The Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, which the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI) annually organizes, is an important opportunity for scholars, political leaders, diplomats, and activists from around the world to discuss current issues regarding peace, prosperity, and multilateralism; it gives our scholarly activities an important practical anchor as well as a point of reflection.
The Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, which the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI) annually organizes, is an important opportunity for scholars, political leaders, diplomats, and activists from around the world to discuss current issues regarding peace, prosperity, and multilateralism; it gives our scholarly activities an important practical anchor as well as a point of reflection.
The Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, which the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI) annually organizes, is an important opportunity for scholars, political leaders, diplomats, and activists from around the world to discuss current issues regarding peace, prosperity, and multilateralism; it gives our scholarly activities an important practical anchor as well as a point of reflection.
The Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, which the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI) annually organizes, is an important opportunity for scholars, political leaders, diplomats, and activists from around the world to discuss current issues regarding peace, prosperity, and multilateralism; it gives our scholarly activities an important practical anchor as well as a point of reflection.
This article reviews Soviet foreign policy towards Asia from 1969 to 1991. For much for the Cold War the focus of Moscow’s foreign policy agenda was actually in Europe. This was because the Soviet Union was primarily a European power, and the Soviet leaders regarded themselves as historically and culturally “European.” Moscow’s relationship with Asia was historically that of a European imperialist power, and the legacy of this experience was that the Soviets wanted to shape Asia, perhaps even to lead in Asia, but they certainly did not see themselves as a properly Asian player. They have always been on the outside looking in. Asia’s cultural “otherness” was compounded by Soviet security concerns. By the 1960s – as a result of the Sino-Soviet split – China emerged as the most significant threat to the USSR in the East. Dealing with this threat became the key preoccupation of Moscow’s Asian policy for much of the period under discussion.
This article asks whether “principled negotiation” as explained by William Ury and Roger Fischer in their classic book Getting to Yes is possible in the context of negotiations between the United States and North Korea. Answering this question leads to a description of two competing schools of interpretation among American analysts trying to explain why negotiations since the end of the Cold War have failed genres. In the end, however, it seems impossible to judge which of these schools—the comedic and the tragic—is correct. Instead, the article concludes by proposing two principles of interpretation—indeterminacy and entanglement—in place of the two.
This paper starts with the realisation that East Asia, since 1980, has been successful in preventing fatalities of organized violence compared to other regions, and compared to its performance three decades before 1980. The paper proceeds by establishing the recipes for the long peace of East Asia: non-interference, and developmental definition of state’s purposes. Once there is clarity of the East Asian recipe for peace, this paper moves to the contribution of the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity and similar forums to the East Asian strategy for peace. There the conclusion is that Forums like the JFPP can offer support to several of the elements of the East Asian peace formula. Finally, the paper will investigate whether the East Asian and Jeju recipes for peace and prosperity could offer global prescriptions. Again, the conclusion is clear. The world could learn from East Asia and Jeju: some of the recipes that Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity supports, can be found useful also to the entire world.
There are some generalizations about the end of the Cold War which are widely believed but are greatly misleading. The following five are among the most popular misinterpretations of the Cold War’s ending: (1) The Cold War ended with the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991; (2) The Reagan Administration’s military buildup forced the Soviet Union to concede defeat in the Cold War; (3) The Soviet Union’s inability to compete with the West economically left it with no option but to reform; (4) A Western ideological offensive against Communism, led by Ronald Reagan with important help from Margaret Thatcher, forced the Soviet Union to change its thinking; (5) If Mikhail Gorbachev had not been chosen as Soviet leader in March 1985, some other Soviet leader would have had to pursue similar policies and the Cold War would still have ended largely on Western terms.
As a result of the 2020 U.S. presidential election, Joe Biden of the Democratic Party will take office for the upcoming four years. Although U.S. foreign policy is expected to be more stable and predictable in the Biden administration, it is likely that its foreign policy will produce a modified U.S. global leadership, which has the features of both Trump’s America First foreign policy and the global leader of the liberal international order. Meanwhile, it is anticipated that U.S.-China relations could be more manageable in the Biden administration than it did in the Trump presidency even if U.S.-China strategic competition will persist. To maintain the strategic balance between U.S. and China, South Korea needs to pursue the ‘principled diplomacy,’ aimed at advancing its national interests based on the principles of ‘openness, transparency, and inclusiveness.’
The American government’s broad ranging efforts targeting an array of challenges to US interests posed by the policies and behavior of the Chinese government developed through close collaboration between the Trump administration and both Democrats and Republicans in the Congress. Emerging erratically in the first year of the Trump administration in late 2017, the US government’s hardening against China later demonstrated momentum in gaining greater support in the United States. It reached a high point during the heat of the 2020 presidential election campaign as the most important foreign policy issue in the campaign. South Korea has shown more angst over its vulnerability to negative fallout from the growing US-China rivalry than any other regional power. South Korea is very exposed and has few good options for dealing with the intensifying US-China rivalry. Prevailing assumptions are that a tough US policy toward China will continue in 2021 and strong Chinese retaliation will follow South Korean moves to align with the United States in the rivalry with China.