance structure. The two countries appear to have accepted that it will be difficult, realistically, for any single country to monopolize the position of leader in the international system. In other words, they appear to have accepted that they should inevitably recognize each others' status and cooperate in a grander context, although they will inevitably compete and come into conflict over individual issues from time to time. A Collaborative Relationship Hardly Guarantees Stability Still, it remains debatable whether the two countries can continue to be optimistic about their bilateral relationship Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi appraised Hu Jintao's recent visit to the US as "a trip that explored a new phase in the relationship of collaborative partnership." One can read the painstaking effort made by the two countries to show that they have reached agreement on a considerable number of areas as stated in the joint statement comprising 41 items in 6 sections. Meantime, a closer look into the contents of the joint statement shows that the controversial points that caused conflict between the two countries in 2010 remain unresolved. The two countries failed to hide the fact that they hold different views on such issues as human rights in China, Taiwan, and Tibet. In his speech in Washington DC, Chinese President Hu Jintao referred to matters related to Taiwan and Tibet as matters of Chinese territorial integrity and a "core interest" and as having to do with the sentiment of China’s 1.3 billion people. Concerning the US's demand for the appreciation of the Chinese currency, it appears that China assuaged US complaints with an offer to import USD 45 billion worth of US goods. They also appear to have reached an agreement on North Korea's nuclear program in principle, but failed to present a new, workable solution. It is not clear whether the two countries succeeded in drawing up a blueprint for the future world order at the summit despite the visions presented in the form of diplomatic rhetoric. It is thought that the two leaders met halfway, seeking common ground despite their differences, due to their respective political needs to conclude the summit successfully. Mr. Hu Jintao needed to reinforce the legitimacy and stability of the leadership of his country in connection with his forthcoming step-down as Chinese President in 2012, by reminding the world that China is emerging as a power equal to the US. President Barack Obama also needed an appraisal to the effect that the economic concessions he won from China have helped the country to extricate itself from the economic recession in connection with his forthcoming reelection campaign. Following the Summit, the two countries will move on to the path of a collaborative relationship, leaving their conflicts behind. However, it is difficult to predict whether their relationship will remain stable despite collaboration. The bilateral relationship is developing as something both vital and complex, as stated in the joint statement. Unlike the bipolar system between the US and the USSR during the Cold War era, the current relationship between the US and China is developing in such a way that their interdependence is increasing, with more incentives for mutual collaboration, but at the same time the bilateral relationship contains issues that may lead to sentiments of competition, conflict or even confrontation. The recent Summit also revealed another aspect of the complex relationship between the two countries: It is highly likely that the bilateral relationship will go through phases of competition, conflict and collaboration in the future, with the complex factors interacting among each other. Something that causes concern among Koreans is that a potential inability to accurately grasp the complexity of the relationship between the US and China may deliver an unexpected, devastating jolt as they wake up to the fact that their country has a vulnerable security structure and an easy-to-split domestic political topography. The summit dealt extraordinarily with the Korean Peninsula issue as a core item of the agenda. In addition, the two countries reached a compromise in a greater context on the Korean Peninsula issue, unlike on other controversial issues. They expressed concern over the heightened tension on the peninsula triggered by recent developments, and agreed that the critical importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula called for necessary steps to be taken that would allow for resumption of the Six-Party Talks process and sincere and constructive inter-Korea dialogue. In that process China agreed to include the concern over North Korea's uranium enrichment program (UEP) in the joint statement. The US even added that the expression of such concern in the joint statement laid the basis for South Korea to return to the inter-Korea talks and that the two Korea's recent agreement on the high-level military talks was an important result of the US-China Summit. It is not difficult to find traces of a give-and-take type compromise they made in connection with the need to have the two Koreas return to the inter-Korea dialogue and the Six-Party Talks. Implications of the US-China Summit We Koreans need to draw some important diplomatic lessons from and understand the implications of this summit. First, there is a greater possibility that the destiny of the Korean Peninsula may be left to the conflicts and compromises made between the US and China, regardless of what Koreans themselves really want. And we can see that basically neither of the two big countries want to see an abrupt change in the situation or further instability concerning the Korean Peninsula. The joint statement shows that the two countries are aware of the possibility that their bilateral relationship could deteriorate due to the Korean Peninsula issue. It indicates that, ultimately, China's relative influence on the Korean Peninsula issue will increase, whereas Koreans' say in issues that will determine their destiny may well decrease. In the wake of the Cheonan incident, we Koreans could not help but watch the way in which the situation on the Korean Peninsula rapidly developed into a conflict between the US and China. We should learn a sharp lesson from the fact that we had no choice but to agree to dialogue with the North in accordance with the outcome of the compromise made between the US and China. We must realize that we need to secure our own position on the Korean Peninsula issue, keeping in mind that no issue is more important than this one with regard to our own future, with the aim of minimizing the impact of the relationship between the super powers on the peninsula and of realizing the ultimate task of unification of the homeland. Concerning the forthcoming resumption of dialogue with the North, we need to bear such a lesson in mind in making well-knit preparations for dialogue and play a leading role in formulating progressive agenda items that can be effective in finding a solution to the Korean Peninsula issue. Mr. Lee is a professor in the Department of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University, South Korea. Mr. Lee's publication includes "China's policy and influence on the North Korea nuclear issue: Denuclearization and/or stabilization of the Korean peninsula?" The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.22, No.2 (June 2010),『New Areas in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy』(Nanam, 2008), and『China's Territorial Dispute』(Northeast Asian Foundation 2008). Mr. Lee received his Ph. D. in political science from Peking University, the PRC in 1996.

[편집자 註] 대규모 자연재해에 대처하는 국제협력에서 한국의 역할과 전략은 무엇이 되어야 하나? 하규만 인제대학교 외래교수는 작년 9월 JPI PeaceNet 기고문을 통해 자연재해와 관련된 국제협력에서 발견되는 문제점들을 지적하고 그에 대한 해결책을 제시하였다. 일본 도호쿠 대지진을 계기로 하규만 교수의 기고문을 재발송한다. 자연재해 국제협력에서 바람직한 한국의 역할과 전략에 대하여 다시 생각해 보는 기회가 되기를 기대한다.  최근에 발생한 아이티 지진, 파키스탄 풍수해 등에서 알 수 있듯이 대규모 자연재해는 피해가 거대한 지역에 미치기 때문에 재해관리를 위해서 국제협력이 반드시 필요하다. 예를 들어서 태풍이 특정국을 강타하는 경우에 다수의 주변국에도 비슷한 피해가 발생하기 때문에 자연재해의 발생 이전, 발생 기간 중, 그리고 발생 이후에도 국제협력을 추진할 필요가 있다.  자연재해 관리는 민간단체에서 시도하는 경우도 있지만 그 성격상 공공재이기 때문에 국가기관에서 총괄적인 책임을 맡고 있다. 우리나라의 경우에는 행정안전부 산하의 소방방재청이 관련된 업무를 총괄하고 있다. 소방방재청이 2004년 6월에 설립될 즈음에는 국제협력 업무가 매우 미비하였다. 어느 조직이든 설립 초창기에는 국제협력 보다는 국내적 역량강화에 집중을 하기 때문이다. 그러나 6년이 지난 지금 우리나라는 소방방재청이 주축이 되어 외교통상부가 협조하는 가운데 자연재해와 관련한 국제적 교류를 활발히 하고 있다. 예를 들면 최근에 소방방재청은 중국 쓰촨성 지진복구에 원조팀을 파견하였고, ‘제4차 유엔 재해경감 아시아 각료회의’를 국내에 유치하는 등 활발한 활동을 보이고 있다. 자연재해와 관련하여 우리 정부가 국제사회에 기부하는 액수도, 우리의 경제위상에 비해 아직도 미비하다는 국제사회의 평가도 있지만 그래도 최근에는 많은 증가를 하고 있는 상황이다. 이와 같은 활동과 노력에도 불구하고 자연재해와 국제협력에 관련하여 우리 정부는, 특히 소방방재청은 다수의 문제점을 보이고 있다. 그 중에서 거시적 차원의 문제를 다섯 가지를 소개하고 해결책을 제시해 보겠다.  첫째, 자연재해와 관련하여 우리나라는 주로 아시아 국가들과 협력을 시도하고 있다. 예를 들어서 소방방재청은 중국, 몽고, 일본, 동남아시아에 위치한 국가들과 국제협력을 서두르고 있다. 최근에 자연재해의 피해가 직접 발생하였던 중국과 몽고의 경우에 소방방재청은 지원팀을 파견하였고 현장에서 재난복구를 시도하였다. 중국의 경우에는 지진 발생 후에 구조구급팀을 파견하였고, 몽고의 경우에는 황사현상을 감소시키는 노력을 공동으로 기울였다. 자연재해가 직접적으로 발생하지 않는 이웃국가들과도 평상시에 합동세미나, 공동회의, 재난관리자 훈련, 재난관리 관련자 초청 등을 통하여 국제협력을 시도하고 있다.  이러한 경우에 이웃한 국가들과는 국제협력상 큰 문제가 발생하지 않고 있다. 국제협력에 동참한 이웃한 국가들은 우리나라의 원조에 대하여 감사를 표시하고 있기 때문이다. 그러나 우리나라는 멀리 위치한 국가들과의 국제협력을 소홀히 여기는 경향을 보이고 있다. 예를 들어서 최근에 아이티와 칠레에서 치명적인 지진피해가 발생하였는데 기부액을 포함한 우리의 국제협력이 미비한 것으로 지적이 되고 있다. 우리나라와는 달리 중국의 경우에는 아이티 공항에 비행기가 착륙하기 어려웠음에도 불구하고 대규모의 원조팀을 파견하면서 국제협력을 시도하였다. 당연히 아이티와 특히 미국의 언론에서 중국의 원조를 칭송하기에 이르렀다. 이러한 관점에서 앞으로 멀리 위치한 국가들에게도 국제협력을 시도해야 할 것이다. 왜냐하면 그것이 장기적 관점에서 재난관리 측면뿐만 아니라 국가차원의 실익 확장에 기초가 되어서 긍정적 파급효과를 가져오기 때문이다.  둘째, 우리나라는 자연재해와 관련한 국제협력을 시도하는 경우에 주로 정부기관 및 정부 인사들이 주축이 되어서 활동을 전개하고 있다. 예를 들어 소방방재청이 자연재해에 관련한 국제협력을 하는 경우를 분석해 보면 거의가 공무원 위주로 활동이 전개되고 있다. 간헐적으로 민간인이 동반되는 경우가 있지만 이러한 경우는 민간인이 개인적으로 그리고 자기조직의 재정지원으로 공무원들과 형식적으로만 동반하여 국제협력을 하는 경우이다.민간기관이나 민간인들은 업무수행능력에 한계가 있기 때문에 자연재해와 관련된 국제협력을 시도하는데 매우 큰 장애를 가지고 있다. 특히 국제협력은 경비가 비교적 많이 들기 때문에 작은 규모의 민간단체가 시도하기에는 어려움이 많은 것이 사실이다. 그러나 이들 중에서도 인류애에 기초하여 국제협력을 하고자 하는 열망을 가진 단체와 개인들이 많이 존재하고 있다. 특히 우리의 1인당 국민소득이 2만 불을 상회하는 요즘에는 이러한 국제협력 희망자들이 더욱 늘어나고 있다. 이러한 사실에 기초하여 우리 정부는 국제협력을 시도하는 경우에 정부기관뿐만 아니라 민간단체와 함께 국제협력을 시도해야 할 것이다. 특히 한국 적십자사나 기타 중요한 NGO의 경우에는 전 세계적으로 거대한 조직을 보유하고 있기 때문에 이러한 민간단체들과 함께 국제협력을 시도하는 것이 정부의 목적달성에 보다 용이할 것이다.  셋째, 우리나라는 국제협력을 시도하는 경우에 현직에 있는 인적자원만 활용하는 경향을 보이고 있다. 예를 들어서 주변국가 및 기타지역의 국가들과 국제협력을 시도하는 경우에 거의 모든 인원들이 현직에 종사하는 사람들로 구성이 되었다. 인적자원 활용의 폭이 매우 좁은 경우이다.  이러한 경우에 현직에서 물러났지만 국제적으로 중량감이 높은 인사를 동반하여 국제협력을 시도하는 것이 바람직하다. 왜냐하면 퇴직인사들도 국제사회에 공헌하고 싶어 하는 열망을 가지고 있으며, 특히 국제사회에서 여전히 영향력을 보유하고 있는 인사는 우리 나라의의 국제협력 효과를 배가시킬 수 있기 때문이다. 구체적으로 전임 대통령, 전임 국무총리, 전임 국회의장, 전임 대법원장 등을 활용하는 국제협력을 시도할 필요가 있다. 이들은 현직에서 물러났지만 전직 정치인 및 고위공무원으로서 국제사회에서 여전히 잠재적인 효과를 지니고 있다. 미국의 경우에 국제적으로 재난이 발생하였을 경우에 전임 대통령을 활용하는 경우가 매우 빈번하다. 이러한 점을 고려하여 소방방재청은 급박한 자연재해가 발생하는 경우에 특히 전임 대통령을 효과적으로 활용하는 방안을 마련해야 할 것이다.  넷째, 소방방재청의 경우 형식적으로나 실질적으로 이웃한 국가들과 국제협력은 서두르고 있으나 북한과의 국제협력은 거의 없는 것이 현실정이다. 북한과의 협력은 통일부가 총괄하고 있기 때문이다. 그러나 대부분의 자연재해는 남한에서 발생하는 경우에 북한에서도 발생하여 큰 피해를 야기시키고 있다. 하지만 북한과의 국제협력은 거의 없는 경우이다.  여러 가지 정치적 이유로 인하여 자연재해에 관하여 북한과의 국제협력이 불가능하다고 하더라도 정부는, 특히 소방방재청은 미래지향적인 차원에서 북한의 자연재해에 관하여 최소한 관련연구를 시도하는 것이 필요할 것이다. 이러한 연구결과는 통일이 되는 경우를 대비해서라도 필요한 지식자원이 될 것이다. 북한 자연재해 연구를 전담하는 팀을 새롭게 두기 보다는 기존인력과 조직으로 하여금 지금 하고 있는 연구에서 북한과의 연계성도 고려하는 연구를 하게끔 해야 할 것이다. 그것이 국제협력의 차원에서 미래지향적인 효과를 도출할 수 있을 것이다.다섯째, 우리나라가 외국에서 자연재해에 관련된 원조를 시도하는 경우에 언론매체가 이것을 보도하고 있지만 거의가 국내의 언론매체이다. 이는 국민의 세금으로 시도되는 국제협력이 안방잔치로만 끝나는 경우이다. 자연재해와 관련하여 국제협력을 시도하는 목적은 인류애에 기초하여 인명과 재산상의 손실을 감소시키려는 것이다. 하지만 다른 측면에서는 국제협력을 통하여 우리나라의 위상을 강화하려는 의도도 분명하게 존재하고 있다. 따라서 국내홍보용으로만 시도되는 국제협력은 재고할 필요가 한다.  우리 정부는 자연재해가 발생하는 지역에서 국제협력을 시도하면서 국가를 홍보하는 전략을 대폭적으로 강화해야만 할 것이다. 아이티에 지진이 발생하였던 경우에 중국은 원조팀이 아이티 공항에 도착하자마자 대형 오성기를 선두에서 들고 나가면서 아이티 원조의 구호를 외친 것으로 외신이 보도하고 있다. 또한 아이티 원조의 가장 큰 축을 담당한 미국의 경우에는 모든 주요방송사들이 아이티로 옮겨와 뉴스 프로그램을 진행하면서 미국 정부의 원조노력을 전하기도 하였다. 현재에도 파키스탄에 대규모 홍수복구를 시도하면서 미국홍보를 노리고 있다. 우리 정부도 중국과 미국의 이러한 전략을 분석하여 외국에서 자연재해가 발생하는 경우에 보다 적극적으로 우리의 노력을 국제적으로 알리려는 전략을 강화해야만 할 것이다. 이러한 전략은 소방방재청의 노력은 물론이고 외교통상부, 외국 언론사와의 사전협의에 기초해야만 가능할 것이다.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* 하규만인제대학원대학교 외래교수

 1985년경 필자가 요덕 정치범수용소에서 수감생활을 할 때 남한에서 보내는 풍선을 처음 접했던 기억은 지금도 잊을 수 없다. 갑자기 요덕 수용소 상공에 기구 모양의 대형풍선과 거기에 달린 네모난 형태의 지함이 터지면서 전단(‘삐라’)과 함께 여러 가지 물건들이 쏟아져 내렸다. 요덕 수용소 일대는 전단으로 덮였고 각종 내의류와 영양제, 육포, 라면 등 먹을 것들은 정치범들의 눈을 놀라게 했다. 이들 전단은 비도 젖지 않고 불도 붙지 않으며, 찢어지지도 않는 특수 비닐로 제작된 컬러 형태의 전단지였다.북한 체제 자체가 워낙 폐쇄된 상황인데다 수용소는 그야말로 외부와의 모든 것이 단절된 곳으로 정치범들에게는 외부의 정보는 고사하고 북한 내에서 벌어지고 있는 일조차 알 수 없었다. 그들에게 전단은 전율을 느끼게 하는 하나의 무기였고 외부와의 소식이 전달되는 유일한 수단이기도 했다. 정치범들은 남한에서 수용소가 있다는 사실을 알고 있다는 그 자체가 위안이 됐고 힘이 됐지만 국가보위부 요원들에게는 외부에서 날아오는 전단은 심각한 위협이 됐다.1987년 요덕 수용소를 출소한 이후에도 남한에서 보내오는 전단을 지속적으로 보게 됐다. 1990년 초 요덕군 읍광장에서 수천 명의 주민들이 집회를 하고 있었는데 그 위로 전단이 살포됐다. 당시 광장은 아수라장이 됐고 그 속에서 많은 젊은이들이 전단의 내용을 보느라 정신이 없었다. 국가보위부는 전단을 모두 수거하기 위해 주민들을 모두 철수시켰다. 당시 동구권 유학생들이 대거 남한으로 탈출한 사실이 전단으로 알려져 북한사회는 큰 충격을 받고 있었다.전단지의 효과북한은 극단적인 정보통제 국가로 라디오를 비롯한 일체 외부 소식을 접하는 행위 자체가 국가반역 행위로 규정돼 있다. 특히 김일성이나 김정일 등 김씨 왕조를 비판하거나 거론하는 것 자체가 죽을죄이기 때문에 북한 내에서는 김씨 왕조에 대한 그 어떤 비판적인 것을 본다는 것 자체가 충격이다. 동네 반정부 인사들이 개별적으로 낙서하거나 자그마한 전단 한 장이 붙어도 국가보위부는 총 비상 상태에 직면하게 된다.북한주민들이 전단을 보면서 가장 크게 충격을 받는 것은 첫째, 일체 거론할 수 없는 김씨 왕조에 대한 전면적 비판을 전단을 통해 한다는 것 자체가 엄청난 충격이다. 특히 김정일에 대한 사생활은 젊은 군인들에게는 충격 그 자체다. 그 많은 부인들과 화려한 음식들, 온갖 악행들이 적나라하게 알려지는 것은 김정일을 떠받들고 있는 군대가 김정일을 불신하게 하는 결정적 역할을 하게 된다. 둘째, 철저한 주민감시와 통제로 집단행동이 불가능한 북한 내부에서 주민들이 김씨 왕조를 반대해 들고 일어날 수 있는 분위기를 만들어주고 있기 때문에 정권에는 큰 위협이 될 수밖에 없다.1997년 출범한 김대중 정부는 북한의 김정일로부터 대북 심리전을 중단해야만 모든 남북관계를 개선할 수 있다는 제안을 받고 전단 살포를 중단하게 되는데 이는 무너져가던 북한체제를 살려주는데 결정적 역할을 했다고 볼 수 있다. 당시 전단 살포는 내륙의 수용소들에 집중되다가 평양으로 옮겨갔고, 1994년경 이후부터는 휴전선 일대에 집중적으로 살포됐다. 당시 북한은 식량난으로 휴전선 일대의 정규군단에도 식량공급이 제대로 안 돼 사실상 군대는 와해상태에 직면했었다. 그 어려운 상황 속에서 뿌려진 전단지와 식품은 북한이 자랑하는 사상적 무기를 와해시키는 결정적 역할을 하게 됐다.외부 정보와 단절돼 있던 휴전선 군단의 인민군 병사들은 남쪽에서 날아오는 전단지를 보며 체제에 분노할 수밖에 없었다. 경제적 위기 속에서 체제 붕괴에 직면했던 김정일 정권은 김대중 정부의 대북 심리전 중단으로 기사회생할 기회를 얻게 됐다.이명박 정부 이후 북한의 대남전략 변화북한은 이명박 정권 등장을 막기 위해 대남공작부서를 총동원해 한국 좌파가 집권하도록 도왔지만 결국 실패하자 한동안 충격에 빠졌고 그 이후 북한의 대남전략은 이명박 정권을 흔들고 5년 후 다시 친북적인 정권을 세우는 목표를 세우게 된다.북한은 핵실험과 미사일 발사 등을 통해 강성대국 완성을 위해 전력하면서 대남협박을 강화하게 되는데 결국 대북지원이 중단되고 국제적 고립을 자처하는 결과를 가져오게 된다. 북한당국은 지난 10년간 한국 정부의 대북지원에 도취돼 과거 10년 대아사 시절을 망각했고, 체제를 개혁하지 않고 버틸 수 있는 모든 시간과 에너지를 낭비함으로서 결국 똑같은 위기에 직면하고 있다. 북한의 이런 위기는 천안함 폭침과 연평도 도발 이후 한국 정부까지 가세한 대북 심리전이 시작되면서 걷잡을 수없는 사태에 이르고 있다.탈북자들이 한국 정부가 중단한 전단지 살포를 시작하게 된 것은 2003년부터다. 당시 노무현 정부는 2003년 유엔인권위가 상정한 북한 인권결의안에 기권하면서 탈북자들은 분노하게 됐고, 당시 탈북자들은 북한인권 단체를 결성하면서 전단지 살포와 같은 행동으로 넘어가게 됐다. 탈북 과학자 이민복씨와 박상학씨가 주축이된 전단지 살포는 원시적인 풍선에 의한 적은 규모의 전단 살포였지만 국민들의 지속적 관심이 높아지면서 상당한 규모로 발전하면서 북한 정권을 위협하기 시작했다. 북한당국은 군부를 동원해 탈북자들을 원색적으로 비난하며 전단지 살포에 극단적인 반응을 보이고 있다.이명박 정부 들어서 남북관계를 고려해 탈북자들의 전단지 살포에 대해 자제시키는 방향에서 넘어가려고 했지만 결국 북한은 천안함을 폭침시키고 연평도 도발까지 자행하면서 그에 대한 보복수단으로 대북 심리전 무기를 사용하지 않을 수 없게 만들었다. 1997년 김대중 정부 이전처럼 정부가 직접 나서서 대북 심리전을 재개할 경우 민간에서 하는 것보다 상상할 수 없는 위력이 나타날 수 있다. 일단 기구가 정교해지고 전단지 내용이나 물품 살포 등도 막대한 예산이 소요되는 것만큼 민간이 하기에는 사실 벅찬 사업이다.3대 세습 단행 이후 체제 급변사태 가능성2009년 11월 단행한 화폐개혁은 체제를 혼란 속에 몰아넣었고 시장이 무너지면서 시장상인들은 물론 국영기업소와 국가기관 외화벌이 회사들까지 모두 무너지는 결과로 이어졌다. 여기에 대외적인 압력이 가시화되면서 이중 삼중의 압력에 직면한 북한은 작년 태풍 콘파스에 의해 황해도 곡창지역의 농사까지 망치면서 식량난은 극에 달하고 있다.이런 와중에 단행한 2010년 9월 당(黨)대표자회는 체제 혼란을 가중시키고 있다. 무리하게 28세의 김정은과 김정일의 여동생 김경희 등이 인민군대 대장 칭호를 받자 군인들의 웃음거리가 되고 있다. 3대 세습은 명백한 봉건주의로의 회귀이기 때문에 인민군 병사들조차도 3대 세습을 경멸할 수밖에 없는 상황이다. 인민군대의 구호가 ‘인민을 위해 복무함’에서 ‘수령결사옹위 총폭탄이 되자’로 바뀌었고 인민의 군대에서 김정일의 군대로 공식화됐다.이 모든 것은 군대에 배급이라도 제대로 주면서 떠들면 괜찮겠지만 식량난에 군인들이 굶주림에 노출되면서 당국의 선전은 전혀 먹혀들지 않고 있다. 탈영병이 급증하고 10년 전처럼 영양실조 군인들이 창궐하면서 대북 심리전은 그 효과가 엄청나게 커지고 있다. 탈북자들이 보내는 전단지에 이어 정부차원에서 전단지 살포가 시작되자 북한은 군부의 이름을 빌어 전단 살포 근거지에 대한 조준사격 위협까지 가하고 있다.이집트에 이어 북한과 가장 유사한 독재국가인 리비아의 카다피 정권이 붕괴위기에 내몰리며 김정일 정권은 극도의 위기감에 내몰리고 있다. 특히 리비아 군부가 카다피가 아닌 인민의 편에 돌아서면서 카다피의 친위대가 인민들을 향해 무차별 살상을 벌이는 소식이 북한 내부에 전해질 경우 그 파장 역시 만만치 않을 것이다. 앞으로 벌어질 북한의 변화 중심에 인민군이 서게 되고 그들은 절대다수가 인민을 지지하지만 결국 김정일 정권에서 최대 호의호식했던 김정일 친위대와 호위부대가 끝까지 저항할 가능성이 높기 때문이다. 대북 심리전 수단은 김정일 정권에 대해 무력을 사용하지 않고 무너뜨릴 수 있는 강력한 무기이기 때문에 북한의 협박에 굴하지 말고 북한 군인들을 우리 편으로 돌리기 위해 전단지 살포는 더 강화해야 한다고 본다.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* 북한 정치범수용소(요덕 수용소) 10년 수감. 1992년 대한민국 입국. 한양대학교 경영학부를 졸업하고 한국전력공사 3년 근무 후 2000년 조선일보 입사(정치부 기자). 현재 조선일보 동북아연구소 연구위원과 탈북자들의 싱크탱크인 북한전략센터 대표로 활동함. 저서로 『수용소의 노래』가 있음.